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Abstract 
 
Poverty and inequality are deeply entrenched in Kenya, with the country being one of the most 
unequal countries in the world. To eradicate poverty and inequality, enhance the achievement of 
social justice, fast-track human development, as well as to entrench participatory democracy 
and a culture of justification in governance, Kenya has, for the first time, entrenched justiciable 
socio-economic rights (SERs) in its 2010 Constitution. In this thesis, I undertake a critical 
analysis of the prospects for the implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs as 
well as the probable challenges that Kenya may face in their realisation. In this endeavour, the 
thesis develops a theoretical and interpretive approach for the realisation of these entrenched 
SERs. It entails an expansive analysis of the nature, scope, content and extent of the SERs 
entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, and especially the place of international human 
rights obligations contained in customs and ratified international human rights treaties due to the 
provisions of the 2010 Constitution which espouse the direct application of international law in 
Kenya’s domestic legal system.  
It is submitted in this thesis that in order to improve the socio-economic conditions of the 
poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups in Kenya, there is a need for their socio-economic as 
well as political empowerment to enable them to effectively take part in societal decision-making 
in both the public and private spheres with regard to resource (re)distribution. The theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism, based on the constitutionally entrenched principle of popular 
participation in governance and public decision-making, is aimed at the realisation of both 
political and socio-economic empowerment of these groups. Even though the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism underscores the importance of litigation in the achievement of the 
transformative aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution contained in the entrenched SERs, it 
acknowledges that litigation is not the panacea of SER enforcement, and that other political and 
advocacy strategies play an important role in the emancipation of the socio-economically 
deprived groups in society. The thesis thus advocates a multi-pronged strategy which espouses 
the equal participation of all sectors of society in a collaborative and cooperative deliberative 
effort aimed at the full realisation of the entrenched SERs. 
To accompany the above theoretical framework for the interpretation and 
implementation of the entrenched SERs, the thesis further proposes a transformative and 
integrated approach which combines the progressive aspects of the minimum core approach 
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and the reasonableness approach. This is an approach of purposive interpretion which, in the 
first instance, envisages the courts undertaking a strict and searching scrutiny of the SER 
implementation framework developed by the political institutions of the State to ensure that 
sufficient provision has been made for the basic necessities of the most poor and vulnerable 
groups in society, basically the espousal of a minimum core content approach. The approach 
entails the requirement that should the SER implementation framework fail to provide this basic 
minimum to vulnerable groups, and the political institutions do not provide a substantive 
justification as to the failure, then the courts should find the relevant SER implementation 
framework per se unreasonable and thus invalid. However, should the implementation 
framework provide sufficiently for the basic essentials for vulnerable groups, the courts should 
then proceed to review it using the reasonableness standards that have been developed by the 
South African Constitutional Court. The rationale for this searching analysis is the 
acknowledgement that if the needs and interests of the most indigent and marginalised in 
society are not catered for, the entire corpus of rights in the Bill of Rights becomes redundant. 
The thesis then undertakes a case study of two rights, the right to food and the right to 
housing, using the theoretical and interpretive approaches developed in the previous chapters 
of the thesis. On food security, the thesis finds that Kenya is a food insecure country with a 
declining food production capacity. This is basically due to a lack of subsidy to farmers, global 
warming leading to intermittent rainfall, lack of investment in sustainable agriculture as well as a 
fragmented and contradictory legislative and policy agenda. In response to this situation, the 
thesis proposes the adoption of a livelihoods approach to food security in Kenya, based on the 
constitutionally entrenched right to food and other supporting rights. This approach advocates 
the enhancement of the food entitlements of the different sectors of the Kenyan society to 
ensure their access to adequate and nutritious food, be it through self-production or through the 
market.  
On the right to housing, the thesis finds that housing plays a crucial role in ensuring that 
people are able to have a holistic, dignified and valuable existence. However, Kenya faces a 
dire housing situation, with the majority of Kenyans, both in rural and urban areas lacking 
adequate shelter and sanitary conditions, evidenced by the large informal settlements in urban 
areas and the squatter phenomenon in rural areas. With the entrenchment of a justiciable right 
to adequate housing in the 2010 Constitution, the study finds that several legislative and policy 
reforms are underway to improve the housing situation, with efforts being made to draft the 
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Landlord and Tenant Bill 2007, the Housing Bill 2011, the Evictions and Resettlement 
Guidelines and the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012, among others. The thesis 
proposes that these legal reforms must be undertaken within an environment of cooperative and 
collaborative strategic partnership involving all sectors of society so as to ensure that the 
housing concerns as well as interests of all are catered for.  
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
The historical divide between civil and political rights (CPRs) and socio-economic rights 
(SERs),1 evidenced by the adoption in 1966 of two different international covenants,2 has led to 
the general neglect of SERs in contradistinction to CPRs,3 with a detrimental effect on the 
overall realisation of the entire corpus of human rights.4 Commenting on the artificiality of the 
                                                            
1 Even though cultural rights are also contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), this thesis will focus only on economic and social rights. P O’Connell, 
Vindicating socio-economic rights: International standards and comparative experiences (2012) 3-6, 
defines SERs as the rights concerned with the material bases of the well-being of individuals and 
communities, that is, rights aimed at securing the basic quality of life for a particular society. They include 
the right to shelter, food, water, healthcare, education and work. These rights serve two important and 
related goals: equality of opportunity and social justice. O’Connell further emphasises that although these 
rights are relevant to all sectors of society, they are more pertinent in the protection of poor, marginalised 
and disadvantaged groups due to these groups’ material deprivation as well as their lack of political voice 
(at 5).  
2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
3 See for example the Statement to the  1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights on behalf of 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (seventh session; E/1993/22-E/C.12/1992/2, 
annex III), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/statements.htm (accessed on 26 
October 2011)  which stated that:  
States and the international community as a whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches of 
[SERs] which, if they occurred in relation to [CPRs] would provoke expressions of horror and 
outrage and would lead to concerted calls for immediate remedial action…violations of [CPRs] 
continue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently intolerable, than 
massive and direct denials of [SERs] (paras. 5 & 7). 
See also AR Chapman ‘A “violations approach” for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 26-27. 
4 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Report ‘Courts and the legal enforcement of economic, social 
and cultural rights: Comparative experience of justiciability’ (2008) 1, available at 
http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/ESCR.pdf (accessed on 3 March 2011). See also S Liebenberg Socio-
economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 35-36; UO Umozurike The African 
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separation of SERs and CPRs, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) has stated that such a divide is arbitrary and is incompatible with the principle that the 
two sets of human rights are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent.5 The CESCR has 
acknowledged that the division has curtailed the capacity of national courts to enforce SERs, 
thus leaving the most vulnerable, marginalised and disadvantaged groups in society 
unprotected.6 It has further reminded the international community that the realisation of SERs 
will not follow automatically from the enforcement of CPRs, but only through the development, 
implementation and enforcement of specific legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks 
aimed at the full realisation of SERs.7 
With the Second International Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 19938 and the 
adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action9 emphasising that rights are 
interdependent, interrelated and interconnected,10 international consciousness was re-
awakened to the importance of the fulfilment of SERs. The Conference recognised the futility 
inherent in entrenching CPRs without the corresponding SERs, skewing the overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997) 41, who avers that the greatest impediment to the 
realisation of CPRs is the illiteracy, ignorance and poverty of the populace (resulting from the non-
realisation of SERs) which makes them unable to assert their rights and free themselves from exploitative 
political regimes. 
5 CESCR, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, 
E/C.12/1998/24, para. 11, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a7079d6.html (accessed 2 
November 2011). See also C Young, Constituting economic and social rights (2012) 5-6. 
6 As above. See also R Kunnemann ‘A coherent approach to human rights’ (1995) Human Rights 
Quarterly 323, at 332, who contends that SERs are the only means of self-defence for millions of 
impoverished and marginalised individuals and groups all over the world. 
7 CESCR ‘Statement to the World Conference on Human Rights on behalf of the Committee, E/1993/22-
E/C.12/1992/2, annex III), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/statements.htm 
(accessed on 18 November 2011). 
8 Report of the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna from 14 to 25 June 1993, 
A/CONF.157/24, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/A.CONF 
(accessed 3 March 2011). 
9 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23 available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28symbol%29/a.conf.157.23.en (accessed on 3 March 
2011). 
10 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para 5. 
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implementation of human rights at the national and international level.11 In the African context, 
the interrelatedness of rights and the importance of the realisation of SERs were captured in the 
preamble to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,12 and in the incorporation of a 
catalogue of SERs on the same footing as CPRs,13 with the same implementation 
mechanisms.14 The renewed emphasis on the importance of SERs in the building of just, free, 
                                                            
11 SC Agbakwa ‘Reclaiming humanity: Economic, social and cultural rights as the cornerstone of African 
human rights’ (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177, at 180. 
12 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 17 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, preamble para 6 which provides that:  
[i]t is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that [CPRs] 
cannot be dissociated from [SERs] in their conception as well as universality and that the 
satisfaction of [SERs] is a guarantee for the enjoyment of [CPRs]. 
13 SERs are entrenched in the following provisions of the African Charter: articles 14 (right to property), 15 
(right to work), 16 (right to health), 17 (right to education), 18 (right to the protection of the family, 
women’s and children’s rights), 22 (right to economic, social and cultural development), and 24 (right to 
satisfactory environment). The SERs in the African Charter were further elaborated, with regard to 
women, in the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the SERs contained 
therein include: articles 12 (right to education and training), 13 (economic and social welfare rights which 
include employment, equal pay for equal work, freedom of choice in occupation and protection from 
exploitation, social insurance, minimum age of work and prohibition of exploitation of children), 14 (right to 
health and reproductive rights), 15 (right to food security encompassing right of access to clean drinking 
water, sources of domestic fuel, land and other means of food production), 16 (right to adequate 
housing), 17 (right to a positive cultural context), 18 (right to a healthy and sustainable environment), 19 
(right to sustainable development) and 21 (right to inheritance).  
14 See, the African Charter, article 1 which provides that ‘….parties to the present Charter shall recognise 
the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to them’. This obligation applies in relation to both CPRs and SERs, and 
mandates the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Commission), in 
accordance with articles 30 and 45 to monitor the implementation of both sets of rights. The African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, created to complement the protective mandate of the African 
Commission by the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPRIPROT (III) (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004), also has the jurisdiction to deal 
with the entire corpus of rights, including the SERs catalogued in the African Charter and the African 
Women’s Protocol. See SA Yeshanew ‘Approaches to the justiciability of economic, social and cultural 
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equal, democratic and stable societies has seen many States in the world,15 some African 
States included,16 taking steps to enhance the realisation of SERs through their entrenchment in 
constitutions as justiciable rights.17 The constitutional entrenchment of SERs has ensured the 
availability of accessible and effective domestic remedies at the national level, especially for 
countries with a system of constitutional supremacy coupled with the availability of judicial 
review.18 
On 27 August 2010, Kenya joined the small community of States19 that have thus far 
included justiciable SERs in their constitutions.20 This step is in line with General Comment 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Progress and 
perspectives’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 317, at 318ff. 
15 States with justiciable SERs in their constitutions include Germany, Portugal, Spain, and many of the 
South American States. 
16 Several African countries have entrenched justiciable SERs in their constitutions such as The 1996 
South African Constitution, 1980 Egyptian Constitution, the 1990 Constitution of Cape Verde, the 1991 
Constitution of Gabon, and the 1990 Constitution of Sao Tome and Principle. For a more elaborate 
discussion on the SER provisions in African constitutions, see DM Chirwa ‘An overview of the impact of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (2001) 7-10, available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/socio-economic-rights(accessed on 26 October 2011). 
17 See Young – Constituting SERs (n 5 above) 12-13; DA Desierto ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: 
Comparative powers, roles, and practices in the Philippines and South Africa’ (2009) 23, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485555 (accessed on 3 March 2011). 
18 S Liebenberg ‘The domestic protection of economic and social rights in domestic legal systems” in A 
Eide et al (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights, 2nd ed, (2001) 55, 57. Kenya is one such country, 
as the 2010 Constitution provides for the supremacy of the Constitution in article 2 and entrenches 
judicial review of legislative and executive acts with a plethora of available remedies as provided in article 
23(3) of the Constitution. 
19 The three phases leading to the entrenchment of SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution are similar to 
the situation leading to the entrenchment of SERs in Latin American States’ constitutions, and they are: 
first, transformation from an authoritarian to a relatively democratic political dispensation; secondly, the 
adoption of the “Washington consensus” which espoused the adoption of neo-liberal market reforms 
unsympathetic to social services and import restrictions; and thirdly, the incorporation of SERs into new or 
amended constitutions so as to bridge the gap between the requirements of public participation to 
enhance democratisation, and the emasculated economic capabilities of the majority of citizens as a 
result of liberalised markets. See DM Brinks & W Forbath ‘Commentary - Social and economic rights in 
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Number 9 of the CESCR which enshrines the idea that the primary obligation for the protection 
and realisation of human rights is the duty of States.21 The General Comment further calls on 
domestic legal orders to provide appropriate means of redress and appropriate remedies to 
aggrieved persons as well as to put in place or enhance accountability systems to ensure that 
the State’s SER obligations are fulfilled.22  This inclusion of SERs in the 2010 Constitution has 
been greeted by much optimism taking into account the Kenyan situation exemplified by a vast 
disparity in wealth distribution, socio-economic marginalisation and grinding poverty as 
discussed in section 1.2 below.23 
The pursuit of sustainable development and the enhancement of democratisation in 
Kenya are critically interlinked with the need to enhance the realisation of human rights. Due to 
the interrelatedness and interdependence of rights, for Kenya to achieve the overall realisation 
of CPRs, which was its major concern and focus in the former constitution,24 it has to build a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Latin America: Constitutional courts and the prospects for pro-poor interventions’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas 
Law Review 1943, at 1948. 
20 The justiciability of constitutionally entrenched SERs was confirmed by the South African Constitutional 
Court (SACC) in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (First Certification 
case) 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) of 4 December 1996 even though this may have direct financial and 
budgetary implications, para 78. For an elaborate analysis of the justiciability of SERs both at the national 
and international level, see M Scheinin ‘Justiciability and the indivisibility of human rights’ in J Squires, M 
Langford & B Thiele (eds.), The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and 
cultural rights (2005) 17-20. 
21 CESCR, General Comment No. 9, paras. 1 & 4. 
22 General Comment No. 9, para.2. 
23  See Brinks & Forbath (n 19 above) 1943-1944, who contend, in the context of Latin American 
Constitutions, that the reason for the inclusion of SERs in the new constitutions was ‘to match the 
democratic promise of participation in public life with a promise of participation in the material 
opportunities, public goods and social wealth of the State ...[and thus] protect [the poor, marginalised and 
vulnerable citizens] against the harshness and widening inequalities of market-based political economies’. 
24 The Bill of Rights in the 1963 Kenyan Constitution predominantly provided for the protection of CPRs, 
with the only notable SER provision being the protection of property rights in article 75. This was mainly 
inserted by the departing colonialists so as to protect their vast properties that had been acquired at the 
expense of native Kenyans. See O Opiata ‘Litigation and housing rights in Kenya’ in J Squires, M 
Langford & B Thiele (eds.), The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and 
cultural rights (2005) 155. 
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proper and stable governance foundation which depends a great deal on the fulfilment of 
SERs.25 In entrenching SERs in the 2010 Constitution as justiciable rights, the first steps 
towards the realisation of this dream of a stable governance foundation have been taken.26 The 
2010 Constitution enshrines SERs in the following articles: 21(2),27 43,28 53(1)(a)29 and (b)30 and 
                                                            
25 N Haysom ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’ (1992) 8 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 452. He further avers that for a constitution to have a meaningful place 
in the hearts and minds of citizens, and for it to have lasting resonance among them, it must address their 
pressing survival needs through the entrenchment of justiciable SERs, at 454.  
26  See J Nedelsky & C Scott ‘Constitutional dialogue’ in J Bakan & D Schneiderman (eds.) Social justice 
and the Constitution: Perspectives on a social union for Canada (1992) 59, at 59-60, who affirm that the 
entrenchment of SERs is a formal constitutional recognition of the existence of disadvantaged groups in a 
society, and thus giving their voices and claims a formal priority by acknowledging that marginalisation is 
caused by structural injustices. It thus provides an opportunity for the use of the language of rights 
coupled with the structural institutions of power to advance the cause of the vulnerable and marginalised 
groups. 
27 Article 21 deals with the implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms and sub-article 2 requires 
the State to ‘take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting of standards, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the rights guaranteed under article 43’. 
28 Article 43 is entitled “Economic and social rights” and it provides in article 43(1) that ‘Every person has 
the right  –  
a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to healthcare services, 
including reproductive health; 
b) to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; 
c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality;  
d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; 
e) to social security; and, 
f) to education” 
Article  43(2) prohibits the denial of emergency medical treatment; 
Article 43(3) requires the State to provide social security to persons who are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants. 
29 Every child’s right to free and compulsory education. 
30 Every child’s right to basic nutrition, shelter and healthcare. 
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they encapsulate the major SERs that have been captured by the constitutions of countries that 
have entrenched SERs.31 
The entrenchment of these rights will not, however, lead to the automatic emancipation, 
empowerment as well as the upliftment of the standards of living of the poor and vulnerable 
groups in Kenya.32 If the rights are to serve their purpose, a number of pressing questions will 
have to be addressed, such as: how are these rights to be interpreted? What is the content of 
each of the entrenched rights and who has the competency to determine that content? What is 
the nature, scope and extent of these rights and what is the nature, scope and extent of the 
obligations that they place on the State?  How can these rights be implemented in practice so 
as to enhance the standard of living and the general well-being of the Kenyan people? These 
issues, as are further extrapolated in the research questions in section 1.3 below, provide the 
main focus of this thesis. 
In interrogating and responding to the above issues, the thesis will thus critically analyse 
the jurisprudence developed by international and regional human rights mechanisms concerning 
SERs, and progressive jurisprudence on the implementation and enforcement of SERs at the 
national level, such as those from South Africa, Colombia and India. The aim of this 
comparative critical analysis will be to appraise the prospects for the enforcement and the 
probable challenges for the implementation of these rights in Kenya, taking into account 
Kenya’s historical, institutional, political and economic peculiarities.33 
                                                            
31 See for example the 1996 South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 (SAC), sections 26, 27 and 28.   
32 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 19(2) provides that the purpose for the realisation and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities, as 
well as to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings. See also Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights Positional Paper ‘Enhancing and operationalising economic, 
social and cultural rights in the Constitution of Kenya’ (2006) paras. 7 & 25, available at 
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/EcosocReports/PP%20on%20socio-economic%20rights%20-%20final.pdf 
(accessed on 15 September 2011) who, in calling for the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 
Constitution, affirm that the aim of these rights are to alleviate poverty and inequality, improve the 
livelihoods and living conditions of the Kenyan people, enhance social justice as well as to ensure 
government accountability. 
33 Mark Tushnet, in his exposition of comparative constitutionalism, has expounded contextualism as an 
important approach emphasising that constitutional law is deeply embedded in the institutional, doctrinal, 
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1.2 Statement of the problem  
1.2.1 Kenya’s factual and contextual situation in relation to socio-economic deprivation  
Kenya is a country with a high level of inequality, political, economic and social marginalisation, 
and a massive gap between the rich and the poor, with adverse consequences for human 
development.34 The poverty35 level is among one of the world’s highest with a population of 
approximately 46-56 per cent living below the poverty line,36 showing very little improvement 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
social and cultural contexts of each nation and context must thus be appreciated when undertaking 
comparative constitutional analysis, M Tushnet Weak courts, strong rights: Judicial review and social 
welfare rights in comparative constitutional law (2008) 10-15. 
34 According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), human development entails the 
enlargement of people’s choices through the creation of an enabling environment for the enjoyment of 
long, healthy and creative lives; receipt of quality education; and the enjoyment of decent standards of 
living, political freedoms, guaranteed human rights and self-respect. UNDP emphasises that for the above 
to be achieved, there must be an equality of opportunity for all people in society, as people are both the 
beneficiaries and agents of development. See S Alkire ‘UNDP Human development research paper 
2010/01 – Human development: definitions, critiques and related concepts’ (June 2010) 4ff, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP_2010_01.pdf (accessed on 7 November 
2011). 
35 Poverty is defined by the CESCR Statement ‘Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 10/05/2001. E/C.12/2001/10’ (May 2001) para. 8, available at 
http://www.acpp.org/RBAVer1_0/archives/CESCR%20Statement%20on%20Poverty.htm (accessed on 
13 November 2011) as ‘a human condition characterised by sustained or chronic deprivation of the 
resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard 
of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’. Poverty, as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, should be understood in terms of the qualitative approach that views it (poverty) not only in 
terms of household income and consumption (quantitative approach) but holistically to capture the 
processes and interactions between social, political, cultural and economic factors. Such factors include 
vulnerability, isolation, powerlessness, survival, personal dignity, security, self-respect, basic needs and 
ownership of assets. See S Carvahlo & H White ‘Combining the qualitative and the quantitative 
approaches to poverty measurement and analysis: The practice and the potential’ World Bank Technical 
Paper No. 366 (1997) 7, available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org (accessed on 4 November 2011).   
36 Government of Kenya ‘Poverty reduction strategy paper: First medium term plan 2008-2012’ submitted 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at ii, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10224.pdf (accessed on 8 June 2011). However, many 
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from the officially estimated poverty rate of 48 per cent in 1981.37 According to data from the 
International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD), the overall poverty levels are 
increasing rather than reducing, with estimates that since the post-election crisis of 2008, the 
poverty headcount has increased by 22 per cent and the measure of severe poverty has gone 
up by a startling 38 per cent.38 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human 
Development Index (which measures development in terms of life expectancy, educational 
attainment and standards of living) ranks Kenya as a low income country at position 143 among 
the 187 ranked countries in 201139 showing almost negligible improvement as compared to its 
ranking in position 128 among the 169 ranked countries in 2010.40 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
commentators have argued that the actual percentage of people living below the poverty line is higher 
than the government estimates, with the percentage placed at between 56-65 per cent and rising. See 
Foundation for Sustainable Development ‘Kenya: A development overview’ para. 4, available at 
http://www.fsdinternational.org/country/kenya/devissues (accessed on 8 June 2011); J Kiringai et al. 
‘Feminisation of poverty in Kenya: Is fiscal policy the panacea or achilles’ heel?’ A paper presented during 
the 5th PEP Research Network General Meeting held on 18-22, 2006 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, available 
at http://www.pep net.org/fileadmin/medias/pdf/files_events/5th_ethiopia/Kiringai.pdf (accessed on 8 June 
2011). 
37 See The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region Report ‘Kenya 
poverty and inequality assessment: Executive summary and synthesis report’ (June 2008) 3, available at 
http://marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/2011/01/AID_EFFECTIVENESS/Documents/Donor_works/Executive_Su
mmary-KPIA_Report.pdf (accessed on 6 November 2011). 
38 See, International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD) ‘Kenya: Programme for rural outreach 
of financial innovations and technologies (PROFIT) programme design document – Main Report – 
Volume 1’ (May 2010) 5, available at http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/design/100/kenya.pdf 
(accessed on 8 November 2011). 
39 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2011 ‘Sustainability 
and equity: A better future for all’ (2011) 126, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/ 
(accessed on 3 November 2011). According to the rankings, the country in the first position has the 
overall best human development record and that in the last position has the poorest human development 
record. 
40 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ‘International human development indicators-Kenya’ 
available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KEN.html (accessed on 9 June 2011). In 
accordance with the explanatory notes on the 2011 HDI for Kenya, UNDP contends that the ranking for 
Kenya in the 2010 HDI, based on the data available and methods used in 2011 is 144 out of 187 
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Poverty in Kenya has a political and regional tilt, with statistical figures indicating that 
regions that have traditionally benefitted from ruling elite practices continue to be characterised 
by the lowest levels of poverty. A Report by the Development Policy Management Forum 
(DPMF), relying on data emanating from a report by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(Geographic Dimensions of Wellbeing in Kenya: Who are the poor (2007)), shows the level of 
poverty as being 65 per cent in Nyanza, 64 per cent in North Eastern, 61 per cent in Western, 
58 per cent in Eastern, 57.6 per cent in Coast, 45 per cent in Rift Valley, 44 per cent in Nairobi, 
and 31 per cent in Central.41 Regional disparities are further indicated by a look at the poverty 
levels in the different counties, with the richest county, Kajiado (according to the government 
statistic) having a relatively impressive poverty rate of only 12.1 per cent while the poorest 
county, Turkana has a depressing poverty rate of 92.9 per cent.42 
Poverty and socio-economic marginalisation has been exacerbated in the recent past by 
the explosion of ethnic violence following the bungling of the 2007 presidential elections;43 
rampant and runaway corruption that has debilitated government’s resource capacity to provide 
basic services; climate change which has led to increased drought, crop failure and an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
countries, an improvement by only one. See UNDP Human Development Report 2011 ‘‘Sustainability and 
equity: A better future for all - Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices, Kenya’ 2 available at 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/KEN.pdf (accessed on 4 November 2011). 
41 L Keriga and A Bujra (Development Management Policy Forum (DPMF) Report) ‘Social policy, 
development and governance in Kenya: An evaluation and profile of education in Kenya’ (March 2009) 7, 
available at http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/downloads/Evaluation%20&%20Profile%20of%20Education.pdf 
(accessed on 9 November 2011). 
42 Kenya Open Data ‘County poverty rates’ available at http://opendata.go.ke/Counties/County-Poverty-
Rates/rfxq-gvgu (accessed on 10 November 2011). 
43  The Committee on the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD 
Committee) has noted that ethnic tensions and continued ethnic violence is due to the failure by the State 
to address ethnic and regional disparities in the enjoyment of economic and social rights leading to 
resentment. The Committee has thus urged the State to enhance resource allocation to address 
disparities in access to socio-economic goods and services, especially in the historically marginalized 
areas and communities. This should be aimed at the reduction of inequality through employment and 
education, and this effort should be anchored in the State’s poverty reduction policies and strategies. 
See, CERD Committee ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Kenya, CERD/C/KEN/CO/1-4, September 2011, para. 23, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds79.htm (accessed on 26 February 2012). 
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exponential increase in the prices of basic commodities;44 international forces of globalisation; 
skewed international trade, and the international economic downturn of 2008-2009.45 
Despite substantial economic growth levels in the recent past,46 inequality47 is still highly 
entrenched in the Kenyan political, economic, social and cultural spheres, with Kenya ranking 
among the most unequal countries in the world.48 An exacerbation of the inequality situation is 
further evidenced by an assessment by the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) which indicates that in the period between 2009-2010, inequality had 
increased in Kenya by 20 per cent.49 Inequality and deep human development disparities in 
Kenya exists between rich and poor people, men and women, rural and urban areas, uptown 
and informal settlements, and between different regions and groups. The high inequality is 
intricately linked to the skewed distribution of State resources among the different geographical 
areas and the different communities in Kenya, leading to increased exclusion and 
marginalisation. Inequality is manifested in huge disparities in income, lack of equal access to 
                                                            
44 See M Barasa ‘Rural poverty in Kenya’ (2007) Contemporary Review 294.  
45 CS Adam et al, Kenya: Policies for prosperity (2010) 1. 
46 UNDP Indicators show that Kenya’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita increased by about 11 per 
cent between 1980 and 2011, see UNDP HDR 2011 - Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices, 
Kenya (n 40 above) 2. 
47 According to the Society for International Development (SID) ‘Pulling apart: Facts and figures on 
inequality in Kenya’, popular version (2004) 1 available at http://www.sidint.net/docs/pullingapart-mini.pdf 
(accessed on 4 November 2011), inequality is: 
 [t]he degree to which distribution of economic welfare generated in an economy differs from that 
of equal shares among its inhabitants… It is observed not only in incomes but also in terms of 
social exclusion and the inability to access social services and socio-political rights by different 
population groups, genders and even races. 
48 Egerton University, Tegemeo Institute Agricultural Policy and Development ‘Rural incomes, inequality 
and poverty dynamics in Kenya’ (2009) 2, available at 
http://www.tegemeo.org/documents/work/Tegemeo-WP30-Rural-incomes-inequality-poverty-dynamics-
Kenya.pdf (accessed on 11 November 2011). 
49 See DFID ‘Kenya-Key facts’ available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-Eastern--
Southern/Kenya1/Key-facts1/ (accessed on 7 November 2011).  
 
 
 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
productive assets, social and political exclusion, and the inability of certain groups in society to 
access key social services.50 
A study by the Society for International Development (SID) paints a grim picture of 
inequality in Kenya. The study shows that Kenya’s top 10 per cent households control 42 per 
cent of the total income while the bottom 10 per cent control less than 1 per cent of the income; 
the difference in life expectancy between two regions of the State (formerly Central and Nyanza 
provinces) is a glaring 16 years.51 The high level of income inequality in Kenya is also confirmed 
by the Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) who contend that of the 14 per cent 
wage earners in Kenya, 0-90 per cent of them earn Kshs. 15, 000 (approximately 179 US 
dollars) or less, 91-99 per cent (the middle income 9 per cent) earn between Kshs. 15, 000 to 
100, 000 (approximately 1136 US dollars), and the elite 1 per cent (99-100) earn above Kshs. 
100, 000.52 
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2011 indicates that inequality in Kenya 
is so high that in the region, it only compares favourably with that in South Africa, a country that 
had suffered many years of apartheid. The inequality Gini coefficient index53 for Kenya is 48 per 
cent as compared to South Africa which has a Gini index of 57.8 per cent, Tanzania at 37.6 per 
                                                            
50 Egerton University, Tegemeo Institute Agricultural Policy and Development (n 48 above) 4. 
51 SID Report (n 47 above) v & 3. 
52 Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) ‘A brief general overview of inequality in Kenya’ para 
2, available at http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/index.php (accessed on 9 November 2011). 
53 The Gini coefficient varies from a range of zero (0) to 1 with zero indicating perfect equality between 
households, while the value of 1 indicates perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of most African countries 
range from about 0.40 to 0.50 , while most developed countries have a Gini ranging from 0.20 to 0.30, 
indicating that developed countries have less inequality than developing countries. See Egerton 
University, Tegemeo Institute Agricultural Policy and Development (n 48 above) 8. Oxfam GB indicates 
that the Gini coefficient for the rural areas in Kenya is 0.38 while that of Nairobi is a staggering 0.59, 
indicating similar inequality levels to those in Johannesburg (South Africa) in the mid-1990s, see Oxfam 
Great Britain (GB) ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya: Background analysis for the preparation of 
an Oxfam GB urban programme focused on Nairobi’ (September 2009) 3, available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/Urban_Poverty_and_Vulnerability_in_Kenya.pdf (accessed on 13 November 
2011). 
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cent and Ethiopia at 29.8 per cent.54 The above dire inequality indicators are confirmed by the 
World Bank Poverty and Inequality Assessment Report which indicates that the ratio of 
consumption between the top and bottom 10 per cent of the Kenyan population stood at 20:1 in 
the urban areas, and 12:1 in rural areas. This compares adversely to the ratio of consumption in 
Tanzania which stood at 5:1 and that in Ethiopia which stood at 3.3:1.55 
The lie in improved economic growth indicators in Kenya vis-à-vis the overall well-being 
of the people is brutally exposed by the UNDP Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. 
Even though Kenya ranks 143 out of the 187 ranked countries with an HDI index of 0.509, a 
discounting of that value for inequality using the Inequality Adjusted HDI brings the index down 
to 0.338, a loss of 33.6 per cent, a loss higher than the average 33.3 per cent for low HDI 
countries.56 
Gender inequality is deeply entrenched in Kenya’s social, economic and cultural 
spheres. Poverty and socio-economic deprivation is feminised in Kenya, both at the household, 
sectoral, occupational and locational levels. Women are heavily marginalised in relation to 
ownership of land and available data indicates that only 1 per cent of land titles in Kenya are 
held by women while 5-6 per cent is jointly held,57 denying women the means of production and 
collateral in accessing credit. This situation is made worse by the fact that women are 
disproportionately discriminated against when it comes to access to formal employment. 
Statistical data indicates that women are five times more likely to be unemployed than men, with 
an Oxfam GB Assessment, relying on a 2006 World Bank Study, indicating that the 
unemployment rate is 48 per cent for women as compared to 10 per cent for men.58 Even 
though Kenya has a high literacy level at 71.4 per cent, the gender literacy difference at the 
                                                            
54 The World Bank ‘World Development Indicators 2011’ (April 2011) 67-70, available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/ (accessed 9 November 2011). 
55 See the World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region Report (n 37 
above) 3. 
56 UNDP HDR 2011 - Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices, Kenya (n 40 above) 4. 
57 Institute of Economic Affairs ‘Profile of women’s socio-economic status in Kenya’ June 2008, available 
at http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/Profiling%20Women%20in%20Kenya.pdf, (accessed on 9 June 
2011) 42. 
58 Oxfam Great Britain (GB) ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya (n 53 above) 12. 
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national level is 10.8 per cent with the least urbanised regions such as Coast and North Eastern 
recording gender literacy difference of 20.8 per cent and 25.9 per cent respectively.59 
 With regard to primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment, even though an almost equal 
number of boys and girls enrol at primary school with boys at 119.0 per cent of the Net 
Enrolment Rate (NER)60 and girls at 114.8 per cent of the NER, retention of girls in secondary 
and tertiary institutions is poor with girls only forming 37.5 per cent of the NER as compared to 
42.2 per cent of the NER for boys at the secondary level, and 9.3 per cent of the NER as 
compared to boys’ 10.4 per cent of the NER at the tertiary level.61  On life expectancy, even 
though it is almost the same for male and female through most of the age groups, in the age 
groups between 20-24 and 25-29 there is a higher mortality rate for women than men and this is 
related to issues of child bearing, lack of access to adequate healthcare, especially reproductive 
healthcare and lack of control over their sexuality, leading to uncontrolled childbearing.62  There 
is a high dependency ratio in Kenya at 45 per cent and this puts even more strain on women as 
they are mostly the caregivers, eroding their socio-economic resources and stagnating their 
development.63 
                                                            
59 UNDP-Kenya National Human Development Report, 2009 ‘Youth and Human Development, Tapping 
the Untapped Resources’ June 2010, at 10, available at 
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Kenya/KenyaNationalHumanDevelopmentReport2009.pdf 
(accessed on 18 June 2011). 
60 Net Enrolment Rate (NER) is defined as the number of children of official primary school age who are 
enrolled in primary education as a percentage of the total children of the official school age population. 
On the method of computation of the NER, see 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=0&SeriesId=589 (accessed on 1 February 
2013).  
61 UNDP-Kenya Human Development Report 2009 (supra n 59 above) 12, table 2.2. 
62 UNDP-Kenya Human Development Report 2009 (supra n 59 above) 14, table 2.4. 
63 Institute of Economic Affairs (supra n 57 above) 17. Dependency statistics are made starker by World 
Bank data which indicates that in 2009, persons between the ages of 0-14 years formed 43 per cent of 
the Kenyan population, and people between the ages 15-64 years formed 55 per cent of the Kenyan 
population. This taken together with the statistics indicating that 80 per cent of the unemployed people in 
Kenya are the youth gives an indication that a huge chunk of the population is dependant. See World 
Bank – World Development Indicators 2011 (n 54 above) 37. 
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Poverty and inequality are specifically rampant in the rural areas in Kenya where the 
majority of the poor (82 per cent), around 14 million people, live.64 The poverty headcount ratio 
in the rural areas is over 50 per cent as compared to the urban poverty headcount ratio of 34.4 
per cent and the national poverty headcount ratio of 46.7 per cent,65 a clear indicator that 
poverty is more pronounced in the rural areas. Kenya’s rural poverty profile reveals strong 
regional disparities and IFAD, relying on the 2005/06 Kenya Integrated Household and Budget 
Survey (KIHBS) data, indicates that ‘the lowest incidence of rural poverty was in Central 
province (30.3 percent), followed by Nyanza (47.9 percent, Rift Valley (49.7 per cent), Eastern 
(51.1 percent), Western (53.2 percent), Coast (69.7 percent), and North Eastern province (74.0 
percent)’.66 Poverty and inequality have specifically been exacerbated in the rural areas, whose 
economic mainstay is agriculture, by the declining agricultural productivity and compepetiveness 
in both domestic and export markets, with a recorded decline of 5 per cent in 2008 and a further 
decline of 2.3 per cent in 2009.67 Decline in agricultural production augurs badly for the efforts at 
poverty reduction in Kenya as an Agrucultural Policy Review (APR) conducted in 2008 by the 
World Bank has affirmed that agriculture-led growth in Kenya is more than twice as effective in 
reducing poverty as compared to industry-led growth.68 
Rural poverty and socio-economic marginalisation has led to the phenomenon of rural 
urban migration leading to the exponential growth in Kenya’s urban population (at a growth rate 
of 1.2 per cent),69 with the projection that 50 per cent of the Kenyan population will be living in 
                                                            
64 See the World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region Report (n 37 
above) 3. 
65 Institute of Economic Affairs (supra n 57 above) 18. 
66 International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD) (n 38 above) 5. 
67 International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD) (n 38 above) 1. 
68 World Bank Project Appraisal Document ‘Kenya agricultural productivity and agri-business project’ 
(May 2009) 1 available at http://www.kapp.go.ke/kappdoc/docs/KAPAP_Project_Appraisal_Document.pdf 
(accessed on 8 November 2011). 
69 A Abdulla et al (Institute of Development Studies, UK) ‘Towards sustainable vulnerability reduction for 
Kenya’s ultra-poor living in urban slums’ (April 2011) 1, available at 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Abdullaetal2011VulnerabilityreductioninKenyasurbanslumsCSPconferenc
edraft.pdf (accessed on 14 November 2011). 
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urban areas by the year 2020.70 The phenomenon has witnessed a trebling of the urban 
population from 2.5 million in the 1980s to 7.6 million currently, with the majority (over 60 per 
cent)71 of these people living in overcrowded informal settlements and facing dire socio-
economic deprivation.72 Statistical data indicates that 70 to 75 per cent of informal settlement 
dwellers are defined as poor, as compared to the 46.7 per cent national average.73 An analysis 
of urban poverty by Oxfam GB indicates that urban poverty is inextricably linked with the 
process of rapid urbanisation and estimates that by 2020, urban poverty will represent half of 
the total poverty in Kenya.74 The deprivation in the informal settlements has increased the 
violations of other important and cross-cutting rights such as the right to life, property, as well as 
the right to a clean and healthy environment.75 
An important question to ask at this juncture is, how did Kenya get to have these very 
adverse poverty and inequality statistics? The answer is basically to be found in colonialism and 
the resultant ethnic-based capitalist political dispensation that Kenya adopted after 
independence in 1963.  Development, or underdevelopment as is the prevailing situation in 
Kenya, is critically linked to the political dispensation present in a State as it embodies the 
dominance of different combinations of class interests.76 In Kenya, politics has been used to 
enhance the interests of the political and economic elite, those who own the means of 
production and exploit the labour of others, and the advantages that accrue from that 
relationship.77 Inequality has thus been evidenced in the distribution of farmland and the 
                                                            
70 Oxfam GB ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya: The urgent need for coordinated action to reduce 
urban poverty’ 10 September 2009, 2, available at 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bn_urban_poverty_kenya.pdf 
(accessed on 31 October 2011). 
71 Oxfam GB – Need for coordinated action (n 70 above) 1. 
72 Adams et al (n 45 above) 4. 
73 Abdulla et al (Institute of Development Studies, UK) (n 69 above) 1. 
74 Oxfam GB ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya (n 53 above) v & 1. 
75 See Oxfam GB ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya (n 53 above) 5; Abdulla et al (Institute of 
Development Studies, UK) (n 69 above) 3. 
76 C Leys Underdevelopment in Kenya: The political economy of neo-colonialism 1964-1971 (1975) x. 
77 Leys – underdevelopment in Kenya (n 76 above) xii. 
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unequal flow of income into and out of the agricultural economy.78 This system, which thrives on 
the impoverisation and the marginalisation of the majority, was entrenched during colonisation 
by British settlers through the annexation of land belonging to Africans and the relocation of 
Africans into unproductive and congested reserves, as well as by forcing Africans to provide 
cheap labour in settler farms through the introduction of taxes.79 Similar structures have been 
retained since independence with the entrenchment of the mechanisms which have ensured 
dominance for the political and economic elite, and a marked absence of effective and powerful 
redistributive mechanisms to engender in-country equality.80 
Poverty and inequality greatly determine access to socio-economic goods and services 
such as education,81 health, water,82 access to employment and income generating 
opportunities, access to political or decision-making power to determine the distribution or 
redistribution of national resources and wealth. Statistics indicate that the richest 20 per cent 
have a primary school attendance ratio of 86 per cent while the poorer 20 per cent only have a 
61 per cent access ratio, the disparity growing even larger in the access to secondary and 
tertiary education.83 On health, and taking the infant mortality rate as an indicator, the poorest 
                                                            
78 YW Bradshaw ‘Perpetuating underdevelopment in Kenya: The link between agriculture, class and 
State’ (1990) 33 (1) African Studies Review 1. 
79 Leys – Underdevelopment in Kenya (n 76 above) 30-31 
80 C Leys ‘Interpreting African underdevelopment: Reflections on the ILO report on employment, incomes, 
and equality in Kenya’ (1973) 72 Journal of African Affairs 419 at 420. See also J Arwa ‘Litigating socio-
economic rights in domestic courts: The Kenyan experience’ A paper presented at The Colloquium on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights held in Cape Town South Africa from 7 – 10 November 
2012, 2-5, available at http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/LITIGATING-SOCIO-
ECONOMIC-RIGHTS-3.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013). 
81 Lack of access to education and poverty are cyclic in nature, with statistical data indicating that the 
level of education of the household head is inversely related to the incidence of poverty; with poverty 
levels of nearly 69 per cent in households where the head has no education, 48 per cent where the 
household head had primary education and 22 per cent for households where the head had secondary 
education. See Oxfam GB ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya (n 53 above) 9. 
82 Available data indicates that poor people often pay between three to eight times as much as the rich for 
water as they are forced to buy water from private venders, as 90 per cent of the poor, especially in the 
slum areas have no access to piped water. See Oxfam GB ‘Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya (n 
53 above) 14. 
83 SID Report (n 47 above) 6. 
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20 per cent lose 149 children before their fifth birthday, in every 1000 live births, as compared to 
only 91 children for the richest 20 per cent.84 These huge disparities occur in relation to access 
to all the other socio-economic goods and services, and unfairly constrain the life choices of 
people marginalised by poverty and inequality, leading to social destabilisation85 and the 
absence of human security.86 The 2005 UNDP Human Development report indicates that: 87 
[o]vercoming the structural forces that create and perpetuate extreme inequality is one of the 
most efficient routes for overcoming extreme poverty, enhancing the welfare of society and 
accelerating progress towards the MDGs. 
This shows that if Kenya is to achieve real and sustainable development, the entrenched 
inequalities must be addressed and the capabilities of all people must be uplifted to the level 
that they can participate actively and beneficially in the process of development.  
1.2.2 Poverty eradication and the potential of the entrenched socio-economic rights 
Transformative social policy, in the form of constitutional interventions that directly affect social 
welfare, institutions and relations, and involves overarching concerns with redistribution, 
production, reproduction and protection,88 is key in the enhancement of accessibility, availability 
                                                            
84 As above. 
85 For an account of how horizontal political and socio-economic inequality in Kenya were the root causes 
and led to the social destabilisation and conflict after the 2007 bungling of the Presidential elections in 
Kenya, see F Stewart (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity  (CRISE), 
University of Oxford)  ‘Note for discussion: Kenya, horizontal inequalities and the political disturbances of 
2008’  (March 2008), available at http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/copy/kenya_note.pdf (accessed on 8 
November 2011). 
86 Alkire (n 34 above) 18. According to the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report, where political 
institutions are unresponsive and are seen as tools for the perpetuation of unjust inequalities or the 
advancement of the interests of the elite, democratisation is undermined, creating conditions for State 
breakdown. This relates closely to the conflict in Kenya following the bungling of the 2007 Presidential 
Elections which nearly degenerated to civil war and which was majorly sparked by the inequality and the 
huge regional disparities that have been entrenched in the governance of the country. See UNDP Human 
Development Report 2005 ‘International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an 
unequal world’ (2005) 54, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR05_complete.pdf (accessed on 7 
November 2011). 
87 UNDP HDR 2005 (n 86 above) 5. 
88 Keriga & Bujra -DPMF Report (n 41 above) iv. 
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and accountability in the provision of socio-economic goods and services.89 The above realities 
led to the entrenchment in the 2010 Constitution of justiciable SERs, as is discussed in section 
1.1 above. The entrenchment of SERs is an affirmation of the internationally-acknowledged fact 
that pro-poor growth policies that enhance social transformation through the improvement in 
distribution and enhancement of wealth redistribution are a powerful weapon in the fight against 
poverty and inequality.90 The close link between social protection and economic growth is 
further elaborated by Abdulla, MacAuslan and Schofield who list six ways in which social 
protection can support economic growth as follows:91 
First, measures that help individuals to manage risk allow them to invest in activities that have 
higher risk but higher returns, raising economic productivity…Second, small transfers or loans to 
very poor households can enable them to overcome liquidity constraints, invest and generate 
positive returns. Third, transfers to low income areas or households can generate economic 
multipliers as individuals spend their transfers in local businesses. Fourth, social protection 
programmes may create productive assets – as public works programmes. Fifth, measures that 
help individuals to maintain their health can permit them to participate more actively in the 
economy. Finally, ensuring that households have sufficient resources to send their children to 
school means that those children have better chances of being productive members of society. 
The potential of redistribution and reduction of inequality in ensuring sustained economic growth 
is also confirmed by Adams, Collier and Ndung’u who contend that redistribution enhances the 
                                                            
89 UNDP HDR 2005 (n 86 above) 62-64. The key agenda for the entrenchment of SERs is ‘to shield the 
most vulnerable from the uncertainties and harshness of a pure market model, and to extend the benefits 
of public services and public goods to the most vulnerable,’ see Brinks & Forbath (n 19 above) 1949. 
90 UNDP HDR 2005 (n 86 above) 69. An analysis of the Kenya situation with regard to the achievement of 
MDG number 1 ‘Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger’ shows that Kenya is unequivocally off track 
in the achievement of the above goal. The analysis affirms that: 
If Kenya were to achieve a 1% per capita growth rate on current distribution patterns, it would not 
halve poverty until 2030. Doubling the share of the poor in future growth even at the 1% per 
capita growth rate would enable Kenya to halve poverty by 2013, meeting the MDG target. In 
other words pro-poor growth would reduce the time horizon for halving poverty by 17 years. 
See UNDP HDR 2005 (n 86 above) 66. 
91 Abdulla et al (Institute of Development Studies, UK) (n 69 above) 6. 
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poverty reduction impact of growth as it ensures social and political stability, and also enhances 
the capacity of the poor to realise their productive potential.92 
Further, the very entrenchment of justiciable SERs is recognition, according to Robert 
Alexy, that legal freedom is worthless without actual freedom, that is, the real possibility of 
choosing between permitted alternatives, and that access to social entitlements for the poor and 
vulnerable individuals and groups depends on government activities.93 Thus, in the provision of 
services as well as the apportionment of life opportunities through the guaranteed SERs, the 
State makes it possible for people to have a dignified existence, therefore providing them with 
the requisite conditions for the equal exercise of individual liberties.94 
While the entrenchment of SERs in a democratic, progressive and transformative 
Constitution is not the panacea for the implementation and enforcement of this rights in Kenya, 
their inclusion is an important symbolic gesture of intent, and a platform for advocacy and 
monitoring of the political institutions of the State. As was aptly stated by Craig Scott and Patrick 
Macklem:95 
Whereas the constitutionalisation of social rights would be a recognition of the fact that adequate 
nutrition, housing, health, and education are critical components of social existence… [their] 
exclusion will result in the suppression of certain societal voices… A constitution only containing 
[CPRs] projects an image of truncated humanity. Symbolically, but still brutally, it excludes those 
segments of society for whom autonomy means little without the necessities of life. 
It is submitted, therefore, that in order to achieve the promise entailed in the entrenchment of 
SERs, and for the social policies emanating from the entrenchment to be successful in 
enhancing social justice, reducing poverty and inequality, and to lead to the emancipation of the 
poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups in Kenya, a political framework of real participatory 
democracy and good governance at the national and county levels is a necessity.96 
                                                            
92 Adams et al (n 45 above) 35-36. 
93 R Alexy, Theorie Der Grundrechte 458 (1985), quoted in J Habermas ‘Paradigms of law’ (1995-1996) 
17 Cardozo Law Review 771, at 773. 
94  Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 93 above) 775. 
95 C Scott & P Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social rights in a new 
South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 28-29. 
96 Keriga & Bujra - DPMF Report (n 41 above) iv. 
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However, despite the entrenchment of these SERs, there is no guarantee of their 
effective implementation and enforcement, if the mere rhetorical commitment of Kenya’s political 
establishments to human rights in the past is anything to go by. The concerns about the 
ornamental use of entrenched SERs to beautify the Constitution without their effective 
implementation and enforcement are not far-fetched, and have been witnessed in several 
countries that have justiciable SERs in their constitutions.  A case in point is the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution which had not only entrenched SERs in Article II sections 8-24 and Articles XIII-XV 
but the Supreme Court of the Phillipine had also declared those rights to form “the heart of the 
new charter”.97 The practice in the Philippines, as can be extracted from the jurisprudence of its 
Supreme Court, is, however, that SERs are still treated as no more than aspirations which are 
non-self-executing and which ultimately only reflect hortatory guidelines for the political 
institutions of the State.98 The less than stellar jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines can be contrasted with the more progressive attitude of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court (CCC) and SACC which have recognised the justiciability and actionability of 
constitutionally entrenched SERs in several ground-breaking judgments.99 
                                                            
97 ARIS (Phil) Inc. v National Labour Relations Commission and others, G.R. No. 90501, August 5, 1991, 
para. 28, available at http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/aug1991/gr_90501_1991.html (accessed on 
14 November 2011). For an analysis of the case, see Desierto (n 17 above) 1. 
98 Desierto (n 17 above) 11 referring specifically to the case of   Basco et al. v Philippine Amusements 
and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, where the Supreme Court expressly held that 
‘several provisions of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights) and XIV (Education, Science and 
Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports) of the 1987 Constitution “are merely statements of principles and 
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to 
clearly define and effectuate such principles”.  
99 Examples of such judgments include: Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & 
Others 2000 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) 
SA 721 (CC); Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council 2002 6 BCLR 625 
(W); Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 6 BCLR 789 (C); Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development,2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); Mazibuko and others v The City of Johannesburg and others High 
Court of South Africa (Witwatersrand Local Division) Case No: 06/1386; CCC Decision T-025 of 2004 
(IDP Case); and CCC Constitutional Claim Decision C- 355 of 2006 (The Colombian Abortion case). For a 
discussion of SER cases of the CCC, see chapters two and four below. 
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Kenya, with its past history of rhetorical commitment to human rights, can easily take the 
path of the Philippines if the midwifing of the new constitutional dispensation, especially with 
regard to the entrenched SERs, is not undertaken properly. Even though the entrenchment of 
SERs in the Constitution has a strong symbolic value, the mammoth challenge will be the 
bridging of the gap between the precepts and actual practice with the aim of ensuring 
substantial transformation of Kenyan society into an equal, free and just society.100  There is, 
therefore, a need for intense dialogue and awareness raising among the two levels of 
government, national and county, and also within the three institutions of the national 
government, the executive, legislature and the judiciary, to ensure that political will for the 
realisation and enforcement of the SERs is harnessed. The need to build capacity and to 
harness financial resources to enhance the implementation of the SERs, together with the need 
to build strong, transparent, accountable and responsive institutions, are thus important building 
blocks that must be put in place to ensure the substantive realisation of the entrenched SERs.  
This study, therefore, aims to direct Kenya not only towards the progressive 
jurisprudence and purposive interpretation of SERs that has been developed by the CCC, 
SACC and the Indian Supreme Court, but is also intended to urge Kenya to surpass that 
protection by adopting a transformative and integrated approach to constitutional interpretation 
of SERs that incorporates the positive aspects of the minimum core content approach and 
reasonableness approach in the implementation of the entrenched SERs.101 
                                                            
100 S Siebert ‘Beyond changing the face of power and altering the structure of oppression: Socio-
economic rights, constitutional jurisprudence and social transformation in South Africa’ (2000) Trinity 
College Law Review 131. 
101 Unlike South Africa, Kenya is a party to the ICESCR and should be bound to adopt the minimum core 
content of SERs as developed by the CESCR in accordance with articles 2(5) & (6) of the 2010 
Constitution which provides that treaties or conventions ratified by Kenya forms part of Kenyan law. For a 
more elaborate discussion, see chapter two, section 2.2 on the place of international law in the Kenyan 
domestic legal system, as well as chapter two, section 2.5 and chapter five, section 5.3.2 on the place of 
the minimum core approach in the Kenyan domestic legal system. See also Yeshanew (n 14 above) 329-
330, who acknowledges the possibility of combining these two approaches in the interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement of SERs. 
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1.3 Research questions 
Poverty, inequality and massive socio-economic deprivation are endemic in Kenya, and have 
led to social injustices, the exclusion and marginalisation of large numbers of people from both 
the political and the socio-economic spheres of society, the stagnation of development, as well 
as the deterioration of human security as is set out in section 1.2 above. The importance of a 
firm constitutional, legislative and institutional framework to tackle these challenges is reflected 
in the entrenchment of justiciable SERs, as well as other interrelated and mutually supportive 
human rights, in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The objective of this study is to undertake a 
critical analysis of the entrenched SERs and their potential to respond to the challenges 
mentioned above.  
In this vein, therefore, the main question that this study aims to answer is the following: 
which theoretical and interpretive approach for the realisation of SERs should Kenya adopt to 
enhance the achievement of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution? In 
proposing an answer to this main question, the study will undertake an analysis of the following 
interrelated issues: Kenya’s political and socio-economic context leading to the entrenchement 
of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Constitution; the nature, scope, content and extent of the 
entrenched SERs as well as Kenya’s national and international obligations emanating from 
these entrenched SERs; whether these obligations are extensive enough to realise the goal of 
achieving substantive equality, social justice and dignity for all the Kenyan people; which 
approaches to the interpretation of SERs should be adopted in Kenya to enhance the 
implementation and enforcement of these rights with the aim of achieving the transformative 
potential of the 2010 Constitution; as well as an analysis of the probable gaps and challenges 
that may hinder the effective implementation of the entrenched SERs. 
1.4 Significance of the study: Literature survey  
Even though Kenya has entrenched, in its 2010 Constitution, several progressive provisions 
aimed at enhancing proper governance and accelerating development,102 the SER provisions 
have the most potential to ensure the realisation of Kenya’s developmental goal of being an 
                                                            
102 For a discussion of this progressive provisions which in essence qualify the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
as a transformative constitution, see chapter five, section 5.2.  
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industrialising middle-income State by the year 2030.103 This is because the implementation and 
enforcement of SERs is crucial to the equitable distribution of national resources, reduction of 
poverty, and the reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor.104 Further, and in line with 
the principle of interdependence and interrelatedness of rights, the realisation of SERs is critical 
in the achievement of substantive equality, dignity, freedom and democracy, fundamental 
values that augment the entire constitutional project;105 as well as the realisation of other CPRs 
such as the right to political participation, the foundational bedrock upon which the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism proposed in this thesis is premised.106  
 Extensive research has been undertaken on the implementation and enforcement of 
constitutionally entrenched justiciable SERs in general,107 and specifically in relation to the 1996 
South African Constitution.108 Such a comprehensive debate has not yet taken place in Kenya, it 
                                                            
103 Government of Kenya ‘Vision 2030 – Popular version’ (2007) available at http://www.vision2030.go.ke/ 
(accessed on 2 February 2012). 
104 DM Chirwa, Towards binding economic, social and cultural rights obligations of non-state actors in 
international and domestic law: A critical survey of emerging norms (2005) 27-29, a thesis submitted at 
the University of the Western Cape (on file with author).  
105 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble para. 6 & article 10.  
106 For an extensive discussion of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism and how it is augmented by 
the right to political participation, see chapters three and four below.  
107 See for example: Y Ghai and J Cottrell (eds.), Economic, social and cultural rights in practice: The role 
of judges in implementing economic, social and cultural rights ( 2004); F Coomans (ed.) Justiciability of 
economic and social rights: Experiences from domestic systems  (2006); Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), Litigating economic, social and cultural rights: Achievements, challenges and 
strategies (2003); COHRE, Leading cases in economic, social and cultural rights: Summaries (2006); M 
Langford (ed.) Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in comparative and international law (2008); 
M Tushnet, Weak courts, strong rights: Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative 
constitutional law (2008); and C Bateup ‘The dialogical promise: Assessing the normative potential of 
theories of constitutional dialogue’ (2006) 73(3) Brooklyn Law review 1109-1180. 
108 See for example: S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution 
(2010); S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009) 33-1; S Liebenberg 'The value of human dignity in 
interpreting socio-economic rights' (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 436; S Fredman, 
Human rights transformed: Positive rights and positive duties (2008); C Mbazira, Litigating socio-
economic rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and distributive justice (2009); S Liebenberg 
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having only promulgated its new Constitution in August 2010.109 Most of the available literature 
have dealt with the interpretation and implementation of the 2010 Constitution in general and 
have not been specific to SERs.110  
An exception to this general trend has been the International Commission of Jurists, ICJ-
Kenya’s Judiciary Watch Report Volume 10 titled Judicial Enforcement of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Challenges and Opportunities for Kenya, which contains a collection of chapters 
addressing different aspects of the entrenched SERs.111 The publication analyses the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘Socio-economic rights: Revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate’ in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 303; M Pieterse ‘On dialogue, translation and voice: A 
reply to Sandra Liebenberg’ in S Woolman & M Bishop (Eds.), Constitutional conversations (2008) 331; D 
Bilchitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2007); D Bilchitz ‘Health’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 
(2009) 56A-1; D Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance’ 
(2002) 118 South African Law Journal 484; D Bilchitz ‘ Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum 
core: Laying the foundation for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence ‘ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 9; D Brand and C Heyns (eds), Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005); 
JC Mubangizi, The protection of human rights in South Africa: A legal and political guide (2004); J De 
Waal, I Currie and G Erasmus, The Bill of Rights handbook (2001); B De Villiers, ‘Social and economic 
rights’ in D Van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1994); S 
Liebenberg & K Pillay (eds), Socio-economic rights in South Africa: A resource book (2000);  D Brand and 
S Russel (eds), Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international 
perspectives (2002); and R Dixon ‘Creating dialogue about socio-economic rights: Strong v weak form 
judicial review revisited’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391. 
109 The paucity of legal material in the Kenyan domestic legal system on the interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement of SERs was acknowledged by the current Chief Justice of Kenya, Dr. 
Willy Mutunga in his address at the book launch of the International Commission of Jurist – ICJ Kenya 
Judiciary Watch Report, Volume 10 which undertook an exposition of SERs in the Kenyan Constitution. 
The speech is available at http://www.icj-kenya.org/index.php/media-centre/news/460-cj-jwr-launch 
(accessed on 15 September 2012).  
110 YP Ghai & JC Ghai Kenya’s Constitution: An instrument for change (2011); PLO Lumumba, MK 
Mbondeny & SO Odero The Constitution of Kenya: Contemporary readings (2011). 
111 J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: Challenges 
and opportunities for Kenya (2011). 
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conceptual and practical issues in relation to SERs,112 reflects on the issue of resources in the 
implementation of SERs,113 examines the prospects and challenges for public interest litigation 
in the enforcement of SERs,114 analyses specific SERs in the Constitution such as the right to 
health,115 housing,116 the right to water,117 as well as the right to education.118 This publication is 
a timely intervention in the quest to build a domestic legal literature on the implementation and 
enforcement of SERs. However, it has several shortcomings in that it concentrates solely on the 
judicial enforcement of entrenched SERs, and fails to sufficiently and comprehensively 
acknowledge the role of other organs of the State, non-state actors as well as the society in the 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of SERs. Further, the publication fails to set out 
a clear theoretical framework in which the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the 
entrenched SERs is to be based. It also fails to comprehensively set out the best interpretive 
approach for the courts to adopt in interpreting and enforcing SERs during litigation.  In one of 
the chapters of the publication, the current author proposes and lays the basis for the 
                                                            
112 J Biegon ‘The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the 2010 Constitution: Conceptual and practical 
issues’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 13. 
113 W Kaguongo ‘Reflections on the complexities in adjudicating socio-economic rights from the 
perspective of resource allocation and budgetary issues’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial 
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 89. 
114 BJ Mwimali ‘Public interest litigation and the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: Prospects 
and challenges under the Constitution of Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of 
economic, social and cultural rights: Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 247. 
115 C Mbazira ‘The judicial enforcement of the right to the highest attainable standard of health under the 
Constitution of Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural 
rights: Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 113. 
116 I Ndegwa ‘A roof over Wanjiku’s head: Judicial enforcement of the right to housing under the 
Constitution of Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural 
rights: Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 143. 
117 K Moyo ‘False hopes or realisable rights: The right to clean and safe water under the Constitution of 
Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 179.  
118 LC Murungi ‘The right to education under the Constitution of Kenya: Scope and prospects for 
enforcement’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2011) 217.  
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transformative and intergrated approach for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement 
of the entrenched SERs, but the approach is developed more fully and comprehensively in this 
thesis.119  
 Therefore, even though the interpretation, implementation and enfrorcement of 
justiciable SERs has been in discussed extensively in comparative jurisdictions such as South 
Africa as mentioned above, there is need for a Kenyan-specific study due to Kenya’s  unique 
and different historical, cultural, social, political and institutional context compared with other 
countries that have entrenched justiciable SERs in their constitutions. This study will thus 
undertake a critical analysis of the interpretive opportunities presented by the entrenchment of 
SERs in the 2010 Constitution, and how these opportunities can be harnessed to enhance the 
prospects for the protection, promotion and fulfilment of SERs in Kenya. The study is intended 
to provide the Kenyan political and judicial institutions with critical information and research to 
guide them in the development of the legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks for the 
implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs, with the overall aim of enhancing 
equality and the achievement of social justice for the Kenyan people.  
1.5 Research methodology 
With the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution and the important 
role their interpretation, implementation and enforcement plays in achieving the transformative 
aspirations of the Constitution, there is a dire need for a comprehensive study of these rights. 
This thesis conducts a broad study of the nature, scope, content and extent of these rights, as 
well as proposes the theory of dialogical constitutionalism and a transformative and integrated 
approach for their realisation. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to provide critical research on 
SERs to guide scholars, legal practitioners and judicial officers on how best to interpret, 
implement and enforce the entrenched SERs with the objective of achieving the transformative 
potential of the Constitution.  
                                                            
119 N Orago ‘A gender perspective of socio-economic rights under the 2010 Kenyan Constitution: A 
mirage or a path towards gender equality and women empowerment in Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila 
(eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: Challenges and opportunities for 
Kenya (2011) 275. 
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 The thesis intends to achieve the above objectives by undertaking a review and an 
analysis of both primary and secondary literature that is relevant to the subject-matter of this 
study. The primary sources include international legal instruments (both “soft law” and “hard 
law”) such as conventions, charters, resolutions, declarations, general comments, as well as 
State Party reports under the various international and regional human rights instruments. At the 
national level, primary sources include constitutions, Acts of Parliament, Bills and policy 
documents. Great reliance has further been placed on comparative case-law from jurisdictions 
such as South Africa, Colombia, India, Canada and the United States of America. The 
comparative analysis of these jurisdictions has been used to deduce lessons, experiences and 
approaches that are useful in the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of 
constitutionally entrenched SERs. Inevitably, the study also places considerable reliance on 
relevant secondary literature such as books, articles and academic commentaries in the area of 
human rights in general and SERs in particular. Conclusions drawn from an analysis of this 
information is then applied towards answering the research questions. 
Despite the reliance on the legal material and progressive jurisprudence emanating from 
the courts in South Africa, Colombia, India, Canada and the United States, this study is not a 
comparative study strictly speaking, where the three successive stages of description, 
comparison and explanation are followed. It is basically a study of Kenya and its prospective 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the constitutionally entrenched SERs, with 
these five jurisdictions being used in a supplemental manner to augment the discussions as well 
as to provide guidance and best practices aimed at enhancing the realisation of SERs in Kenya.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This study is divided into eight chapters. The chapters are broadly divided into three interrelated 
thematic areas. Thematic area 1 (chapters one and two), provides the historical, contextual and 
substantive framework for the SERs discussed in the subsequent chapters. It commences with 
a historical discussion of the endemic poverty and inequality in Kenya resulting from entrenched 
socio-economic deprivation for the majority of Kenyans (chapter one, section 1.2). It further 
entails a preliminary discussion of the nature, scope, content and extent of the SERs 
entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution as well as Kenya’s national and international 
obligations arising from these rights. Thematic area 2 (chapters three, four and five) then sets 
out the theoretical framework for the realisation of the obligations arising from the 
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constitutionally entrenched SERs. It delves into an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings 
of the study, both at a general level and with specific reference to the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. 
It also proposes an approach for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the 2010 
Constitution. Thematic area 3 (chapters six and seven) entails case studies of the interpretation, 
implementation and judicial enforcement of two selected SERs entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution: the right to food and the right to housing. It expounds on the SER obligations 
discussed in thematic area 1 and uses the theoretical framework developed in thematic area 2 
in relation to the two selected rights with the aim of exploring the practical realisation of SERs. 
Taking into account these three interrelated thematic areas, the specific chapters will deal with 
the issues illustrated below. 
Chapter one, which is the introductory chapter, provides a context to the study, and sets 
the background, problem question, justification, methodology, and the structure of the study. 
Chapter two undertakes a general analysis of the nature, scope, content and extent of 
the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. It commences with an extensive 
analysis of the place of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system and the impact 
international law has on the understanding of the SER obligations of the State. The main thrust 
of the arguments in this section is that ratified international law as well as customary 
international law have been incorporated and have direct application in the Kenyan domestic 
legal system taking into account the provisions of article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution. The chapter then engages in an analysis of the nature of Kenya’s SER obligations 
at the international, regional and national level.  It calls for the development of a substantive 
normative content of SERs, taking into account the minimum core approach as developed 
internationally by the CESCR so as to enhance the realisation of the entrenched SERs. Lastly, 
the chapter acknowledges that SERs are not absolute and can be legitimately limited by the 
State. However, it argues, taking into account article 24 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, that 
any limitation of the entrenched SERs must scrupulously meet all the constitutional 
requirements set out in that article if the limitation is to be considered legitimate.   
Chapters three and four provide the theoretical framework upon which the entire thesis 
is premised, with chapter three entailing a general analysis of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism, and chapter four undertaking a specific analysis of dialogical constitutionalism 
in the Kenyan context. In this scheme of things, chapter three provides an analysis of the 
historical and philosophical foundations of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, tracing the 
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theory from the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin and Paulo Freire. It then engages in an analysis of 
the theory in the writings of two prominent contemporary thinkers in the field, Jürgen Habermas 
and Frank Michelman. The chapter then undertakes a comparative analysis of the practical use 
of aspects of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism in three jurisdictions, Canada (the 
“dialogic metaphor”), the United States of America (coordinate construction) and South Africa 
(meaningful engagement). The three jurisdictions are chosen due to the rich jurisprudence that 
has emanated both from the courts and from academic commentators on the importance of 
dialogue and deliberation in the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of 
constitutionally entrenched human rights in these jurisdictions.  
Chapter four is a continuation of the analysis of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
in chapter three, but focussed specifically on the Kenyan context, taking into account the 
provisions of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution that point to the need for dialogue in the 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs. The main import of the 
chapter is to fashion a model of dialogical constitutionalism for Kenya. This model is developed 
at three levels, first, at the political level in the development of the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework for the implementation of the entrenched SERs; secondly, at the level 
of constitutional litigation in the courts; and thirdly, in the fashioning of judicial remedies 
subsequent to constitutional litigation. These three levels of dialogue are intertwined by the 
requirement of public participation in societal decision-making at all levels of government, a 
requirement that populates the entire constitutional structure.  
Chapter five undertakes an analysis of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution as a transformative 
Constitution, detailing the elements of the Constitution which are aimed at the transformation of 
the Kenyan society to enhance social justice and human development, as well as to ensure 
improved living conditions for every Kenyan. The requirement for transformation leads to the 
proposal that Kenya adopts an integrated approach in the interpretation, implementation and 
enforcement of the entrenched SERs, an approach which marries the progressive as well as 
dialogic elements of the reasonableness approach with the protective aspect of the minimum 
core approach, with the aim of achieving the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution. 
Chapter six, which deals with the right to adequate food, is the first component of the 
case studies which forms part 3 of the thesis. This chapter undertakes an analysis of the food 
security situation in Kenya in the first instance. It then develops the meaning, content and the 
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scope of Kenya’s obligations in the realisation of the right to food, an SER which has been 
entrenched in the Constitution. It further engages in an analysis of the mandate of the Courts in 
the realisation of the right to food in Kenya, and proposes that Kenya adopts the integrated 
approach as well as a livelihoods approach, based on the concept of the indivisibility, 
interrelatedness and interdependence of human rights, in relevant circumstances when food 
entitlements of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups are threatened. The right to food was 
chosen as a case study due to the precarious food security situation prevailing in Kenya 
currently due to droughts and the spike in the global food and oil prices which have driven many 
Kenyans to the brink of starvation and abject poverty. The seriousness of the food insecurity 
situation has been recognised at the highest level of political government, with the President of 
the Republic declaring the situation a national emergency on 16 January 2009. The right to food 
has also been chosen as a case study due to the importance of food in the life of human beings, 
as without food, other important rights such as the right to life, health, labour, education, 
adequate standards of living, dignity and equality cannot be realised. 
Chapter seven, which deals with the right to accessible and adequate housing, forms the 
second component of the case studies in part 3 of the thesis. The chapter commences with an 
analysis of the housing situation in Kenya, looking at the challenges of informal settlements as 
well as endemic lack of tenure security for many households in Kenya, with its attendant forced 
evictions and demolitions. It then develops the meaning and content of the right to housing and 
the scope of Kenya’s obligations for the realisation of the right to housing. It then delves into an 
analysis of the mandate of the courts in the realisation of the right to housing, proposing that the 
courts adopt a transformative approach to adjudication that is capable of enhancing the 
realisation of the right to housing for the Kenyan people, especially with regard to the protection 
of Kenyans from forced evictions. The right to housing has been chosen as a case study due to 
the important role of housing in the preservation of the family, the basic unit of society, and in 
the realisation of other related rights such as the right to dignity, privacy, health, security as well 
as other CPRs and SERs. Kenya faces several challenges in the provision of housing to its 
citizens, which is evidenced by the dire housing situation that has forced the majority of 
Kenyans to live in inadequate shelters in informal settlements without access to necessary 
services such as water, electricity and proper sanitation. The challenge above is exacerbated by 
massive land grabbing, land holding for speculative purposes, as well as a lack of land security 
of tenure and its attendant forced evictions by both government and non-governmental entities. 
The entrenchment of a right to accessible and adequate housing in the Constitution can play a 
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prominent role in engendering a paradigm shift in housing, with the objective of responding to 
the challenges mentioned above. This chapter thus looks at the potential of the entrenched right 
to enhance the housing conditions of Kenyans.  
Chapter eight, which contains the thesis conclusion and recommendations, sums up the 
main findings of the thesis and provides key recommendations to the relevant sectors of society 
charged with the implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs. 
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Chapter two: The general nature, scope and content of Kenya’s socio-
economic rights obligations in view of the direct incorporation of 
international law by the Constitution 
2.1. Introduction 
The primary responsibility of a State, and a major measure of its legitimacy, is the enhancement 
of the general welfare and the standards of living of its citizens.1 This is achievable through the 
respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights, especially socio-economic rights (SERs).2 
Despite the close link between the realisation of SERs and the improvement of people’s 
standards of living, there has traditionally been either a general reluctance to implement or the 
overall neglect of SERs at the national and international levels.3 This reluctance has mainly 
been due to the perceived vagueness, imprecision and lack of awareness of the real nature, 
scope, content as well as extent of States’ SER obligations.4  
                                                            
1 N Udombana ‘Social rights are human rights: Actualising the right to work and social security in 
Africa‘(2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 181 at 188. See also IP Stotzky ‘Creating the 
conditions for democracy’ in H Hongju-Koh & RC Slye (eds.) Deliberative democracy and human rights 
(1999) 157, at 180, who argues that the basic justification for a government is the realisation of human 
rights, and a government is simply illegitimate if its actions are not geared towards that goal. 
2 SC Agbakwa ‘Reclaiming humanity: Economic, social and cultural rights as the cornerstone of African 
human rights’ (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177, at 179. 
3 P Alston, ‘International law and the human right to food’ in P Alston & K Tomasveski The right to food 
(1984) 54. See also The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), ‘7th Report on Economic 
and Social Rights: Millennium Development Goals and the progressive realisation of economic and social 
rights in South Africa - 2006-2009’ (2010) 9, who pinpoints the obtuse way in which SER obligation have 
been defined internationally as one of the main challenges on the monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of entrenched SERs.   
4 J Waldron ‘Socio-economic rights and theories of justice’ New York University School of Law Public Law 
and Legal Theories Research Paper Series, No. 10-79 (November 2010) 1, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699898 (accessed on 23 April 2012), who argues 
that SERs are formulated at the wrong level of generality or abstraction; J Mchangama ‘Commentary to 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ September 
2011, available at http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org (accessed on 25 January 2012), who argues 
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In response to this tradition of neglect of SERs, there have been developments in 
international human rights law, at the national and international levels, that have re-affirmed the 
justiciability of SERs and enhanced accountability for their violation. These include the adoption 
of individual and inter-state complaints mechanisms at the international and regional levels,5 as 
well as the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the constitutions of several States.6 At the 
international level, the closest and most recent development is the adoption on 10 December 
2008 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (OP-ICESCR) which expands the mandate of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) to receive and consider individual, group and inter-state 
communications,7 as well as to conduct inquiries into cases of grave or systematic violations of 
SERs by a State party.8 At the national level, the promulgation of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
which entrenched justiciable SERs and empowered courts to enforce them can also be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
against the establishment of an international complaint mechanism to adjudicate SERs through the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR) 
due to the vague nature of SERs and their undefined obligations which might result in subjective and 
preferential decision-making by the CESCR. 
5 In Africa, see The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 
articles 47-56; and, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 3. 
6 Some African countries with entrenched SERs include: The 1996 South African Constitution, the 1980 
Egyptian Constitution, and the 1990 Constitution of Cape Verde. For a more elaborate discussion on the 
SER provisions in African constitutions, see DM Chirwa ‘An overview of the impact of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (2001) 7-10, available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/socio-economic-rights(accessed on 26 October 2011). 
7 According to article 10 OP-ICESCR, this only applies to states that have, upon ratification of the 
Protocol, accepted the competence of the CESCR to receive and consider such communications. See L 
Chenwi ‘Monitoring the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights: Lessons from the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the South African Constitutional Court’ (2010) 5, 
available at 
http://www.spii.org.za/agentfiles/434/file/Progressive%20realisation%20Research%20paper1.pdf 
(accessed on 25 January 2012). 
8 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: resolution / 
adopted by the General Assembly, 5 March 2009, A/RES/63/117, arts. 1, 2, 10, &11 available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c226dd0.html (accessed 24 January 2012). 
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heralded as an important development in relation to the overall realisation of SERs.9 These 
developments are important as they dispel the notion of non-justiciability of SERs, enhance 
accountability for their violation at the international and national levels, as well as bridge the 
ideological divide between civil and political rights (CPRs) and SERs.10 
This chapter aims to undertake a substantive analysis of the nature, scope and content 
of Kenya’s SER obligations at the national and international level.11 The Chapter is divided into 
seven interrelated sections. After this introduction, the chapter undertakes an exposition of the 
applicability and hierarchy of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system taking into 
account articles 2(5) and (6) of the Kenyan Constitution which incorporate customs and ratified 
international treaty law into the Kenyan legal system, in section 2.2. It is submitted that due to 
the above constitutional provisions, Kenya’s international SER obligations have been 
incorporated into the national domestic legal system and the State has a duty to realise them. 
Section 2.3 undertakes an analysis of Kenya’s SERs obligations using the standard of 
progressive realisation, which has been applied at the international level and has been 
incorporated in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution in article 21(2) as read with article 20(5). Section 
2.4 analyses Kenya’s SER obligations as contained in African regional legal instruments, 
contending that these regional SER obligations are immediate as the African human rights 
treaties do not generally espouse the standard of progressive realisation to the maximum of 
available resources.  Section 2.5 advocates the development of the scope and content of the 
entrenched SERs, especially the minimum core content, so as to enhance the realisation of the 
transformative constitutional objectives and aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution.  
Section 2.6 acknowledges the non-absolute nature of the entrenched SERs and discusses 
instances where limitations on SERs can be justified. The chapter then ends with a short 
conclusion in section 2.7. 
                                                            
9 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 22 & 23. 
10 M Sseyonjo ‘Economic, social and cultural rights: An examination of State obligations’ in S Joseph & A 
McBeth (eds.), Research handbook on international human rights law (2010) 36, at 37. 
11 See K Iles ‘Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitation clauses’ (2004) 20 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 448, at 454, who argues that ‘part of the difficulty in [the South African 
SER] jurisprudence has been the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to engage in the task of defining 
the scope and content of [SERs]’ giving the State little guidance on how to implement SERs. 
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2.2 The place of international law in Kenya’s domestic legal system 
As a State party to several international and regional legal instruments that have entrenched 
SERs, Kenya has undertaken a continuum of both immediate and progressive obligations.12 
Some of these instruments include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);13 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);14 the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);15 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC);16 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;17 the 
                                                            
12 SI Skogly Beyond national borders: States’ human rights obligations in international cooperation (2006) 
59. She submits that States’ SER obligations include both positive and negative obligations ranging from 
the obligation to refrain to the obligation to fulfil.  
13 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A 
(III), preamble paras 2 & 5, as well as articles 1, 2, 17, 21(2), & 22-26, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html (accessed 25 January 2012). Debate on the 
binding nature of the SER provisions of the UDHR as part of customary international law is inconclusive. 
However, with the accelerated pace of incorporation of justiciable SERs into national constitutions and the 
adoption of these provisions into binding international legal instruments, there is a strong case for their 
attainment of customary international law status. This makes for their incorporation as part of Kenya’s 
SER obligations in accordance with article 2(5) of the 2010 Constitution as general rules of international 
law. See N Orago ‘A gender perspective of socio-economic rights under the 2010 Kenyan Constitution: A 
mirage or a path towards gender equality and women empowerment in Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila 
(eds.) Judicial enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights: Challenges and opportunities for 
Kenya (2011) 275, at, 282-283; International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) Duties sans 
frontieres: Human rights and global social justice (2003) 30, available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/43/108_report_en.pdf (accessed on 22 February 2012). 
14 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, preamble paras 2 & 3; articles 1 & 6-13. 
Accented to by Kenya on the 1 May 1972, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm 
(accessed on 26 January 2012). See, Orago (n 13 above) 283. 
15 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions on 18 December 1979 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1981, preamble paras 2, 3, 8 & 13; articles 10-14. Accented to by Kenya on 9 
March 1984, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm (accessed on 26 January 2012). 
See, Orago (n 13 above) 286. 
16 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 
20 November 1989. Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. Ratified by Kenya 
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions;18 the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights19 and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa;20 and, the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.21  
Kenya’s international SER obligations are based on the important international principle 
of pacta sunt servanda which provides that ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith.’22 The good faith principle has been characterised 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as one of the key principles governing the creation 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
on the 30 July 1990, articles 23-32, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (accessed on 
26 January 2012). See, Orago (n 13 above) 288. 
17 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, articles, 5-7, 12, 19, & 24-28, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f973632.html (accessed 31 January 2012). Signed by Kenya on 30 
March 2007 and ratified on 19 May 2008. 
18 Kenya has ratified 49 ILO Conventions, 43 of which are in force and 6 have been denounced. Some of 
the Conventions in force include: The Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); The Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); and, Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). For the full ratification information, see 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:1445709296871334::NO:11200:P11200 (accessed on 
26 February 2012). 
19 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions on 1 June 1981 and entered into force 
on 21 October 1986, articles 14-18, 22 & 24. Ratified by Kenya on 23 January 1992, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties (accessed on 26 January 2012). See, Orago (n 13 above) 289. 
20 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 1 July 2003 and entered into force on 
25 November 2005, articles 12-21. Ratified by Kenya on 6 October 2010, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties (accessed on 26 January 2012). See, Orago (n 13 above) 289. 
21 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 1 July 1990 and entered into force on 
29 November 1999, articles 4, 11-15, & 19-20. Ratified by Kenya on 25 July 2000, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/treaties (accessed on 26 January 2012). See, Orago (n 13 above) 289. 
22  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1980), article 26. Good faith in the realisation of SERs is also emphasised by the Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, para 7, UN doc. 
E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122–135. 
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and performance of legal obligations.23 With the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, these 
international obligations have been incorporated into the Kenyan domestic legal sphere by 
articles 2(5)24 and (6)25 of the Constitution.26 The entrenchment of the primacy of international 
law into the Kenyan legal system, a system that has been plagued by almost four decades of 
totalitarian rule, is not a strangely Kenyan phenomenon, but has been witnessed world-wide, 
                                                            
23 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 20 December 1974, 268, 
para. 47, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4023a57c7.html (accessed 17 January 2012). 
24 Provides that “The general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya”. This provision 
has similarities to article 25 of the German Basic Law which provides that ‘the general rules of public 
international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and 
shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory’.  An analysis of the 
practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court indicates that customary international law plays an 
important role in the German legal system as domestic legislative acts must be interpreted in accordance 
with article 25, see G Slyz ‘International law in national courts’ (1995-1996) New York Journal of 
International Law and Politics 65, at 94-95. 
25 Provides that “Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this 
Constitution”. 
26 The practice of directly incorporating international law into the domestic legal system in articles 2(6) of 
the Kenyan Constitution is comparatively similar to the 1991 Colombian Constitution, article 93, which 
provides that international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia take precedence over domestic law; 
and the international obligations entrenched in international SER treaties must be undertaken by 
Colombia, see M Sepulveda ‘The Constitutional Court’s role in addressing social injustice’ in M Langford 
(ed.) Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative law (2008) 144, at 
145-146. Similarly, the Russian Constitution of 12 December 1993, article 15(4) also incorporates 
international law into the Russian legal system by providing that ‘[c]ommonly recognised principles and 
norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation are a competent part of its 
legal system. If an international treaty [...] stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules 
of international treaty apply’. Similar provisions are also included in the new East European States’ 
Constitutions such as Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, 
and Belarus. See VS Vereshtin ‘New Constitutions and the old problem of the relationship between 
international law and national law’ (1996) 7 European Journal of International Law 29, at 34; A Peters 
‘Supremacy lost: International law meets domestic constitutional law’ (2009) 3 International Constitutional 
Law Journal 170, at 171; GM Danilenko ‘Implementation of international law in CIS States: Theory and 
practice’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 51, at 52-53. 
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and is based on the importance of a commitment to international values at the highest level 
possible with the hope of non-regression to totalitarian rule.27 
The change in the Kenyan legal system from dualism to monism was confirmed by 
Justice Martha Koome in in the High Court case of Re The Matter of Zipporah Wambui 
Mathara,28 concerning article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). She held that article 2(6) imports the provisions of international treaties and 
conventions that Kenya has ratified into Kenyan law as part of the sources of Kenyan law.29 
Further affirmation of the changed situation in relation to the applicability of international law in 
Kenya after the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution was provided by the Kenyan Court of 
Appeal in the case of David Njoroge Macharia v Republic.30 The above important constitutional 
provisions are in line with CESCR General Comment Number 9 which recommends the 
immediate and direct application of binding international instruments in the domestic legal 
systems of States so as to enhance the ability of individuals to seek effective, accessible, 
affordable, and timely enforcement of their rights in domestic courts and tribunals.31 
                                                            
27 Vereshtin (n 26 above) 29-30; GL Neuman ‘The use of international law in constitutional interpretation’ 
(2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 82, at 85. 
28 David Ndungo Maina v Zipporah Wambui Mathara, Bankruptcy Cause 19 of 2010, available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/77605.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2011). 
29 As above, at 4. See also John Kabui Mwai & 3 Others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 
Others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 15 of 2011, 6-7; and Ibrahim Songor Osman v 
Attorney General & 3 Others, High Court Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2011, 8-10, where the High Court 
affirmed that since Kenya has ratified the ICESCR, it has become part of the Kenyan law by dint of article 
2(6) of the Constitution.   
30 David Njoroge Macharia v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 497 of 2007, 15, available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/81236.pdf (accessed on 23 February 2012). See also 
CEDAW Committee Concluding Observation to Kenya’s 7th Periodic Report, 5 April 2011, para. 4 where 
the Committee contends that the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution ensured the immediate 
domestication of the Convention. 
31 CESCR, General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, 
E/C.12/1998/24, para. 4, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a7079d6.html (accessed 2 
November 2011).  
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However, progressive as it may seem, the change in the system of applicability of 
international law from a dualistic to a monistic system32 portends great challenges in the 
implementation of the 2010 Constitution, especially the entrenched SERs. The lack of clear 
constitutional safeguards in relation to the interpretation and operationalisation of article 2, 
coupled with the lack of a role for parliament in the treaty-adoption process,33 raises concerns 
about the limitation of Kenya’s sovereignty vis-à-vis international law.34 These concerns are, 
however, too broad to be adequately and comprehensively discussed in this Chapter. The main 
concern of this section is the hierachy or place of international law in relation to other sources of 
law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction. A secondary concern is to what extent the international 
SER obligations of the State, as entrenched in international and regional human rights treaties 
ratified by Kenya, form a part of the core justiciable SERs in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction. 
To answer these questions, a brief analysis of a few of the jurisdictions with provisions 
incorporating international law into their domestic legal system is imperative. 
                                                            
32  Monism is a system of direct incorporation of international law, especially ratified treaties, into the 
domestic legal system without the requirement of enabling domesticating legislation; with the effect that 
international law is not only superior to municipal law, but also determines the content of municipal law. 
See WM Gibson ‘International law and Colombian constitutionalism: A note on monism’ (1942) 36(4) The 
American Journal of International Law 614; Slyz (n 24 above) 67. 
33  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, in article 94(1) vests the legislative authority of the State in parliament, 
and further provides in sub-article 5 that no person or body has the power to make law in Kenya, except 
under authority conferred by the Constitution or legislation. The Kenyan Constitution and the prevailing 
practice, unlike in the United States and in Colombia, does not require the approval of parliament as a 
condition precedent before the executive ratifies a treaty, and thus direct application of treaties as law in 
the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction will be tantamount to legislation by the executive.  
34  Gibson (n 32 above) 614; Slyz (n 24 above) 67, who argues that in monist States, legislatures are 
circumscribed by international law requirements when making decisions, the executive is obliged to 
ensure that international law obligations are faithfully realised, and the courts must take into account and 
give effect to international law in their decisions. A further argument against direct incorporation of 
international law principles (customary international law) is that such incorporation interferes with 
democratic governance as no democratically elected institution evaluates their desirability and acts 
affirmatively to adopt them. See PR Dubinsky ‘International law in the legal system of the United States’ 
(2010) 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 455 at 464. This cautious approach towards the 
incorporation of recent international law customs, especially modern international human rights law, was 
affirmed in 2004 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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2.2.1 International law in the United States domestic legal system 
The supremacy of international law in the domestic legal system of the United States (U.S.) was 
affirmed as early as 1804 when the then Chief Justice Marshal in his interpretation of article VI 
of the U.S. Constitution35 held that ‘an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains’.36 This was affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1895 and 1900 when it held that ‘international law is part of our national law, 
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as 
often as questions of rights depending upon it are duly presented for their determination’.37 
However, international law jurisprudence in U.S. courts has progressively shifted 
towards a nationalist leaning.38 Three reasons have been fashioned for this nationalist shift: first, 
the perceived different nature of international law from, and its potentially pervasive effects on, 
domestic law; second, the perception that fundamental tenets of the domestic legal order, as 
enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be altered by a body of law which does not exclusively 
emanate from a national societal body;39 and, third, an understanding of constitutions as 
emerging from, espousing and responding to a nation’s particular history and traditions.40 This 
                                                            
35 Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that ‘…all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding’. See The 
Constitution of the United States, available at http://constitutioncenter.org/633876696043236250.pdf 
(accessed on 5 April 2012).  
36 Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), quoted in H Hongju-Koh 
‘International law as part of our law’ (2004) 98(1) American Journal of International Law 43, at 44. 
37 See Hilton v Guyot 159 U.S. 113 (1895); The Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900) at, 700, quoted in 
Hongju-Koh (n 36 above) 43. See also XF Torrijo ‘International and domestic law: Definitely an odd 
couple’ (2008) 77 Revista Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 483, at 485, who affirms that the 
supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution allows for the direct incorporation of ratified treating, making 
them applicable, in principle, by national courts. 
38 A Bianchi ‘International law and U.S. Courts: The myth of Lohengrin revisited’ (2004) European Journal 
of International Law 751, at 754. 
39 As above. 
40 S Choudhry ‘Globalisation in search of justification: Towards a theory of comparative constitutional 
interpretation’ (1999) 74 Indiana Law Journal 819, at 822, who expounds on the doctrine of “legal 
particularism” and “legal hegemony” as some of the interpretive attitudes militating against the use of 
international in the interpretation of constitutional provisions in the U.S., at 830-832. 
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shift has signified that for non-self-executing treaty provisions41 to provide concrete litigable 
rights to individuals, parliament must pass implementing legislation.42 The U.S. Supreme Court, 
faced with the question of the status of article 94 of the UN Charter and as a consequence the 
status of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s decision in the Avena case,43 decided in 
Medellin v Texas (2008)44 that the Avena decision was not self-executing within the U.S. legal 
system. The Court, in a six to three decision held as follows:45 
An ICJ judgment creates legal obligations for the United States under public international law and 
should be accorded "respectful consideration" within the U.S. domestic legal system, but is not to 
be accorded the status of binding law to be applied by U.S. courts in the absence of either 
implementing legislation or an intent, clearly expressed in the treaty text, for the provision at issue 
to be incorporated into U.S. law without action by Congress. 
                                                            
41 Application of the non-self-executing principle in the U.S. commenced with the decision of Chief Justice 
Marshal in Foster & Elam v Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), at 314 where he held that a treaty 
addresses itself to the political, and not the judicial institutions of the State, and the legislature must 
execute it before it becomes a binding rule for the Court. The Courts then developed criteria for the 
determination of the self-executing nature of a treaty which included: purpose of treaty and objective of its 
creators; circumstances surrounding its execution; the nature of obligations imposed by the agreement; 
the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation; the 
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods; and, the immediate and long term 
implications of self or non-self-execution (People of Saipan v United States Department of the Interior, 
502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974) and Frolova v U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985)). The above criteria 
were captured in the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. which provided the 
following three conditions, any of which makes a treaty non-self-executing: if it manifests an intention not 
to be an effective domestic law without implementing legislation; if Congress or Senate requires 
implementing legislation; or if the Constitution requires implementing legislation. For a discussion of 
these, see Slyz (n 24 above) 78-80. 
42 Slyz (n 24 above) 67-68 & 78. He gives the example of the U.S. Genocide Convention Implementation 
Act of 1987, sections 1091-1093 which proscribes the statute from creating any substantive or procedural 
right enforceable by law by any party in any proceedings, at 68, footnote 15. 
43 Case concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf (accessed on 12 April 2012). 
44 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
45 Dubinsky (n 34 above) 461. 
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George Slyz contends that this is a prudent way of avoiding the question of the supremacy of 
one system of law over the other, as they do not share a common field of application.46 Andrea 
Bianchi, however, disagrees, contending that it detracts from, and waters down, the intended 
protection envisaged by international human rights and humanitarian law, as was exemplified by 
the lack of international law protection given to Guantanamo Bay detainees in the context of the 
war on terror.47 
On the place of international law in relation to the Constitution and domestic legislation, 
the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and its primacy envisages that treaty or 
customary law provisions inconsistent with the Constitution will not have force of law in the 
U.S.48 On the relationship between federal statutes and international law, the U.S. courts, on the 
basis of the supremacy of the Constitution, have held that federal statutes and self-executing 
treaty provisions have equal status as sources of domestic law.49 Therefore, in case of conflict 
between them, the Courts have used the “last-in-time” doctrine to hold the validity of the 
subsequent instrument, be it the treaty or the statute.50 A reading of articles 2(5) and (6) to 
infuse this type of interpretation in the Kenyan jurisdiction is possible taking into account article 
21(4) of the 2010 Constitution which calls on the State, that is parliament and the executive 
                                                            
46 Slyz (n 24 above) 68. 
47 Bianchi (n 38 above) 758. He cites the case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld where the 4th Circuit Court held that 
the Geneva Convention three on Prisoners of War was non-self-executing and could not create 
enforceable private rights of action in the U.S. domestic courts, at 764.  
48 Bianchi (n 38 above) 780. This position was espoused as early as 1957 in Reid v Covert, 354 US 1, 16-
7 (1957), where the Supreme Court stated that ‘… no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power 
on Congress, or any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution … 
The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government 
and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or the Executive and the Senate combined.' 
49 Slyz (n 24 above) 84; Dubinsky (n 34 above) 458. 
50 DL Sloss, MD Ramsey & WS Dodge (eds.) International law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and 
change (2011) 58. However, to minimise Congressional abuse of the ‘last-in-time doctrine’ U.S. courts 
have purposed to construe statutes so as not to conflict with international law and have strived to 
reconcile subsequent statutes with international law (the Charming Betsy rule of statutory construction). 
Thus, in United States v Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the 
Court held that ‘in order for a subsequent statute to supersede a treaty, the explicit purpose of the statute 
must be to supersede the treaty,’ at 1459. See also, Bianchi (n 38 above) 761-763. 
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respectively, to enact and to implement legislation aimed at fulfilling its international human 
rights obligations. 
2.2.2 International law in the Colombian domestic legal system 
Colombia, a country with a similar consstitutional provision incorporating international law 
directly into the domestic legal system, provides a contrary practice to the U.S. in relation to the 
applicability of international law in the domestic legal system. Monism has been entrenched in 
the Colombian constitutional jurisprudence as far back as 1914, with the Supreme Court of 
Colombia insisting that in instances of conflict between treaty provisions and provisions of 
municipal law, the treaty provisions prevailed.51 This is the prevailing situation after the adoption 
of the 1991 Constitution, and the supremacy of international law was affirmed in 2010 by the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia (CCC).52 In its anlysis of Decision C-376/10, the International 
Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) contends that it was significant 
as it ‘restates that human rights treaties and  general comments by [human rights treaty] bodies 
regarding [SERs] are part of the Colombian legal system and, within it, have a superior standing 
compared with the remaining regulations’.53 
A further elaboration of this expansive use of international law in Colombia is exemplified 
by Decision C-355/2006 of the CCC which dealt with women’s rights to reproductive health and 
especially the right to abortion. In her analysis of this case, Emilia Ordolis chronicles a broad 
use of international human rights law, and an affirmation by the Court that since women’s sexual 
and reproductive rights had been recognised as human rights under international law, they as 
                                                            
51 Challenge on the Constitutionality of Law No. 14 of 1914, Decision of July 6, 1914, 23 Gaceta Judicial 
(1915), analysed in Gibson (n 32 above) 614-615.  
52 Decision C-376/10, available (in Spanish) at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/C-376_10_in_spanish.pdf 
(accessed on 6 April 2012). In arriving at its decision, the Court used a plethora of international legal 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration, art. 26; ICESCR, art. 13; the Protocol of San Salvador, art. 
13; and CESCR General Comments Nos. 11 & 13, see ESCR – Justice, Monthly Case Law Update 
‘Colombian Constitutional Court issues a landmark decision on the right to education’ (November 2010) 
available at http://www.agirpourlesdesc.org/english/esc-rights-caselaw/article/colombian-constitutional-
court (accessed on 6 April 2012). 
53 ESR-Net ‘Decision C-376/10 of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ available at http://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=1407210 (accessed on 6 April 2012). 
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such became part of Colombian constitutional rights.54 She argues that the Court’s reliance not 
only on international human rights law instruments,55 but other soft law instruments56 enabled it 
to espouse a progressive approach to reproductive rights. These instruments formed the basis 
for the recognition and protection of women’s reproductive health by the Court.57 
Monica Olaya, in analysing the health rights jurisprudence of the CCC, contends that the 
Court has developed the notion of “constitutional blocks” which entails the incorporation of 
norms, standards and principles espoused in ratified international human rights instruments, 
and even interpretive documents issued by international human rights monitoring bodies, when 
reviewing the constitutionality of laws or when interpreting fundamental rights.58 This has been 
affirmed by Joie Chowdhury who submits that international human rights treaties ratified by 
Colombia are at the same level as the Colombian Constitution with regard to the hierarchy of 
sources of law, and that the provisions of the ICESCR must be used when interpreting the 
relevant articles of the Constitution.59 
2.2.3 The proposed hierarchy of international law in the Kenyan legal system 
The question then is, which way for Kenya? It is submitted that, as a source of legal obligations, 
international law is either of the same status as constitutional provisions (constitutional 
hierarchy) or slightly lower than the constitutional provisions, but is superior to domestic 
                                                            
54 E Ordolis ‘Lessons from Colombia: Abortion, equality and constitutional choices’ (2008) 20 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 263, at 267. 
55 Instruments relied on include: Universal Declaration, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention Belem do Para). See Ordolis (n 54 above) 267. 
56 The Court used the definition of reproductive health adopted in the 1994 UN International Conference 
on Population and Development (ICPD). See Ordolis (n 54 above) 268. 
57 Ordolis (n 54 above) 268. 
58 MA Olaya ‘The right to health as a fundamental and judicially enforceable right in Colombia’ (2009) 10 
(4) ESR Review 16-17, available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/socio-economic-
rights/esr review (accessed on 2 April 2012). 
59 J Chowdhury ‘Judicial adherence to a minimum core approach to socio-economic rights – A 
comparative perspective’ (2009) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference 
Papers. Paper 27, at 8, available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/27 (accessed on 2 April 
2012). 
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legislation (infraconstitutional but supralegal hierarchy), in the new constitutional dispensation.60 
This is due to the supremacy clause in the 2010 Constitution which not only provides in article 
2(1) that it is the supreme law of the land binding on all persons and all State organs, but also 
provides that its validity is not subject to any challenge, and that any other law, custom, act or 
omission inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, as per 
articles 2(3) and (4). It is submitted here that taking into account a holistic reading of article 2 of 
the Constitution, in incorporating international law as part of Kenyan law in articles 2(5) and (6) 
within the supremacy clause, the drafters intended that international law, so long as it is 
consistent with the purport, spirit and the provisions of the Constitution,61 should have a 
                                                            
60 Torrijo (n 37 above) 491. See also Danilenko (n 26 above) 64, who submits, taking into account the 
debate on the interpretation of article 17 of the Russian Constitution, that international law has the same 
status as constitutional provisions in Russia. This is the position in Argentina whose Constitution in article 
75 also provides clearly that ratified international treaties are at the same level as the Constitution and 
should be considered as complimentary to the rights in the Constitution. Commenting on article 75 of the 
Argentinian Constitution, the UN Housing Rights Programme Report emphasises the importance of giving 
international law a prominent role at the national level, especially in the interpretation, implementation as 
well as enforcement of fundamental human rights, and encourages the inclusion of such clauses into the 
constitutional frameworks of other countries, see UN Housing Rights Programme Report No. 1 ‘Housing 
rights legislation: Review of international and national legal instruments’ (2002) 39-40, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HousingRightsen.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2012). In 
Albania on the other hand, international law is subordinate to the Constitution, but is superior to other 
Albanian laws, see generally, F Korenika & D Doli ‘The relationship between international treaties and 
domestic law: A view from Albanian constitutional law and practice’ (2012) 24(1) Pace International Law 
Review 92, at 103ff. 
61 Inapplicability of treaties contrary to the provisions, principles and purport of the 2010 Constitution can 
be drawn from the use of the word “under this Constitution” in article 2(6). This can be interpreted as a 
requirement that a proper constitutional analysis is undertaken before the ratification of a treaty to ensure 
that it is in compliance with the Constitution and that the processes leading to the ratification of a treaty 
must be accomplished in accordance with the Constitution. See for example JH Jackson ‘Status of 
treaties in domestic legal systems: A policy analysis’ (1992) 86(2) American Journal of International Law 
310, at 317, who contends that there is a possibility that a treaty binding under international law may be 
invalid under the constitution of a State if it conflicts with the provisions of the domestic constitution. In 
such instances, the treaty cannot have a direct application and will be invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency with the domestic constitution. He further argues that for the issue of hierarchy of norms to 
surface in relation to treaty law, it must first be determined that the treaty is valid both internationally and 
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prominent place in the Kenyan domestic legal system. This is to ensure that important 
democratic governance standards as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms 
contained in international law is sufficiently entrenched in the Kenyan domestic legal system, 
and are not left to the whims of the ruling majority of the day to change at their own convenience 
through legislative amendments. In this way, the drafters of the Constitution intended to 
safeguard the democratic and fundamental rights protection gains that were won in the struggle 
for constitutional change and to preclude a relapse to totalitarian rule.62 
This understanding of the place of international law in the Kenyan legal system finds 
resonance with the arguments of Ann Peters who fashions two reasons why international law 
must be placed at the same hierarchical level as national constitutions. First, she argues for the 
abandoning of a formal hierarchy between constitutional provisions and international law 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
domestically (not inconsistent with the Constitution), must be directly applicable (reliance on the treaty 
provisions by the courts and other government institutions as a source of law) as well as invocable by 
parties in litigation, at 318. See also Korenika & Doli (n 60 above) 110-117, who similarly contend, in the 
context of Albania, that for treaties to have direct application, they must be constitutional, and that a priori 
process of analysis of the constitutionality of the treaty is undertaken by the Albanian Constitutional Court 
before the ratificiation of the treaty in question. Though the 2010 Kenyan Constitution has no express 
provision requiring priori review of treaties for constitutionality, a similar procedure must be developed in 
practice to ensure that treaties are consistent with the 2010 Constitution before their ratification. 
62 Torrijo (n 37 above) 491, who avers that ‘domestic legislation should not be allowed to untie what has 
been tied through the incorporation of international law into domestic law’ and that to achieve this, 
international law should be placed beyond the reach of domestic law; Jackson (n 61 above) 322-323 & 
331ff. He contends that: 
[i]f citizens of a nation have a higher degree of trust in the international institutions and treaties 
than they do in their own governmental structures, they will prefer [directly applicable international 
norms with higher status than national legislative norms] as a conscious or implicit check on their 
government. Thus, it is entirely understandable that some persons in recently autocratic countries 
might favour an international regime to protect human rights, at 332. 
This adequately summarises the Kenyan situation and supports the constitutionalisation as well as the 
prominent status given to international law in the 2010 Constitution. See also D Shelton ‘Introduction’ in D 
Shelton (ed.) International law and domestic legal systems: Incorporation, transformation and persuasion 
(2011) 2, who affirms that due to the post-war emphasis on human rights and democratic governance, 
international law has been given a prominent status in domestic legal jurisdictions as a form of 
“international safety net”. 
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provisions by stating that due to the increasing permeability and convergence of State 
constitutions (constitutional cross-pollination) resulting in vertical and horizontal harmonisation 
(that is, with international law and with other State constitutions respectively),  it matters little 
whether a court applies a domestic fundamental right or an international human rights provision, 
because both sets of norms tend to acquire the same content and scope.63  She thus calls for 
the adoption of a “substance-oriented perspective” where norms are ranked in accordance with 
their substantive weight and significance, with less significant State constitutional provisions 
giving way to important international norms in instances of conflict.64 Second, she argues that 
‘[i]n a strictly legal positivist and schematic perspective, a hierarchically inferior norm cannot 
have an impact on the reading of a higher norm’.65 She contends that in accordance with this 
understanding, the idea of the supremacy of domestic constitutional law over international law is 
irreconcilable with the requirement that national constitutions must be interpreted in conformity 
with international law.66  Therefore, for international law to have the desired effect and impact on 
the development of national constitutional and domestic law, it must of necessity be ranked at 
the same level as constitutional provisions. 
                                                            
63 Peters (n 26 above) 197. This is the doctrine espoused by the universalist model of constitutional 
interpretation through the use of comparative international and foreign law sources, which provides that 
constitutional guarantees are cut from a universal cloth and constitutional interpretation is an engagement 
in the identification, construction and application of the same set of principles, see Choudhry (n 40 above) 
833; DM Beatty ‘Law and politics’ (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 131; C L'Heureux-
Dube` ‘The importance of dialogue: Globalisation and the international impact of the Rehnquist Court’ 
(1998-1999) 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15, at 24ff, who avers that since human rights law, national and 
international, are cut from the same cloth and are drawn from similar earlier documents, it makes sense 
for judges to engage with the expertise, experience and reasoning of interpreters of similar documents 
from other jurisdictions.  
64 Peters (n 26 above) 197 
65 Peters (n 26 above) 181. 
66 Peters (n 26 above) 177-178. She gives the examples of the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, article 
16(2); the 1978 Spanish Constitution, article 10(2); and the 1991 Romanian Constitution, article 20(1), as 
those constitutions which require that their provisions are interpreted in conformity with international law. 
See also K Young Constituting economic and social rights (2012) 23, who similarly contends that 
domestic constitutional rights must be interpreted compatibly with international human rights law. 
 
 
 
 
49 | P a g e  
 
Therefore, Kenya, in its implementation of SERs must not only take into account its 
constitutional obligations, but must also enforce its international SER obligations as entrenched 
in ratified international legal instruments and general principles of international law.67 As such, in 
instances of conflict between national domestic legislation and international law, the Courts 
should resort to the use of the Charming Betsy doctrine of constitutional interpretation, 
discussed in section 2.2.1 above, and interpret the domestic legislation, as far as possible, to 
conform to international law, failing which international law should triumph.68 
This approach is envisaged by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, especially article 20(2) 
which provides for the enjoyment of rights in the Constitution to the greatest extent consistent 
with the nature of the rights. This is further buttressed by article 20(3)(b) which calls for the 
adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights.69 This is more in line 
with the approach to international law adopted in Colombia than that adopted in the U.S. It 
                                                            
67 As Kenya already has an extensive constitutionally entrenched catalogue of human rights based on the 
generally recognised international human rights standards, the practice should be that cases on SER 
violations are premised on constitutional provisions, and international law provisions are used as 
additional arguments in support of the constitutional provisions. Only in instances of a real gap in the 
domestic constitutional provisions should international law be applied directly to cover the deficit. See 
Danilenko (n 26 above) 62. 
68 The Kenyan Courts can also benefit from the experience of the Russian Constitution Court in its use of 
international law in the interpretation of constitutional and other domestic laws such as: Case Concerning 
Certain Normative Acts of the City of Moscow and Some Other Regions, VKS 1996, No. 2 at 42, where 
the Court held that article 17 of the 1993 Russian Constitution recognises and guarantees human rights in 
accordance with the general principles and norms of international law, and emphasised that the right to 
freedom of movement is not only guaranteed by the Constitution, but also by the ICCPR, article 12, and 
other international human rights instruments including article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. For more such Russian cases, see Danilenko (n 26 above) 57-59 & 68; 
GM Danilenko ‘The new Russian Constitution and international law’ (1994) 88 American Journal of 
International Law 451; J Henderson ‘Reference to international law in decided cases of the first Russian 
Constitutional Court’ in R Mullerson et al (eds.) Constitutional reforms and international law in Central and 
Eastern Europe (1998) 59. 
69 See also, 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 259(1) which calls for the construction of the provisions of 
the Constitution in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law 
and the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of law; and contributes to good 
governance. 
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espouses an acknowledgment of the transnational nature of international human rights law in a 
globalising world, and a recognition that this nature of human rights law has led to both vertical 
and horizontal constitutional cross-pollination.70 This chapter, therefore, of necessity, adopts an 
expansive elaboration of Kenya’s SER obligations encompassing both national (constitutional) 
and international (ratified human rights treaties and general principles) law, as they have a 
similar scope and content as discussed above. 
2.3 The obligation of progressive realisation to the maximum of available resources  
An understanding of Kenya’s SER obligations must commence from the premises of the 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of rights.71 This is to enhance coherence in 
rights implementation, and to ensure that similar mechanisms are used for the realisation of the 
entire corpus of human rights.72 Internationally, the general obligation for the realisation of SERs 
is premised on the standard of “progressive realisation” in accordance with the “maximum 
available resources” of the State. The standard is entrenched in the ICESCR, the foundational 
binding legal instrument entrenching SERs and generating State obligations for their 
realisation,73 in article 2(1) which provides as follows: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights 
                                                            
70 Hongju-Koh (n 36 above) 53; E Benvenisti ‘Reclaiming democracy: The strategic use of foreign and 
international law by national courts’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 241, at 242; Peters 
(n 26 above) 173-174. She argues that the reception of international standards such as human rights 
protection, good governance and democracy, into national constitutions leads to the vertical convergence 
of constitutional and international law; that is ‘the globalization of State constitutions and the 
constitutionalisation of international law’.  
71 Amartya Sen emphasizes the instrumental values of all rights contending that rights reinforce each 
other and that: political freedoms (free speech & elections) help promote economic activity; social 
opportunities (education & health) facilitate economic participation; and economic facilities (opportunities 
for participation in trade and production) generate personal as well as public resources for social facilities, 
see A Sen Development as freedom (1999) 11. 
72 R Kunneman ‘A coherent approach to human rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323, at 323. 
73 See, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) Economic, social and cultural 
rights: A handbook for National Human Rights Institutions (2005) 5. 
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recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures. 
 
This standard has over the years been incorporated into most of the international legal 
instruments entrenching SERs.74 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), though 
containing the duty to ensure and respect rights without discrimination,75 inserts, with regard to 
SER provisions, that they are to be realised to the maximum of a State’s available resources, 
including reliance on international co-operation.76 Article 477 has been interpreted by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) to inculcate the standard of 
“progressive realisation” as entrenched in article 2(1) of the ICESCR with regard to the SERs of 
children.78 Differentiation of obligations, as with regard to CPRs and SERs, is also apparent in 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) which, even though setting the 
                                                            
74 M Sepulveda The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2003) 256. 
75 CRC, article 2. 
76 CRC, article 4; S Detrick A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1999) 101-102. 
77 Article 4 CRC provides that ‘States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With 
regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the 
maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-
operation’. 
78 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5 (2003), General measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 27 November 2003, CRC/GC/2003/5, paras. 5-8, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538834f11.html (accessed 31 January 2012). Para. 5 incorporates 
the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee (ICCPR) and the CESCR as complimentary in 
the interpretation of the obligations of States under the CRC. Para. 7 acknowledges the constraint of 
resources in the implementation of SERs and introduces the concept of “progressive realisation to the 
maximum extent of available resources”. See also CRC Committee, Working Group 3 ‘States parties’ 
obligations: realizing economic, social and cultural rights – are child rights a luxury during an economic 
crisis?’ available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/20th/BackDocWG3.doc (accessed on 10 
October 2011); Detrick (n 76 above) 103-109. 
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standard for States to ensure and promote the full realisation of human rights, still adopts the 
standard of progressive realisation for entrenched SERs.79 
The standard has also been entrenched into some of the national constitutions that have 
justiciable SERs such as the SAC.80 The SACC adopted the same interpretation that was given 
to the standard by the CESCR in the Grootboom case where it held as follows:81 
Although the Committee’s analysis is intended to explain the scope of the states parties’ 
obligations under the Covenant, it is also helpful in plumbing the meaning of “progressive 
realisation” in the context of the Constitution. The meaning ascribed to the phrase is in harmony 
with the context in which the phrase is used in our Constitution and there is no reason not to 
accept that it bears the same meaning in the Constitution as in the document from which it was 
clearly derived. 
The Kenyan Constitution, germane to this study, also entrenches the standard of progressive 
realisation with regard to entrenched SERs, and should thus adopt a similar interpretation.82 
The SER obligations as entrenched in article 2(1) of the ICESCR differ significantly from 
the undertaking to “respect” and “ensure” that is incorporated in article 2 of the ICCPR.83 This 
was basically due to political, ideological and pragmatic reasons84 at the time of drafting of the 
two covenants which engendered a perceived difference in nature between the two categories 
                                                            
79 See CRPD, article 4 (1) & (2). 
80 The 1996 South African Constitution, sections 25(5), 26 & 27. 
81 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 45. For 
an analysis of the jurisprudence of the SACC on the standard of “progressive realisation” see, Chenwi (n 
7 above) 21-23. 
82 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(2) as read with article 20(5).  
83 Article 2 of the ICCPR entails the general obligation to respect and ensure entrenched rights. 
84 E Wiles ‘Aspirational principles or enforceable rights: The future for socio-economic rights in national 
law’ (2006-2007) 22 American University International Law Review 35, at 38-39. For an in-depth analysis 
of the reasons that were fashioned for the differing state obligations with regards to the two categories of 
rights in the two conventions see Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 116-133. See also: 
Asbjorn Eide ‘Economic, social and cultural rights as human rights’ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas 
Economic, social and cultural rights: A text book (2001) 9, at 10; MA Baderin & R McCorquodale ‘The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Forty years of development’ in MA 
Baderin & R McCorquodale (eds.), Economic, social and cultural rights in action (2007) 3 at 6-12. 
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of rights, and which led to the erroneous conclusion that they required different methods of 
implementation.85 The major prevailing reason, based on the perceived nature of SERs, was 
that SERs entailed highly resource-dependant positive obligations, and thus required only that 
States take steps to the maximum of their available resources to progressively realise these 
rights.86 However, with the contemporary developments in international law, and an improved 
understanding of the nature of SERs, it has become clear that CPRs and SERs both contain 
positive and negative obligations, both require resources to implement, and both contain 
immediate87 and progressive obligations.88 
The difficulty in implementing the “progressive realisation” standard, coupled with the 
monitoring and evaluation challenges it engenders, has led to a barrage of criticisms, with its 
opponents arguing that it is the major reason for the endemic neglect in the realisation of SERs 
nationally and internationally.89 Robert Robertson argues that the use of the standard as a 
measuring tool for State compliance with their SER obligations is problematic as it has eluded 
adequate definition through the years, and that authoritative bodies and rights advocates have 
                                                            
85 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 118-119. See also P Alston & G Quinn ‘The 
nature and scope of state parties obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly  156, at 159-160; D Olowu ‘Human development 
challenges in Africa: A rights-based approach’ (2004) 5 San Diego International Law Journal, 179, at 188-
189. 
86 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 133. 
87 The CESCR has for example elaborated immediate obligations generated by the ICESCR in several of 
its General Comments, for example General Comment No. 4 para. 10, General Comment No. 11 para.10, 
General Comment No. 12 para.16, General Comment No. 13 para.31, General Comment No. 14 para.30, 
General Comment No. 17, paras.25 & 39, General Comment No. 18, paras.19& 33, General Comment 
No. 19, paras.40 & 65, General Comment No. 20, paras.7 & 8. 
88 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has stated, in its interpretation of article 2 of the ICCPR, that the 
“duty to respect” entails negative obligations of non-interference while the “duty to ensure” entails positive 
and progressive obligations of states in the realisation of CPR. See HRC General Comment No. 3 para. 
1, General Comment No. 4 para.3, General Comment No. 17 paras.10 and 18, and General Comments 
No. 28 para. 3. 
89 M Dowell-Jones Contextualising the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Assessing the economic deficit (2004) 39. See also Young - Constituting SERs (n 66 above) 101-104, 
who views the standard as a limitation on SERs. 
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been unable to develop adequate indicators to usefully operationalise it.90 He marks it as a 
‘difficult phrase’ where ‘two warring adjectives describe an undefined noun, where “maximum” 
stands for idealism, and “available” stands for reality; “maximum” is the sword of human rights 
rhetoric, and “available” is the wiggle room for the State.’91 He affirms the need for the 
development of content to the standard; and contends that if the content of the standard is not 
developed, the assessment of State performance in the realisation of SERs will lack vigour and 
SERs will be viewed as idealistic rhetoric, lacking in legal obligations.92 
Matthew Craven contends that article 2(1) of the ICESCR is ‘a fairly unsatisfactory 
article, with its convoluted phraseology in which clauses and sub-clauses are combined together 
in an almost intractable manner, making it virtually impossible to determine the precise nature of 
the obligations’.93 Audrey Chapman also contends that the standard is inexact and difficult to 
monitor, and thus making it difficult to hold States accountable for delay in the implementation, 
or liable for the violation, of SERs.94 She further argues that the standard assumes differentiated 
content of rights and obligations for States depending on their relative level of development and 
availability of resources; and thus necessitating the development of a multiplicity of performance 
standards for substantive SERs in relation to the varied social, developmental and resource 
context of each of the member states of the Covenant.95 David Harris has also argued that the 
language of article 2(1) is wide and full of caveats, making an assessment of compliance or 
infringement by States of their obligations under the Covenant a complex issue.96 Finally, Scott 
Leckie has remarked that with the continued expansive interpretation and clarification of the 
                                                            
90 RE Robertson ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation to devote the “maximum available 
resources” to realising economic, social and cultural rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693, at 
694. 
91 As above. 
92 As above. 
93  M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A perspective on its 
development, revised edition (1998) 151. 
94 AR Chapman ‘A “violations approach” for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23. 
95 Chapman (n 94 above) 31. 
96 D Harris ‘Comments’ in F Coomans and F Van Hoof (eds.) The right to complain about economic, 
social and cultural rights (1995) 103-06. 
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content of substantive SERs, recalcitrant States will seek to rely on the convoluted nature of 
article 2(1) to escape from their SER obligations.97 
To help enhance the understanding of this standard, a systematic analysis of its 
components is imperative. Even though the components will be analysed separately, it is 
important to note that they are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and should thus be viewed 
as an organic whole.98 The components to be analysed include: progressive realisation; 
obligation to take steps; maximum of the available resources; and, international cooperation and 
assistance.  
2.3.1 Progressive realisation  
The entrenchment of the “progressive realisation” standard in the ICESCR was due to the 
recognition that full realisation of all the substantive SERs could not be achieved over a short 
period of time.99 It was thus intended as a flexibility device reflecting the realities of the world 
and the difficulties in achieving the full realisation of SERs, especially for the developing and the 
least developed countries.100 However, due to its haziness, there were concerns that States will 
misuse the standard as an excuse for them to undertake measures to realise their Covenant 
SERs obligations. These concerns led the CESCR to stress that the standard should not be 
misinterpreted to leave States SER obligations bereft of content, but that it obliges States to 
move as expeditiously, and as effectively, as possible towards meeting their goal of the full 
                                                            
97  S Leckie ‘Another step towards indivisibility: Identifying the key features of violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly  81, at 94. 
98 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 313. 
99 CESCR General Comment No. 3, paras.1 & 9; Chenwi (n 7 above) iii; Sepulveda – Nature of SER 
obligations (n 74 above) 312; Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 172, who contend that the adoption of this 
standard ‘mirrors the inevitably contingent nature of State obligations’ on SERs.  
100 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 9. According to the words of Mr. Sorenson, the Danish 
representative during the drafting of the Covenant, the adoption of the standard of “progressive 
realisation” was ‘…necessary and valuable as it introduced a dynamic element, indicating that no fixed 
goal had been set in the implementation of [SERs], since the essence of progress was continuity.’ See 
Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 174. The SACC has interpreted the “progressive realisation standard to be 
inherently limited by availability of resources, see Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), para. 11. 
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realisation of SERs, the raison d’être of the Covenant.101 The Maastricht Guidelines also 
acknowledges this requirement for expeditious realisation of Covenant obligations by providing 
the following:102 
The fact that the full realisation of most [SERs] can only be achieved progressively …does not 
alter the nature of the legal obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken 
immediately and others as soon as possible. [...] The State cannot use the “progressive 
realisation” provisions in article 2 of the Covenant as a pretext for non‑compliance.  Nor can the 
State justify derogations or limitations of rights recognised in the Covenant because of different 
social, religious and cultural backgrounds. 
The progressive realisation obligation goes further than the realisation of the minimum 
essential elements of the entrenched substantive rights, and encompasses an obligation for the 
State to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the rights on a progressive basis.103 This was 
recognised by the SACC in the Grootboom case when it interpreted “progressive realisation”, 
with regard to housing, to engender the obligation of the state to ‘progressively facilitate 
accessibility and examine legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles with the aim of 
lowering them over time and making housing accessible to a larger number, and a wider range, 
of people as time progresses’.104 The Principles and Guidelines for Human Rights Approach to 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (2006) acknowledge that progressive realisation due to resource 
                                                            
101 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 9; Chenwi (n 7 above) iii & 20-21. 
102 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-
26, 1997, guideline 8, available at http://www.escr-
net.org/resources_more/resources_more_show.htm?doc_id=425803 (accessed on 23 January 2012). 
See also the Limburg Principles, principle 21 which obliges states to expedite the realisation of the rights 
and not to use the “progressive realisation” standard to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realisation. 
103 Chenwi (n 7 above) iii & 20. See also, South African Human Rights Commission Working Paper 
‘Millennium Development Goals and the progressive realisation of economic and social rights in South 
Africa: A review (December 2008) 6, available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/1/ESR%20Working%20Paper%20for%20Public%20Hearings%202
009.pdf (accessed 28 March 2012), which defines “progressive realisation” as ‘a continuum where the 
rational is to start at the minimum socio-economic provision necessary to meet people’s basic needs 
(minimum obligation) to the full realisation of a significant improvement of the capabilities of people in the 
society to the extent that they can meaningfully participate and shape society’.  
104 Grootboom, para. 45. 
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constraints requires States to adopt strategies that are time bound, with properly set targets and 
benchmarks.105 This is to ensure that SER policies and programmes are not unduly delayed, 
and that there is a careful prioritisation and balanced trade-offs in the implementation of these 
policies and programmes that conform to human rights norms and standards.106 Progressive 
realisation thus requires the constant review and revision of SER policies and programmes over 
time to enhance the standards of life of the people within the jurisdiction of the State.107 
The use of the term “progressive” necessarily prohibits the adoption of retrogressive 
measures by the State in the full realisation of SERs. According to Sepulveda, progression 
entails two complimentary obligations: ‘the obligation to continuously improve conditions, and 
the obligation to abstain from taking deliberately retrogressive measures except under specific 
circumstances’.108 The CESCR has been very assertive against retrogressive measures in its 
general comments, delineating very stringent conditions for such retrogressive steps to be 
acceptable. It has affirmed that deliberately retrogressive measures must be fully justified in 
relation to the totality of the Covenant rights and in the context of the maximum use of available 
resources.109 
The CESCR has further elaborated in General Comment Number 19, in relation to social 
security, measures that the Committee will consider when looking at the justifiability of 
retrogressive measures. They include reasonableness of the action; comprehensive 
                                                            
105 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights 
Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, 2006, HR/PUB/06/12, para. 49, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46ceaef92.html (accessed 28 January 2012). 
106 OHCHR Principles and Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (n 105 above) para. 50. The human rights 
approach imposes some conditions during prioritisation and they include: the need for effective 
participation by all stakeholders, especially the poor; the establishment of just institutional mechanisms to 
reconcile conflicting worldviews in a fair and equitable manner; the requirement that prioritisation of rights 
meets the principles of equality and non-discrimination and that it does not exacerbate poverty, inequality 
and discriminatory outcomes; and that prioritisation must not interfere with the realisation of the minimum 
core obligations of the other entrenched rights. See, paras. 56-61. 
107 This aspect of the “progressive realisation” standard was expounded by the SACC in Mazibuko and 
Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC), para. 40. 
108 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 319. 
109 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 9; General Comment No. 13, para.45; General Comment No. 
14, para. 32. 
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examination and consideration of alternatives to the retrogressive action; genuine participation 
of the affected groups in decision-making; the long term adverse impact of the action and 
whether it deprives access to the minimum essential levels of rights; and, the presence or 
otherwise of independent national review.110 However, despite the flexibility allowing States to 
justify retrogressive measures, the CESCR in General Comment Number 14 has further stated 
that any such measures which affect the minimum core content of Covenant rights is a violation 
of the Covenant.111 The Maastricht Guidelines also provide that the adoption of deliberately 
retrogressive measures by states is a violation of their obligation under the Covenant.112 
Even though the Covenant adopts the “progressive realisation” standard, it also contains 
immediate obligations.113 They are as follows: non-discrimination;114 obligation to take steps (as 
discussed herein below); obligation to realise the minimum core content of substantive SERs;115 
                                                            
110 CESCR General Comment No. 19, para. 42. Retrogression must be justified by a reference to the 
totality of the rights in the Covenant taking into account the state’s full use of the maximum of its available 
resources. 
111 General Comment No. 14, para. 48.  
112 Maastricht Guidelines, Guideline 14(e). 
113 See CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 1; General Comment No. 4, para.8; General Comment 
No. 9, para.10; General Comment No. 13, paras.31 & 43; General Comment No. 14, para.30; General 
Comment No. 15, paras.17 & 37; General Comment No. 16, paras.16, 32 & 40; General Comment No. 
17, paras.25 & 39; General Comment No. 18, paras.19 & 33; General Comment No. 19, para.40; General 
Comment No. 20, para.7; and, General Comment No. 21, paras.25, 44, 55, 66 & 67. See also Limburg 
Principles, principles 16 & 21. 
114 CESCR General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 
2(2) of the ICESCR) 2 July 2009E/C.12/GC/20, para. 7, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm (accessed on 31 January 2012). It provides 
that ‘[n]on-discrimination is an immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the Covenant’.  The CESCR has 
also stated, in General Comment No. 13, that State Parties have an immediate obligation in relation to the 
right to education, such as the guarantee that the right will be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind. See, CESCR General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 
December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 43, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838c22.html (accessed 28 January 2012). 
115 Limburg Principles, principle 25, which provides that ‘State Parties are obligated, regardless of the 
level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all’. The immediate 
nature of the realisation of the minimum core obligations was disputed by the SACC when it rejected the 
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trade union rights;116 obligation to ensure fair wages and equal remuneration for equal work;117 
the obligation to take measures for the protection of children and young persons without 
discrimination; the obligation to penalise by law the employment of young children and young 
persons in dangerous or harmful work, and the duty to prohibit child labour;118 the duty to 
provide compulsory primary education free of charge;119 obligation to respect the freedom of 
parents to choose the school for their children;120 the freedom to establish and direct 
educational institutions;121 the freedom essential for scientific research and creative activity;122 
obligation to monitor implementation of the Covenant rights,123 which include the duty to submit 
initial and progressive reports to treaty monitoring bodies,124 among others.125 The immediate 
nature of these duties is reflected by the wording of the rights which provides for an undertaking 
to “ensure” and “guarantee”.126 
The immediate nature of the non-discrimination and equality obligations of States with 
regard to SERs can be seen in the standard of compliance entrenched in CEDAW, a convention 
inspired by the principle of equality and non-discrimination.127 CEDAW obliges States to take 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
minimum core content approach to SERs. The Court’s concerns were the difficulty of determining the 
minimum content of the substantive SERs, the fact that societal needs are diverse and people are 
differently situated and that the court was not institutionally competent to make such decisions without 
raising democratic concerns. For a more substantive analysis, see chapter five, section 5.3 of this thesis.  
116 ICESCR, article 8. 
117 ICESCR, article 7 (a) (i). 
118 ICESCR, article 10(3). 
119 ICESCR, article 13(2) (a); CESCR General Comment No. 13, para. 51. 
120 ICESCR, article 13(3). 
121 ICESCR, article 13(4). 
122 ICESCR, article 15(3). 
123 In relation to housing, see, CESCR General Comment No. 4, para. 13. Monitoring requires the 
development of relevant indicators and benchmarks for each of the substantive SER, see Sepulveda – 
Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 363. According to the Maastricht Guidelines, guideline 15(f), 
failure to monitor the realisation of SER is a violation of the Covenant. 
124 Chapman (n 94 above) 25. 
125 See Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 175 &345; Chenwi (n 7 above) 37ff. 
126 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 185-186; Chenwi (n 7 above) 27. 
127  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties 
under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 19 
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appropriate measures, including the adoption of legislation, to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women in all fields of human rights, SERs inclusive.128 The CEDAW Committee 
has interpreted the chapeau of article 2, which engenders the obligations of States to undertake 
measures “without delay”, to mean that States have an immediate and continuing obligation to 
condemn all forms of discrimination, especially those against women.129 It has found that the 
immediacy of the non-discrimination obligation entails the duty of the State to undertake due 
diligence in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations.130 The 
Committee further engenders the duty of the State to enhance substantive equality by adopting 
concrete and effective policies and programmes (including special measures in accordance with 
article 4 of CEDAW) to eliminate discrimination against women, especially taking into account 
the vulnerabilities of girl children.131 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
October 2010, CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, paras. 3, 4 & 5, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d467ea72.html (accessed 31 January 2012). See also UNIFEM 
South Asia & Partners for Law in Development ‘CEDAW: Restoring rights to women’ (2004) 23, available 
at http://www.unifem.org.in/CEDAW.pdf (accessed on 31 January 2012). 
128 CEDAW, articles 2, 3, 8 (right to represent their governments in international organisations), 10 
(education), 11 (employment), 12 (health), and 13 (other areas of SERs); CEDAW Committee 
Recommendation 28, paras. 6 & 7. 
129 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, paras.14, 15& 29. Para. 29 provides that the 
language in CEDAW is unqualified and does not allow for delays or incremental implementation. It, 
therefore, means that delay in the implementation of the CEDAW provisions cannot be justified on any 
grounds, even socio-economic, and further obliges states that may be facing resource or expertise 
constraints to seek international assistance to overcome their difficulties. 
130 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, para. 19. 
131 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, paras. 20-36. Para. 24 provides that the State has 
an obligation to immediately assess the de jure and de facto situation of women and take concrete steps 
towards the formulation and implementation of policy (constitutional and legislative guarantees) targeted 
at the elimination of discrimination and the enhancement of substantive equality of women. Para. 31 calls 
for an overriding constitutional provision eliminating discrimination against women; the incorporation of 
CEDAW provisions into domestic law; the immediate modification or abolition of discriminatory laws, 
regulations, customs and practices; and the enactment of legislation prohibiting discrimination against 
women in all fields of life, with a special attention to vulnerable women. Para. 32 calls for the provision of 
adequate remedies in instances of violations, especially reparations. 
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2.3.2 Obligation to take steps 
This is an immediate obligation that the State must undertake shortly after the ratification of the 
Covenant to enhance the realisation of SERs.132 The obligation requires that the State 
undertakes deliberate, concrete and targeted steps aimed at, and capable of fully realising, 
SERs.133 De Schutter avers that in order to fulfil this obligation as swiftly as possible, the State 
should adopt national strategies entrenched in legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks 
with quantified and time-based objectives reflected in sufficient benchmarks and monitoring 
indicators.134 De Schutter’s contentions are supported by the Principles and Guidelines for 
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies developed by the OHCHR.135 UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in their Voluntary Guidelines for the Progressive 
Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (2004) also 
reiterates that strategies for the progressive realisation of SERs must include: ‘objectives, 
targets, benchmarks, time-frames; and actions to formulate policies, identify and mobilise 
resources, define institutional mechanisms, allocate responsibilities, coordinate the activities of 
different actors, and to provide for monitoring mechanisms’.136 The CEDAW Committee has 
further provided a comprehensive framework that must be met by measures undertaken by 
States in the implementation of their obligations under CEDAW.137 
                                                            
132  Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 165-166. They contend that the “obligation to take steps” was preferred 
by the drafters to the wording requiring States to “guarantee” the rights in the Covenant because the latter 
commitment would have been too onerous. See also D Olowu An integrative rights-based approach to 
human development in Africa (2009) 32. 
133 CESCR General Comment No. 3, paras. 2 & 4. 
134 O De Schutter International human rights law: Cases, materials and commentaries (2010) 462. 
135 OHCHR Principles and Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (n 105 above) paras. 51-55. It requires the 
State’s commitment to poverty reduction, the development of a time-bound plan of action, establishment 
of benchmarks and indicators to enhance monitoring, and the involvement of the public in the design and 
development of the plan of action so that it is reflective of the concerns and the interests of all sectors of 
society. 
136 FAO Voluntary Guidelines for the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the 
Context of National Food Security 23 September 2004, para. 3.3, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/008/J3345e/j3345e01.htm (accessed on 29 January 2012). 
137 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, para. 28. 
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In the domestic context, the SACC, in its reasonableness approach, has held that in order 
for measures aimed at the realisation of SERs to be reasonable, they must meet the following 
criteria:138 
a) Be comprehensive, coherent and coordinated, and must also be properly conceived and 
implemented; 
b) Be inclusive, balanced, flexible and make appropriate short-, medium- and long-term provisions 
for people in desperate need or in crisis situations, whose ability to enjoy all human rights is most 
in peril; 
c) Clearly set out responsibilities of the different spheres of government and ensure that financial 
and human resources are available for their implementation; 
d) Be tailored to the particular context in which they are to apply and take account of the different 
economic levels in society; 
e) Be continuously reviewed because conditions change; 
f) Be transparent and have its contents made known appropriately and effectively to the public; and, 
g) Allow for meaningful or reasonable engagement with the public or affected people and 
communities. 
The steps taken must, therefore, have a time scale of implementation, and must be 
rationally connected to the clear State objective of the full realisation of substantive SERs to the 
greatest majority of people, prioritising marginalised and vulnerable groups in society.139 The 
CESCR has emphasised that even in situations of severe economic constraints, marginalised 
and vulnerable groups must be protected through the adoption of low-cost targeted 
programmes.140 Therefore, a measure that does not prioritise the needs of the marginalised and 
vulnerable groups is less likely to meet the required threshold under this obligation. The 
Grootboom case hinged on this particular aspect and the reason why the Court found the 
housing programme in question to be unreasonable was because it failed to provide for, or to 
prioritise the needs of, people in desperate situations. Similarly, in the case of Minister of Public 
Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association, the same Court held that the obligation to 
                                                            
138 See Chenwi (n 7 above) 35-36 (footnotes omitted). 
139 Chenwi (n 7 above) 10. 
140 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 12; and General Comment No. 15, para. 13. 
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take steps includes the need to facilitate access to temporary relief for people living in 
intolerable conditions and for people who are in a crisis due to natural disasters.141 
 What measures must States adopt in order to fulfil their SER obligations? In answering 
this question it is important to note that States are afforded a margin of appreciation in relation 
to the measures to be implemented in the realisation of their obligations with regard to SERs.142 
The CESCR, in its interpretation of this obligation, requires States to take all appropriate 
measures, depending on the nature of the substantive right in question,143 and such measures 
include, but are not limited to, the adoption of legislation.144 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
explicitly adopts this requirement - that the State is required to undertake legislative, policy and 
other measures for the progressive realisation of the entrenched SERs.145 The Constitution 
further affirms, in article 21(4), the duty of the State to enact and implement legislation aimed at 
fulfilling its international human rights obligations. 
The adoption, or reform, of legislation to enhance the realisation of SERs is an important 
component of the obligation to take steps, especially in instances where the existing legislation 
is in violation of the SER obligations assumed under national and international law.146 The 
adoption of a comprehensive and financially-backed legislative, policy and programmatic 
framework is, therefore, indispensable in laying a proper foundation for the full and progressive 
                                                            
141 Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 
(Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC), paras. 38-40. 
142 M Sseyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law (2009) 54. 
143 The Limburg principles, principle 17 stresses that the measures taken must be consistent with the 
nature of the rights in order to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant. 
144 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 3. 
145 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(2) & (4). 
146 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 167. The CESCR has consistently called on States to amend 
discriminatory laws as can be seen in its Comments such as General Comment No. 13, para. 15; General 
Comment No. 7, para. 9; and General Comment No. 14, para. 50. This is in line with the Limburg 
Principles which, in principle 37, calls on States to eliminate all de jure discrimination by abolishing 
discriminatory laws, regulations and practices; and with the Maastricht Guidelines, guideline 14(b), which 
consider the existence of discriminatory laws as a violation of the Covenant. See Sepulveda – Nature of 
SER obligations (n 74 above) 348-349. 
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realisation of SERs.147 This is recognised by the CESCR, who further affirm the indispensability 
of legislation in combating discrimination,148 in realising the right to health149 and education, the 
protection of mothers and children, as well as the fulfilment of the rights captured under articles 
6 to 9 of the ICESCR.150 
However, the adoption of a legislative framework on its own is not enough in enhancing 
the realisation of SERs at the national level.151 Affirming the inadequacy of legislation alone in 
the implementation of the Covenant obligations, Mr. Cassin, the representative of France at the 
drafting of the Covenant, argued that:152 
[l]egislative texts might prove inadequate when it came to reforms, or indeed, upheavals that [are] 
sometimes necessary to implement certain [SERs] which had not yet been recognised for the 
reason that a number of diverse measures had to be adopted involving changes in the country’s 
economic and social equilibrium. It would be deceiving the peoples of the world to let them think 
                                                            
147 Kenya has been known to enact legislation without the allocation of adequate resources to effectively 
implement them. This was pointed out by the CRC Committee in its consideration of Kenya’s Initial Report 
to the body in 2001, and the Committee encouraged Kenya to allocate resources, human and financial, to 
the organs mandated to implement legislation protecting the SERs of children and to prioritise its 
budgetary allocation to children to the maximum extent of the available resources taking into account the 
principle of the best interests of the child. See CRC Committee, Concluding Comment – Kenya 
CRC/C/SR.725-726, paras. 11-13, 16-19 available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/uncom.nsf/fe005 
(accessed on 19 February 2012). 
148 See CESCR General Comment No. 20, paras. 11, 37, 39 & 40, where the Committee emphasises that 
the adoption of specific legislation is an indispensable measure for eliminating and prohibiting both formal 
and informal discrimination, be it in public or private sphere. See also General Comment No. 16, para. 41, 
where the CESCR has reiterated that the failure by the State to implement and monitor effects of laws, 
policies and programmes aimed at the prohibition of discrimination in access to SERs is a violation of the 
Covenant,. 
149 CESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 56, affirms the need for states to adopt a framework law to 
operationalise the right to health.  
150 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 167. 
151 The Limburg Principles, principle 78 alludes to this by providing that States should not only report on 
the relevant legislative provisions that have been put in place to realise Covenant rights, but must also 
specify ‘the judicial remedies, administrative procedures and other measures they have adopted for 
enforcing these rights and the practices under those remedies and procedures’. 
152 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.232 (1951) Quoted in Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 168. 
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that a legal provision was all that was required to implement certain promises, when in fact an 
entire social structure had to be transformed by a series of legislative and other measures. 
Alston and Quinn also contend that the adoption of legislation on its own does not ipso facto 
discharge relevant State obligations, and that what is required is to make the Covenant 
provisions effective in law and in fact.153 
Thus, the other measures which are considered appropriate to compliment the adoption 
of legislation include the provision of adequate remedies,154 which basically calls on states to 
entrench justiciable SERs in their constitutions and to allow for judicial or other effective 
administrative enforcement of SERs.155 The enforcement measures adopted by the State must 
be practical, accessible, affordable, timely and effective in addressing the violations, or the 
perceived non-realisation, of SERs.156 The 2010 Constitution, in article 22, avails judicial 
remedies to individuals, groups or public interest organisations in the instances of denials, 
infringements or violations of the entire corpus of human rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, 
SERs included. The available remedies in this instance include: a declaration of rights; an 
injunction; a conservatory order; a declaration of invalidity of the infringing law; an order for 
compensation; and, an order of judicial review.157 For Kenya to meet its obligations to provide 
adequate remedies, these constitutional provisions must be made effective to parties who seek 
judicial enforcement of their SERs. The adoption of administrative, financial, educational and 
social measures;158 the creation of appropriate implementation and monitoring institutions,159 
                                                            
153 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 169. 
154 See CESCR General Comment No. 9, para, 2 which provides, among other things, that ‘appropriate 
means of redress, or remedies, must be available to an aggrieved individual or group, and appropriate 
means of ensuring government accountability must be put in place’. 
155 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 5. Some of the provisions in the ICESCR that are amenable to 
judicial enforcement include articles 3, 7(a)(i), 8, 10(3), 13(2)(a), (3) & (4), and 15(3).  
156 CESCR General Comment No. 9, para. 9. 
157 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 23(3). The entrenchment of horizontally applicable justiciable SER 
into national constitutions and the empowerment of the judiciary to enforce those rights play an important 
role in meeting the states duty to protect the population from the violation of their rights by private entities, 
see Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 314. 
158 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 7. 
159 Some of the institutions that may play a key role in the monitoring of SER implementation in Kenya 
are: The Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission and the Office of the Ombudsperson. 
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and the establishment of action programmes160 also constitute steps toward the full realisation 
of SERs.  
Dowell-Jones has decried the continued over-reliance on legal measures such as the 
enactment of legislation and the provision of legal remedies in the realisation of SERs.161 She 
argues that a realistic understanding of the obligations under article 2(1) of the Covenant must, 
as a necessity, involve a discussion of the macro-economic measures that the States must put 
in place to enhance the realisation of SERs, a task that has not been undertaken by either 
commentators or the CESCR due to a lack of technical, administrative or financial means.162 
She mentions some of the macro-economic measures that must be put in place by States so as 
to create a sustainable, non-inflationary growth path capable of generating the requisite financial 
resources to implement SERs. They include the following:163 
[a]doption of deficit reduction and revenue raising programmes; the streamlining of government 
operations including the privatisation of public enterprises in areas efficiently managed in the 
private sector; removing barriers to entry in employment-generating industries; and the 
investment in power, transport and communications infrastructure.  
Resources are critical in the realisation of SERs and unless measures are put in place to 
generate these resources, the full realisation of SERs will remain a pipe dream. It is therefore 
essential that an understanding of the measures to be taken to realise SERs must also include 
measures to enhance macro-economic stability which would lead to the generation of sufficient 
resources for the full realisation of SERs. 
Even though the State has discretion as to the steps it can take with the objective of 
meeting its SER obligations, the final determination of the appropriateness of the steps to meet 
SER objectives lies with the Committee to be determined during the Committee’s consideration 
                                                            
160 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 169. 
161 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 40-43. 
162 As above. 
163 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 44. She quotes CESCR Concluding Observations to Mexico where the 
Committee praised Mexico’s ‘improved macro-economic performance, particularly the reduction of foreign 
debt, the decrease in inflation and the growth of export capacity, all of which create an environment 
conducive to a more effective implementation of the rights under the Covenant,’ E/C.12/1/add.41, para. 3.  
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of the State’s reports or through its expanded mandate as provided by the OP-ICESCR.164 The 
obligation to take measures is however not absolute, as the measures to be taken will be 
determined by the availability of resources as discussed below.165 
2.3.3 Maximum of available resources 
Even though substantive SERs are the same universally, the level at which these rights can be 
realised in any given State will depend vitally on the State’s economy, and this determines the 
threshold a country must meet in discharging its obligations.166 This component is at the core of 
article 2(1) as it ties compliance to quantitative economic factors and necessitates deference to 
the State on the quantum of resources that can be expended in the realisation of its SER 
obligations.167 However, the discretion is not absolute as it would otherwise nullify the substance 
of the State’s obligations.168 The obligation calls for prioritisation in the allocation of State 
resources especially with regard to social spending, and also implies the duty on the State to 
effectively and efficiently use the allocated resources accountably in the realisation of Covenant-
related objectives without diversion or misuse through corruption.169 The need for the 
prioritisation of Kenya’s resources in the realisation of its SER obligations is entrenched in the 
Kenyan Constitution which provides that:170 
[i]n allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest possible enjoyment of 
the right or fundamental freedom having regard to prevailing circumstances, including the 
vulnerability of particular groups or individuals. 
The Constitution further provides that in the instances where the State alleges the unavailability 
of resources to fulfil SERs, it is its responsibility to prove that such resources are lacking.171 The 
constitutional requirements with regard to the availability of resources is thus in line with the 
                                                            
164 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 4.  
165 Chenwi (n 7 above) 10. 
166 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 177-181. 
167 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 44-45. For an example of the use of a State’s discretion to balance needs 
in accordance with the available resources, see the Soobramoney case, paras. 24-25 & 29. 
168 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 177-181. 
169 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 315. 
170 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(b). 
171The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(a). 
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Maastricht Guidelines which provide that the failure by a State to allocate the maximum of its 
available resources to the implementation of Covenant rights is a violation of the Covenant.172 
The maximum available resources do not refer only to the State’s budgetary 
appropriations, but to all the real resources it can muster though the harnessing of public and 
private resources (creation of a conducive legal and social environment to encourage the 
voluntary use of private resources in the realisation of SERs),173 and the resources available 
through international cooperation and assistance.174 This has been affirmed by the CESCR, in 
its statement on the meaning of “maximum available resources” in the context of the OP-
ICESCR, where it avers that this phrase refers to resources existing within the State as well as 
those available to the State from the international community through the facility of international 
cooperation and assistance, as discussed herein below.175 Further, the CESCR has contended 
that in interpreting “the obligation to take steps to the maximum of its available resources” under 
OP-ICESCR, it will assess the adequacy and the reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
the State, taking into account the deliberate, targeted and concrete nature of measures taken; 
non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory use of the State’s discretion; compliance with international 
human rights standards in the allocation or lack of allocation of available resources; adoption of 
options that least restrict SERs where several policy options are available; implementation time-
frames for adopted steps; and, the prioritisation of the situation of vulnerable and marginalised 
groups.176 
                                                            
172 Maastricht Guidelines, guideline 15(e). 
173 Robertson (n 90 above) 698-699. Government practices such as the enhancement of access to land 
and agrarian reforms are capable of enhanced individual, group or community realisation of SERs such 
as the right to food, housing, and improved standards of living. See also A Eide ‘Economic and social 
rights’ in J Symonides (ed.) Human rights: Concepts and standards (2000) 109, at 126-127; D Bilchitz 
‘Health’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009) 56A-1, at 42-
46. 
174 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 13; Sseyonjo – SER in International law (n 142 above) 62. 
175 See CESCR Statement: An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the maximum of available 
resources under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, para. 5, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/Obligationtotakesteps-2007.pdf (accessed 
31 January 2012). 
176 CESCR Statement on OP-ICESCR (n 175 above) para. 8.  
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 The question then is, what are the resources that are at the disposal of a State? 
Robertson argues that resources mean more than just financial resources and includes 
natural/material resources such as land, water, seeds and animals; human resources; 
technological and informational resources; and, organisational resources.177 Radhika 
Balakrishnan et al have advocated an expanded interpretation of maximum available resources 
which incorporates other determinants of availability of resources such as a State’s monetary 
policy,178 financial sector policy and deficit financing.179 They affirm the concept of “fiscal space 
diamond” developed by some economists, with the four points of the diamond containing the 
following sources of resources for the realisation of SERs:180 
[e]xpenditure reprioritisation and efficiency; domestic resource mobilisation through taxation and 
other revenue raising measures; foreign aid grants (Official Development Assistance); and deficit 
financing. 
In addition to the four points above, the authors incorporate a “monetary space” which refers to 
the central bank policies that influence interest rates, exchange rates,181 foreign exchange 
                                                            
177 See Robertson (n 90 above) 695-697. 
178 These include the tax regime operating in any particular country. Olivier de Schutter, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food affirms the importance of a progressive tax regime in the generation of 
resources for the realisation of SERs. He argues, in relation to Brazil, that the skewed and regressive tax 
regime, which has high tax rates for goods and services and low tax rates for income and property, has 
exacerbated inequality in Brazil and thus hampered the redistribution efforts, limiting access to socio-
economic goods and services. See O De Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Mission to Brazil, 19 February 2009, para. 36, available at 
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305_a-hrc-13-33-add6_country-mission-
brazil_en.pdf (accessed on 7 February 2012). 
179 R Balakrishnan et al (Centre for Women’s Global Leadership) ‘Maximum available resources and 
human rights: Analytical report’ (June 2011) 2, available at 
http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/publications/marreport.pdf (accessed on 7 February 2012). 
180 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 4. 
181 A case in point is the lack of adequate financial management policies at the Central Bank of Kenya 
that led to an exponential increase in the rate of exchange of the Kenyan shilling as compared to the 
other international currencies towards the end of 2011, leading to increased inflation, the skyrocketing of 
the prices of basic goods and services and thus generally reducing the amount of resources available for 
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reserves, reserves in the banking sector and the regulation of the financial sector.182 They thus 
call for a re-interpretation and further development of the concept of “maximum available 
resources” so as to enhance the redistribution of material resources and to re-imagine the role 
of the State, not only as the efficient administrator of available resources, but also as an 
institution with the role and potential capacity to mobilise resources for the realisation of 
SERs.183 
One of the criticisms that has been levelled against the “progressive realisation” 
standard is the difficulty in monitoring State compliance with the obligation to use maximum 
available resources in the realisation of SERs. Dowell-Jones indicates that no definite and 
effective criteria for assessing compliance with this obligation have been formulated.184 The 
CESCR has, however, adopted a “social expenditure analysis” approach in which they have 
developed some indicators to assist in assessing State compliance with this obligation. The first 
indicator entails an analysis of the percentage of the national budget allocated to social 
expenditure such as education, health, housing, social security vis-à-vis the expenditure in other 
areas such as defence and debt-servicing.185 Skewed allocation to the other areas indicates a 
lack of prioritisation of SERs and thus an indication that the State is not using the maximum of 
its available resources to fully realise SERs. The second indicator is the assessment of a State’s 
social expenditure in comparison with the social expenditure of other States at the same level of 
development.186 A huge disparity in such expenditure in relation to similarly situated States is 
also an indication of a lack of prioritisation of SERs by a State. 
The Committee’s approach above has been criticised by Balakrishnan et al who argue 
against the limitation of analyses of public expenditure on social spending, arguing that some 
areas of spending such as public investment in infrastructural development (building of roads, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the realisation of SERs, especially for the poor and marginalised who use the majority of their income on 
acquiring the basic commodities for survival. 
182 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 4. The authors argue that a county’s central bank policies influence 
the availability of resources for the realisation of SERs as they impact on the level of employment and the 
utilisation of productive resources. 
183 As above. 
184 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 46. 
185 Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 142 above) 63. 
186 Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 142 above) 64. 
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schools and hospitals), agriculture, and industrial and employment policies also have a major 
impact on the realisation of SERs.187 They further contend that in instances where the private 
sector is involved in the provision of socio-economic goods and services, the State must, as a 
necessity, put in place monitoring and regulatory mechanisms to ensure that its SER obligations 
are met.188 For these mechanisms to be effective, public resources must be expended, 
expenditures that might not be captured by the social expenditure analysis.189 They thus argue 
for an expansive analysis which is inclusive of expenditure on other economic sectors with a 
clear tilt towards the realisation of SERs. They are of the view that the analysis of expenditure 
should not be an end in itself which provides for specific targets such as a definite percentage of 
GDP that must go to each of the substantive SER areas, but should instead be used as a broad 
benchmark for assessing government policy and to detect regression.190 
Dowell-Jones has also criticised the CESCR assessment methods above, arguing that 
the traditional approach of assessing State spending fails to take into account the fact that the 
realisation of SERs is not the sole responsibility of the State191 and that resources for the 
realisation of SERs are not all necessarily intended to be generated by the State alone.192 This 
criticism is supported by Balakrishnan et al who contend that in jurisdictions where the private 
sector is actively involved in the realisation of SERs, social expenditure analysis does not 
provide a true reflection of the amount of resources being harnessed for the fulfilment of 
                                                            
187 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 6. 
188 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 7. 
189 As above. 
190 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 6. 
191 See CRC Committee General Comment 5, para. 56 & CESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 42 
which provides that the realisation of rights engenders not only the responsibility of the government in 
question, but also of other sectors of society such as individuals, professional associations, local 
communities, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and the 
private sector. 
192  Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 47-51. She argues that ‘the approach fails to capture the wide variety of 
institutional arrangements amenable to realising the Covenant rights,’ at 47. She further emphasises that 
the realisation of SERs involves the appropriation of socio-economic risks and costs across economic 
actors, at 49. 
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SERs.193 Dowell-Jones further contends that the approach also conflicts with the principle of 
political and economic neutrality of the Covenant (CESCR General Comment Number 3, 
paragraph 8).194 
A further point of criticism of the social expenditure analysis is that it masks 
discrimination and inequality in the distribution of resources and may not indicate instances 
where the socio-economic needs of the vulnerable and marginalised groups are being 
ignored.195 This is compounded by the general antipathy of States to presenting to the treaty 
monitoring bodies age and sex disaggregated data or data that identifies disadvantaged groups 
and minorities, and their practice of instead presenting national averages that cloak the specific 
needs and concerns of these groups.196 This, as a consequence, limits the viability of the social 
expenditure analysis as it is unable to enhance the protection of the people who are in most 
need of SER protection, the poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups and communities. 
As is indicated by the above criticisms, the lack of proper indicators and analytical 
benchmarks to monitor State use of the maximum of their available resources in the realisation 
of SERs is still a reality. To enhance the realisation of SERs at the national level, and to ensure 
the effectiveness of monitoring of State compliance with their international SER obligations at 
the international level, an expansive analytical mechanism with sufficient indicators and 
benchmarks need to be developed to augment the social expenditure analysis method that is 
currently being used by the CESCR and other treaty monitoring bodies. As Dowell-Jones 
argues, this expansive interpretation should encompass ‘a systematic consideration of 
                                                            
193 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 7. They contend that the analysis of social spending can only be 
taken as a preliminary measurement of the resources allocated to the realisation of SERs and cannot be 
presumed as the definitive standard for the assessment of the State’s fulfilment of its SER obligations. 
194 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 47-51. She argues that different political systems will choose different 
methods of realisation of SERs. She gives the example of liberal States which may shun broad-based 
socialisation of risk and instead choose market-driven solutions with strong individual choice and 
responsibility as the means for the realisation of entrenched SERs. This will thus reflect fewer quanta of 
State appropriations being directed to social spending.  
195 Balakrishnan et al (n 179 above) 7. 
196  Chapman (n 94 above) 28 & 33-34. 
 
 
 
 
73 | P a g e  
 
economic variables while also incorporating sufficient flexibilities to encapsulate the inevitable 
multiplicity of social and political choices as to how the rights are implemented’.197  
2.3.4 International cooperation and assistance 
The requirement for international co-operation in the realisation of rights was first entrenched in 
the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) articles 1,198 55 and 56199 and has been characterised 
as the “centre of gravity of the UN Charter”.200 It has been incorporated in the ICESCR in 
articles 2(1),201 11(1)-(2),202 and 22.203 It has also been incorporated in the CRC,204 and its two 
                                                            
197 Dowell-Jones (n 89 above) 51. 
198 UN Charter, article 1(3), it enumerates one of the purposes of the UN as the achievement of 
international cooperation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
199 Article 56 encompasses the pledge of members of the UN to take joint and separate actions for the 
realisations of the aims of the UN as provided for in article 56 and which include:  
a) the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; 
b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems ... 
c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all... 
200 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 187. Bruno Simma (B Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations – A 
commentary (1994) 793-794) and Sigrun Skogly (SI Skogly ‘Extraterritoriality: Universal human rights 
without universal obligations?’ in S Joseph & A McBeth (eds.) Research handbook on international 
human rights law (2010) 71, at 77-78) both acknowledge the substantive legal obligations for international 
co-operation and assistance that are entailed in the above provisions of the UN Charter. Skogly further 
affirms the primacy of the obligations under the UN Charter in relation to article 103 of the Charter which 
provides for their primacy in cases of conflict with any other international law obligations, see Skogly-
Beyond national boarders (n 12 above) 74. 
201 For the drafting history of article 2(1) in relation to the “international cooperation and assistance”, see 
Skogly-Beyond national boarders (n 12 above) 84-87. The drafting history shows that there was 
consensus as to the importance of international cooperation and assistance in the full realisation of the 
Covenant rights, and of the interpretation of available resources to include resources that could be 
accessed through international assistance, at 86. 
202 Article 11 provides for the right to adequate standards of living and the right to be free from hunger and 
it calls for international cooperation through the consent of States to enhance the progressive realisation 
of those substantive rights. For a substantive discussion, see Skogly-Beyond national boarders (n 12 
above) 89-93.                                                                                                                                                                             
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Optional Protocols,205 CEDAW,206 and CRPD.207 The provision of international assistance has 
raised several issues in the international legal arena on whether it entails a legal obligation on 
developed countries to provide assistance to developing countries.208 This debate has 
especially been premised on the legal nature of the right to development and the advocacy by 
developing States for the creation of a new international legal order. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
203 Article 22 engenders the responsibility of ECOSOC to bring to the attention of other UN organs reports 
on the implementation of the Covenant so as to assist those organs in deciding, in accordance with their 
respective competencies, international measures that they can undertake to assist States fulfil their 
Covenant obligations. For an elaboration of the obligations arising from article 22, see CESCR General 
Comment No. 2 ‘International technical assistance measures (E/1990/23)’ available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc. (accessed on 27 January 2012).  
204 CRC preamble para.12, articles 4, 17(b), 22(2), 23(4), 24(4), and 28(3). For an analysis of this 
provisions, see Skogly – Extraterritoriality (n 200 above) 81; BI Hamm ‘A human rights approach to 
development’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1005, at 1014-1015; W Vandenhole ‘Economic, 
social and cultural rights in the CRC: Is there a legal obligation to cooperate internationally for 
development’ (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 23, at 41ff. 
205 CRC Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, article 10(4) 
which entails  the responsibility of developed States (who are able to do so) to provide financial, technical 
and other assistance multilaterally, regionally or bilaterally so as to address the root causes of exploitation 
of children such as poverty and underdevelopment; CRC Optional Protocol on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, preamble and article 7 which refer to the requirement of international 
cooperation in the implementation of the Protocol and entails the responsibility of State parties (in a 
position to do so) to provide financial assistance through existing programmes or through a voluntary 
fund.  For a more extensive discussion of the preparatory history and interpretation of international 
cooperation and assistance in the CRC and its two Optional Protocols, see generally Vandenhole (n 204 
above). 
206 CEDAW, preamble para. 10. 
207 CRPD preamble para. l; articles 2, 32, 37 & 38. For an analysis of the preparatory works leading to the 
inclusion of international cooperation and assistance into the CRPD, see, Vandenhole (n 204 above) 55-
61. 
208 See for example Alston & Quinn who, basing their arguments on the preparatory works of the 
ICESCR, affirm the difficulty of sustaining an argument that the commitment to international cooperation 
is a legally binding obligation for developed States to provide development assistance to developing 
States, Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 191. 
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The right to development in international law has two components, an internal 
component which deals with the duty of States (as primary duty bearers) to enhance 
development within their own borders for the benefit of their own people; and the external 
component aimed at dealing with the massively unequal international political economy, and 
which places an obligation on developed States to contribute to development in developing 
States through international assistance and co-operation.209 Despite objections to the legality of 
the right to development,210 especially its external component,211 it has been argued that it takes 
                                                            
209 ME Salomon, ‘Legal cosmopolitanism and the normative contribution of the right to development’ in SP 
Marks (eds.) Implementing the right to development: The role of international law (2008) 17. 
210 The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by 146 yes votes, 1 no vote (United States 
of America) and 8 abstentions (Australia, Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Japan, 
Norway and the United Kingdom). See J Donnelly,’ In search of the unicorn: The jurisprudence and 
politics of the right to development’ (1985) 15 California West International Law Journal 473 - 509 for 
arguments against the legal existence of the right to development in international law. Sepulveda also 
indicates that the obligation of international assistance and cooperation was one of the most contentious 
topics during the discussions leading to the elaboration of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, with 
questions asked about their legality or morality and whether the complaint procedures adopted under the 
Optional Protocol will be used to adjudicate on this obligation, see M Sepulveda ‘Obligation of 
international assistance and cooperation in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 271, at 273. 
211 Proponents objecting to the legally binding nature of the external component of the right to 
development have proposed two non-legal justifications for international co-operation and assistance: 
enlightened self-interest and ethical considerations. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (Shaping the 21st century: The contribution of 
development cooperation) contend, in relation to the enlightened self-interest theory as follows: 
Increased prosperity in the developing countries demonstrably expands markets for the goods 
and services of the industrialised countries. Increased human security reduces pressures for 
migration and accompanying social and environmental stresses. Political stability and social 
cohesion diminish the risk of war, terrorism and crime that inevitably spill over into other 
countries. 
Proponents of the ethical approach argue that the obligation of international cooperation and assistance 
is based on: the moral grounds of humanity - ability of individuals in developed States to prevent death 
and human suffering in developing States through the transfer of resources; obligations for corrective 
justice; the rectification of past wrongs done to developing States through slave trade, colonisation and 
inequitable exploitation of natural resources in developing States; and obligations for distributive justice – 
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development assistance from the realms of charity to a more concrete obligation.212 The UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development affirms this by stating that States have a duty ‘to 
cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development’ 
and should fulfil their duties in such a manner as to ‘promote a new international economic order 
based on sovereign equality, interdependence and mutual interest’.213 It calls for State 
cooperation with a view to fulfilling the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.214 
The obligation of international co-operation has also expanded beyond the realm of States to 
incorporate international organisations and the international financial institutions, which must 
adopt a rights-based approach, especially the realisation of SERs, in their developmental 
policies.215 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the distribution of social goods within society, see KD Feyter, World development law: Sharing 
responsibility for development (2001) 24-25. 
212 SR Chowdhury et al (eds.), The right to development in international law (1992) 13. Remarking on the 
philanthropic manner in which international assistance and cooperation has been interpreted, especially 
with regard to allocation of international resources for the realisation of children’s rights in Africa, J Sloth-
Nielsen et al argue that Africa has been viewed as the object of charitable and humanitarian relief rather 
than as a partner in a developmental programme sanctioned and defined by international legal 
obligations. They call for an expanded interpretation of international assistance and cooperation as an 
international legal obligation, see J Sloth-Nielsen et al ‘Available resources: The African context; an 
African perspective’ Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child for the Day of General 
Discussion, 21 September, 2007, at 2, para. 3, available 
athttp://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clcprojects/childrensrights/submissions/CRCsubmissionAfrica 
(accessed on 6 February 2012). 
213 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), (1986) ‘UN Declaration on the Right to Development,’ 
article 3(3), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm (accessed on 6 February 
2012). 
214 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (n 213 above) article 6. 
215 CESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 45; Hamm (204 above) 1016; Sepulveda – Obligation of 
international assistance (n 210 above) 277. See also R Hammonds & G Ooms ‘Wold Bank policies and 
obligations of its member to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health’ (2004) 8 (1) Health and Human 
Rights 26-60, who argue, using the right to health as an example, that World Bank (WB) policies, such as 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper processes, makes it impossible for developing countries to 
undertake social spending that is sufficient to satisfy their core SER obligations due to restriction on social 
spending in national budgets of developing States. They submit that WB member States (developed), 
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Despite the recognised legal obligation of development assistance and cooperation at 
the international level, it has not been recognised in practice, and many international treaty 
monitoring mechanisms have not been assertive in its implementation.216 Although it has argued 
that international cooperation for the realisation of SERs is an obligation of all States,217 the 
CESCR has been very diplomatic in the debate on its legality or otherwise, insisting instead on 
the obligation of the developed countries to provide assistance depending on the availability of 
resources and based on their consent.218 It has continued to urge developing States without 
sufficient resources to realise SERs to seek international assistance.219 It has also emphasised 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
who have ratified international legal instruments providing for the realisation of SERs, are thus in violation 
of their SER obligations under the ICESCR. They contend that State parties to the ICESCR control 
76.28% of the votes in the WB, giving them the power and opportunity to restructure WB policies to 
enhance the realisation of SERs, at 46. 
216 Hamm (204 above) 1015. 
217 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 14 which states as follows: 
The Committee wishes to emphasise that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the [UN] 
Charter, with well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions of the 
Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of [SER] is 
an obligation of all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position to 
assist others in this regard. 
218 See for example CESCR General Comment No. 12 on the right to adequate food, at para. 38, which 
provides that  ‘States have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the UN Charter, to co-
operate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including 
assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Each State should contribute to this task in 
accordance with its abilities’. CESCR General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, at para. 39, also provides that ‘[d]epending on the availability of resources, States [in 
particular States in a position to assist developing countries in fulfilling their core and other obligations 
under the Covenant] should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services  in other 
countries, wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when required’. See also CESCR General 
Comment No. 14, para. 45; General Comment No. 15, para.38; General Comment No. 17, paras.36-38; 
General Comment No. 18, paras.29-30; General Comment No. 19, paras.41, 52-58 & 61; General 
Comment No. 20, para. 14. 
219 Skogly - Extraterritoriality (n 200 above) 95. In CRC Committee, General Comment No. 5, paras. 61 & 
63, the Committee encourages State parties to seek international assistance within the framework of the 
CRC and prioritise the use of those resources for the realisation of children’s rights. It further calls on 
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that developed States need to take into account their actions through international 
organisations, international financial institutions and other private actors under their control to 
ensure that such actions do not interfere with the realisation of SERs in other countries, 
especially the developing States.220 
The CEDAW Committee has also emphasised this by stating that State Parties are 
responsible for their actions that violate human rights even if the affected persons are not within 
their territory.221 The CRC Committee in its general comments has also been unwilling to affirm 
a legal obligation to development assistance, instead choosing to urge donor States and 
international agencies to “contribute systematically” or to mainstream child rights into their 
development strategies.222 The obligation of developed countries in international cooperation 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
State parties to provide and use technical assistance and also to engage UN and UN related agencies in 
the provision of technical assistance in the implementation of the CRC.  
220 Skogly - Extraterritoriality (n 200 above) 95. See also CESCR General Comment No. 18, para. 30 
which provides the following: 
State parties that are members of international financial institutions, in particular the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and regional development banks, should pay greater attention to 
the protection of the right to work in influencing the lending policies, credit agreements, structural 
adjustment programmes and international measures of these institutions. 
See also General Comment No. 20, para. 14; and General Comment No. 19, para. 53, which provides 
that States in their action should not interfere directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of social security in 
other countries. Para. 54 further provides the following: 
State parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by preventing their own 
citizens and national entities from violating this right in other countries. Where State parties can 
take steps to influence third parties (non-State actors) within their jurisdiction to respect the right, 
through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and applicable international law. 
221 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, para.12. 
222 CRC Committee General Comment No. 3 (HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child), para. 41; General 
Comment No. 1(Aims of education), para. 28; General Comment No. 9 (Rights of children with disability), 
para. 16. See also Vandenhole (n 204 above) 44-47. 
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and assistance has also been discussed using the tripartite typology of obligations, which is the 
obligation to respect,223 protect224 and fulfil.225 
Kenya, as a country, has an internal obligation to ensure the harnessing, and the 
effective use, of the resources available internally, both public and private, in the realisation of 
entrenched SERs and of its international obligations on SERs. After the effective and prioritised 
utilisation of internal resources for the realisation of SERs, the country should also look 
outwards to international cooperation and assistance to plug the deficit which is likely to hamper 
                                                            
223 The duty not to engage in activities, or to refrain from measures, that can directly or indirectly affect the 
enjoyment of SERs in other countries. For a more substantive discussion, see Sepulveda – Obligation of 
international assistance (n 210 above) 280-282; Skogly – Beyond national borders (n 12 above) 68-69. 
See also Vandenhole (n 204 above) 23-24 & 26, who avers that while it is not possible to establish the 
existence of the legal obligation to provide development assistance (extra-territorial obligation to fulfil), the 
extra-territorial obligations to respect and protect SERs have crystallised into hard law. 
224 The duty to ensure that non-state actors within their jurisdiction or control (such as transnational 
corporations and international organisations) are prevented from interfering with enjoyment of SERs, or 
engaging in active violation of SERs of people in other countries.  The duty also requires care in the 
adoption of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. See Sepulveda – Obligation of international assistance 
(n 210 above) 282-284; Skogly – Beyond national boarders (n 12 above) 70; Maastricht Guidelines, 
guideline 19. 
225 The duty to fulfil is divided into three components: obligation to facilitate, provide and promote. The 
duty to facilitate entails the responsibility of the developed States to ensure that development assistance 
programmes create the requisite environment for an enhanced enjoyment of SERs in receiving States. It 
thus engenders a responsibility for the adoption of a human rights approach to development that takes 
into account the active participation and involvement of all the people to whom development projects are 
being designed, a bottom-up approach to development. The duty to provide entails the responsibility of 
developed States to provide development assistance to developing and least developed countries when 
they are incapable, from their own available resources and for reasons beyond their control, to realise 
SERs. The target of official development assistance for the developed States has been pegged by the UN 
at 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Product (GNP) for developing States and 0.15-0.20 per cent of the 
GNP for least developed States. The duty to promote entails the duty to empower the population of the 
developing States to be active participants in development, to know and be vigilant about their rights as 
well as to monitor and evaluate the effective use of resources acquired through development assistance. 
See Sepulveda – Obligation of international assistance (n 210 above) 285-289; Skogly – Beyond national 
borders (n 12 above) 71. 
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the realisation of SERs. International resources obtained for the realisation of SERs should be 
used effectively for the intended purposes and resources should not be diverted to other non-
SER projects. The State should, as a matter of urgency, enhance effective participation of all 
people in the use of resources obtained internationally for the realisation of SERs and must also 
put in place effective transparency and accountability as well as monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms to guard against mismanagement or the diversion of resources to other non-
priority areas.226 
2.4 Immediate obligations in the African human rights system  
Kenya has also undertaken international obligations with regard to the realisation of SERs at the 
regional level. These commitments can be gleaned from the regional integration treaties such 
as the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act) and its attendant treaties.227 Kenya’s SER 
                                                            
226 See Sepulveda - Obligation of international assistance (n 210 above) 291, who summarises the duties 
of developing States in relation to the obligation of international assistance and cooperation as follows: to 
enhance assistance flow to the most marginalised and vulnerable in society; to  utilise resources received 
so as to enhance the realisation of SERs, with the prioritisation of the realisation of the minimum core 
content of substantive SERs; to establish mechanisms for the effective utilisation of resources in a 
transparent and accountable manner and to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation; and, to design 
their own development and assistance programme with adequate participation from the affected people 
and establish proper benchmarks and timelines for implementation. 
227 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4937e0142.html (accessed 12 September 2011). Unlike the Charter 
of the OAU which was basically concerned with the rights of States such as self-determination, 
preservation of sovereignty and independence of African States, the integrity of national borders and the 
non-interference with the internal affairs of States (OAU Charter, article II), the Constitutive Act has 
incorporated the protection and promotion of individual rights at its core in its objectives (article 3) and in 
its guiding principles (article 4). See C Heyns ‘The African regional human rights system: The African 
Charter’ (2003-2004) 108 Pennsylvania State Law Review 679, at 681. See also K Kindiki ‘The normative 
and institutional framework of the African Union relating to the protection of human rights and the 
maintenance of peace and security: A critical appraisal’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 97, 
at 98; and E Baimu ‘The African Union: Hope for better protection of human rights in Africa? (2001) 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal 299. 
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obligations can further be found in other regional human rights treaties such as the African 
Charter,228 the African Women’s Protocol;229 and, the African Children’s Charter.230 
 
2.4.1 SER obligations under the African Charter  
States’ SER obligations under the Charter can be gleaned from article 1 which provides as 
follows: 
The Member States of the [AU] parties to the present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties 
and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to them. 
 
The obligations in article 1 are buttressed by article 62 of the Charter which requires the 
submission of State reports on measures that have been taken by States to implement their 
Charter-based obligations.231 States are further obliged to enhance the promotion of human 
rights, especially the rights under the Charter, in their jurisdiction through teaching, education 
and publications.232 States are also obliged to guarantee the independence of the courts and to 
create institutional mechanisms for the promotion and protection of Charter-based rights.233 
Dejo Olowu sums up these obligations as requiring African States to actively enforce the entire 
corpus of human rights, and not merely seeing them as idealistic goals.234 
Unlike the international SERs treaties which encompass the standard of “progressive 
realisation to the maximum available resources,”235 the obligations contained in the African 
Charter are peremptory, requiring states to immediately realise SERs without resort to the 
excuse of lack of resources. Nsongurua Udombana affirms this immediacy by contending that 
                                                            
228 For an elaboration of its SER provisions, see CA Odinkalu ‘Analysis of paralysis or paralysis by 
analysis? Implementing economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 23(2) Human Rights Quarterly 327 at 336-341. 
229 For an elaboration of its SERs provisions, see Orago (n 13 above) 289. 
230 For an elaboration of its SERs provisions, see Orago (n 13 above) 289. 
231 Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 55. 
232 African Charter, article 25. 
233 African Charter, article 26. 
234 Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 56. 
235 For a discussion of this standard, see section 2.3 above. See also Chapman (n 94 above) 30 ff; 
Odinkalu (n 228 above) 332-333 & 335. 
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the Charter envisaged member States taking prompt and adequate steps to secure the 
protection of human rights without expressing any resource limitations.236 The immediacy of 
Charter-based SER obligations is affirmed by Dejo Olowu who contends that in the absence of 
any textual inference to the contrary, the spirit and the letter of the Charter connotes immediate 
implementation of SERs.237 Olowu cautions against the blind extrapolation of SER jurisprudence 
at the international level in Africa so as to prevent the adoption of a model of implementation 
that will provide leeway for African governments to evade their SER responsibilities, or which 
will affirm the protracted scepticism that has derailed the full realisation of SERs at the global 
level.238 He refers to the unified, all-inclusive and classification-neutral nature of the entire 
corpus of human rights in the Charter, and avers that any cynical or pessimistic stereotyping of 
SERs intended to lead to severance of their standard of implementation, vis-à-vis CPRs, would 
amount to a disservice to the drafters of the Charter.239 
The immediacy of the implementation of SERs in the African Charter has raised debate 
within the African Human Rights System (AHRS), especially due to the poverty, under-
development and scarcity of resources that bedevil the African Continent. The immediacy of 
SER obligations has for a long time been the official position of the African Commission having 
been affirmed by the then chairperson Oji Umozurike in his presentation of the Commission’s 
Third Annual Activity Report to the 26th Assembly of the OAU Heads of State and Government 
on 9-11 July 1990. Some scholars have, however, differed from the above view, insisting that 
due to African realities, the immediacy of human rights obligations, especially SER obligations, 
cannot affirmatively be contended. Christopher Mbazira has argued that due to the prevailing 
economic situation of Africa, attended by corruption, poor planning, and insignificance in the 
global economy, immediate realisation of SERs is impossible and that we should instead adopt 
the progressive realisation standard in the AHRS.240 Danwood Chirwa is also of the opinion that 
                                                            
236 Udombana (n 1 above) 199; N Udombana ‘Between promise and performance: Revisiting states’ 
obligations under the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 105, 
at 125. 
237 Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 58. 
238 Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 190. 
239 Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 58. 
240 C Mbazira ‘Enforcing the economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: Twenty years of redundancy, progression and significant strides’ (2006) 6 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 333, at 340. 
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it is unrealistic, considering the many SER problems and human, infrastructural and financial 
resource constraints that African States face, to expect them to be bound by unqualified positive 
obligations.241 He supports his argument by relying on the findings of the African Commission in 
the case of Purohit and another v The Gambia, dealing with article 16 of the Charter, where the 
Commission found that ‘[the Charter] requires States to take concrete and targeted steps, while 
taking full advantage of available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in 
all its aspects without discrimination of any kind’.242 His conclusion is, therefore, that resource 
constraints can be used by an African State as a possible defence in cases of violation of 
SERs.243 
Frans Viljoen, reacting to the above debate and the Commission’s findings in the Purohit 
case, acknowledges that the African Charter, in contrast to the ICESCR, does not make the 
fulfilment of SERs dependant on the availability of resources or to the standard of progressive 
realisation.244 He remarks that due to the consciousness of the Commission as to the resource 
realities in Africa, it read into the Purohit judgment a qualification of available resources and also 
imported from the CESCR the concept of the core obligation of States to take concrete, targeted 
and non-discriminatory steps in the realisation of SERs.245 He, however, clarifies that the 
importation of the qualification of the “availability of resources” may have been influenced by the 
specific wording of article 16 of the Charter which provided for “best attainable state of health” 
and “necessary measures”, and was not meant to be the standard of obligation for the fulfilment 
of other Charter-based SERs.246 He, therefore, concludes that the qualification of “available 
resources” referred to by the Commission in the Purohit judgment should not be applied to other 
unqualified SERs, such as the right to education.247 
                                                            
241 DM Chirwa ‘African Regional Human Rights System: The promise of recent jurisprudence on social 
rights’ in M Langford (eds.) Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative 
law (2008) 323, at 326-27. 
242 Purohit and another v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003), para. 84. 
243 Chirwa - AHRS (n 241 above) 327. 
244 F Viljoen, International human rights law in Africa (2007) 240. 
245 As above. 
246 As above. 
247 As above. 
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It is my submission that from the express reading of the Charter and the analysis of the 
debate around the immediacy of Charter-based SER obligations, it can safely be stated that the 
Charter envisaged these obligations to be immediate. It is further submitted that the resource 
realities of African States and the structural difficulties that have been relied on to justify the 
introduction of the progressive realisation standard in the AHRS are surmountable with good 
and accountable governance which is responsive to the needs of the African people. In support 
of these arguments, reference can be made to the Commission’s jurisprudence in Commission 
Nationale des Droits de L’Homme et des Libertes v Chad, where the Commission found, in 
relation to the lack of a derogation clause in the Charter, that it meant that States cannot 
derogate from their obligations under the Charter at any time, be it during war, emergency or 
any other situation.248 This is further supported by the Commission’s holding in Media Rights 
Agenda and Others v Nigeria, where the Commission, in acknowledging the function of article 
27(2) of the Charter as a general limitation clause, found that:249 
[t]he reason for possible limitation must be founded in a legitimate State interest and the evils of 
limitation of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages 
which are be obtained. Even more important, a limitation may never have as a consequence that 
the rights become illusory. 
It is therefore submitted that allowing States the leeway to use lack of availability of resources 
as a defence to ignore their obligations with regard to SERs will, in the long run, make the rights 
illusory, the very danger the Commission was referring to in the Media Rights case above. 
SERs have suffered years of neglect in Africa, and the failure of African States to take 
them seriously is one of the major reasons for the endemic poverty and under-development 
afflicting the continent as well as the lack of availability of infrastructural, human and financial 
resources to implement them.250 Resources for the implementation of SERs do not come from 
                                                            
248 (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995) at para. 49. 
249 (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) at paras. 69 & 70. Though the above-mentioned cases did not 
expressly deal with SERs in the Charter, the jurisprudence emanating from them is indicative of the 
Commission’s reasoning in relation to State’s obligations under the Charter. 
250 See Agbakwa (n 2 above) 188-191, who closely links the achievement of sustainable development to 
the realisation of SERs and quotes a UNESCO report which avers that ‘national development hinges on 
the ability of working populations to handle complex technologies and to demonstrate inventiveness and 
adaptability, qualities that depend a great deal on the level of education’. He further contends that the 
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the State coffers only, but can be harnessed through the creation of a conducive framework by 
the government to enable individuals and communities to use their own resources to realise 
their own SERs, as has been discussed in section 2.3.3 above.251 The harnessing of private 
resources (private-public partnership initiatives) and reliance on international assistance and 
cooperation are other avenues for enhancing the realisation of SERs.252 The International 
Council for Human Rights Policy has emphasised the importance of developing States showing 
that they have made honest and commensurate efforts at meeting their SER obligations as a 
matter of priority, and to demonstrate a high level of commitment to the objectives of enhancing 
the realisation of SERs if they are to attract the reciprocal commitment of donors in international 
assistance and cooperation.253 
African States have, however, in general not undertaken such initiatives, relying on the 
excuse of non-availability of resources to mask the lack of political will,254 lack of proper 
prioritisation of government expenditure,255 the misuse and misdirection of resources meant for 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
generation of wealth and the enhancement of the ability of the populace to realise full SERs depends a lot 
on the fulfilment of basic SERs such as education and health. He reacts to the lack of resources 
argument by stating that it should only affect the level of realisation of SERs, and does not justify outright 
non-enforcement, the situation presently prevailing in Africa.  
251 See ICHRP, Duties sans frontieres (n 13 above) 1 & 24, who affirm that even though the government 
is not expected to make all the interventions aimed the realisation of SERs, it is the one that is capable of 
focusing the resources and creating the necessary political and legal framework to deliver the core 
services either through public or private institutions.  
252 See Baderin & McCorquodale (n 84 above) 14, who state that developing States must make 
conscientious effort in meeting their SER obligations to the maximum of their own resources through 
careful balancing, prioritisation and effective use so as to encourage international assistance from 
developed States. 
253 ICHRP, Duties sans frontieres (n 13 above) 22. 
254 See Olowu – Integrative rights based approach (n 132 above) 70 who contends that what the 
realisation of SERs in Africa requires is the exertion of political will. He affirms the efficacy of putting in 
place effective, credible and equitable normative and institutional frameworks for the implementation of 
SERs, which has been lacking in Africa. 
255 See Olowu – Human development challenges in Africa (n 85 above) 187, who remarks that many of 
the African States which occupy the lowest ranks of human development spend the most resources on 
the acquisition of military ware. He contrasts this with States with higher human development indices that 
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development, and the pilfering of State resources into private pockets and bank accounts 
through corruption.256 The adoption of the standard of progressive realisation in Africa will not 
make the scenario any better, in fact it will be doubly worsened as States will lack even the 
moral pressure to realise SERs. The adoption of the standard of progressive realisation will also 
hamper the work of the African Court on Human Rights which will have difficulties deciding 
cases related to SERs due to the difficulty in developing indicators for the standard of 
progressive realisation as discussed in section 2.3 above.  
2.4.2 SER obligations under the African Children’s Charter 
Children are a special group deserving of special safeguards and care due to their immaturity 
and vulnerability.257 The need for their protection is entrenched in the Children’s Charter which 
entails the obligation of member States to recognise the rights and duties contained in the 
Charter, and further enshrine the duty of member States to:258 
 
[u]ndertake to take necessary steps, in accordance with their constitutional processes and with the 
provisions of the present Charter to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the provisions of the Charter. 
 
It is clear from the article that the Children’s Charter neither distinguishes between the 
obligations of States with regard to CPRs and SERs nor contain the “progressive realisation” 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
have shown a marked improvement on resource allocation to social spending as compared to military 
expenditure.  
256 See Agbakwa (n 2 above) 189-190, who avers that were it not for poor administration and 
kleptomaniacal tendencies, African states would have by now reached the level of realising at least the 
basic survival needs (minimum core content of SER) for their people. He quotes Richard Falk who argues 
that most third world countries possess sufficient resources to eliminate poverty and satisfy basic 
essential needs if the policy makers were so inclined. See also Olowu – Human development challenges 
in Africa (n 85 above) 198; ICHRP, Duties sans frontieres (n 13 above) 25. 
257 African Children’s Charter, preamble, paras. 3 & 5. See also T Bankole ‘Africa’s Charter on children’s 
rights: A normative break with cultural traditionalism’ (1992) 41(2) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 432, at 434; D Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 157, at 157. 
258 African Children’s Charter, article 1. 
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standard for SERs as contained in the CRC.259 It therefore follows that, like the African Charter 
discussed above, the African Children’s Charter contains immediate obligations of States with 
regard to entrenched SERs.260 Further, the Children’s Charter does not refer to States, an 
indication that the obligations in the Charter are not only vertical, but are also horizontal in 
nature, thus binding parents, and other non-state actors who have not traditionally had 
international human rights obligations such as MNCs.261 The Children’s Charter also places the 
best interest of the child as the primary consideration for States in their undertaking of 
obligations under the Charter, further entrenching the protection accruing to children.262 
The immediate obligations of States vis-à-vis SERs are also contained within the Charter 
provisions such as in articles 11 on education, article 14 on health and health services, article 
15 on child labour, and 16 on protection against abuse; all of which entail the obligation of the 
State to undertake all appropriate measures with a view to achieving the full realisation of these 
rights.263  
However, despite the general immediacy of SER obligations under the Children’s 
Charter, some provisions dealing with specific SERs within the Charter have adopted the 
standard of “progressive realisation”. They include articles 11(3)(b) dealing with the obligation of 
States to progressively make secondary education free and accessible to all; and article 13(2) 
which obliges States to ensure the protection, and access of children with disability to training, 
preparation for employment, and recreation opportunities subject to the available resources. 
Article 13(3) further obliges States to use their available resources with a view to progressively 
                                                            
259 CRC, article 4. 
260  See D Olowu ‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 127, at 130; S Rosa & M 
Dutschke (Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town) ‘Child rights at the core: A commentary on the 
use of international law in South African court cases on children’s socio-economic rights. A Project 28 
Working Paper, May 2006, at 11. 
261 Chirwa – Merits and demerits (n 257 above) 159; Rosa & Dutschke (n 260 above) 10. 
262 African Children’s Charter, article 4. See also A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s 
rights in Africa: An introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 11, at 18.  
263 For further analysis, see Chirwa – Merits and demerits (n 257 above) 162-169; Bankole (n 257 above) 
436. 
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achieving access to public facilities for the children with mental and physical disability. Article 
20(2) also underscores the importance of resources by obliging States to provide material 
assistance to parents and other persons who are responsible for children, with regard to basic 
socio-economic goods and services such as nutrition, health, education, clothing and housing, 
in accordance with the State’s means and national conditions.264 These provisions seem out of 
place taking into account the vulnerability and developmental needs of children, especially 
children with disability, but they may have been the result of compromise, a necessity that visits 
any process of treaty making to enhance ratification and accession. 
Despite the immediate nature of State obligations with regard to the realisation of the 
SERs of children in Africa, several children’s rights experts have acknowledged the inability of 
most African States to realise these rights due to the inadequacy of resources.265 In the Kenyan 
context, the CRC Committee, considering the Initial Report submitted by Kenya in September 
2001, acknowledged the economic and social constraints in the realisation of children’s rights, 
but also stated that these are exacerbated by rampant corruption.266 Resources are key to the 
fulfilment of rights, especially SERs, but the duty of States contain a continuum of obligations, 
some that do not require colossal amounts of resources to implement. Resources should, 
therefore, not be the pretext for the lack of political will to implement children’s SERs. 
2.5 The place of the “minimum core obligations” in Kenya 
The major objective of the entrenchment of SERs in a constitution is to facilitate the reduction of 
poverty and inequality, improve the overall standards of living, and ensure social justice.267 To 
achieve these objectives, a strong normative approach, with sufficient foundational standards 
and tests for the translation of the abstract SER norms into tangible realities for the rights-
                                                            
264 Rosa & Dutschke (n 260 above) 8. 
265 Sloth-Nielsen et al (n 212 above) para. 5. They refer to the stark reality that over 80 per cent of the 
highly indebted poor countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa 
266 CRC Committee, Concluding Comment – Kenya (2001), para. 9. The socio-economic challenges 
identified by the Committee included high external debt payments, pressures exerted by structural 
adjustment, increased levels of unemployment, and deteriorating economic conditions.  
267 Z Yacoob ‘The entrenchment and enforcement of socio-economic rights’ a paper presented by the 
Justice of the SACC at a conference to mark the inauguration of the new building for the SACC 18-20 
March 2004, at 3, available at http://housingjustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/the-entrenchment-
and-enforcement-of-socio-economic-rights.pdf (accessed on 27 January 2013).  
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holders, is crucial.268 This, in essence necessitates that, apart from the duty to realise SERs 
progressively, there exists an implicit minimum core obligation which requires the State to, at 
the very least, provide the most vulnerable of its citizens with the minimum essential levels of 
the entrenched SERs.269 
2.5.1 Foundational origins of the minimum core obligations 
The existence of the minimum core as an intrinsic component of the standard of progressive 
realisation was averred by the CESCR as follows:270 
[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party 
in which a significant number of individuals are deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary healthcare, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic form of education is, prima 
facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. 
The Committee further states that a reading of the Covenant obligations devoid of the minimum 
core is tantamount to depriving it of its raison d’être.271 The Committee has thus been at the 
forefront in developing a comprehensive minimum core jurisprudence detailing the content of 
the SERs in the Covenant.272 The importance of developing the minimum core content of SERs 
                                                            
268 Chowdhury (n 59 above) 2, who contends that without identifying the tangible content of SERs, and 
linking that content to the actual satisfaction of material needs, SERs are reduced to meaningless 
rhetoric, at 5-6. 
269 Rosa & Dutschke (n 260 above) 12; Robertson (n 90 above) 701. See also M Craven ‘Assessment of 
the progress on adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights’ in J Squires, M Langford & B Thiele 
(eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 
27, at 39, who defines the minimum core content of rights as representing a quantitative or qualitative 
threshold of enjoyment;  SACHR – 7th Report on economic and social rights (n 3 above) 14, who affirm 
that the minimum core obligations are an inherent component of the progressive realisation test and that 
the two cannot be divorced from one another. 
270 General Comment No. 3, para. 10. 
271 As above. 
272 See for example: General Comment No. 12 on the right to adequate food, paras. 6, 8, & 33; General 
Comment No. 13 on the right to education, para.57; General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, paras. 43 & 47; General Comment No. 15 on the right to water, para. 37; 
General Comment No. 17 on the right of everyone to benefit from the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author, para. 39; General 
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has been affirmed By Phillip Alston who argues that the logical implication of terming SERs as 
rights is that SERs must give rise to some minimum entitlements, the absence of which must be 
considered a violation of the SER obligations of States.273 
The development of the minimum core relates closely to the “basic needs” paradigm 
developed under the 1976 World Employment Conference which espoused the commitment of 
all International Labour Organisation (ILO) Member States to provide:274 
(i) the minimal consumption requirements needed for a physically healthy population (food, 
shelter, clothing); (ii) access to essential services and amenities (safe drinking water, sanitation, 
health and education); (iii) access of all to adequately remunerated employment opportunities; 
and, (iv) the satisfaction of the needs of a more qualitiative nature (a healthy humane 
environment, and popular participation in making decisions that affect the lives and livelihoods of 
the people and their individual freedoms).  
This basic needs paradigm, like the minimum core content approach, is based on human dignity 
and it finds expression in the understanding that human dignity is entrenched in the material and 
non-material conditions of life required for human survival and happiness.275 As an ILO Member 
State, Kenya is under an obligation to enforce the above-mentioned standards in accordance 
with its ILO commitments, a process of realisation which will go a long way in fulfilling the 
minimum core of the entrenched SERs.  
The imperative for States to realise their minimum SER obligations can be gleaned from 
the development in international human rights law, as is evidenced in the General Comments of 
the CESCR, to the point that resource constraints are no longer a justification for a State to fail 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Comment No. 18 on the right to work, para. 31; General Comment No. 19 on the right to social security, 
paras.59-61; and, General Comment No. 21 on the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, paras.55, 
59 & 67. 
273 P Alston, ‘Out of the abyss: The challenges confronting the new United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 352-353. 
274 Employment, growth and basic needs: A one- world problem, Report of the Director-General of the 
International Labour Office 7 (1976), quoted in Olowu – Human development challenges in Africa (n 85 
above) 200. 
275 Olowu – Human development challenges in Africa (n 85 above) 201. 
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to meet its minimum core obligations.276 The Committee’s stance has been reiterated by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on SERs, Danilo Turk, who contends that ‘States with specific legal 
obligations to fulfil [SERs] are obliged, regardless of the level of economic development, to 
                                                            
276 General Comment No. 3, para. 10 allows States to use the justification of resource constrains if they 
fail to realise their minimum core obligations, though it requires a high threshold which is fulfilled if a State 
is able to show that it has used all the resources at its disposal to satisfy its minimum core obligations as 
a matter of priority. However, the Committee has contended in the later General Comments such as 
General Comment No. 14 (The Right to the Highest Attainable Standards of Health (2000) para 47) and 
General Comment No. 15 (The Right to Water (2003) para 40) that the realisation of the minimum core 
was non-derogable and failure could not be justified by reliance on the lack of availability of resources. 
Para. 47 of General Comment No 14 provides that: 
[i]f resource constraints render it impossible for a State to comply fully with its Covenant 
obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made to use all 
available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations 
outlined above. It should be stressed, however, that a State party cannot, under any 
circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in 
paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable (emphasis added). 
Para. 40 of General Comment 15 provides as follows:  
To demonstrate compliance with their general and specific obligations, States must establish that 
they have taken the necessary and feasible steps towards the realisation of the right to water. In 
accordance with international law, a failure to act in good faith to take such steps amounts to a 
violation of the right. It should be stressed that a State party cannot justify its non-compliance with 
the core obligations set out in paragraph 37 above, which are non-derogable (emphasis added). 
The Draft Principles and Guidelines on the SERs in the African Charter (available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/achpr/files-for-achpr/draft-pcpl-guidelines.pdf (accessed 25 
January 2012)) also acknowledges this progressive shift in the minimum core approach by stating that 
they form a part of the immediate obligations of the State with regard to the implementation of SERs 
(para. 16). It goes further to state that the obligation exists regardless of the availability of resources and 
that no matter the resource constraints, ‘the State should still implement measures to ensure the 
minimum essential levels of each right to members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, particularly 
by prioritising them in all interventions’(para. 17). 
The above jurisprudence shows the shift in international obligations with regards to the realisation of the 
minimum essential elements of SERs, and it is thus imperative that Kenya must take this into account 
when developing the framework for the implementation of entrenched SERs and in SER adjudication. 
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ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all’.277 The minimum core calls for the 
prioritisation of resource allocation in the realisation of the minimum essential to the most 
vulnerable in society, and also entails a stricter standard of judicial review in relation to the 
courts’ enforcement of entrenched SERs278 as is discussed in chapter five, section 5.3 below. 
2.5.2 The minimum core obligations in the Kenyan context 
The most important question at this juncture is whether there is any obligation on Kenya to 
adopt the minimum core approach, and how the adoption of the approach can spur on the 
implementation of SERs. This question raises the following three pertinent issues for discussion: 
- Where do the treaty monitoring mechanisms, especially the CESCR, get their legitimacy 
from to interpret the relevant international legal instruments in question and how does 
this warrant States’ voluntary compliance with the monitoring bodies’ interpretations? 
- Do the monitoring bodies, in their interpretation of the Covenant and in the development 
of the minimum core obligations employ interpretive approaches that are consistent with 
the rules of interpretation accepted under international law? 
- What has been the practice of States in relation to the general recommendations that 
have been adopted by treaty monitoring bodies, especially the CESCR? 
These issues are broadly dealt with below with the objective of making a case for the adoption 
of the minimum core approach in Kenya. 
i) Interpretive legitimacy and authority of treaty monitoring bodies 
The treaties detailing SERs have reporting mechanisms created by State parties to monitor 
State implementation of the treaties, be it through State reporting, consideration of individual, 
group or State communications, or by conducting inquiries. The mandates of these treaty bodies 
give them the authorisation to interpret the provisions of relevant treaties in line with the 
                                                            
277 Second Progress Report Prepared by Danilo Turk, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para. 52(d), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.SUB.2.1991.17.En?Opendocumen
t (accessed on 2 February 2012). See also Limburg Principles, principle 25; Maastricht Guidelines, 
guideline 9. 
278 S Liebenberg 'The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights' (2005) 21 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 436-472. 
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experiences through the formulation of General Comments.  The ICESCR, in part IV, mandates 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to receive State reports279 and to produce General 
Comments to assist States and UN specialised agencies in the implementation of their 
obligations under the Covenant.280 
In order to enhance the implementation of its mandate, ECOSOC created the CESCR in 
May 1986,281 taking over from the ECOSOC Sessional Working Group of Government Experts 
that had been monitoring implementation on behalf of ECOSOC from 1976.282 The Committee is 
composed of experts with recognised competence in SERs and they act in their personal 
capacity, enhancing their impartiality and independence.283 They also represent different 
geographical, legal and social systems of the world, enhancing the consideration of the different 
world-views in its interpretation of Covenant provisions.284 The CESCR is mandated to submit to 
ECOSOC a report of its activities, including a summary of its consideration of State reports and 
general recommendations, so as to facilitate ECOSOC’s responsibilities under articles 22-22 of 
the Covenant.285 Alston simplifies the above mandate into the following responsibilities:286 
(1) the clarification of the normative content of each of the relevant rights; (2) the encouragement 
of more meaningful reporting by State parties; (3) the improved cooperation with relevant UN 
bodies, including the specialised agencies; (4) the facilitation of greater input from non-
governmental organisations; and (5) the effective follow-up to the examination of States' reports. 
Though the CESCR was not specifically established in the ICESCR, as is the norm with 
the other treaty monitoring bodies, its establishment was authorised and done in accordance 
with the Covenant. The fact that its work is mainly aimed at assisting ECOSOC, the body that 
was conventionally mandated to monitor the implementation of Covenant, does not detract from 
                                                            
279 ICESCR, articles 16-20. 
280 ICESCR, articles 21-22. 
281  It was established under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, 1985 
U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1985). 
282 See, Alston – Out of the Abyss (n 273 above) 333. He details the failures of the Working Group which 
led to the establishment of the CESCR, at 335-349 
283 Resolution 1985/17 (n 281 above), para. b. 
284 As above. 
285 Resolution 1985/17 (n 281 above), para. f. 
286 Alston – Out of the Abyss (n 273 above) 349-379. 
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the authenticity of its mandate and the legitimacy of its interpretation of the Covenant as is 
encompassed in its Concluding Observations and General Comments. 
The legitimacy of the other treaty monitoring bodies such as the CEDAW Committee, 
CRC Committee and the CRPD Committee have not generated much debate as their mandate 
is provided for within the text of the relevant treaties. The CEDAW Committee is established 
under part V of the Convention287 and article 21 provides for its mandate to make suggestions 
and adopt General Recommendations based on the consideration of State reports and 
information received from State parties. The acceptability of its General Recommendations can 
be gleaned from the fact that even though the Convention provides for a system of dispute 
resolution in instances of a difference in interpretation or application, the system has so far not 
been used to challenge any of the interpretations of the Convention as has been provided by 
the CEDAW Committee.288 
The CRC Committee is established in part II of the CRC289 and it is mandated to receive 
and consider State reports,290 and to make General Recommendations based on information 
received from State parties and other specialised agencies in accordance with articles 44 and 
45.291 Lastly, the CRPD Committee is established under article 34 of the Convention with the 
tasks of considering State reports,292 and can also make suggestions and General 
Recommendations based on the examination of State reports and on the information received 
from State parties.293 
Since States have ratified these relevant treaties knowing the mandates of the 
monitoring bodies, they have, in good faith, undertaken to be bound to accept the authenticity 
and legitimacy of the General Recommendations emanating from them, and should thus be 
expected to be bound, or at least to be authoritatively persuaded, by the General 
Recommendations in good faith. This conclusion is supported by Alston and Quinn, in relation to 
                                                            
287 CEDAW, article 17. 
288 CEDAW, article 29(1). 
289 CRC, article 43. 
290 CRC, article 44. 
291 CRC, article 45(d). 
292 CRPD, articles 35-36. 
293 CRPD, article 39. 
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the CESCR, where they contend that if State parties had ratified the Covenant in good faith, and 
given the CESCR genuine authority as the body charged with the interpretation of the Covenant 
provisions, then they must, as a necessity, be bound by the interpretation that has been 
accorded to the treaty by the CESCR, including the incorporation of the minimum core content 
into State parties SERs obligations.294 
ii) Compliance of the treaty monitoring bodies with rules of interpretation under international law 
On this second question, SERs are part of human rights law, which are part of the larger body of 
international law. So the customary rules of treaty interpretation, albeit with a little adjustment 
due to the sui generis nature of human rights instruments, also apply to SERs.295 The customary 
rules of interpretation are encapsulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
articles 31-33. Article 31(1) is especially informative as it calls for treaty provisions to be 
interpreted in good faith taking into account not only their ordinary meaning (literal 
interpretation), but also the objects and purpose of the relevant treaty (teleological 
interpretation), and the context in which the treaty is applied (systematic interpretation). To 
further support article 31, the Vienna Convention provides other aids of interpretation which 
include the preparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.296 
In using the above rules to interpret human rights treaties, the monitoring bodies are 
expected to take into account the objects and purposes of the relevant treaty, and to undertake 
an expansive interpretation aimed at providing the greatest and most effective protection to 
individuals and groups.297 This should be done in accordance with the principle of good faith 
                                                            
294 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 160-161. 
295 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 74, 77-87. She undertakes an extensive 
discussion, quoting several authors and decisions of the International Court of Justice, especially the 
Advisory Opinion on the Reservation of to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, which indicate the special nature of human rights treaties as treaties granting 
protection to individuals and groups who are not parties to the treaty but who need protection all the 
same.  
296 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 32.  
297 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 79. She quotes the European Court in Soering v 
United Kingdom where the Court stated the following:  
In interpreting the Convention, regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the 
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms […] thus the object and 
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which requires that positive rules of law contained in treaties are interpreted and applied 
honestly, fairly and reasonably.298 The customary norms of treaty interpretation as well as the 
principle of good faith have been effectively employed in practice by the treaty monitoring 
bodies in the interpretation of the contents of the relevant legal instruments. A case in point is 
the CESCR which has undertaken an expansive interpretation to make the entrenched SER 
provisions effective and practical in the protection of the relevant groups and individuals. This 
can be seen in the development of the minimum core obligations of States, which is aimed at 
giving content to SERs to make them practical in the protection of marginalised and vulnerable 
groups.299 
iii) State practice in relation to the general comments of treaty monitoring bodies 
On this third issue, and as has been discussed above, the treaty monitoring bodies are 
authoritatively mandated to monitor the implementation of the relevant treaties, and as such 
have the authority to interpret the scope of their (the treaties’) provisions through the General 
Comments. Through their General Comments the monitoring bodies have developed the 
minimum core obligations as being implicit in the obligations of States in accordance with the 
relevant treaties.300 Even though under traditional international law these General Comments 
are not legally binding on member States, it is beyond doubt that they carry considerable legal 
clout.301 This is reflected in the wide acceptance of the monitoring bodies’ General Comments 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires 
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.  
She further discusses the need for an evolutive interpretation of human rights treaties taking into account 
the developments in international human rights law and in the context of the present day conditions, 
basically adopting the ‘living instrument principle’. She refers to the European Court case of Airey v 
Ireland where the court stated in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights that ‘the 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions and it is designed to safeguard the 
individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals’, at 80. 
298 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 76. 
299 CESCR General Comment No. 9, para. 11 & 15; General Comment No. 12, para.6; and General 
Comment No. 14, para.11. 
300 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 10. 
301 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 88; Craven (n 93 above) 91. 
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by State parties to those relevant treaties.302 Kenya, as a State party to the relevant treaties is, 
therefore, under an obligation to fulfil its obligations under these treaties in good faith, including 
the realisation of its minimum core obligations on SERs. Failure to do so will be indicative of bad 
faith.303 
2.5.3 An analysis of the viability for the adoption of the minimum core obligations in the 
development of Kenya’s SER jurisprudence  
It is generally accepted that where there is doubt with regard to the meaning or import of 
domestic law, that law should be interpreted in a way that gives credence to the relevant 
international obligations accruing to the State due to its ratification of international legal 
instruments.304 Kenya has undertaken international SER obligations by ratifying the international 
and regional legal instruments as has been discussed above.305 The Kenyan Constitution 
acknowledges that all these international human rights instruments and all the general rules of 
international law accruing from them form part of Kenyan law.306 The provisions of the ratified 
international legal instruments have been interpreted, by the authoritative mechanisms 
responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of those instruments, to include the 
minimum core obligations envisaged by the entrenched rights. Kenya, taking into account the 
doctrine of good faith, must thus be bound to adopt the interpretation of the monitoring bodies 
on the minimum core obligations and thus implement the same in its legislative, policy and 
                                                            
302 Chenwi (n 7 above) 4-5; Craven (n 93 above) 92, who contends that the endorsement of the General 
Comments of the CESCR by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly  where a number of State parties 
participate in the consideration of the Committee’s report as a clear indication of acceptance of the 
interpretation given to the ICESCR provisions by the Committee. See also Chowdhury (n 59 above) 5, 
who states that national courts have been known to draw from the CESCR’s General Comments when 
they adopt the minimum core approach.  
303 Sepulveda – Nature of SER obligations (n 74 above) 88. 
304 Alston & Quinn (n 85 above) 171. An expansive interpretation of constitutional rights to accord with 
international law has been adopted by the High Court of Kenya in the case of John Kabui Mwai (n 29 
above) 7, where the Court relies heavily on the education provisions of the ICESCR as well as the 
elaboration of the right to education in General Comment No. 13 of the CESCR in interpreting the right to 
education in article 43(1)(f) of the 2010 Constitution. 
305 It has been indicated in section 2.3 above that the implementation of the minimum core is an 
immediate obligation of each and every State party to the Covenant. 
306 For this discussion, see section 2.2 above. 
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programmatic framework aimed at the realisation of the entrenched SERs, and also by the 
courts during the adjudication of SER cases as is discussed more elaborately in chapter five, 
section 5.3 below.307 
A wholehearted espousal of the minimum core approach in understanding, 
implementing, and enforcing SER obligations can be seen in national practice in domestic 
jurisdictions, as has been espoused in Colombia by the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC), 
a country with a similar constitutional clause incorporating international human rights law in 
ratified treaties into the national jurisdiction as part of national law.308 The commitment of the 
Court to the minimum core approach has been exemplified by its development of the concept of 
“the minimum conditions for dignified life” a concept constructed from the right to life, human 
dignity, health, work and social security.309 This approach has been used in individual cases 
such as in a case on the right to health, in a situation of 22 Tutela310 actions dealing with a 
systematic violation of the right to health in Colombia.311 The Court, adopting the right to health 
framework expounded by the CESCR in General Comment Number 14, restructured the entire 
                                                            
307 For the importance of adopting the minimum core obligations, see Limburg Principles, principle 5; 
Maastricht Guidelines, guideline 8. See also CESCR General Comment No. 9, paras. 3 & 15, which 
requires States to interpret domestic legal provisions in a manner that gives credence to their 
international law obligations and discourages reliance on national laws to defeat international legal 
obligations. 
308  Chowdhury (n 59 above) 7-8. He affirms that the CCC has adopted and uses the minimum core 
approach as expounded by the CESCR. He cites some of the cases dealing with housing and health 
where the Court has categorically applied the minimum core content approach and they include: ‘CCC 
decision, T-859, 2003; CCC decision, T-025, 2004; CCC decision, T-585, 2006’. 
309 Sepulveda – The Constitutional Court’s Role (n 26 above) 148. 
310 A tutela is an innovative writ of protection of fundamental rights enshrined in article 86 of the 
Colombian Constitution and which can be filed by any person whose fundamental rights are threatened or 
violated, and requires immediate protection. It entails a summary proceeding with the judge obliged to 
provide a resolution within ten days of a writ being filed. See Sepulveda – The Constitutional Court’s Role 
(n 26 above) 146. 
311 CCC Decision T-760 of 2008, discussed in Olaya (n 58 above) 16-17; AE Yamin & OP Vera ‘The role 
of courts in defining health policy: The case of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2008) 1-4, available 
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Yamin_Parra_working_paper.pdf (accessed on 2 
April 2012).  
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Colombian health system by giving content to the right to health.312 It distinguished essential 
minimum core aspects of the right to health which were immediately enforceable, from those 
aspects which were subject to progressive realisation taking into account the available 
resources.313 The Court thus ordered the provision of specific health goods and services such 
as the provision of viral load tests and anti-retroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS, costly cancer 
treatment, the implementation of which were resource intensive.314 
The espousal of the minimum core content approach by the Court can also be seen in 
an earlier case on the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs).315 One of the three main 
orders of the Court was for the government to guarantee the protection of survival-level content 
(essential core) of the most basic rights such as the right to food, education, healthcare, 
housing, and land within a stringent period of six months from the date of the decision.316 The 
adoption of the minimum core in this case has led to the improvement in access to education 
and healthcare for the IDPs with nearly 80 per cent of them benefitting.317 In its 2010 decision C-
                                                            
312 Yamin & Vera (n 311 above) 3. They argue that in adopting the health jurisprudence of the CESCR, 
the Court: (i) elaborated on the multiple dimensions of  State obligations on the right to health, and the 
importance of monitoring and oversight to enhance protection and accountability; (ii) reiterated the 
responsibility of the State to adopt deliberate measures to achieve progressive realisation, and the 
impermissibility of retrogression; and the importance of transparency, access to information, public 
participation in the realisation of the right to health. 
313 Yamin & Vera (n 311 above) 3-4; Chowdhury (n 59 above) 8; Olaya (n 58 above) 16-17. Her analysis 
of the Court’s minimum core reasoning indicates that the Court acknowledged that the right to health has 
both positive (which require resources to implement) and negative obligations (which require State 
abstention); enforceability of positive obligations (as the vital minimum) depended on their urgency and 
the impact of their non-implementation on human dignity; and that non-implementation of positive 
obligations which did not have adverse impact on human dignity were subject to progressive realisation.   
314 Yamin & Vera (n 311 above) 2. 
315 Sentence T-025/04, this judgment was the outcome of the aggregation of 1,150 constitutional 
complaints (tutelas) by IDPs. This case is discussed in more detail in chapter four, section 4.5 below. 
316 C Rodriguez-Garavito ‘Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on socio-economic rights 
in Latin America’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1669, at 1682 &1693. 
317 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 316 above) 1686. He however remarks that due to the high number of IDPs, 
with over 5 million IDPs in the last 25 years and 280, 000 IDPs in 2010 alone, access to the other SERs 
has been unsatisfactory, with 98 per cent of them living in poverty, and only 5.5 per cent having adequate 
housing, at 1687. 
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376/10, a case concerning the validity of article 183 of Law 115 of 1994 which authorised public 
education institutions to implement charges for education, the Court, taking into account 
international human rights law as incorporated in the Colombian domestic jurisdiction through 
articles 44, 67 and 93 of the Constitution,318 held that a right to free primary education was 
immediately enforceable.319 
The Colombian system of protection of rights has been defined as “biting substantive 
progressiveness” by Manuel Cepeda-Espinoza, a former judge of the CCC.320 Progressiveness 
recognises that: rights are not absolute, and must be developed and expanded within certain 
limitations; implementation of rights must show advancement accompanied by proof of 
progress; and, that advancement should show progressiveness towards an outcome, which is 
the effective enjoyment of rights.321 The substantiveness of the approach is indicated by two 
phenomena: the adoption of a fixed standard that substantively defines the scope and content 
of rights (including the minimum core); and, the ability of the Court to give a remedy to the 
individual petitioners while at the same time ordering structural remedies to cover similarly 
situated people, a contrast to the South African situation exemplified by the Grootboom case.322 
The biting nature of the approach is indicated by the extensive nature of the decisions as they 
impose government expenditure on implementation, order administrative and policy changes, 
and prompt regulatory action.323 
                                                            
318 See Amicus brief to case C-376/10 prepared by The Cornell International Human Rights Clinic, Robert 
F. Kennedy Centre for Justice and Human Rights, and Association NOMADESC (November 2009) 1, 
available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Amicus-Brief-w-Annexes-Report-ENG-FINAL.pdf (accessed 
on 6 April 2012).  
319 See, ESR-Net ‘Decision C-376/10 of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ available at http://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=1407210 (accessed on 6 April 2012).  
320 MJ Cepeda-Espinoza ‘Transcript: Social and economic rights and the Colombian Constitutional Court’ 
(2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1699, at 1702-1703. 
321 Cepeda-Espinoza (n 320 above) 1702-1703. Transparent rights-based rationality, which requires the 
State to define objectives, rationalise means to objectives, develop policies and regulations aimed at the 
fulfilment of objectives, and to build institutional capacity to enhance the achievement of objectives, can 
also be said to form part of the substantive aspect of the approach. 
322 Cepeda-Espinoza (n 320 above) 1703. 
323 As above. 
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It is therefore imperative, following the Colombian example, that Kenya adopts the 
minimum core approach and entrenches it in the legislative, policy and programmatic framework 
aimed at the implementation of SERs. An expansive reading of the entrenched SERs to 
incorporate the minimum core approach is envisaged by the Kenyan Constitution, especially 
article 20(2) which provides for the enjoyment of rights in the Constitution to the greatest extent 
consistent with the nature of the rights. This is further buttressed by article 20(3)(b) which calls 
for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights.324 The CESCR 
has been categorical that an understanding or a reading of substantive SERs which does not 
incorporate the minimum core deprives SERs of their raison d’être. It has emphasised an 
extensive and inclusive interpretation of SER obligations, and has categorically called on States 
not to interpret SER provisions in a way that deprives them of their meaningful content, and thus 
rendering them ineffective and illusory.325 It follows, therefore, that for the entrenched SERs to 
achieve the purpose for which they were intended, in accordance with article 19(2) of the 
Constitution, the minimum core obligations envisaged by the entrenched SERs must be upheld. 
The adoption of the minimum core approach necessitates the development of the 
substantive content of SERs. This, however, raises another set of questions, which are, how to 
pragmatically determine the substantive content of the rights, and how a determination of the 
substantive content of SERs will be beneficial to Kenyans, especially the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised. This question has been one of the major concerns that led to the SACC declining 
to adopt the minimum core approach to the interpretation of SERs.326 It raises the dilemma of 
how, in a diverse society with different understandings of minimum essential needs for human 
survival and well-being, there can be an imposition of a detailed and comprehensive theory of 
value to determine what the minimum core content of each of the SERs entail.  
However, to respond to the above concerns, the very entrenchment of justiciable SERs 
in the Constitution can be said to be an acknowledgment of the very diversity of society and a 
                                                            
324 See also, 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 259(1) which calls for the construction of the provisions of 
the Constitution in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances the rule of law 
and the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights; permits the development of law; and contributes to good 
governance. 
325 CESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 31; General Comment No. 13, para.44; General Comment 
No. 9, para.11; and General Comment No. 3, para. 9. 
326 Grootboom, paras. 32-33. 
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realisation that different individuals and groups have different needs that must be provided for. 
These needs can be met either through the adoption of relevant legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework by the State to provide an enabling environment to allow people to 
meet their basic socio-economic needs using their own resources; or through the actual 
provision of basic socio-economic goods and services to individuals and groups who are unable 
to provide for themselves. This acknowledgment resonates perfectly with the international 
obligations of the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill SERs as discussed in the case 
studies in chapter six and seven below. This, in essence, therefore places the responsibility for 
the development of the content of SERs squarely on the doorstep of the government, especially 
the political institutions.327 
 How then will the political institutions determine the contents of SERs? My submission 
here is that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of work has already been done in the 
international arena, especially by the CESCR and other international experts,328 to develop the 
minimum essential elements for most of the SERs entrenched in the Constitution. All that is 
required of the State, therefore, and this can be done almost immediately without raising 
arguments about the availability of resources, is to use the available international material to 
develop the minimum essentials to the entrenched SERs taking into account Kenya’s peculiar 
historical context, priorities and long-term objectives. If this is done in an inclusive process 
allowing for participation of all the Kenyan people in accordance with article 10 of the 
Constitution, the State will be able to develop a detailed and comprehensive standard detailing 
the minimum core content of the SERs that is inclusive and that is acceptable to all Kenyans. As 
part of the process of developing the minimum core content of SERs, the State must incorporate 
the requisite achievable targets, indicators, benchmarks and specific timelines to provide 
guidance in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the plan of action as well as 
enabling the public and other watchdog institutions to also monitor progress.329 The minimum 
                                                            
327 For a more elaborate discussion, see chapter four, section 4.2 below. 
328 See generally, S Chapman & S Russell (eds.) ‘Core obligations: Building a framework for economic, 
social and cultural rights’ (2002); P Hunt, Reclaiming social rights: International and comparative 
perspectives (1996). 
329 S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Woolman et al Constitutional law of South 
Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009) 33-42. 
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core contents, as developed by the political institutions, will then be polished by the courts over 
time as and when cases dealing with specific SERs come to the courts for interpretation. 
 The adoption of the minimum core approach will be beneficial to the poor, vulnerable 
and marginalised individuals, groups and communities because it will breathe life into the 
abstract constitutional provisions, and ensure that the government has clear criteria within which 
to structure its legislation, policies and programmes aimed at implementing the entrenched 
SERs. Such criteria will involve the development of the content of the abstract SERs in the 
Constitution to ensure that both the citizenry and the government have a clear understanding of 
the nature, content and extent of the rights provided by the constitutional provisions and a clear 
understanding of the duties imposed on State institutions by the provisions. Such criteria are 
also important for the donor community, international agencies, and, national and international 
NGOs as they can then choose specific aspects within the criteria to fund and also have clear 
indicators for monitoring the State’s policies and programmes for the implementation of SERs. 
2.6 Limitations on SER obligations 
An understanding of the scope and extent of Kenya’s SER obligations is incomplete without 
undertaking a limitations analysis, as limitations impact directly on the extent of the obligations 
that accrue to the State. The importance of this analysis is affirmed by Roza Pati who contends 
that the ascertainment of the legal effect of a right by only defining its substantive scope is 
incomplete until a limitations analysis is undertaken due to the need to balance societal needs 
vis-à-vis individual interests.330 The International Council of Human Rights Policy has also 
affirmed the importance of a limitations analysis, especially in instances where resources are 
constrained and capacities are inadequate.331 This section will, therefore, briefly undertake a 
limitations analysis with regard to the SERs in the Kenyan Constitution. 
The incorporation of a limitations clause in legal instruments, national or international, is 
a recognition of the non-absolute nature of rights. Limitation is thus a legitimate way in which 
                                                            
330 R Pati ‘Rights and their limits: The constitution for Europe in international and comparative legal 
perspective’ (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 323, at 324-325. See also J Mutakha-Kangu 
‘The theory and design of limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms’ (2008) The Law Society of 
Kenya Journal 1, who argues that effective protection of human rights at the national sphere is dependent 
on the design of the limitation clause. 
331 ICHRP Duties sans frontieres (n 13 above) 15. 
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legal instruments accommodate the democratic conflict between entrenched rights and 
competing social interests.332 The non-absolute nature of human rights, and the legitimacy of a 
limitations clause in a constitutional system, was affirmed by the SACC in the case of De Reuck 
v Director of Public Prosecution (Witwatersrand Local Division) and others.333 The Court 
acknowledged the importance of harmonious co-existence in society and noted the need for a 
balancing process should individual rights conflict.334 However, it is important to emphasise that 
SER obligations can only be limited by the State in particular instances, and the following 
criteria must be met for the restrictions to be legal: the objectives justifying such limitation must 
be legitimate; the limitation must be prescribed by law; and the limitation must not be 
disproportionate, meaning that it must not exceed the aim envisioned by the particular 
limitation.335 The restriction on limitation is based on the principle that the exercise of public 
power derives its force from the relevant legal instrument, be it a treaty or a constitution, and 
must therefore be justified with reference to that particular legal instrument.336 
In the Kenyan context, limitation of rights is envisioned by article 24 of the Constitution, 
which provides clear grounds that must be met before limitation on rights can be legitimate. A 
discussion of these grounds of limitation is the main thrust of this section. However, as has been 
discussed in section 2.2 above, Kenya has also incorporated ratified international law into its 
                                                            
332  H Cheadle ‘Limitation of rights’ in In H Cheadle, DM Davis, & N Haysom (eds.) South African 
constitutional law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 30-1. The first national constitution to engender limitation of 
rights was the German Basic Law (German Constitution of 23 May 1949). For a comprehensive analysis 
of limitation under the German Basic Law, see Pati (n 330 above) 234-342. 
333 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecution (Witwatersrand Local Division) and others 2002 (12) BCLR 
1285 (CC), para. 89.  
334 As above. See also Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others; Shalabi & Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs & Others; Thomas & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (3) SA 
930 (CC), para. 57; S v Mamela & Another 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC), para. 32. In Mamela, the Court affirmed 
the need for a balancing exercise based on the proportionality principle, holding that the more serious the 
impact of limitation, the stringent the criteria for its justification and the more onerous the requirements for 
its justification (justifications must be persuasive and compelling). 
335 De Schutter (n 134 above) 241. See also S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), at para. 
104. 
336 S Woolman & H Botha ‘Limitations’ in Woolman et al Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 
(2009) 34-7. 
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domestic jurisdiction in accordance with article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution, and so has 
incorporated international human rights obligations arising from international human rights 
treaties and customs. In that context, it is thus important that a brief analysis of the use of 
limitation at the international and regional sphere be undertaken so as to inform the 
interpretation of article 24 of the Constitution. Therefore, before we commence an analysis of 
article 24, it is imperative that an analysis of limitations at the international and regional levels 
be undertaken. 
2.6.1 Limitations in the international sphere 
At the international level, the ICESCR acknowledges the possibility of the limitation of the SERs 
entrenched therein. The limitation clause is contained in article 4 which provides that SERs can 
be limited as provided by law, and that such limitation must be compatible with the nature of the 
rights, and must be done only for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.337 Article 5 further prohibits the destruction of SERs or the imposition of limitations 
exceeding the extent envisioned by the Covenant.338 The Covenant goes further to espouse the 
principle of permeability and interdependence of rights by foreclosing the use of its provisions as 
a pretext to limit or lower the level of protection of any other rights provided for in other treaties 
or national law.339 Article 5(2) is thus a saving provision aimed at preserving the sanctity of laws 
providing higher SER protection than those envisaged in the Covenant.340 
The Limburg Principles also provide that these articles were meant to protect rights 
rather than to permit imposition of limitations, and calls for their strict interpretation.341 It 
interprets the provision “determined by law” to refer to a national law of general application 
which must be clear and accessible to everybody, consistent with the Covenant, and must not 
                                                            
337 See CESCR General Comment No. 14, para. 28 & 29 where the Committee affirmed that article 4 was 
meant to protect rights and not to impose limitation on rights by States. It thus calls for a restricted 
interpretation of article 4 in accordance with the elements enumerated in the article, and further clarifies 
that international standards must be adhered to in the imposition of limitations. It states that limitation 
measures must be of a limited duration and subject to review. 
338 ICESCR, article 5 (1). 
339 ICESCR, article 5 (2). 
340 Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 142 above) 102. 
341 Limburg Principles, principles 46-47.  
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be arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.342 It further requires the adoption of adequate 
safeguards and the provision of effective remedies should the limiting law be abused or used 
illegally.343 For the limitation to be compatible with the nature of the rights, it should not render 
the rights ineffective or illusory.344 
The phrase “general welfare” has been interpreted to ensure that limitations should only 
be aimed at furthering the economic, social and cultural well-being of the people as a whole, 
meaning that a proper proportionality test must be undertaken if the limitation is to be justified.345 
The proportionality test must be undertaken within the context of a democratic society 
characterised by pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness taking into account the views of 
minority groups and preventing the arbitrary totalitarian imposition of limitations on minority 
groups by the majority.346 
The interpretation of article 4 of the ICESCR in the Limburg Principles is informed by the 
work of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, especially the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of the Provisions 
in the ICCPR.347 Though based on the ICCPR, Siracusa Principles provide general interpretive 
principles relating to the justification of limitations that have application across all the 
international treaties allowing for limitation of rights. Some of the principles include the 
prohibition of limitations that jeopardise the essence of the rights; strict interpretation of 
limitation clauses in favour of rights, and in accordance with the nature of the right; compatibility 
of limitations with the objects and purpose of the Covenant; non-arbitrary application of 
limitations; provision of safeguards and remedies against abusive use of limitations; non-
discriminatory application of limitations; necessity and the basis of limitations on justifiable 
                                                            
342 Limburg Principles, principles 48-50. See also Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 142 above) 100-
101. 
343 Limburg Principles, principle 51.  
344 Limburg Principles, principle 56. 
345 Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 142 above) 101. 
346 As above. 
347 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984), available at 
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/humanrights/HUMR5503/h09/undervisningsmateriale/SiracusaPrincip
les.pdf (accessed on 9 February 2012). 
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Covenant grounds; and, the proportionate pursuit of legitimate aims responsive to public needs 
in accordance to the Covenant.348 
The CESCR has not substantively expounded on the interpretation of article 4 in a 
General Comment.349 However, guidance on understanding it can be sought from the work of 
the Human Rights Committee, especially its General Comment Number 27 where it provides 
that permissible limitation must be provided by law and the law must establish all the conditions 
under which the right may be limited.350 It further provides that the limitation must be necessary 
in a democratic society for the protection of the Covenant acknowledged purposes, must not 
impair the essence of the right, must not confer unfettered discretion on the authority charged 
with their execution, must conform to the principles of proportionality, must be appropriate to 
achieve their intended purpose, and must be the least intrusive among the available options.351 
The conditions under which limitation of rights are permissible in the international sphere 
have been affirmed by several judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The Inter-American Court in an 
Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Word “Law” in Article 30 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights has affirmed the importance of guarantees and safeguards to 
fetter the discretion of governments in the application of limitations so that the inviolable 
attributes of the individual are not impaired.352 The European Court on Human Rights has also 
held that even though States could legitimately limit rights, they must do so in a manner which is 
compatible with their international law obligations, and such limitations must be subject to 
                                                            
348 Siracusa Principles, principles 1-14. 
349 A reference was made to article 4 by the CESCR in General Comment No. 14, paras. 28 & 29. 
350 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of 
Movement), 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, paras. 11-12, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45139c394.html (accessed 9 February 2012). 
351 As above, paras. 13-16. 
352 Inter-American Court ‘The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 6 (1986), paras.22-24, available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4f.htm (accessed on 9 February 2012). The Court held that 
the legitimacy of a limitation is guaranteed in it passing through the national legislative process and the 
opportunity being given to the people, through their representatives to express their disagreements or to 
propose different optional initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
108 | P a g e  
 
review by the treaty monitoring mechanisms.353 It further held that in undertaking these review 
functions, the Court must ascertain the necessity of the limitation, especially with regard to an 
existing pressing social need, and the proportionality of the limitation in relation to the purpose 
sought to be achieved.354 Similarly in the Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom, the 
European Court held that rights, freedom of expression in this instance, are subject to a number 
of exceptions, which must be narrowly interpreted, and the necessity for limitation convincingly 
established.355 It stated that “necessary” must imply the existence of pressing social need, and 
that even though States have discretion in the imposition of limitations; the same is subject to 
the overall supervision of the treaty monitoring bodies.356The Court further held, in relation to 
proportionality, that it has to look at the limitation in question in light of the entire national context 
as a whole. In doing this, the Court has to determine whether the limitation is proportionate to 
the legitimate aims being pursued, and whether the State’s justifications are relevant and 
sufficient.357 
2.6.2 Limitations in the regional sphere 
The question of limitation of rights in the African Human Rights System (AHRS) has raised 
some debate due to the lack of a general limitations clause in the African Charter and its 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well as the African Children’s Charter, unlike 
other regional human rights instruments.358 Concerns on limitations are specifically greater in 
relation to the SERs in these instruments, as they do not contain internal limitations or claw-
back clauses as is the case with the CPR. In response to this debate, the African Commission 
                                                            
353 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, 64/1991/316/387-388, Council of Europe: European 
Court of Human Rights, 23 September 1992, para. 69, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7020.html (accessed 9 February 2012). 
354 As above, para. 70. 
355 The Observer and the Guardian v The United Kingdom, Application No. 13585/88, Judgement of 26 
November 1991, Para.59 (a) & 60, available at http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/681 
(accessed on 9 February 2012). 
356 As above, para.59 (c). 
357 As above, para.59 (d). 
358 Viljoen (n 244 above) 348-352; F Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
comprehensive agenda for human dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (2003) 425. 
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has delineated article 27(2)359 as the general limitations clause and has developed limitations 
jurisprudence around the article.360 The Commission has affirmed that a law limiting rights must 
be a law of general application,361 and must be in conformity with the provisions of the African 
Charter.362 It has then propounded a proportionality test which balances the nature and extent of 
the limitation imposed vis-à-vis the legitimate State interest aimed to be protected by the 
limitation. In the Media Rights case the Commission stated as follows:363 
The reasons for possible limitation must be founded in a legitimate State interest and the evils of 
limitation of rights must be strictly proportionate with, and absolutely necessary for, the 
advantages which are to be obtained. Even more important, a limitation may never have as a 
consequence that the right itself becomes illusory. 
The Commission is thus basically contending that any use of the limitations clause must meet 
the basic requirements of legality, necessity and the prohibition of arbitrariness.364 It has further 
found, when undertaking the proportionality analysis, that if there is more than one way of 
achieving the legitimate State objective, the measure that least limit rights must be adopted.365 
The Commission thus contends that the onus of proving the legitimacy of the limitations of rights 
is on the State, and that once the limitation of a right has been proven, it is up to the 
government in question to justify the reasonableness of that limitation.366 
                                                            
359 It provides that ‘[t]he rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest’. 
360 See Media Rights Agenda & Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998), para. 68; Prince v 
South Africa, Communication 255/2002, para, 43 reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander, Compendium of key 
human rights documents of the African Union 3rd edition (2007) 239;  
361 Media Rights case, para. 71; Prince case, para. 44. 
362 Media Rights case, para. 66. 
363 Media Rights case, paras. 69-70; Prince case, para. 43;  
364 Ouguergouz (n 358 above) 430. 
365 Communication 242/2001 Interights & Others v Mauritania (2004) AHRLR 87 (ACHPR 2004), para. 
82-85. 
366 Media Rights case, para. 73. The Commission states that the Nigerian government had not provided 
any evidence to justify its limitation of the freedom of expression. See also Communication 212/98 
Amnesty International v Zambia, para. 50, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/212-98.html (accessed on 17 February 2012), where the 
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 The object and purpose of the legal instruments in the AHRS are to confer protection on 
individuals, and the limitations clause must be interpreted with this in mind. Ouguergouz argues 
that having the object and purpose of the African Charter in mind, article 27(2) should be given 
the most restrictive interpretation possible so as to enhance the protection of rights entrenched 
in the Charter.367  
2.6.3 Limitations in the domestic sphere 
Limitation of rights is not a new concept in the Kenyan constitutional jurisprudence, with the 
1963 Constitution having contained a limitations clause.368 A reading of the limitation clause 
however indicates that it was not meant to be a general limitations clause, but was only a 
reference to the internal limitations within the provisions in the Bill of Rights. The construction of 
the internal limitations envisaged restricted use, as they were meant to only operate to curtail 
enjoyment of rights in instances where the exercise of rights prejudiced the rights and freedoms 
of others or the public interest.369 In Changanlal v Kericho Urban District Council, a case dealing 
with compulsory acquisition of private property, the Court held that such an acquisition was 
subject to payment of compensation and no legislation would pass constitutional muster if it took 
private property without compensation.370 The Kenyan courts have generally been state-centric 
in their proportionality test where rights have been limited by the State. This was apparent in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Commission not only cautioned against a too easy resort to the use of limitation, but also found that the 
onus is on the State to prove that it is justified to resort to the use of the limitation clause 
367 Ouguergouz (n 358 above) 432-433. 
368 See 1963 Constitution of Kenya, section 70 which provides that:  
[t]he provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to those 
rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection as are contained in those 
provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms 
by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest. 
369 Internal limitations included that related to the compulsory acquisition of private property, section 75; 
arbitrary search or entry, section 76(2). See generally Mutakha-Kangu (n 330 above) who contends that 
due to the pervasive nature of the internal limitations in the Bill of Rights, it has been described as a bill of 
exceptions, at 1. 
370 (1965) EA 370. 
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Pattni v The Republic where it was held that public interest triumphed individual interests.371 
Under the old Constitution, the onus of proof of limitations generally lay on the Applicant and the 
justification for limitations was borne by the Respondent.372 
A more comprehensive provision for the limitation of rights has been entrenched in the 
2010 Constitution, in article 24, and it provides clear grounds for when the State can legitimately 
limit rights. Article 24(1) provides that rights can only be limited in accordance with the law, and 
only to the extent that is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality, and freedom. Further safeguards are provided to ensure that limitations 
of rights are legitimate, and they include:373 
(a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual 
does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and 
(e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose. 
Article 24(2) further provides safeguards where a limitation is contained in legislation and it 
provides that such limitation is not valid unless it specifically expresses the intention to limit a 
particular right in a clear and specific manner, as well as the nature and extent of that 
limitation.374 It not only calls for the strict construction of legislative provisions limiting rights, but 
also prohibits any limitations that have the effect of derogating from the core or essential content 
                                                            
371 High Court Criminal Application 481 of 1995 (unreported). See also Riungu v Republic High Court 
Criminal Application No 232 of 1994 (unreported) and Mazrui v Republic High Court Criminal Application 
No 91 of 1985 (unreported). 
372 AW Munene ‘The Bill of Rights and constitutional order: A Kenyan perspective’ (2002) 2 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 154. 
373 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(1). 
374 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(2)(a)-(b). 
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of rights leading to the rights being ineffective or illusory.375 It places the burden of proof as to 
the legitimacy of a limitation on the authority or organ imposing the limitation in question. 
The article 24(1) limitations clause is very similar to that in section 36 of the 1996 
SAC.376 The section 36 clause of the SAC has been subject to a comprehensive judicial and 
academic interpretation over the years, and the jurisprudence emanating from that interpretation 
can be used to enhance the understanding of limitations in the Kenyan context. The SACC has 
utilised the limitations clause in a two-stage constitutional analysis which looks, first, at whether 
there has been a contravention of the guaranteed right, and secondly, whether the 
contravention is justified under the limitations clause.377 The first part of the test entails the 
responsibility of the Applicant378 while the second part of the test burdens the person or 
authority who seeks to limit rights to justify the limitations.379 
In undertaking the first stage of the analysis, which basically involves the interpretation 
and development of the meaning, nature, content and extent of the right in question380 and the 
                                                            
375 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(2)(b)-(c). 
376  These grounds of limitation and the requirement that the court undertakes a proportionality test taking 
into account the necessity, suitability and appropriateness of limitations was first entrenched in the 
German Basic Law, article 19, see Pati (n 330 above) 238.  
377 S v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), at 414; Makwanyane, at para. 100. See also Woolman & 
Botha (n 334 above) 34-3 – 34-4; Iles (n 12 above) 453-455. 
378 During this first stage of the two-stage limitations analysis, the SACC has adopted an objective 
approach of unconstitutionality, which holds that the finding of invalidity is not dependent on the parties 
before the Court (subjective approach). This is to prevent a situation where the law can be held invalid for 
one litigant and valid for another litigant. The theory also espouses a generous interpretation of locus 
standi rules to allow Applicants who have not been directly affected by a limitation on rights to bring cases 
to court, see Woolman & Botha (n 336 above) 34-42 – 34-43, footnote 5. 
379 See Moise v Transitional Local Council of Greater Germiston 2001 (4) SA 491 CC, para. 19, which 
confirms that once a limitation is proven, the burden of justification rests on the party seeking to rely on 
the limitation, and the analysis of the justification will depend on the balancing of competing interests.   
380 Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO & Others, and Vryenhoek & Others v Powell NO & Others 1996 
(1) BCLR 1 (CC), at para. 252. 
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assessment of whether the offending legislation381 impairs or limits the defined content of the 
rights, the SACC has used an approach based on the text, the context and the foundational 
values.382 It involves the analysis of the text of the right in its context which entails the historical 
background of both the constitution and the right; the reasons for its inclusion as a constitutional 
right; the concepts enshrined in the right, and their legal elaboration both under national, 
international and comparative law; the other constitutional provisions, particularly the other 
rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights; and, the foundational values.383 This stage entails the 
analysis of the internal demarcations/qualification of rights and their circumscription of the scope 
of rights.384 
The second stage, which encompasses the proportionality test, entails the analysis of 
the reasonableness and the justification of the limitation, in the context of a democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom and using the factors listed in section 36(1) 
(similar to article 24(1) of the Kenyan Constitution).385 Cheadle, relying on Canadian 
jurisprudence in relation to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, contends 
that this analysis should not be a balance between the importance of the right as against the 
purpose of the limitation, but an analysis of the propriety and viability of the means used to limit 
the right.386 He quotes the Canadian case of R v Oakes which not only calls for the 
proportionality test after a sufficiently significant objective of the limitation has been established, 
but also details three important components of the proportionality test which include:387 
                                                            
381  For it to be legitimate, a limitation clause must be entrenched in a law of general application and not 
on a policy or executive act. This is to guarantee rights by only giving the legislature the power to limit 
rights. See Cheadle (n 332 above) 30-8 – 30-9. 
382 Ferreira v Levin, para. 46.  
383 Cheadle (n 332 above) 30-5; Woolman & Botha (n 336 above) 34-19 - 34-32. 
384  I Currie & J de Waal, The Bill of Rights handbook 5th Edition (2005) 187. 
385 Cheadle (n 332 above) 30-9 – 30-11; Woolman & Botha (n 336 above) 34-26 – 34-27, they contend 
that for the respondent to succeed at the limitation stage, they must satisfy all the limitation clause’s 
requirements as provided in section 36(1). For an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence of the SACC in 
relation to the understanding of the factors involved in the proportionality analysis, see Woolman & Botha 
(n 336 above) 34-47 – 34-103. 
386 Cheadle (n 332 above) 30-11 – 30-12. 
387 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200, at 227, quoted in Cheadle (n 332 above) 30-11. 
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First, measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They 
must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations…they must be rationally 
connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in the 
first sense, should impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question. Third, there must 
be proportionality between the effects of the limiting measures and the objective which has been 
identified as of sufficient importance.  
It is thus important that in determining the justifiability of a legislation limiting rights, the Kenyan 
courts must take the above factors into consideration and ensure that the raison d’être of the 
entrenched rights in the Bill of rights are achieved. 
Interestingly, the limitation clause has not been used in the SACC jurisprudence on 
SERs as evidenced by the Grootboom and the Treatment Action Campaign388 cases.389 This is 
due to the requirement that for a limitation on rights to be legitimate, it must be contained in a 
law of general application, which was not the case with the two decisions.390 However, a 
limitation analysis was also not undertaken in the Khosa case, which dealt with the Social 
Assistance Act 59 of 1992, the Court deciding the case on the criterion of reasonableness.391 
The Court categorically acknowledged the difficulty of applying section 36 in SER cases due to 
the internal limitation requiring the State ‘to go no further than to take “reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation” of the 
rights’.392 The Court further stated as follows:393 
If a legislative measure taken by the State to meet this obligation fails to pass the requirement of 
reasonableness for the purposes of sections 26 and 27, section 36 can only have relevance if 
what is “reasonable” for the purposes of that section, is different to what is “reasonable” for the 
purposes of sections 26 and 27.  
                                                            
388 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 70 (5 July 
2002). 
389 Currie & de Waal (n 384 above) 594. 
390 As above. 
391 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of 
Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (4 March 2004). 
392 Khosa, para. 82. For an in-depth analysis, see generally, Iles (n 12 above) 448 ff. 
393 Khosa, para. 82. 
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Justice Ngcobo, in the same judgment, questions whether the standard of determining 
reasonableness under section 27(2) is a similar standard to that of determining reasonableness 
and justifiability under section 36(1), but did not give any concrete way forward on how the two 
sections can be used in the context of SER adjudication, preferring to state that an analysis 
using any of the sections will have the same conclusion.394 
 Currie and de Waal argue that even though a law of general application can only feasibly 
limit the negative aspects of SER obligations,395 such a law would be held to be unreasonable in 
the first stage of the interpretation analysis as the principle of reasonableness has been 
included in the demarcation of SERs, and that the courts would not have to proceed to 
undertake a limitation analysis.396 However, Marius Pieterse, relying on the judgment of 
Budlender AJ in the Residents of Bon Vista Mansion case, contends that the application of 
section 36 is necessary in relation to the duty to respect SERs if limitations of such duties are to 
assail constitutional muster.397 He argues that violations of SERs should not only be analysed 
using the principle of reasonableness, but must also be justified with reference to an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and that a proportionality test 
taking into account all the relevant factors should be undertaken.398 
 Pieterse’s approach was seemingly taken up by the SACC in the Jaftha case.399 In this 
case, the court not only acknowledged the existence of negative SER obligations in sections 
                                                            
394 Khosa, paras. 105-107. See Woolman & Botha (n 336 above) 34-37 footnote 2, who conclude that 
Ngcobo J’s analysis leads us nowhere. 
395 See Currie & de Waal (n 384 above) 594, who argue that since most SER litigation concerned with 
positive obligations are likely to be due to omissions, section 36 analysis will be irrelevant due to the 
requirement of a law of general application.   
396 Currie & de Waal (n 384 above) 594-595. 
397 M Pieterse ‘Towards a useful role for section 36 of the Constitution in social rights cases? Residents of 
Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council (2003) 20 South African Law Journal 41, at 
45-46. The Court in Bon Vista did not engage in a section 36 analysis despite the presence of a law of 
general application, Water Services Act 108 of 1997, because the Respondents had not fashioned any 
arguments justifying the use of the limitation. 
398 Pieterse (n 397 above) 47. 
399 Jaftha v Schoeman & Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). The case involved the validity of the Magistrates’’ 
Court Act which permitted the sale of a person’s home in execution of a civil debt. 
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26(1) and 27(1) of the SAC,400 but also held that where the State limits those obligations, such a 
limitation must be justified under section 36.401 The Court proceeded to undertake a limitations 
analysis under section 36 and held that the breach of section 26(1) was not reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of section 36 because of the importance of access to housing and its link to 
dignity, the seriousness of the infringement, and the existence of less restrictive means.402 
Sandra Liebenberg, affirming the importance of section 36 analysis in relation to SERs 
contends that:403 
[t]he State's purpose in limiting a right should not be solely for reasons of administrative 
convenience, cost-saving or a re-prioritisation of resources. Allowing these reasons to constitute 
sufficient grounds of limitation will strip the rights of all effect. In order to justify a limitation on 
these rights under section 36, the State will have to argue that the restriction based on resource 
constraints is reasonably required in the interests of the general welfare in a democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. In addition, the nature and degree of the 
restriction must be carefully tailored to fit these purposes (the proportionality test). 
The existence of this debate on the use of section 36 in SER cases was acknowledged by the 
Court in the Khosa case, but it did not provide any guidance on the same as this was 
unnecessary for the determination of the case.404 
 This whole debate strangely rests squarely on the approach to interpretation and 
implementation of SERs that has been adopted by the courts in a particular domestic 
jurisdiction. In the South African context, the adoption of the reasonableness approach in the 
interpretation of SERs, of necessity, undermines the value of a section 36 analysis in instances 
where the State has failed to take adequate measures to realise progressively the right in 
question. However, if the SACC had adopted the minimum core approach, more stringent 
justifications would have been required in the instances where the State had failed to meet its 
minimum core obligations of providing the minimum essential goods and services, especially for 
                                                            
400 Jaftha, paras.32 & 33. 
401 Jaftha, para. 34. 
402 Jaftha, paras. 35-49; Woolman & Botha (n 336 above) 33-35 – 33-46. 
403 S Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: The role of the South African Human Rights 
Commission’ in P Andrews & S Ellman (eds.), The post-apartheid constitutions: Perspectives on South 
Africa’s basic law (2001) 424. 
404 Khosa, para. 84. 
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the most marginalised and vulnerable groups.405 This is due to the immediate nature of the 
minimum core obligations, and the developments in international human rights law to the effect 
that a lack of resources is no longer a justification for the non-fulfilment of these obligations as 
discussed in section 2.5 above. If Kenya adopts the integrated approach to the interpretation of 
SERs, as is proposed in chapter five of this thesis, with its minimum core component, it will thus 
follow that a limitations analysis which engenders a proportionality test using all the factors 
provided for in article 24(1) of the Kenyan Constitution will be necessary. 
Despite its progressive nature in the protection of rights, article 24 of the Kenyan 
Constitution has retrogressive aspects, especially in relation to Muslims and members of the 
disciplined forces. With regards to people who profess the Islamic faith, it qualifies the 
provisions of equality that runs throughout the Bill of Rights, and which forms the backbone of 
the entire corpus of SERs, by providing that the equality provision does not apply to Muslims on 
matters relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance.406 With regard to 
members of the disciplined forces (persons serving in the Kenyan Defence Forces and the 
National Police Service), the article allows some of their fundamental rights to be limited, such 
as the right to association (article 36); assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition (article 
37); labour relations (article 41); and, SERs (article 43).407 An extensive discussion of these 
retrogressive aspects is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is briefly submitted herein 
that these provisions are incompatible with the objectives and purposes of the Bill of Rights in 
particular, and of the entire Constitution in general. 
In conclusion, and in line with the arguments of former Chief Justice Earl Warren of the 
United States made in 1962, the courts must be vigilant in the protection of fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights for all persons at all times, and any legislative or executive 
action limiting the fundamental rights of any group of citizens must be given the strictest 
                                                            
405 Iles (n 12 above) 458, who argues that if the SACC had adopted the minimum core approach, section 
36 would have had a more meaningful role in justifying failures to realise the minimum core, while the 
internal limitation would serve to justify failure to expand the realisation of SERs beyond the minimum 
core. 
406 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(4). 
407 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(5). 
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interpretation possible.408 The strict interpretation should apply even for constitutional provisions 
limiting the rights of members of disciplined forces such as article 24 (4) and (5) of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In entrenching justiciable SERs in the 2010 Constitution, and incorporating international law into 
its domestic legal system, Kenya has undertaken an extensive transformative project aimed at 
the enhancement of equality, social justice and sustainable development, the eradication of 
poverty and inequality, as well as the uplifting of standards of living of all Kenyans. This chapter 
sought to undertake an analysis of this transformative project, by determining the nature, 
content and extent of the SER obligations that Kenya has undertaken. This analysis 
commenced with the determination of the place of international law in the Kenyan domestic 
legal system taking into account article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution which subsumes 
customs and ratified international treaties into the domestic arena. The chapter found that these 
constitutional provisions have changed the Kenyan legal system from pure dualism towards 
monism, with ratified international law forming a part of the domestic legal system without the 
requirement of domesticating legislation.   This has, however, led to sovereignty concerns, 
especially due to the unclear role of the legislature in the treaty-adoption process. Related to 
this concern has been the hierarchy of incorporated international law vis-à-vis the constitutional 
provisions as well as national legislation. After a comparative analysis of the place of 
international law in the United States and in Colombia, two countries with similar constitutional 
provisions incorporating international law into the domestic legal system, it is submitted that in 
order to achieve the transformative potential of the Constitution, international law should have 
the same status as constitutional provisions and should have a higher status than legislation. 
This is due to the vertical and horizontal cross-fertilisation of constitutional provisions by 
international law to the point that both sets of norms have acquired the same scope and 
content. This reading is supported by the Kenyan Constitution in article 20(2) which requires 
rights to be enjoyed to the greatest extent consistent with their nature, and article 20(3)(b) which 
calls for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of rights. In this 
regard, therefore, the chapter proceeds to jointly discuss the SER obligations of the State at the 
                                                            
408 E Warren ‘The Bill of Rights and the military’ (1962) 4(3) United States Air Force Judge Advocate 
General Bulletin 6, at 19. 
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national and international levels on the understanding that they are of the same nature and 
espouse the same scope and content. 
After laying this basis, the chapter then proceeds to discuss the “progressive realisation 
standard”, a standard that has been adopted both at the international level and in the Kenyan 
Constitution as the standard for the monitoring of the implementation of SERs by States. The 
discussion divides the standard into four related components: progressive realisation; obligation 
to take steps; the maximum of available resources; and, international cooperation and 
assistance. It is submitted that the progressive-realisation component encompasses the reality 
that States cannot meet all their SER obligations immediately due to scarcity of resources, but 
still contains some immediate aspects that the States must undertake as soon as they assume 
SERs obligations, such as the prohibition of non-discrimination, the requirement that the State 
puts in place effective and comprehensive measures to enhance the realisation of SERs over 
time, the obligation to provide the minimum essential levels of goods and services for the 
vulnerable groups in society (minimum core).  The obligation-to-take-steps component requires 
the State to put in place a comprehensive national strategic plan based on a legislative, policy 
and programmatic framework to enhance the realisation of SERs. It further requires non-
legislative steps such as putting in place remedial institutions such as courts to enhance 
accountability in the realisation of SERs and to enable victims of violations to vindicate their 
rights. This component is entrenched in articles 21(2)-(4), 22 and 23 of the Constitution.  
The third component of maximum available resources is a recognition that the full 
realisation of the entire continuum of SERs requires resources, which are almost always scarce 
for a developing country like Kenya. It, however, requires the prioritisation of resources to meet 
the immediate needs of the most vulnerable and further entrenches the obligation of the State to 
use resources efficiently as well as accountably to enhance the full realisation of SERs. This 
component is entrenched in the Constitution in articles 20(5)(a) and (b). This component 
acknowledges that resources for the realisation of SERs need not come only from the State, but 
that the State has the primary obligation to put in place measures to ensure that people are able 
to use their own resources to realise their SERs, or to harness resources from the private sector 
to enhance the realisation of SERs, and in instances where resources within the State are 
insufficient, for the State to look to the international community through the facility of 
international cooperation and assistance, which is the fourth component of the standard of 
progressive realisation. 
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At the regional level, the African human rights treaties have not adopted the standard of 
progressive realisation for SERs, instead adopting a universal obligation requiring member 
States to realise the entire corpus of human rights catalogued therein, including SERs. The 
chapter undertakes an analysis of the debate on the SER obligations under the AHRS, 
concluding that the SER obligations therein are immediate, and thus States do not have the 
defence of lack of resources when it comes to the realisation of their SER obligations.  
As has been stated above, the elaboration of the substantive content of SERs can go a 
long way in achieving the transformative potential of the Constitution. This is because such 
elaboration ensures that the State has in place proper guiding and review standards for the 
development of an SER implementation framework, as well as their monitoring and evaluation. 
The chapter thus undertakes a discussion of the place of the minimum core obligations 
approach, submitting that due to its ratification of international legal instruments on SERs which 
have been authoritatively interpreted to imply the existence of the minimum core obligations, 
Kenya has the responsibility to adopt this approach in good faith and to ensure its 
entrenchement in the legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the implementation of 
SERs. It is further submitted in this chapter that the Kenyan courts should also adopt the same 
approach when enhancing the accountability of the political institutions for the realisation of 
entrenched SERs through adjudication. The chapter, in this section, relies on the jurisprudence 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court, a court that has extensively adopted the minimum core 
obligations approach with the aim of enhancing the protection of right-holders against the 
recalcitrance of the State. In concluding that analysis, it is submitted that the development of the 
content of SERs, especially the minimum core content, is beneficial to the poor, marginalised 
and vulnerable people as it ensures that their basic survival needs are catered for, giving them 
the opportunity to enjoy the maximal level of SERs in future.  
Lastly, the chapter acknowledges that SERs are not absolute and can legitimately be 
limited by the State. It undertakes an analysis of the factors that the State must take into 
account if limitation of rights is to be legitimate, as is provided for both under international and 
regional law as well as in constitutional provisions, especially article 24 of the Constitution. To 
enhance the substance of this analysis, the chapter borrows heavily from the limitations 
jurisprudence of South Africa courts, a national jurisdiction with a similar limitation clause as that 
included in the Kenyan Constitution.  
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Chapter three – Theory of dialogical constitutionalism: Philosophical 
foundations and comparative analysis  
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we discussed the importance of developing a clear understanding of the 
nature, scope, content and extent of socio-economic rights (SERs) with the objective of their 
effective and scroupulous implementation so as to enhance the realisation of the constitutional 
project of improving the living standards of the Kenyan people. However, to develop this clear 
understanding, it is imperative that Kenya adopts a progressive theoretical framework for the 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs, an approach that 
recognises the important relative competences of all the institutions of the State as well as all 
other societal actors. This chapter and the subsequent chapter four propose and develop a 
theory of dialogical constitutionalism, which encompasses both a theory of law and a theory of 
politics, aimed at enhancing the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the 
entrenched SERs. 
The phrase “law is politics” coined by members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement 
has divided legal and political scholars into different groups.1 Anel Boshof, analysing this 
phrase, classifies its objectors into two groups. On the one hand are the traditionalists who see 
law as a pure, objective and value-neutral system capable of finding the correct interpretation of 
legal norms and applying them impartially to specific facts.2 On the other hand are the radicals 
                                                            
1 A Boshoff ‘Law as dialogical politics’ in H Botha et al (Eds.) Rights and democracy in a transformative 
constitution (2003) 1. 
2 Boshoff (n 1 above) 1. The traditionalists argue that the capacity of law to yield right answers depends 
on it being kept separate from politics, guaranteeing its protection from the despotism of men. See also P 
Goodrich et al ‘Introduction: Politics, ethics and the legality of the contingent’ in P Goodrich et al (eds.) 
Politics, post-modernity and critical legal studies: The legality of the contingent (1994) 17 who contend 
that ‘any contamination of law by value will compromise its ability to turn social and political conflict into 
manageable disputes about the meaning and applicability of pre-existing public rules’; O Fiss ‘The death 
of the law’ (1986) 72 Cornell Law Review 1, at 2 & 9-10, who contends that the phrase “law is politics” 
denies law its special hierarchical place in society above politics; and also denies law its objectivity, 
espoused by the judicial determination of legal meaning, thus leading to the death of the law. 
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who view law as having a pervasive and restrictive influence on politics and democratic self-
government, and thus also want law to be kept separate from politics.3 A third group of scholars, 
such as Jeremy Waldron and Frank Michelman, whose approach will be of great relevance in 
the development of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism here, however, acknowledge the 
obvious connection between law and politics, contending that the development of a theory of 
justice must involve two interlinked and mutually supporting tasks, that is, theorising about 
justice, rights and the common good as well as theorising about politics.4   
The interplay between law and politics is specifically relevant with regard to 
constitutional law, as the development, promulgation, interpretation, implementation and 
enforcement of a constitution engender debate on the connection between politics and law, and 
how the two interact in the sphere of democratic governance.5 Constitution-making is a 
contextual and value-laden process intended to inculcate the societal history, values, principles, 
hopes and aspirations of a people into their main governing document. This was acknowledged 
by Justice Kriegler of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (SACC) in the Makwanyane case 
where he stated that ‘it would be foolish to deny that the judicial process, especially in the field 
of constitutional adjudication, calls for value judgments in which extra-legal considerations may 
loom large’.6 Justice Kriegler’s contentions were further buttressed by those of Justice Mokgoro, 
in the same Makwanyane case, where she argued as follows:7 
                                                            
3 Boshoff (n 1 above) 1.  This group has argued against the courts exercising the power of judicial review 
of executive and legislative acts, terming such exercise of judicial power as denigrating democratic 
deliberation. See A Petter ‘Taking dialogue theory much too seriously (Or perhaps Charter dialogue isn’t 
such a good thing after all’ (2007) 45(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 147, at156; JM Pickerill, Constitutional 
deliberations in Congress: Impact of judicial review in a separated system (2004) 3-4 & 38-54. 
4 J Waldron, Law and disagreement (1999) 3-4; J Waldron, The dignity of legislation (1999) 36, who 
states that law is the offspring of politics; F Michelman ‘Bringing the law to life: A plea for disenchantment’ 
(1988-1989) 74 Cornell Law Review 256, at 256-257, who contends that for law to espouse public values  
and be consonant with the ideas of self-government as well as the rule of law, it must, of necessity, be 
created through democratic political processes. He further states that a constitution, as an authoritative 
expression of public values and ideals, is an embodiment of public morality harnessed through dialogue, 
at 258-259.  
5 Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 261, where he affirms the political nature of popular 
constitution-making. 
6 S v Makwanyane and another (CCT3/94) 1995 (3) SA 391, para. 207. 
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The interpretive task frequently involves making constitutional choices by balancing competing 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This can often only be done by reference to a system of values 
extraneous to the constitutional text itself.... To achieve the required balance will of necessity 
involve value judgments. This is the nature of constitutional interpretation. 
The 2010 Kenyan Constitution is not any different, having gone through an elaborate process of 
dialogue and deliberation almost transcending a generation so as to be reflective of the hopes 
and aspirations of the Kenyan people as contained in articles 4(2), 10 and 24(1). A theory on its 
interpretation must thus espouse an understanding of constitutional interpretation as a value-
laden and dialogical exercise that inculcates societal values and principles into the normative 
content of constitutional provisions.8 
The question then is, should the interpretation of the Constitution be left to a select few 
(the Courts) or should the development of constitutional meaning be the responsibility of all 
societal actors in a process of democratic dialogue and deliberation? In responding to this 
question in the context of the United States (U.S.), Waldron states the following:9 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
7 Makwanyane case, paras.302-04. For an extensive and illuminating discussion of the importance of 
values in constitutional interpretation, see K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ 
(1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146 at 156-166. 
8 S Woolman & H Botha ‘Limitations: Shared constitutional interpretation, an appropriate normative 
framework and hard choices’ in S Woolman & M Bishop (Eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 149, 
at 153; DE Johnsen ‘Functional departmentalism and non-judicial interpretation: Who determines 
constitutional meaning’ (2004) 67(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 105, at 116; R Dworkin ‘The moral 
reading and the majoritarian premise’ in H Hongju-Koh & RC Slye (eds.) Deliberative democracy and 
human rights (1999) 81, at 82ff. He contends that a proper understanding of democracy entails a finding 
that the moral value-laden reading of a political constitution is not antidemocratic, but is actually and 
practically indispensable to democracy, at 86. 
9  Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 4 above) 15-16. See D Bilchitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: 
The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights (2007) 102-104, who argues in answer to this 
question that decision-making on fundamental rights should ultimately be left to highly experienced 
judges in constitutional courts, who are better able to ensure that all people in the society are treated as 
being equally important. He thus views judicial review as ‘shifting the focus of final decision-making from 
majoritarian institutions to judicial ones’. The theory of dialogical constitutionalism differs from Bichitz’s 
view. Although it assigns decision-making and watchdog responsibilities to courts with regards to 
fundamental rights, it contends that legitimate disagreements about rights, which are inherently 
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Men and women who struggled and died to establish [the new constitutional dispensation] were 
looking for far more than a voice on interstitial issues of policy… They fought for [the Constitution] 
because they believed that controversies over the fundamental ordering of the society …were 
controversies for them to sort out…because they were the people who would be affected by the 
outcome. Moreover, they did not fight for [the Constitution] on the assumption that they would 
then all agree about [the meaning of Constitutional provisions] … But they fought for the 
[Constitution] anyway on the ground that the existence of such principled disagreements was the 
essence of politics, not that it should be regarded as a signal to transfer the important issues they 
disagreed about to some other forum altogether, which will privilege the opinions and purses of a 
few.     
The above quote envisions an intrinsic interplay between law and politics in the development of 
constitutional meaning. This interplay foresees the role of all societal actors engaging in a 
collaborative and cooperative project on the development of constitutional meaning through a 
process of deliberative dialogue.10  
Jürgen Habermas affirms the importance of popular participation in the elaboration of 
constitutional meaning by contending that even though constitutional provisions are expressed 
in relatively uncontroversial abstract principles, they are only made clear in an on-going 
translation into laws in response to social problems.11 He argues that for laws so translated to 
be legitimate and to effectively protect individual rights, citizens must have a say in the process 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
indeterminate, should be made by the people themselves in carefully structured deliberative institutions 
that enhance public participation based on equality and mutual respect, and thus engender a sense of 
collective self-governance. 
10  See Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 256, who contends that politics is the only avenue 
through which public values are determinable and accessible, and by deliberating on these values, 
citizens are able to transform themselves as well as their society; C Young Constituting economic and 
social rights (2012) 6, who ascertains the viability of a value-based and deliberative problem solving 
process in which the institutions of the State as well as other societal actors work collectively in a 
collaborative fashion to provide a contextualised, participatory and localised understanding of SERs.   
See also L Du Plessis ‘Constitutional dialogue and the dialogic constitution (or: Constitutionalism as 
culture of dialogue)’ (2010) 25 South African Public Law 683, at 686ff. 
11 See J Habermas, Between facts and norms: Contribution to the discourse theory of law and 
democracy, translated by William Rehg (1996) chapter three. For a discussion of this aspect of 
Habermas, see also C Cronin ‘On the possibility of democratic constitutional founding: Habermas and 
Michelman in Dialogue’ (2006) 19(3) Ratio Juris 343, at 346-49. 
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of translation, especially on how their needs and interest are to be captured within the translated 
laws.12 He concludes that the process of legislation and policy-making can inspire public 
confidence only if it is based on public dialogue and deliberation which fosters informed and 
balanced decision-making on matters of public interest.13 
The interplay between law and politics is specifically pronounced in the interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutionally entrenched SERs due to their perceived policy and 
programmatic nature.14 The above can be seen in the myriad concerns that have been raised 
against the judicial enforcement of SERs: the separation-of-powers concerns and the lack of 
democratic legitimacy of non-elected judges to make decisions on policy choices, traditionally a 
domain of the political institutions of the State;15 the polycentric nature of SERs and the 
                                                            
12 As above. 
13 As above. 
14 C Bateup ‘The dialogical promise: Assessing the normative potential of theories of constitutional 
dialogue’ (2006) 73(3) Brooklyn Law review 1115, at 1109, who states that due to the indeterminate 
nature of SERs, the pervasive disagreements as to their perceptions and application in specific contexts, 
and their implementation in the context of restrictive resources, dialogue has become an important tool in 
their interpretation, implementation and enforcement. See also KG Young ‘A typology of economic and 
social rights adjudication: Exploring the catalytic function of judicial review’ (2010) 8(3) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 385, who acknowledges that tension between democracy and 
constitutionalism is especially pronounced with regard to entrenched SERs. 
15 Young – Typology of SERs adjudication (n 14 above) 386; M Tushnet, Weak courts, strong rights: 
Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative constitutional law (2008) xi; S Liebenberg ‘Socio-
economic rights: Revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate’ in S Woolman & M Bishop 
(eds.), Constitutional conversations (2008) 303, at 311; C Mbazira, Litigating socio-economic rights in 
South Africa: A choice between corrective and distributive justice (2009) 27-29; V Gauri & D Brinks 
‘Introduction: The elements of legalisation and the triangular shape of social and economic rights’ in V 
Gauri & D Brinks (eds.), Courting social justice: Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the 
developing world (2008) 1, at 3; A Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The 
Grootboom case’ in P Jones & K Stokke (eds.), Democratising development: The politics of socio-
economic rights in South Africa (2005) 131, at 140, where he argues that ‘...there can be little doubt that it 
is inappropriate for judges who in general know very little about the practicalities of housing, land and 
other social realities, to pronounce on these issues. That is what parliament is there for’. 
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perceived lack of competence of the courts to balance societal needs against individual rights;16 
and the concern that judicial determination of SERs leads to the re-writing of government 
budgets, traditionally a preserve of the political institutions of the State,17 among many others. 
The development of a theory of constitutional interpretation of the entrenched SERs in 
the 2010 Constitution must address these concerns. The broad theoretical objective of this 
chapter and of chapter four below is to design an inclusive and collaborative normative 
interpretative approach aimed at developing an understanding of SERs that is societally 
agreeable, practical, and capable of implementation so as to achieve the constitutional 
objectives of reducing poverty as well as inequality, and thereby enhancing social justice in 
Kenya.18 
                                                            
16 Mbazira (n 15 above) 30-32; E Wiles ‘Aspirational principles or enforceable rights: The future for socio-
economic rights in national law’ (2006-2007) 22 American University International Law Review 35, at 53-
54.  See also Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) 
2002 (5) SA 703 (5 July 2002) where the South African Constitutional Court held that in dealing with 
SERs: ‘courts are not institutionally equipped to make wide-ranging factual and political inquiries...nor 
deciding how public revenue should most effectively be spent’; and that the 1996 SA Constitution 
envisages a restrained and focused role for the Court, thus making the court ‘ill-equipped to adjudicate 
upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the 
community’, at 722 & 740. Mark Tushnet criticises this as a language of non-justiciability yet the 1996 
Constitution provides for justiciable SERs, see M Tushnet ‘Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial 
review’ (2003-2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1895, at 1903-1904. 
17 Tushnet - Social welfare rights (n 16 above) 1896-1897; K Lehmann ‘In defence of the Constitutional 
Court: Litigating socio-economic rights and the myth of the minimum core’ (2006) 22 American University 
International Law Review 163, at 194, who avers that the remit of the Court, in SER adjudication, is 
limited to testing the constitutionality of specific State policies and programmes, and neither involves 
scrutiny of how the public resources are spent, nor the power to order the government to change its 
macro-economic policies.  
18 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 19(2) which provides that the purpose of the recognition of 
human rights in the Constitution is the preservation of the dignity of individuals and communities, the 
promotion of social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings. Sandra Liebenberg 
acknowledges the transformative capacity of a substantive theory of SERs which enhances the 
participatory capabilities of people living in poverty and inequality, see S Liebenberg ‘Needs, rights and 
transformation: Adjudicating social rights’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law review 5, at 36. Liebenberg thus 
endorses a “relational and dialogic approach” to SER interpretation, implementation and enforcement, 
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The current chapter is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the chapter 
undertakes an analysis of the historical and philosophical foundations of the theory of dialogue, 
looking at Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory and Frank Michelman’s theory of discursive 
politics in section 3.2. Section 3.3 is an analysis of the practical application of the theory of 
dialogue, as expounded by Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, in Canadian constitutional law. This 
section further examines the critique that has been levelled against the use of the “dialogue 
metaphor” in Canada, taking into account this critique in the elaboration of the second level of 
dialogue in chapter four, section 4.3 below. Section 3.4 entails a brief exposition of coordinate 
construction theory in the constitutional context of the United States, identifying important 
dialogical elements in that theory that complements the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
that is further expansively elaborated in chapter four below. Section 3.5 then analyses the 
dialogic jurisprudence of the SACC, especially in relation to the concept of ‘meaningful 
engagement.’ The section looks at the dialogical credentials of the concept and the possibilities 
it provides in the realisation of SERs in Kenya in the context of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism elaborated on more comprehensively in chapter four below. The chapter then 
ends with a short conclusion in section 3.6.  
 
3.2 Historical and philosophical foundations of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
The dialogical approach is broadly rooted in the Hegelian tradition of philosophy, with a focus on 
processes and relationships, with the aim of a mutual constitutional understanding rather than a 
one way cause-effect determinism.19 The term dialogic, as it is used in the dialogical 
constitutionalism model, originates from the works of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975),20 a Russian 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
see Liebenberg – Revisiting the reasonableness review (n 15 above) 321; M Pieterse ‘On dialogue, 
translation and voice: A reply to Sandra Liebenberg’ in S Woolman & M Bishop (Eds.) Constitutional 
conversations (2008) 331, at 332ff, where he discusses the potential of dialogical constitutionalism in 
facilitating the translation of SERs from conceptual abstract principles into more concrete, claimable legal 
entitlements with the aim of achieving egalitarian redistribution, basic service provision, or the satisfaction 
of individual needs. 
19 F Cornish ‘Making “context” concrete: A dialogical approach to the society-health relations’ (2004) 
Journal of Health Psychology 284. 
20 See M Bakhtin, The dialogic imagination translated by C Emerson & M Holquist (1981); M Bakhtin, 
Rabelais and his world translated by H Iswolsky (1984); M Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics 
translated by C Emerson (1984).  
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philosopher and literary scholar, and was originally used to refer to literature that was capable of 
creating a counter-active dialogue between the writer and the reader.21 In the Bakhtinian view of 
dialogue, the meaning of a word is not absolute or abstract, but arises within a web of 
contextual relations.22 The dialogic term is also reflected in the teaching methods of Brazilian 
pedagogue and educational theorist Paulo Freire (1921-1997) who expounded a philosophy of 
social science and a theory of society based on the concept of conscientisation (critical 
consciousness).23 According to Bebbington et al, conscientisation is ‘the process of becoming 
dialogically aware of social reality where those who seek knowledge are active participants in a 
reflexive process of education that teaches those who are supposed to know as well as those 
who seek to learn’.24 Freire’s pedagogy was aimed at those who were traditionally denied 
education and was thus intended to initiate emancipator change through conscientisation and 
reflexive dialogue.25 Cornish provides a wider understanding of Freire’s conscientisation as a 
process where ‘communities of social actors interact to “name the world” and the social factors 
which disadvantage the community can be brought into collective debate, alternatives can be 
envisioned,  and individual and collective action can be taken, aiming to reformulate social 
structures in the interest of the actors’.26  
                                                            
21 J Bebbington et al ‘Theorizing engagement: The potential of a critical dialogic approach’ (2007) 20(3) 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 357. 
22 Cornish (n 19 above) 284. 
23 See P Freire, Pedagogy of the oppressed, translated by M Ramos, 30th Anniversary edition (1970) 
chapters 3-4. See also RA Morrow and CA Torress, Reading Freire and Habermas: Critical pedagogy and 
transformative social change (2002) 6. For similarities in the dialogical conceptions of education by 
Bakhtin and Freire, see generally, Stewart J et al ‘Relationships among philosophies of dialogue’ in R 
Anderson et al (eds.), Dialogue: Theorising differences in communication studies (2004) 21-38; A Aubert 
& M Soler ‘Dialogism: The diagotic turn in the social sciences’ in JL Kincheloe & RA Horn (eds.), The 
Preager handbook of education and psychology (2007) 520-529; R Bowers ‘Freire (with Bakhtin) and the 
dialogic classroom seminar’ (2005) 51(4) The Alberta Journal of Educational Research 368-378.  
24 Bebbington et al (n 21 above) 364. See also E Mustakova-Possardt, Critical consciousness: A study of 
morality in global, historical context (2003) 15, who avers that critical consciousness focuses on achieving 
an in-depth understanding of the world and taking action to address the social and political contradictions 
exposed by such understanding.  
25 Bebbington et al (n 21 above) 364. 
26 Cornish (n 19 above) 286. 
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In the context of contemporary discourse, the dialogical approach to the development of 
constitutional meaning has been expounded extensively by two renowned scholars, Jürgen 
Habermas from Germany and Frank Michelman from the United States of America.  
3.2.1 Jürgen Habermas 
The place of dialogue in resolving communal problems is the cornerstone of Habermas’s 
writings. His reconstructive theory of communicative action seeks to articulate an expanded 
conception of rationality, with the aim of rethinking the foundations of the theory-practice 
problematic.27 He draws a related distinction between two different forms of communication, 
communicative action (interaction) and discourse.28 He terms discourse as that “peculiarly 
unreal” form of communication in which the participants subject themselves to the unforced 
force of the better argument, with the aim of coming to a rational agreement about the validity or 
invalidity of problematic claims.29 The discourse theory is thus based on the capacity of societal 
actors to reach common understanding and to coordinate their actions through reasoned 
argument, consensus as well as cooperation rather than through strategic action strictly in 
pursuit of their own individual interests.30 The resultant consensual agreement, due to its 
foundation in rational argument and evidence, is thus considered not only subjectively valid for 
the participants in the dialogical process, but also objectively valid for all rational subjects.31 
                                                            
27  T McCarthy, The critical theory of Jurgen Habermas (1984) 272-273. The theory is reconstructive as it 
does not espouse ‘enormous revelatory power’ but seeks an exposition of what already occurs in normal 
life, see W Outhwaite, Habermas: A critical introduction (1994) 109. 
28 J Habermas, Theory and practice, translated by John Viertal (1971) 19-21; McCarthy (n 26 above) 291. 
29 McCarthy (n 27 above) 292. McCarthy further notes that the guiding idea of a rationally achieved 
consensual agreement is the cogency of the argument employed, a fact that can be ascertained through 
the analysis of the level and intensity of the discourse, at 304-305. 
30 J Habermas The theory of communicative action– Volume One: Reason and the rationalization of 
society, translated by T McCarthy (1984) x, 85-101 & 284-288; R Bolton ‘Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action and the theory of social capital’ (2005) available at 
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/papers/Habermas.pdf (accessed on 1 August 2012). Strategic forms 
of communication include lying, misleading, deceiving, manipulating and other like strategies, see 
McCarthy (n 26 above) 287. 
31 McCarthy (n 27 above) 192. See also W Rehg ‘Introduction’ in Habermas - Between facts and norms (n 
11 above) xiii-xiv, where he states that Habermas’s view of validity claims is that they contain an 
unconditionality that takes them beyond the context in which they are raised. Rehg points out that this has 
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Habermas contends that for discourse to achieve rational consensus, both internal and 
external distortions such as open domination, conscious strategic behaviour, the use or threat of 
use of force, deception and lies, must be eliminated, and that there must be a symmetrical 
distribution of chances for all participants to present their views on the subject in issue in an 
environment of effective equality, trust as well as respect.32 Habermas’s discourse theory 
therefore presupposes three validity claims, that is, sincerity, truth and normative legitimacy, 
which make it possible to achieve rational consensus in an ideal speech situation.33 Simone 
Chambers, in her analysis of Habermas’s discourse theory, also contends that for dialogue to 
achieve transformation in the context of mutual understanding, participants must be guaranteed 
discursive equality, freedom, impartiality as well as fairness in the dialogical process, with the 
assumption that each participant has the capacity to make a worthwhile contribution to the 
dialogical process.34 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
been one of the points of criticism of Habermas’s theory of discourse; Habermas ‘Postscript’ in Between 
facts and norms (n 11 above) at 458 where he contends that the only deliberative agreements that can 
claim legitimacy are those to which all who are possibly affected could assent as participants in rational 
discourses. For a succinct elaboration of Habermas’s discourse theory, see M Rosenfield ‘Law as a 
discourse: Bridging the gap between democracy and rights – A book review of Habermas’s Between facts 
and norms’ (1995) 108(5) Harvard Law Review 1163, at 1165-70; N Luhmann ‘Quod omnes tangit: 
Remarks on Jurgen Habermas’s legal theory’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 883, at 890-91. 
32 McCarthy (n 27 above) 306-309, who contends that this is what Habermas calls “the ideal speech 
situation”. McCarthy is of the view that discourse rarely happens in conditions of “the ideal speech 
situation”, and that due to space-time as well as psychological and other limitations, actual speech 
precludes the realisation of conditions of ideal speech. He, however, states that this does not render the 
concept of “the ideal speech situation” illegitimate, and that it can serve as an important guide in the 
institutionalisation of discourse and as a critical standard against which every actually achieved 
consensus can be measured, at 309-310. 
33 Habermas – Theory of communicative action (n 30 above) 137 & 307-308. 
34 S Chambers, Reasonable democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the politics of discourse (1996) 99-100 & 
187. See also J Habermas, Moral consciousness and communicative action, translated by C Lenhardt & 
SW Nicholsen (1990) 89; S Liebenberg ‘Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human 
rights adjudication: The possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement’ (2012) 12 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 1, at 7-13, where, in acknowledging the potential of deliberative democracy to 
reconcile the tension between broadly-formulated, universal human rights norms and the values of 
democractic participation aimed at resolving particular disputes,  she argues that deliberative democracy 
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Habermas contends that for participants to reach consensus in decision-making, four 
different types of validity claims must be met, that is, first, participants must use comprehensible 
language to enhance understanding, secondly, participants must have the intention of 
communicating true propositional content to enhance learning and knowledge sharing on the 
subject in question, thirdly, participants must express their intentions truthfully and in good faith 
so as to enhance mutual trust in the dialogical process, and lastly, participants must employ 
appropriate language in light of the existing societal norms and values so as to enhance 
collegiality as well as respect, and thus create a conducive environment for discourse.35 The 
above validity claims are affirmed by Simone Chambers who contends that for transformative 
dialogue to occur, the participants must share the same natural language to be able to 
understand each other, share objective worlds, normative worlds and commensurable 
subjective worlds, in the absence of which communication becomes difficult, if not impossible.36 
In his analysis of Habermas, Roger Bolton states that Habermas’s view of the legitimacy 
of democracy depends ‘not only on the constitutional process of enacting laws, but on the 
discursive quality of the full process of deliberation leading up to such result’.37 This is 
elaborated by Habermas through the expansion of his discourse theory into the legal and 
democratic field in his book – Between facts and norms: Contribution to the discourse theory of 
law and democracy in which he expounds on his conception of the proceduralist paradigm of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
must espouse the principles of ‘universal moral respect’ and ‘egalitarian reciprocity’, two principles which 
entail respect for human dignity, autonomy and equality. 
35 J Habermas, Communication and evolution of society – What is universal pragmatics, translated my T 
McCarthy (1979) 2-3; McCarthy (n 27 above) 288-291; Rehg – ‘introduction’ in Habermas – Between 
facts and norms (n 11 above) xv. 
36 Chambers - Reasonable democracy (n 34 above) 95. 
37 Bolton (n 30 above) 2. See also Outhwaite (n 27 above) 112. 
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law.38 He develops his proceduralist paradigm in contradistinction to the liberal-bourgeois 
paradigm on the one hand,39 and the social welfare paradigm on the other.40  
In developing his proceduralist paradigm of law, Habermas stresses the critical 
interdependence between private and public autonomy,41 contending that total legal autonomy 
                                                            
38 Habermas - Between facts and norms (n 11 above) x, where the translator in his introduction states 
that Habermas’s current work is a drawing out of the legal, political and institutional implications of his 
theory of discourse as is expounded in his two-volume treatise, Theory of communicative action. See also 
J Habermas ‘Three normative models of democracy’ (1994) 1(1) Constellations 1; J Habermas 
‘Paradigms of law’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 771, at 776ff. 
39 This paradigm promotes a formal conception of law and reduces justice to the equal distribution of 
rights. For a discussion, see Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 772-75; Rosenfield – Law as a 
discourse (n 31 above) 1174. Habermas links this paradigm to liberal democracy, in which the political 
process is determined by the competition of strategically acting collectives trying to maintain or acquire 
positions of power, and decisions are made through personal preferences, see Habermas – Three 
models of democracy (n 38 above) 1-3; Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 772-773; Rehg – 
‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxiv. 
40 This paradigm is geared towards achieving factual equality in relation to the material conditions of 
citizens, thus over-relying on State bureaucracy and creating clientalism which detracts from individual 
autonomy, see Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 775; Rosenfield – Law as a discourse (n 31 
above) 1174. See also G Frankenberg ‘Why care? The trouble with social security’ (1995-1996) 17 
Cardozo Law Review 1365, at 1382-83, who contends that ‘the economism, individualism and clientelism 
of the welfarist paradigm lend themselves to paternalism, including the authoritarian-authoritative 
definition of needs and their bureaucratic testing…which does not solve the problem of social security’.   
Habermas links this paradigm with the civic republican conception of democracy where the political 
process is based on dialogue, oriented towards mutual understanding, self-government and the 
achievement of the common good, see Habermas – Three models of democracy (n 38 above) 1-3; Rehg 
– ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxv. 
41 See Rosenfield – Law as discourse (n 31 above) 1175, where he states that what Habermas aims to 
achieve with his paradigm of law is to ‘explore how to restore personal autonomy and dignity without 
abandoning the quest for factual equality under the material conditions characteristic of the modern 
welfare State’. 
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can only be achieved when citizens understand themselves as authors of the law to which they 
are subject as addresses.42 He states the following in this respect:43 
No regulation, however sensitive to context, can adequately concretise the equal right to an 
autonomous private life, unless it simultaneously strengthens the effectiveness of the equal right 
to exercise political autonomy, that is, the right to participate in forms of political communication 
that provide the sole arenas in which citizens can clarify the relevant aspects that define equal 
status.   
Thus according to his proceduralist paradigm, basic rights can only be effectively realised in a 
process that secures and activates both the private and the public autonomy of equally entitled 
citizens.44 It is this duality that guarantees the legitimacy of enacted laws.45 Habermas further 
argues that the achievement of the mutuality of the private-public autonomy requires the 
recognition and institutionalisation, in positive law, of a system of basic rights that delineates the 
general conditions of democratic participation in law and politics.46 The system of rights he 
                                                            
42 Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 104; Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 
776-777. He contends that a legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-original 
private as well as public autonomy of its citizens. He further contends that this can only be done within a 
conscious, deliberate public discourse in which affected parties articulate their viewpoints on the basis of 
concrete experiences of violated integrity, discrimination and oppression, at 783-784. 
43 Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 784. 
44 As above. For an elaboration of Habermas’s paradigm, see Rosenfield – Law as discourse (n 31 
above) 1175-76. 
45 Rehg – ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxv. In Rehg’s analysis, 
Habermas’s proceduralist paradigm is aimed at ensuring that both human rights and popular sovereignty 
play distinct, irreducible roles in the legitimation of laws. See also Habermas – Postscript in, Between 
facts and norms (n 11 above) 447, at 448-450 where he avers that the democratic procedure of law 
formation is the only post-metaphysical source of legal legitimacy, due to its reliance on discursive 
rationality and democratic self-determination.  
46 Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 122ff; Rehg – ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – 
Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxvii. See also Habermas – Three models of democracy (n 38 
above) 7 & 8, where he avers that the success of political deliberations lies not ‘on collectively acting 
citizenry, but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions’ of discourse and 
decision-making within parliamentary bodies as well as in the informal networks of civil society; J Bohman 
‘The coming of age of deliberative democracy’ (1998) 6(4) Journal of Political Philosophy 400, at 414, 
where he acknowledges Habermas’s argument that the legitimacy of the State depends on a 
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envisages can be divided into five categories. The first three categories, aimed at guaranteeing 
private autonomy, include basic negative liberties, membership rights as well as due process 
rights.47 The fourth category, rights of political participation, and fifth, socio-economic rights, are 
aimed at ensuring public autonomy, as the exercise of civil and political rights depends on 
certain social and material conditions.48 He contends that the five categories of rights are 
mutually interdependent and none can be subordinated to the others.49 
The analysis of the mutuality of private-public autonomy and its place in the 
legitimisation of law leads to Habermas’s central thesis, the internal relationship between 
deliberative democracy and the rule of law or the constitutional State.50 In conceptually 
explaining this link, he argues that individual private liberties (human rights) and the public 
autonomy of enfranchised citizens (popular sovereignty and democratic self-governance) are 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
constitutional framework of rights which supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for freedom & 
equality; R Alexy ‘Jurgen Habermas’s theory of legal discourse’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review, 
1027, where he also acknowledges Habermas’s objective of entrenching the dialogue principle within the 
institutional frame of a State’s legal system. 
47 Rehg – ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxvii. 
48 As above. 
49 As above. See also Habermas – Postscript in, Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 455; AR 
Oquendo ‘Deliberative democracy in Habermas and Nino’ (2002) 22(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
189, at 190-191& 194-196, where he acknowledges Habermas’s contention that human rights form one of 
the main ingredients of a true democracy, not a constraint on popular sovereignty, and therefore, that the 
concept of the “tyranny of the majority” in relation to the rights of minorities does not arise. 
50 Rehg – ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxiv; Habermas – Between 
facts and norms (n 11 above) 100-104, where he analyses the writings of Rousseau and Kant on the 
mutual connection between human rights and popular sovereignty, and concludes that the co-originality 
or the internal connection between the two concepts ‘lies in the normative content of the very mode of 
exercising public autonomy...a mode that is secured through the communicative form of discursive 
processes of opinion and will-formation’, at 103. See also J Habermas ‘On the internal relation between 
the rule of law and democracy’ (1995) 3 European Journal of Philosophy 12-20; Oquendo (n 49 above) 
195-196, where he reads Habermas as contending that democracy and human rights are co-equal as 
well as co-originating, that private and public autonomy are non-hierarchical and mutually implied, and 
that neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy over each other, as each is a 
necessary precondition of the other (footnote omitted). 
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co-originative and make each other possible.51 He further avers that the constitutional State 
represents crucial legal institutions and mechanisms that govern political deliberation, and which 
transforms citizens’ communicative power into efficacious administrative power, through the 
medium of law.52 This legal institutionalisation of discourse, in his view, transforms the discourse 
principle into a principle of democracy,53 which then becomes the basis for legitimate self-
legislation as well as the basis for the protection of public and private autonomy as 
encapsulated in the corpus of entrenched human rights and fundamental freedoms.54 Thus, 
even though the law-making power properly resides with State institutions such as parliament, 
the exercise of that power is only legitimate if the formal decision-making procedures have a 
discursive character that preserves the democratic source of legitimacy in the public at large.55 
Habermas’s discourse theory and his proceduralist paradigm of law are especially 
relevant in elaborating the meaning of contested constitutional principles such as SERs in the 
context of democratic self-government. The realisation of rights, of which SERs form a crucial 
part, is a functional prerequisite for the achievement of both public and private autonomy.56 
Genuine legal autonomy, which is a prerequisite for active participation in deliberative 
processes aimed at public decision-making, can only be achieved if public and private 
autonomy of all citizens are met. According to Gunther Frankenberg, the discourse theory shifts 
the understanding of SERs from rights to fair, minimal or maximal material benefits aimed at 
uplifting the social situation of the rights-holder; towards a vision of SERs as ‘potentially 
empowering all citizens to be able to fully participate in the cultural, social, economic and 
                                                            
51 Habermas – Postscript in, Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 454ff. See also Cronin (n 11 above) 
346-49 for an elaboration of Habermas’s argument.  
52  Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 169ff.  
53 Habermas – Postscript in, Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 455. 
54 Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 121-122; Habermas – Postscript in, Between facts 
and norms (n 11 above) 458. See also Oquendo (n 48 above) 196, where he contends that for 
Habermas, the exercise of public autonomy in discursive democratic processes requires the respect of 
private autonomy as encapsulated in the corpus of human rights. 
55 Rehg – ‘Introduction’ in Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 11 above) xxxi; Habermas – 
Postscript in, Between facts and norms (n 11 above) 461-462, where he places the burden of the 
normative democratic genesis of law on the structures of a vibrant civil society and an unsubverted 
political public sphere.  
56 Frankenberg (n 40 above) 1384. 
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political life of their society,’ as well as being active equal partners in societal discursive 
decision-making.57 To engender democratic societal participation, the theory emphasises wide 
institutionalised public participation, access to public information to bolster rational decision-
making, public decision-making through societal dialogue rather than through the exercise of 
raw power, as well as the equal consideration of the reflective views and lived experiences58 of 
each person in society rather than the privileging of experts and bureaucrats.59 Thus, the 
endpoint of discursive discourse is the emancipation or empowerment of the populace, leading 
to socio-economic transformation and the enhancement of social justice, the very objective of 
the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. 
3.2.2 Frank Michelman 
Michelman’s conception of dialogical politics is based on a reading of civic republicanism that 
rejects the transferring of responsibilities for the resolution of public controversies to non-
accountable authorities, such as the courts.60 This conception of politics demands the 
                                                            
57 Frankenberg (n 40 above) 1386. 
58 Habermas uses the term “lifeworld” to refer to the lived experiences of participants in discursive 
dialogue, and states that these lifeworlds must be rationalised through discussion so as to achieve social 
evolution which is necessary for an emancipated society, See Habermas – Theory of communicative 
action (n 30 above) 70-74 & 337-340. See also Chambers - Reasonable democracy (n 34 above) 126-
130, who contends that the “lifeworld” is the background against which all social interactions take place; H 
Schnadelbach ‘The transformation of critical theory’ in A Honneth & H Joas (eds.) Communicative action: 
Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action (1991) 8. 
59 Bolton (n 30 above) 2; Habermas – Paradigms of law (n 38 above) 776, and especially 784 where he 
contends that contest over the interpretation of needs cannot be delegated to judges, government 
officials, or political legislators. See also C Nino, The Constitution of deliberative democracy (1996) 137, 
where he argues that ‘the value of a democratic process arises from its capacity to determine moral 
issues such as the content, scope and hierarchy of rights’. 
60  F Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1985 Term, Foreword: Traces of self-government’ (1986-1987) 100 
Harvard Law Review 4, at 17-19. Civic republicanism is based on two ideas, civic virtue, which is the 
willingness of citizens to subordinate their private interests to the general good; and the concept of the 
general good. He ties the two ideas to positive freedom, which he equates with self-government in the 
following manner: 
We are free only in so far as we are self-governing, directing our actions in accordance with law-
like reasons that we adopt for ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection on our identities and 
social situations, at 26. 
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unmediated responsibility of the people, through on-going transformative dialogue, to undertake 
public decision-making about the governance of the polity.61 He develops his idea of dialogical 
and jurisgenerative politics, a subset of deliberative democracy, in contradistinction to 
instrumentalist/pluralist politics.62 Dialogical politics envisions politics as a normative activity 
entailing a contestation over concerns of public value, carried out in a deliberative process 
where reason and persuasion are aimed at achieving the common good in the ordering of 
societal life.63 It further envisions politics as being pragmatic, that is, based on political 
reasoning that is conscious of, and is informed by, the historical as well as cultural situation of a 
particular society.64 It is thus context respecting, with the ability to utilise context-specific 
normative historical resources for critical re-examination with the objective of achieving 
transformation through interpretation (critical self-revision), internal development and re-
collective imagination.65 
In characteristically Habermasian style, Michelman acknowledges people’s capacity to 
reach consensual agreement through mutual dialogue in procedural conditions of open, critical 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
He further affirms that self-government equates to citizenship, which is ‘the direct participation, as an 
equal, in the determination of common affairs,’ at 27. See also S Feldman ‘The persistence of power and 
struggle for dialogic standards in post-modern constitutional jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas and 
civic republicanism’ (1992-1993) Georgetown Law Journal 2243, at 2243-2244; S Feldman ‘Republican 
revival/interpretive turn’ (1992) Wisconsin Law Review 679, at 689-690. 
61 Michelman – Traces of self-government (n 60 above) 17-19. 
62 Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 257; Traces of self-government (n 60 above) 21; F 
Michelman ‘Conception of democracy in American constitutional argument: Voting rights’ (1989) 41 
Florida Law Review 443, at 450-451; F Michelman ‘Law’s republic’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 1493, at 
1507-1508. He envisions jurisgenerative politics as the crux of political freedom, at 1524. 
63  Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 257; Traces of self-government (n 60 above) 23 & 40; 
Voting rights (n 62 above) 447 & 450; The normative character of politics as expounded by Michelman 
has three bases: the independence of mind and judgment; the authenticity of voice; and the diversity or 
plurality of views that enrich societal discourse, see Law’s republic (n 62 above) 1504. See also Boshoff 
(n 1 above) 3. 
64  Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 258. See also Feldman – Struggle for dialogic standards 
(n 60 above) 2248-2250; Boshoff (n 1 above) 3, where she terms Michelman’s conception of dialogue as 
“good-faith, normative, pragmatic dialogue”. 
65 Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 258 (footnotes omitted). 
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and un-dominated normative conversation.66 He further states that it is only through this 
inclusive normative dialogue that total freedom and political liberty – the achievement of both a 
government of the people by the people (democracy and self-rule), and a government of laws 
and not of men (rule of law and the judicial protection of human rights) can be realised.67 He 
thus envisions both legislative politics as well as constitutional adjudication as integral parts of 
his conception of normative dialogue,68 and requires that they should not only be conducted 
rationally and objectively, but also creatively and critically.69 
3.2.3 Summary of Interlinks between Habermas and Michelman  
The theories of Habermas and Michelman have similarities in that they espouse a deliberative 
conception of democracy, require rationality as well as discursive justification in the legitimation 
of law, and also lay emphasis on procedure.70 The theories further acknowledge the 
requirement of a minimum level of socio-economic empowerment of the citizenry to enable 
political dialogue to occur in an environment of equality and fairness, thus espousing a 
recognition of the entanglement of the symbolic and material worlds, or public and private 
autonomy in the creation of an active citizenry.71  
                                                            
66 Michelman – Traces of self-government (n 60 above) 31; Feldman – Struggle for dialogical standards 
(n 60 above) 2245. 
67 Michelman – Law’s republic (n 62 above) 1493-1494. He states that political freedom in American 
constitutionalism is based on two premises: collective self-rule and the rule of law, at 1500. 
68  Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 266; Michelman – Law’s republic (n 62 above) 1494.  
69  Michelman – Bringing law to life (n 4 above) 261. 
70 F Michelman ‘Family quarrel’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 1163, at 1163-64. See also J 
Habermas ‘Reply to symposium participants, Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law’ (1995-1996) 17 
Cardozo Law Review 1477, at 1485-87, where he acknowledges the similarities between his theory and 
Michelman’s and further states that his theory of law has been influenced by Michelman’s work, terming 
Michelman as one of his three most frequently cited contemporary authors. The theories of Habermas 
and Michelman contain two important elements, rationality and consensualism, elements important to the 
interpretation of SERs as is discussed by Young – Constituting SERs (n 10 above) chapter two, at 33ff. 
71 The importance of the realisation of SERs in enhancing deliberation and dialogue in societal decision 
making is acknowledged by Ian Stotzky, see IP Stotzky ‘Creating the conditions for democracy’ in H 
Hongju-Koh& RC Slye (eds.) Deliberative democracy and human rights (1999) 157, at 162 & 168-169. 
See also S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 32-
34 where she affirms the importance of equality in participation in deliberative democratic processes, 
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Even though there is a perceived difference between the two theorists as to the 
requirement of a concrete community with a shared ethical culture for dialogical deliberation to 
occur,72 it is not a substantive difference, as in modern societies, for dialogue about rights to 
occur in a polity, there must be at least a shared culture of democracy, equality, dignity and, at a 
very general level, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of each citizen.73 It is this 
general understanding among the citizenry that enables citizens to actively engage in dialogue 
as equal co-participants tied together in a common bond, that of being members of a specific 
State, and the desire to engage in effective collective self-governance through the enactment of 
valid laws aimed at enhancing the common good.74 
3.3 Dialogical constitutionalism in the Canadian constitutional jurisprudence 
The dialogical metaphor has been adopted and used extensively in the analysis and evaluation 
of judicial review in Canada, especially in relation to the interpretation and enforcement of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This resulted from an exposition of the theory of 
dialogue by Peter Hogg and Allison Bushel who described the interaction between the judiciary 
and the legislature in instances of constitutional review,75 specifically in view of the Charter-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
calling for disadvantaged groups to be provided with substantive means to participate effectively; Klare (n 
7 above) 153, where he acknowledges the intricate intertwinement between political freedom and socio-
economic justice, emphasizing that people must have actual basic resources if there are to meaningfully 
exercise their democratic rights; and KS Czapanskiy & R Manjoo ‘The right of public participation in the 
law-making process and the role of the legislature in the promotion of the right’ (2008-2009) 19 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 1, at 22-25, who contend that democratic deliberation and 
socio-economic emancipation are mutually interdependent and complimentary as deliberation requires 
adequate education and economic security, and a lack of fulfilment of basic SERs denies the poor the 
requisite social agency to participate in public deliberations.   
72 Michelman – Family quarrel (n 70 above) 1164.  
73 Michelman – Family quarrel (n 70 above) 1169-74. He further terms this a ‘consciousness of inter-
subjectivity and a consciously shared awareness of “symmetrical relations of mutual recognition” …as 
subjects “both free and equal”’, at 1172.  
74 Michelman – Family quarrel (n 70 above) 1170-71.  
75  PW Hogg & A Bushell ‘The Charter dialogue between the Courts and Legislatures (or perhaps the 
Charter of Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all’ (1997) 35(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75, at 79-80. 
James Kelly questions the viability of parliament as a participant in this dialogue stating that even though 
some kind of dialogue exists, it is basically between the Cabinet (Executive) and the judiciary due to the 
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based possibility76 of the political institutions of the State reversing, modifying or avoiding the 
courts’ review decisions invalidating legislative or executive action,77 as a dialogue.78 They 
argued that this interaction between the courts and the political institutions entails a dialogue 
because judicial review by the courts is not the final word on constitutional interpretation, and 
the political institutions, especially parliament and the executive, have the capacity and the 
power to override court decisions.79 They thus contend that the Canadian courts espouse a 
weak form of judicial review which does not have denigrating effects on the democratic 
aspirations of the majority as espoused by the political institutions of the State.80 
3.3.1 The espousal of the “dialogic metaphor” by the Canadian Supreme Court 
The theory of dialogue was first adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1998 as a response 
to criticisms of the Court’s usurpation of the legislative role of parliament, with Judge Frank 
Iacobucci holding that the Charter entrenched dialogue as well as accountability of each of the 
branches of government, and judicial review thus had the effect of enhancing, not denying, the 
democratic process.81 This opened the floodgates for judicial reliance on the concept of Charter 
dialogue, and by 2006, a total of 27 judicial decisions, 10 of which were made by the Supreme 
Court, had adopted the concept.82 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
prominent role played by the executive both in the development of the policies prior to introduction in 
parliament. See JB Kelly ‘Legislative activism and Parliamentary Bills of Rights: Institutional lessons from 
Canada’ in JB Kelly & CP Manfredi (eds.) Contested constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2009) 86 & 89-94. 
76 The Charter-based dialogue facilitators relied on by Hogg and Bushell include: The dialogue thesis is 
premised on four Charter-based dialogue facilitators: the section 33 override provision; the section 1 
limitation provision; the internal rights qualifiers in sections 7, 8, 9 and 12; and the guarantee of equality 
rights under section 15(1). See Hogg & Bushell – Charter dialogue (n 75 above) 82-91. 
77  Hogg & Bushell – Charter dialogue (n 75 above) 79-80.  
78 They base their thesis on an analysis of constitutional review cases which showed that of the 88 
invalidation cases analysed, 58 resulted in a legislative modification by parliament, see P Hogg, A 
Bushell-Thornton & WK Wright ‘Charter dialogue revisited – or “much ado about metaphors”’ (2007) 45(1) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, at 51 & Appendix 1 at 55-65. 
79 Hogg, Bushell & Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 4 & 26. 
80  Hogg, Bushell & Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 4, 26 & 29-30.  
81 Vriend v Alberta (1998) 1 S.C.R. 493, at 563 (para 130). 
82 Hogg, Bushell & Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 5 & 7-25 
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Judicial use of the dialogue theory is underscored by an analysis of two interrelated 
cases dealing with access to private medical records of sexual assault survivors. In the first 
case, R v O’Connor,83 the Supreme Court held unanimously that access to private medical and 
counselling records of a complainant by the accused in a sexual assault case that are held by a 
third party was necessary, but under a procedure that adequately balanced the accused’s fair 
trial rights in section 7 of the Charter and the complainant’s right to privacy under section 8.84 
However, the court was divided 5-4 on how to achieve the balance, with the majority holding 
that the threshold to be satisfied by the accused person was the “likely relevance” of the private 
record to the accused’s defence.85 The majority further said that once the accused has proved 
the likely relevance of the requested private records to his defence, the trial judge must then 
examine and weigh the salutary and deleterious effects of a production order to determine 
whether non-production would limit the ability of the accused to prepare his defence. In 
undertaking this balancing the trial judge must take into account: the extent to which the record 
is necessary to the accused’s defence; the probative value of the record; the nature and extent 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy vested in the records; whether production requested is 
based on any discriminatory belief or bias; and the potential prejudice on the complainant’s 
dignity, privacy or security.86 
 The minority on the other hand held that an application for production can only be made 
to the trial judge after the commencement of the trial, and they also held that the determination 
of an application for production must be a restrictive procedure, requiring a more robust 
balancing of interests by the courts.87 The minority stated that orders for disclosure must be 
respectful of Charter values and the fundamental justice that the right to privacy entails, and that 
the violation of complainants’ privacy must be justified in a free and democratic society.88  They 
thus enumerated more stringent grounds that must be met before an order of disclosure is 
                                                            
83 R v O’Connor (1995) 4 S.C.R. 411. 
84 R v O’Connor, at 10-11. Two requirements were to be met before the disclosure could be granted: the 
applicant had to establish the relevance of the records in the resolution of the case; the court must view 
the records and decide whether their disclosure is necessary, taking into account the rights of both parties 
to the case.  
85 R v O’Connor, at 9. 
86 R v O’Connor, at 10-11. 
87  R v O’Connor, at 11-16.  
88 As above. 
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made, which included: the inability of the accused to obtain the information sought by other 
means; disclosure must be as limited as possible to only the information necessary for the 
accused to make their defence; applications for disclosure must be made on reasonable 
grounds, not on discriminatory assumptions and stereotypes; and the need for proportionality 
between salutary and deleterious effects of production.89  
The case led to legislative amendment with the Legislature adopting the restrictive 
procedure developed by the minority in the O’Connor case.90 The Legislature set out its reasons 
for doing so in the preamble to the legislation, which was the need to deal with the high 
prevalence of sexual violence against women and children, and a desire not to deter the 
reporting of those cases, a likely scenario if disclosure of private medical records of survivors 
could be compelled.91 In the subsequent case of R v Mills which was challenging the new 
legislation on disclosure, the Court upheld the legislation.92 The reasoning of the Court was that 
the O’Connor case was not the last word on the subject of disclosure; that the development of 
the law followed a dialogue between the Legislature and the Courts; and that there had been a 
long process of consultation after O’Connor, leading to the adoption of the new legislation.93  
3.3.2 Critique of the use of the dialogical metaphor in the Canadian context 
Although heralded as constituting a powerful account of judicial review as an instrument of 
democratic governance,94 the dialogue theory, as used in the Canadian context has, however, 
                                                            
89 As above. 
90 Hogg, Bushell & Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 19-21. 
91  As above 
92 R v Mills (1999) 3 S.C.R. 668, at 689. 
93 Mills, at 745. For a discussion of similar Canadian cases that have resulted in legislative sequels that 
have been deferred to by the Canadian Supreme Court in subsequent (second look) cases, see R Dixon 
‘Weak form judicial review and American exceptionalism’ Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 348 (May 2011) 13-17 & 20-25, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/348-rd-weak-
form.pdf (accessed on 23 January 2013). 
94  CP Manfredi & JB Kelly ‘Six degrees of dialogue: A response to Hogg and Bushell’ (1999) 37(3) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 513, at 515; A Petter ‘Twenty years of Charter justification: From liberal 
legalism to dubious dialogue’ (2003) 52 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 185-186, who contends 
that the dialogue metaphor has enabled  the Courts to transcend the constrictive theory of liberal legalism 
and has thus allowed them greater scope to justify judicial policy-making such as the imposition of 
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not received universal acclaim. Even though a thorough exposition of all the critique and 
responses to the critique is beyond the scope of this study, some of the most important and 
relevant criticisms are discussed below.   
Carissima Mathen contends that the use of the dialogue metaphor characterises a 
complex, unpredictable inter-institutional relationship as a straight-forward exchange between 
equally matched institutions, an unrealistic scenario taking into account the common sense 
understanding of dialogue.95 She argues that a common sense understanding of dialogue 
envisions a relationship of cooperation, exchange and the possibility of mutual moderation.96 
She, therefore, surmises that the understanding of dialogue envisioned by Hogg and Bushell, 
and subsequently adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court, has limited utility in the debate over 
judicial review as it does not entail a common sense understanding of dialogue.97 Matthew 
Hennigar acknowledges these concerns, contending that the empirical validity of whether or not 
dialogue exists depends on the definition given to the “dialogue metaphor” as the accuracy of 
the reference to the interrelationship between the courts and the political institutions as dialogue 
will depend on the definition used.98 In their response, Hogg, Bushell and Wright argue that they 
envisioned a modest view of dialogue, insisting that it only refers to legislative responses to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
positive obligations on the State, the protection of collective interests, and the fashioning of creative 
remedies. 
95 C Mathen ‘Dialogue theory, judicial review and judicial supremacy: A comment on “Charter dialogue 
revisited”’ (2007) 45(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 125, at 128-129. 
96 As above (footnotes omitted). See also J Goldsworthy ‘Judicial review, legislative override and 
democracy’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 451, 460; J Waldron ‘Some models of dialogue between 
judges and legislators’ (2004) 23 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 7, 36. 
97 Mathen (n 95 above) 131. 
98 M Hennigar ‘Expanding the “dialogue” debate: Canadian Federal Government responses to lower court 
Charter decisions’ (2004) 37(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 3, at 4. In his view, the “dialogic 
metaphor”, as used by Hogg and Bushell and adopted by the Supreme Court, is a discreet inter-
institutional dialogue with the Courts speaking through their judgments and the Legislature doing so 
through legislation. He adds a further angle to the dialogue which involves litigational dialogue that goes 
on in court settings with the government fashioning its interpretation of constitutional provisions 
culminating in government appeals to higher courts from the decisions of lower courts, at 5. 
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judicial decisions, not actual literal inter-branch dialogue on Charter interpretation and 
enforcement.99  
 On a more substantive level, the dialogue theory has been criticised as being merely a 
means of rationalising judicial interpretive supremacy and not a structured system of coordinate 
interpretation of Charter provisions.100 Grant Huscroft contends that the version of dialogue 
espoused in the Canadian context does not offer a normative justification for judicial review, a 
theory of constitutional interpretation, or in any way assist the courts in interpreting the 
Charter.101 This criticism has been echoed by Andrew Petter who avers that the dialogue theory 
‘lacks normative content, and exerts no moral claim to support judges’ involvement in Charter 
decision-making’.102 Huscroft states that the theory does not adequately respond to the counter-
majoritarian dilemma,103 and that it is not concerned with qualitative outcomes, any legislative 
response to judicial decisions being sufficient to satisfy it.104 He further contends that judicial 
review in Canada does not in any way portray a weak form of review, stating that the difference 
between judicial review in Canada and the USA is purely a matter of form and not substance. 105 
                                                            
99 See Hogg, Bushell& Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 4, 26 & 45-46. See also P Hogg 
& A Bushell-Thornton ‘A reply to “six degrees of dialogue”’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 529. 
100 G Huscroft ‘Rationalising judicial power: The mischief of dialogue theory’ in JB Kelly & CP Manfredi 
(eds.) Contested constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2009) 
50, at 50-57; Mathen (n 95 above) 127, 130-131, who contends that due to the simplicity and the 
elegance of the dialogue metaphor, the courts have used it as it presents the court in ‘a more benign light 
than the power-mad institution invoked by opponents of judicial review’.  
101 Huscroft (n 100 above) 52 (footnotes omitted). The above critique has been conceded by the authors 
who contend that dialogue metaphor, as used by them, was meant to be descriptive rather than 
normative, see Hogg, Bushell & Wright – Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 26 & 47. 
102 Petter - Twenty years of Charter justification (n 94 above) 187; Petter - Taking dialogue theory much 
too seriously (n 3 above) 149, he argues that the dialogue theory can properly be understood as a 
mitigation of judicial policy-making through judicial review and not as a legitimisation of judicial review, at 
150.  
103 Huscroft (n 100 above) 62. See also Manfredi & Kelly – Six degrees of dialogue (n 94 above) 522, who 
affirm that the dialogue theory does not address anti-majoritarian objections.  
104 Huscroft (n 100 above) 52.  
105 Huscroft (n 100 above) 57-58. A strong-form judicial review is a form of judicial supremacy ‘in which 
the courts have the final and unrevisable word on what the Constitution means, with legislatures and 
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 Similar sentiments are echoed by Christopher Manfredi who argues that the Court has 
used judicial review to propagate its preferred immediate substantive policy choices, leaving the 
political institutions with very limited options of response, the very hallmark of a strong-form 
judicial review.106 He further scrutinises the section 33 override,107 and the historical difficulty of 
its use that has rendered it a redundant tool for the Legislature to rely on to override judicial 
interpretation of rights or to engage in any meaningful dialogue.108 He thus contends that basing 
the dialogic theory on section 33 is ‘an overly simplistic, ahistorical and apolitical type of legal 
formalism’.109 His summations are thus that rather than encourage democratic dialogue between 
two equal institutions, sections 1 and 33 elevate judicial preferences to the status of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
executive officials having no substantial role in informing the courts’ constitutional interpretations’. On the 
other hand, a weak-form judicial review is a ‘form of judicial review in which judges’ rulings on 
constitutional questions are expressly open to legislative revision in the short and medium term’. It has 
thus been argued that judicial review in the Canadian context is a weak form of judicial review as it allows 
the legislature to override the judicial interpretation of constitutional rights, and thus enhancing the 
position of the people to govern themselves within the bounds of the Constitution. For an elaboration of 
this argument, see M Tushnet ‘Weak form judicial review and “core” civil liberties’ (2006) 41 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 1, at 1-11; Dixon (n 93 above) 2 where she chronicles authors arguing 
that the weak-form judicial review: 
[h]elps transform constitutional rights discourse from a judicial monologue into a richer and more 
balanced inter-institutional dialogue thereby reducing, if not eliminating, the tension between 
judicial protection of fundamental rights and democratic decision-making, at 2. 
106 CP Manfredi ‘The unfulfilled promise of dialogic constitutionalism: Judicial-Legislative relationship 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ in T Campbell et al (eds), Protecting rights without 
a Bill of Rights: Institutional performance and reform in Australia (2006) 239, at 244-248. For an account 
of the adverse effects judicial review to political decision making in Canada, see generally, A Petter 
‘Legalise this: The Chartering of Canadian politics’ in JB Kelly & CP Manfredi (eds.) Contested 
constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2009) 33, at 33-49. 
107 Section 33(1) provides that ‘Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act 
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter’. 
108 Manfredi – The unfulfilled promise (n 106 above) 249-252. 
109 Manfredi – The unfulfilled promise (n 106 above) 252. 
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constitutional principles, foreclosing dialogue in any real sense and leading to overall policy 
distortion.110 
Despite the criticisms, most of the critics agree that an expansive understanding of 
dialogue can have a positive impact on the interpretation of rights, and thus engender a deeper 
understanding of their relationship to competing constitutional visions.111 Canada thus provides 
an important case study of the theory of dialogue in constitutional interpretation. The dialogical 
constitutionalism model further developed in chapter four below, therefore, does not espouse a 
restrictive understanding or oversimplification of the dialogical metaphor, but aims to develop a 
more expansive understanding of dialogue with normative interpretational content, infused with 
the theory of deliberative democracy as well as the theory of coordinate construction.  
3.4 Dialogical constitutionalism and coordinate construction in the United States 
The challenges of judicial review in the United States (U.S.) has led to an extensive debate on 
whether the Supreme Court is the main State organ entrusted with the power of constitutional 
interpretation112 or whether the political institutions also have equal coordinate power to interpret 
                                                            
110 Manfredi – The unfulfilled promise (n 106 above) 249. See also Manfredi & Kelly - Six degrees of 
dialogue (n 94 above) 522, where they explain that ‘policy distortion occurs whenever a legislature must 
subordinate its understanding of constitutionally permissible policy to that articulated by the Court, even 
when legislative objectives are not at issue’. The criticism on the policy distortion even in weak form 
judicial review is conceded by Hogg, Bushell & Wright in their later article, see Hogg, Bushell & Wright – 
Charter dialogue revisited (n 78 above) 39-40; M Tushnet ‘Policy distortion and democratic debilitation: 
Comparative illumination of the counter-majoritarian difficulty’ (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review 245.  
111 Huscroft (n 100 above) 51; Manfredi – The unfulfilled promise (n 106 above) 240, footnote 5; CP 
Manfredi, Judicial power and the charter: Canada and the paradox of liberal constitutionalism, 2nd edition 
(2001) 207-208. For a more critical and elaborate account of dialogue as used in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, see generally, C Bateup ‘Reassessing the dialogic possibilities of weak-form Bills of Rights’ 
(2009) 32 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 529.  
112  This is an aspect of judicial supremacy, which entrenches the supremacy of the court as the ultimate 
interpreter of the constitution, and requires that political branches conform to or defer to the constitutional 
meaning as fashioned by the courts, even when they think that the courts are substantially wrong about 
the meaning of the Constitution, see Johnsen - Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 106; KE 
Whittington ‘Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation: Three objections and responses (2002) 80 North 
Carolina Law Review 773, at 784.  
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constitutional provisions.113 The debate has been occasioned by the courts,114 specifically the 
activist Rehnquist Court which asserted an extreme version of judicial supremacy, declaring that 
it was the sole and exclusive responsibility of the court to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees, and that any foray into the fashioning of constitutional meaning by the political 
institutions was contrary to the principle of separation of powers.115   
The debate led to the development of alternative theories of constitutional interpretation 
to enhance the role of the political institutions in the fashioning of constitutional meaning, such 
                                                            
113 J Meernik & J Ignagni ‘Judicial review and coordinate construction of the constitution’ (1997) 41(2) 
American Journal of Political Science 447; Johnsen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 105 & 118, 
who states that even though the authority of the court to review the constitutionality of the acts of 
congress and the president are an integral part of the American constitutional system since Marbury v 
Madison, this does not equate with the concept of judicial supremacy, as the Marbury court only claimed 
a limited interpretative authority for the courts, that is, only the authority to interpret and apply the 
constitution in the course of resolving justiciable cases and controversies. See also LD Kramer ‘The 
Supreme Court, 2000 term: Foreword: We, the Court’ (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 5-6; P Brest ‘The 
conscientious legislator’s guide to constitutional interpretation’ (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 585, at 
587-588. 
114 See Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) at 177 where Chief Justice Marshal stated that ‘it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’; Cooper v Aaron 358 
U.S. 1 (1958) at 18, where a unanimous Supreme Court also held that the principle of judicial supremacy 
in the exposition of constitutional law is a permanent and indispensable feature of the American 
constitutional system. For further discussion, see Pickerill (n 3 above) 14-15. 
115 Johnsen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 107 & 118-119. He quotes cases such as United 
States v Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000) where the court held that ‘[e]ver since Marbury, this court has 
remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text’; Nevada Department of Human Resources v 
Hibbs 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) where the court held that ‘[i]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define 
the substance of constitutional guarantees...The ultimate interpretation and determination of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the judicial branch’; and Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garret 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) where the Court held that ‘[i]t is 
the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substantive constitutional guarantees’. For an 
exposition of this and other cases where the Court affirms its primary jurisdiction on constitutional 
interpretation, see Whittington – Extra-judicial constitutional interpretation (n 112 above) 775-776; C Zurn 
Deliberative democracy and the institution of judicial review (2007) 21-23. 
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as the theory of departmentalism or coordinate construction.116 Coordinate construction is 
defined by James Meernik and Joseph Ignagni as ‘a process whereby governmental and non-
governmental actors seek to realise their interpretation of the Constitution as equals of the 
Supreme Court’.117 It is the same as departmentalism, which entails the independent and 
coordinate authority of all the branches of government in the fashioning of constitutional 
meaning.118 
Despite contrasting opinions on constitutional interpretation, there is consensus that the 
constitutional text and structure engenders the responsibility of all the three branches of 
government to uphold the Constitution.119 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this in 
the case of Boerne v Flores where it remarked, in relation to Congress, as follows:120 
When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibility, it has not just the right but the 
duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the constitution... Were it 
otherwise, we would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy. 
This is in line with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism further expanded in chapter four 
below which proposes that courts, taking into account the concept of coordinate construction, 
                                                            
116 See Johnsen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 105 & 112-113. For a list of authors who have 
ascertained the existence of coordinate construction in the U.S. see Pickerill (n 3 above) 16.  
117 Meernik & Ignagni (n 113 above) 448. See also Whittington – Extra-judicial constitutional interpretation 
(n 112 above) 782-783. 
118 R Post & R Siegel ‘Popular constitutionalism, departmentalism and judicial supremacy’ (2004) 92(4) 
California Law Review 1027, at 1031. See also Johansen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 117, 
who advocates functional departmentalism that engenders cooperation and collaboration in the design of 
constitutional meaning between the three branches of government based on their interconnections and 
the practical realities of how they govern. He contends that the hallmark of his approach to 
departmentalism is respect and deference between the branches in the fashioning of constitutional 
meaning, at 120; Whittington – Extra-judicial constitutional interpretation (n 112 above) 778 concurs with 
Johansen, stating that the proper degree of deference to the other branches in constitutional 
interpretation is key to enhance collaboration in the design of constitutional meaning. 
119 Johnsen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 113. See also D Landau & JD Lopez-Murcia 
‘Political institutions and judicial role: An approach in context, the case of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court’ (2009) 55, at 59-60 available at http://works.bepress.com/julian_lopez_murcia/26 (accessed on 4 
September 2012).  
120 Boerne v Flores 521 U.S. 507, at 535. 
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should defer to the institutional and constitutional competence of the political institutions to 
make public decisions on the design, development and implementation of SER’s 
implementation framework unless there is a clear error or unconstitutionality.121  
In practice, coordinate construction has been used by Congress and Presidents122 over 
the years in the U.S. to effect substantial constitutional changes, especially in court dominated 
areas of the protection of fundamental rights and the rights of minorities. Examples here are as 
follows:123 Thomas Jefferson’s assertion of independent presidential powers to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act; Andrew Jackson’s veto of the National Bank; Abraham 
Lincoln’s rejection of the Supreme Court decision in the slavery case of Dred Scott v Sandford 
(1987) and his exposition of an antislavery constitutionalism leading to the New Deal,124 among 
others.125 
Johansen argues that to enhance Constitutional fidelity, the use of interpretive powers 
by the political institutions must be undertaken in a transparent and accountable manner, be 
subject to principled self-restraint, and be sufficiently checked by the other branches of 
government, and ultimately by the electorate.126 The interpretation of constitutional meaning by 
the political institutions is thus an important avenue for constitutional development as it ‘provides 
a necessary source of interpretation in the absence of judicial resolution, and a valuable 
                                                            
121 Johansen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 114. 
122  Some of the presidents that have advocated coordinate construction and advanced popular 
interpretation in support of their preferred constitutional understanding include: Thomas Jefferson, 
Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, see KE Whittington 
‘Presidential challenges to judicial supremacy and the politics of constitutional meaning’ (2001) 33 Polity 
365. 
123 Whittington – Extra-judicial constitutional interpretation (n 112 above) 819-820. 
124 In rejecting the notion of judicial supremacy, Lincoln stated in his First Inaugural Speech that: ‘if the 
policy of government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, then the people would have ceased to be their own rulers’ quoted in 
Whittington – Extra-judicial constitutional interpretation (n 112 above) 843. 
125 See Johansen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 115; D Johansen ‘Ronald Reagan and the 
Rehnquist court on congressional power: Presidential influence on constitutional change’ (2003) 78 
Indiana Law Journal 363; Pickerill (n 3 above) 32-33. 
126 Johansen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 115. 
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alternative or supplemental voice when the courts have spoken’.127 Johansen thus 
acknowledges the importance of dialogue in constitutional interpretation, contending that 
coordinate construction envisions ‘a collaborative enterprise in which each branch should 
recognise its own limitations and the relative strengths and functions of the other coordinate 
branches’.128 Coordinate construction forms an important building block of the dialogical 
constitutionalism theory further developed in chapter four below. 
3.5 Dialogical constitutionalism and meaningful engagement in the South African context 
In the enforcement of SERs in the context of evictions, the South African courts have on several 
occasions issued mandatory orders requiring the political institutions of the State to 
substantively and meaningfully engage129 with the affected communities and their 
representatives with the view of reaching a dialogical and mutually satisfactory outcome.130 This 
                                                            
127 As above. 
128 Johansen – Functional departmentalism (n 8 above) 109. See also Pickerill (n 3 above) 3, where he 
details a number of American constitutional scholars who have argued that judicial review and coordinate 
construct can exist in an environment of mutual respect and deference. 
129 See L Chenwi ‘Meaningful engagement in the realisation of socio-economic rights: The South African 
experience’ (2011) 26 South African Public Law 128, at 129-30, who argues that ‘meaningful 
engagement’ is an expression of ‘bottom-up’ participatory democracy. She contends that even though 
participation is an important component of engagement, the concept of ‘meaningful engagement’ goes 
beyond mere participation to envisage a process of constant interchange between government and 
citizens in the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of SER legislative and policy frameworks. 
It further requires accountability, transparency and the inclusion of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised 
individuals as well as groups in the development and implementation of effective as well as sustainable 
SERs implementation frameworks that benefit poor communities and that is capable of promoting social 
change. See also L Chenwi & K Tissington, Engaging meaningfully with government on socio-economic 
rights: A focus on the right to housing (2010) 9 & 21-24, where they aver that the process of meaningful 
engagement must be structured, coordinated, consistent and comprehensive; be sensitive to language 
preferences; be sensitive to and balance individual and group interests and needs; treat all participants as 
equal partners in the decision-making process; as well as involve other stakeholders and third parties 
such as NGOs and other civil society organisations.  
130 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (PE Municipality case); 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg Case CCT 24/07; [2008] ZACC 1 (Olivia Road case); 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) [2011] 
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approach has been termed ‘a tangible expression of a deliberative version of judicial review 
[with the potential for the enforcement of SERs] while preserving the democratic legitimacy of 
legislative bodies’.131  The orders are the product of what the SACC has termed “active judicial 
management,”132 and in issuing these orders, the courts have on several instances retained 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the State does not ride rough shod over the poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised claimants, but engage in a respectful dialogue with clear guidelines 
and review standards/benchmarks that must be met by any resultant negotiated agreement.133   
Even though the need for government engagement with people affected by its action 
was present in the Grootboom, Kyalami Ridge and Modderklip cases,134 the use of the term 
‘meaningful engagement’ was first expressly employed in the Port Elizabeth Municipality case. 
The case concerned an application for the eviction of around 68 people who had illegally 
occupied private land within the municipality for a period ranging from two to eight years.135 In 
emphasising the importance of dialogue and deliberation in the realisation of SERs, the Court 
affirmed the inherent link between the substantive and procedural aspects of justice, which 
required that courts devise innovative ways to undertake their managerial role in the context of 
constitutional adjudication of competing rights.136 To this end the Court stated that:137 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
ZACC 8 (Joe Slovo case); Mamba and Others v Minister of Social Development (36573/08) [2008] 
ZAGPHC 255 (12 August 2008) (Mamba case); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v 
Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Others (CCT12/09) [2009] ZACC 31 (Abahlali case), paras. 
69, 79 & 113-114.  
131 A Pillay ‘Towards effective social and economic rights adjudication: The role of meaningful 
engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732, at 732. 
132 PE Municipality case, para. 36. Justice Albie Sachs stresses that this function goes beyond the normal 
judicial function and has major implications for the manner in which the Court approaches and deals with 
SER adjudication, especially in making remedial choices for the vindication of SER violations. 
133 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 above) 418-19.  
134 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 87; Minister of 
Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others (CCT 55/00) 2001 (3) 
SA 1151 (CC), para. 111; President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd (CCT20/04) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (13 May 2005), para. 31. See Pillay (n 131 above) 739. 
135 PE Municipality case, paras. 1-2.  
136 PE Municipality case, para. 39. 
137 As above. 
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[o]ne potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliation of the 
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each other in a 
proactive and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever possible, face-
to-face engagement or mediation through a third party should replace arm’s-length combat by 
intransigent opponents.  
The Court held that the most important aspect of the engagement was the active participation of 
the affected people, in line with the requirements of justice and equity that people are treated 
with dignity, equal care and concern as bearers of fundamental rights.138 In the Court’s view, 
engagement was advantageous as it reduced the expenses of litigation, reduced the tension 
resulting from litigation, promotes good neighbourliness and social cohesion, and encourages 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.139 The Court thus held that ‘absent special 
circumstances, it would not ordinarily be just and equitable to order eviction if proper 
discussions, and where appropriate, mediation, have not been attempted’.140 
A more elaborate and successful use of the order is evidenced by the Olivia Road case, 
which concerned an application by the city to evict the claimants on account of concerns about 
the health and safety implications of the buildings in which the claimants were staying.141 The 
Court made a mandatory order for engagement on the basis that it was advantageous to 
resolve conflicts amicably in line with the values, principles and purposes of the Constitution and 
also that it was a constitutional duty for the City to engage vulnerable groups before making 
decisions that adversely affect them.142 In doing this, the Court drew a clear link between 
                                                            
138 PE Municipality case, paras. 40-41. The Court further contended that justice and equity also requires 
that poor people undertake some efforts, using their own agency and resourcefulness, to seek possible 
solutions to their situation. 
139 PE Municipality case, paras. 42-43. 
140 PE Municipality case, para. 43. See also paras. 54-56, 59-60 where the Court undertakes its analysis 
of the facts of the case and the circumstances of the families in question and decides that it is not just and 
equitable to order the eviction of the families.  
141 Olivia Road case, paras. 1-3.  
142 Olivia Road case, paras. 5 & 16-23. The Court held that a Municipality that evicts people without 
meaningfully engaging with them was acting contrary to the values, principles and purpose of the 
Constitution, at para. 16. It thus emphasised that the Constitution obliges every Municipality to engage 
meaningfully, openly (secrecy is counterproductive to proper engagement) and in good faith (without 
intransigent attitudes evidenced by the making of non-negotiable demands) with people who would 
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meaningful engagement and the requirement for active public participation in government 
decision-making, especially by those expressly affected by the government’s actions in 
question, noting that people in need of housing should not be seen as a “disempowered mass” 
but as active participants in the process of finding housing solutions.143 The Court further 
provided normative guidance to the parties as to the standards that had to be met before their 
agreement could be accepted;144 with the Court further retaining jurisdiction to review, and either 
endorse or reject, the resulting agreement between the parties as contained in the parties’ 
affidavits to be presented to the Court on or before 3 October 2007.145 The agreement between 
the parties was endorsed by the Court on 5 November 2007 as, in view of the Court, it 
represented a reasonable response to the engagement process.146 
In its elaboration of the concept of meaningful engagement, the Olivia road Court 
contended that it involves a two-way process of deliberation and dialogue, entailing the active 
participation of all the affected parties with the objectives of deciding, in the context of evictions, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
become homeless because it evicts them, and that the occurrence of meaningful engagement was thus 
one of the factors that a court must consider when determining whether it is just and equitable to grant an 
order of eviction, at paras. 17 & 20-23. It further held that the larger the number of people potentially to be 
affected by eviction, the greater the need for structured, consistent and careful engagement which must 
be undertaken by skilled and compassionate government officials, at para. 19.  
143 Olivia Road case, para. 20. 
144 See S Wilson ‘Planning for inclusion in South Africa: The State’s duty to prevent homelessness and 
the potential of “meaningful engagement”’ (2011) 22 Urban Forum 265, at 276, who states that 
negotiations were guided by the indication of the Court that it was unwilling to issue an eviction order 
unless there was alternative accommodation for the occupiers; and also that the major aim of the 
negotiation was to ensure the re-accommodation of the occupiers in safe, decent accommodation. 
145 Olivia Road case, para. 5, especially paras. 3-4 of the interim order. See S Wilson (n 144 above) 276, 
who contends that the retention of jurisdiction and report-back order of the Court was key in facilitating 
negotiations and engagement between the parties, as it ensured that they were focussed and negotiated 
in good faith. 
146 Olivia Road case, paras. 27-30. It was the first time for the Court to approve an out of court agreement 
by the parties which required court approval before major aspects of it could be operational, and reasons 
for the approval included: the fact of respectful engagement between the parties, compliance by the 
parties with the interim court order requiring engagement, resource implications for the city on the 
implementation of the agreement, and the dire consequences to the parties if the agreement was not 
endorsed by the Court, at para. 29. 
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the following issues: What the consequences of eviction might be, the role of the city in 
alleviating those consequences, the possibility of rendering the buildings in issue safe and 
secure, and the alternatives available to the city to fulfil its obligations to the occupiers.147 The 
Court noted the potential of engagement to contribute towards amicable and compassionate 
resolution of conflicts, and called for sensitivity as well as care in the conduct of engagement.148 
Engagement thus represents the opportunities available to the political institutions, together with 
all societal stakeholders, to explore the vast range of possibilities with the object of full 
realisation of entrenched SERs.149  
The resultant agreement between the parties was a comprehensive plan which 
extensively dealt with most of the concerns that had been raised by the claimants, and it 
included: a plan to renovate the buildings in issue to make them safer and more habitable in the 
interim;150 the provision of alternative accommodation in other, better buildings within the inner 
city and the setting of agreeable dates for the occupiers to relocate to these new 
accommodation;151 the nature and standard of the alternative accommodation and its 
affordability for the claimants;152 as well as an undertaking by the City to provide more 
permanent housing solutions for the claimants.153   
In her analysis of the case, Sandra Liebenberg express the view that the agreement 
resulting from the dialogue in the Olivia Road case not only led to an amicable resolution of the 
conflict between the parties, but was also more comprehensive than any court would have been 
able to order.154 She further contends that the judgment is an affirmation by the Court of the 
principle of participatory, deliberative democracy and its importance in the realisation of 
                                                            
147 Olivia Road case, para. 14. 
148 Olivia Road case, para. 15. 
149 G Muller ‘Conceptualising “meaningful engagement” as a deliberative democratic partnership’ (2011) 
22 Stellenbosch Law Review 742, at 744. 
150 This included the installation of chemical toilets, the cleaning and sanitation of the buildings, delivery of 
refuse bags, closure of a lift shaft, and the installation of fire extinguishers, an undertaking which was to 
be completed 21 days after the completion of the agreement,  see Olivia Road case, para. 25.   
151 Olivia Road case, para. 26. 
152 As above. 
153 As above.  
154 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 above) 420. 
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entrenched SERs.155 According to her, the hallmarks of deliberative democracy in the judgment 
include: the requirement for openness, respect for human dignity and equal worth of all 
stakeholders in the engagement process; persuasion and the force of the better argument as 
the basis of decision-making; inclusion of all societal stakeholders in the decision-making 
process, especially indigent, marginalised and vulnerable groups; and the availability and 
consideration of all relevant information.156  Anashri Pillay concurs, arguing that by ordering the 
parties to substantively engage in dialogue, the SACC was able to respond to the institutional 
and constitutional competency concerns that have been raised against judicial adjudication and 
enforcement of SERs, justiciability concerns in relation to SERs as well as concerns about 
democracy and separation of powers.157  
Despite its dialogical and deliberative credentials, the Olivia Road Court failed to further 
spur on societal dialogue by failing to engage with the occupiers with regard to permanent 
housing solutions.158 It is submitted that, even though it was proper for the Court to show 
deference to the City to develop its plan aimed at the realisation of the provision of permanent 
housing for the people living in the inner city, it should have retained jurisdiction to allow either 
the occupiers in question, or any other occupiers who would have faced similar threats of 
eviction to approach it to enhance engagement as to the suitability and ability of the developed 
plan to meet the City’s  housing obligations.159 Similar sentiments are shared by Kirsty McLean 
who labels the failure of the Court to engage with outstanding issues as the negative aspect of 
                                                            
155 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 above) 301; Liebenberg – Engaging 
the paradoxes (n 34 above) 14ff. 
156 As above.  
157 Pillay (n 131 above) 733-34. 
158 Olivia Road case, para. 34-36. The reasoning of the Court was that the City had made an undertaking 
to develop the plan in consultation with the people and that there was no indication that the City would fail 
to continue negotiations with all affected occupiers in good faith; its consideration of the city’s plan would 
amount to abstract review and that it was not proper for it to be the Court of first and last instance in 
scrutinising the new plan. See also Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 
above) 300-301. 
159 See Wilson (n 144 above) 279-280, who chronicles the difficulties that have been experienced by the 
occupiers who have basically been “parked” into the temporary accommodation they were moved to for 
over four years now, and have had to commence fresh litigation at the High Court so as to force the City 
to implement the agreement in its entirety.   
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the judgment.160 She contends that this failure cannot be termed judicial “minimalism” or 
“avoidance” but an express and extensive unwillingness of the Court to adjudicate on the 
issues, a situation that can effectively be termed as abdication of judicial responsibility.161 
Questions as to the adequacy and substantive requirements of the concept of 
meaningful engagement arose in the Joe Slovo case, a case concerning efforts by the 
government to move over 20, 000 residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement to a temporary 
relocation site to pave way for the N2 Gateway pilot project which was aimed at the slum 
upgrading.162 Unlike its dicta in the Port Elizabeth Municipality and the Olivia Road decisions 
discussed above, the Court proceeded to issue an order of eviction despite there being no 
meaningful engagement between the parties, only requiring engagement as to how the eviction 
was to be carried out.163 The Court further retained jurisdiction requiring the engagement to be 
conducted and its results to be placed before the court by 7 July 2009 for its scrutiny and 
possible endorsement.164   
                                                            
160 K McLean, Constitutional deference, courts and socio-economic rights in South Africa (2009) 150-51. 
161 McLean (n 160 above) 151. 
162 Joe Slovo case, para. 1 
163 Joe Slovo case, paras. 2-4, which sets out the order that was made by the Court in the previous case 
(Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae) [2009] ZACC 16; 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC); 2009 (9) BCLR 
847 (CC) at para 7.), especially paras. 4-22 of the order. Points of engagement included: date of 
relocation, timetable for relocation, and any other matter which the parties decided to engage on. For an 
extensive and informative discussion of the first SACC Joe Slovo Judgement, see McLean (n 160 above) 
152-159; Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 146-149; Liebenberg - Adjudication under 
transformative constitution (n 71 above) 303-311. Dismay at the Court’s order has been expressed by 
several authors such as Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 146; Pillay (n 131 above) 
744-745, who contends that the order of eviction watered down the requirements of meaningful 
engagement as developed in the earlier cases, leaving the meaningful engagement concept devoid of 
substantive dialogical safeguards; Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 
above) 308-310, who contends that ‘if engagement is to be meaningful and entrenched [in the courts’ 
SER jurisprudence] consequences must attach to the State’s failure to adhere to the deliberative 
requirements [of the concept of meaningful engagement], at 314. 
164 Joe Slovo case, paras. 2-4.  
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Even though the court-induced dialogue did not occur in accordance with the Court 
order, the Court’s retention of jurisdiction was a crucial factor as it ensured that parties were still 
able to approach the Court, either for the postponement of the order of eviction as was done by 
the Respondents, or for discharging the order of eviction, as was done by the Applicants, 
without commencing a fresh suit.165 Due to the application by the Applicants, the Court annulled 
the eviction order as the government had failed to undertake adequate measures to carry it out 
as well as due to the shift in government plan from relocation to in-situ upgrading of the 
settlement.166 
Several commentators have acknowledged the potential of the concept of meaningful 
engagement to spur on dialogue and deliberation due to its espousal of tenets of participatory 
democracy as well as its delineation of a neutral space where societal actors can engage 
equally and respectfully to seek social solutions in the design of SER legislative, policy and 
programmatic frameworks.167 Lilian Chenwi argues that it responds to traditional concerns that 
have been raised against the judicial adjudication of SERs such as separation of powers and 
polycentricity, as it enables the political institutions of the State, with the participation of all 
affected societal actors, to develop alternative policy choices aimed at the remedying of SER 
violations.168  
                                                            
165 Joe Slovo case, paras. 5-20. 
166 Joe Slovo case, paras. 29-39. 
167 See Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 129 & 144, who contends that it is more 
democratic, flexible and responsive to the practical concerns raised by SERs; Chenwi & Tissington (n 129 
above) 8-9; Pillay (n 131 above) 732; Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 
above) 301 & 308; Liebenberg – Engaging the paradoxes (n 34 above) 26-28; Muller (n 149 above) 745 & 
753-756; and B Ray ‘Proceduralisation triumph and engagement’s promise in socio-economic rights 
litigation’ (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 107, at 114, who contends that the flexibility 
of engagement ensures adequate interaction between the courts, the government, citizens and other 
interested parties on the values espoused by the entrenched SERs, and thus overally leads to the 
enhancement of constitutional democracy. He states that this form of engagement ‘results in a 
collaborative model of constitutional development in which courts, citizens and the political branches each 
participate in negotiating the meaning of the Constitution’. 
168 Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 146. See also Liebenberg – Engaging the 
paradoxes (n 34 above) 27, who contends that for meaningful engagement to effectively serve its 
dialogical purposes, there must be a substantive normative interpretation and understanding of SERs, an 
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Due to its dialogical and deliberative credentials, meaningful engagement can play an 
important role in the realisation of SERs in Kenya as an integral part of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism. The Kenyan Constitution contains similar provisions on which the SACC has 
based its meaningful-engagement jurisprudence.169 The provisions are as follows. First, the 
preamble which espouses the commitment of the State to nurture and protect the well-being of 
all people, the inalienable right of the people to determine the structures of government as well 
as the requirement that the formation of government be based on the essential values of human 
rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law.170 Secondly, article 1 
encompasses the sovereignty of the people and provides that this sovereignty can either be 
exercised directly (participatory democracy) or through democratically elected representatives 
(representative democracy).171 The article further requires that the delegated authority to all the 
institutions and levels of the State be exercised in accordance with the Constitution, which 
requires that the participatory democracy aspects of the Constitution must be respected in 
public decision-making at all levels of the State.172 This, coupled with the supremacy of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
understanding which encapsulates the development of the purposes and values underpinning the various 
SERs. She avers that this is important as it guides the setting of the engagement agenda as well as 
provides an evaluative framework for assessing the outcomes of the engagement exercise. She 
concludes that this normative framework provides safeguards against the imposition of the will of the 
more powerful party in the engagement process. 
169 For an elaborate discussion of the constitutional basis of meaningful engagement, see Chenwi & 
Tissington (n 129 above) 11-12; Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 134-135; 
Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 71 above) 297-298. Some of those 
provisions include: the preamble which requires the State to improve the quality of life of all citizens and 
free the potential of each person; section 152 requiring local governments to involve communities in local 
government governance; section 7(2) which entails the obligations of the State to respect, protect and 
fulfil rights; SERs sections (26(2), 27(2), 25, among others) which requires the State to act reasonably to 
realise SERs such as healthcare, food, water, education, social security, housing, land ; section 26(3) 
which prohibits arbitrary evictions; section 33 which requires procedural fairness in administrative action; 
section 195 which contains basic values of governance, and which requires public participation in policy-
making and access to information; as well as the right to human dignity and the right to life (sections 10 & 
11). 
170 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, preamble paras. 5-7. 
171 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 1(2).  
172 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 1(3). 
 
 
 
 
159 | P a g e  
 
Constitution entrenched in article 2 requires that all State organs at all levels engage 
democratically with the citizenry in decision-making in the design, development, implementation 
as well as evaluation of legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks for the realisation of 
the entrenched SERs. Third, articles 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution which provides for the 
applicability of international law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction also encompasses the 
requirement of active and genuine participation in public decision-making as is entrenched in 
international law.173  This, taken together with article 21(4) which requires the State to enact and 
implement legislation to fulfil its international law obligations, thus firmly entrenches the duty of 
the State to undertake genuine dialogue when undertaking public decision-making in 
accordance with the international law guidelines and standards.174 
Fourth, meaningful engagement requirements are entrenched within the national values 
and principles of governance provided for in article 10 of the Constitution, which are binding on 
all State organs at all levels of government. Fifth, engagement-enhancing provisions populate 
the Bill of Rights such as article 19 which espouses the objective of rights as being to preserve 
the dignity of all people, to promote social justice and enhance the realisation of the well-being 
of all; article 20(4) which requires that interpretation promotes the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights as well as values underlying an open, democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality, equity and freedom;  article 21 which contains the obligations of the State to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights, and especially taking legislative policy and 
other measures to enhance the progressive realisation of SERs contained in article 43 of the 
Constitution; articles 26 and 28 on the right to life and human dignity respectively; article 47 on 
the right to fair administrative action, among many others. Last, and most importantly, 
meaningful engagement is entrenched in Constitutional provisions calling for the active and 
direct participation of the people in legislative and executive policy and programmatic decision 
making such as articles 188 and 119 on public participation in parliament, article 196 on public 
                                                            
173 In developing the concept of meaningful engagement, the SACC did not delve into an analysis of the 
concept as understood in international law or in comparative national jurisdictions. For an analysis of the 
concept of meaningful engagement in international and regional law, see Chenwi - The South African 
experience (n 129 above) 131-34; Chenwi & Tissington (n 129 above) 15-17. 
174 For an extensive discussion of the place of international law in the Kenyan legal system, see chapter 
two, section 2.2 above. 
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participation in county assemblies, articles 129 and 232(1)(d) on public participation in executive 
policy-making, and article 201 requiring public participation in public finance.175 
 The above discussion shows that there are numerous constitutional provisions that can 
be used to entrench constructive dialogue and meaningful engagement between the State 
institutions at all levels of government and the people both at the level of the development of 
SER implementation frameworks and at the remedial level when SER matters are filed for 
adjudication in the courts. Therefore, the concept of meaningful engagement, as has been used 
in the South African context,176 has application at two levels in the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism: at the level of design, planning, development and implementation of 
legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks by the political institutions of the State as is 
discussed more broadly in relation to the first level of dialogue in chapter four below;177 and at 
the remedial stage as discussed in relation to the third level of dialogue in chapter four below.178 
                                                            
175 The above provisions are more extensively discussed in chapters four and five below. 
176 Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 131, where she affirms the use by the South 
African courts of the meaningful engagement concept both as a tool in the conceptualisation as well as 
realisation of SERs, but also as a remedial model in instances of infringement or threatened infringement 
of SERs.  
177 Chenwi & Tissington (n 129 above) 21, where they contend that meaningful engagement should take 
place before policies, strategies and development projects are planned, and must continue during their 
implementation and evaluation. This reflects the SACC’s contentions that meaningful engagement must 
occur before litigation is countenanced, see Olivia Road case, para. 30 and Abahlali case, paras. 119-
120. See also Muller (n 149 above) 753. 
178 Chenwi - The South African experience (n 129 above) 145-146, where she avers that the involvement 
of stakeholders in the remedial process, as was the case in the Olivia Road case and the Joe Slovo case, 
entails the adoption of innovative remedies that are respectful of the separation of powers doctrine and 
responds to polycentricity concerns of judicial adjudication of SERs. She further discusses at which point 
engagement should be ordered, whether it should be before the judgment of the court, as in Olivia Road, 
or after the judgment, as in Joe Slovo. She contends that ordering engagement after the judgment 
ensures that the normative parameters and party legitimate entitlements are clearly set out by the court, 
and thus curbing power imbalances during engagement as parties know what they are entitled to. She 
further contends that ordering engagement after the judgment also enhances the inclusion of CSOs in the 
process, at 151-154.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter lays the basis for the elaboration of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism in 
chapter four below. It espouses the interconnectedness of law and politics, acknowledging that 
constitutional interpretation of entrenched rights, especially SERs, is a value-laden and dialogic 
exercise which requires the equal participation of all citizens in public decision-making.  It briefly 
traces the history of dialogical constitutionalism from Bhaktin’s literary theory of dialogism 
through to Freire’s conscientisation, both of which espoused the idea of collective societal 
dialogue aimed at the emancipation of marginalised and vulnerable communities as well as 
facilitating social transformation. The theory is philosophically grounded in the works of two 
prominent theorists, Habermas and Michelman, who contend that dialogue and citizen 
participation is imperative in the elaboration of the meaning of abstract constitutional provisions 
in the design, planning, development, implementation and enforcement of the State’s legislative, 
policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of entrenched constitutional rights.  They 
argue that the very legitimacy of the legal system is dependent on citizen’s active participation in 
public decision-making through open, transparent and equally accessible deliberative 
structures, in the absence of which the legitimacy of the resultant legal framework is wanting. In 
this way, they contend that democracy and fundamental rights are interconnected and mutually 
supporting, and that the fulfilment of rights, especially the basic material necessities of life are 
imperative for the proper functioning of democracy. 
The chapter also undertakes a comparative study of the use of the dialogical metaphor 
in three different national jurisdictions, in Canada where it has been used in the context of the 
interpretation and enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms; 
in the United States where it has been developed in the context of the theory of coordinate 
construction; as well as in South Africa where it has been used in the context of the concept of 
‘meaningful engagement’ especially in the implementation and enforcement of entrenched 
SERs. The comparative study lays the basis and provides the building blocks for further 
elaboration of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism in the Kenyan context, especially with 
regard to the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of SERs in the Kenyan 
Constitution, as is discussed in chapter four below.    
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Chapter four – Theory of dialogical constitutionalism: Fashioning a 
model of dialogical constitutionalism for Kenya 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter encompassed a general analysis of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism, looking at its development in the writings of two prominent theorists, Jürgen 
Habermas and Frank Michelman, as well as the application of the theory in practice in the 
Canadian, American and South African jurisdictions. This chapter builds on the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism developed in the last chapter, providing an exposition of the theory 
as should be adopted in the Kenyan context. The theory is based on an acknowledgement of 
the inherence of reasonable disagreement in relation human rights, especially socio-economic 
rights (SERs) due to their perceived indeterminate nature. 
Reasonable disagreement is inherent in the entire human rights structure, but more so 
regarding SERs,1 which, it is argued, are only statements of aspiration and not concrete 
fundamental rights.2 Questions abound as to the extent to which the deprivation of nutrition, 
sanitation or health is sufficient to trigger legal redress, and whose duty it is to ensure that the 
rights are fulfilled, taking into account the sometimes dire resource constraints of countries in 
which the fulfilment of SERs is most urgent.3 Further, as the fulfilment of these SERs demand 
the redistribution of societal power and resources between as well as within countries, concerns 
                                                            
1 J Rawls A theory of justice (1999) 198-199; KS Czapanskiy & R Manjoo ‘The right of public participation 
in the law-making process and the role of the legislature in the promotion of the right’ (2008-2009) 19 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 1, at 3, who contend that rights are contestable and 
debate about them are an inescapable part of politics, and that judicial rulings cannot resolve the multi-
faceted disagreements at the heart of the rights discourse. 
2 See D Beetham, Democracy and human rights (1999) 116, who avers that for a claim to be a right, it 
must be fundamental and universal, be definable in a justiciable form, have clear duty-bearers with the 
capacity to fulfil the resultant obligations; criteria that most critics contend that SERs do not satisfy.  
3 As above. Beetham states, at 117, that the capacity of poor States to fulfil the SERs of their citizens has 
been further eroded by globalisation and the skewed international market forces which have limited the 
capacity of governments to control their own economic destinies as ‘collective choices have been 
replaced by market forces’.  
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then arise as to the entity to make societal decisions as to their (SER) interpretation and 
implementation.4 The question is, should these decisions be made by the people themselves, as 
they have the highest stakes in their (SER) enforcement; or by the legislature, the people’s 
representative; or by the courts? These are the questions that abound in the Kenyan context at 
the moment, questions that the theory of dialogical constitutionalism seeks to address.  
This chapter develops for Kenya a theory of dialogical constitutionalism, a form of 
cooperative constitutionalism which acknowledges the full potential as well as limits of the 
responsiveness of the judicial and political institutions of the State in the process of 
constitutional rights interpretation and enforcement.5 It is based on the reasoning that the 
judiciary should not have a monopoly on the interpretation of the Constitution, but must engage 
in an interactive, interconnected and collaborative conversation with all the other constitutional 
actors in order to come up with practical, workable and inclusive interpretations of the 
constitution.6 Its main focus is on the institutional and societal processes through which 
constitutional interpretation is undertaken, and it recognises that other non-judicial organs of the 
State, and society at large, play an important role in the interpretation, elaboration and 
development of constitutional meaning.7 It is based on an understanding of democracy not as a 
simple aggregation of a majority’s private preferences, but as a way of structuring wide 
cooperative participation by citizens in the process of principled opinion formation and decision-
making to achieve the common good of society.8 
                                                            
4 Beetham (n 2 above) 117. 
5 R Dixon ‘Creating dialogue about socio-economic rights: Strong v weak form judicial review revisited’ 
(2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391, at 393. See also D Landau & JD Lopez-Murcia 
‘Political institutions and judicial role: An approach in context, the case of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court’ (2009) 55, at 64 available at http://works.bepress.com/julian_lopez_murcia/26 (accessed on 4 
September 2012), who acknowledge that comparative constitutional law has shown that the “dialogical 
model” is the most plausible way to enforce SERs. 
6 C Bateup ‘The dialogical promise: Assessing the normative potential of theories of constitutional 
dialogue’ (2006) 73(3) Brooklyn Law review 1115, at 1109; JM Pickerill, Constitutional deliberations in 
Congress: Impact of judicial review in a separated system (2004) 11, who affirms the substantial value 
that constitutional deliberation at multiple decision-making points has in the law-making process. 
7 Bateup – Dialogical promise (n 6 above) 1118. 
8 C Zurn Deliberative democracy and the institution of judicial review (2007) 7; J Waldron, Law and 
disagreement (1999) 283; A Gutman & DF Thompson Why deliberative democracy? (2004) 13–21. 
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Two important factors justify the choice of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism in this 
context. Firstly, it engenders diversity and participation in the interpretation and implementation 
of SER provisions.9 Incorporation of a diversity of disciplinary expertise and diversity of social 
experiences is critical if constitutional interpretation is to be reflective of the entire societal 
stratum. Constitutional interpretation, especially when dealing with such sensitive rights as 
SERs, therefore requires a cross-section of expertise in their interpretation, and an injection of 
deeper insight into the lived experiences of the different sections of society, a duty that might be 
too much for the judges who are almost always lawyers.10 The importance of the involvement of 
the entire social spectrum in constitutional interpretation is acknowledged by Craig Scott who 
argues that ‘whatever necessary skills they bring to the interpretive enterprise, lawyers cannot 
claim a monopoly of knowledge of the interpretive content to be given to human rights’.11 Scott 
further contends that there is a risk of a systematic alienation of certain sections of society, 
especially the voiceless poor and vulnerable who need the implementation of SERs the most, 
when constitutional interpretation does not, or does not adequately, represent their 
perspectives.12 Diversity in interpretation, as envisaged by the dialogical approach, enhances 
the legitimacy of constitutional decisions, and thus ensures the implementation as well as 
enforcement of those decisions by political institutions and other sectors of society.13 
                                                            
9 This diversity is in line with the definition of rights expounded by Kartharine Young, who views rights as 
‘a focal point of interpretive disagreements and agreements, of agitation and contestation, and of 
monitoring and enforcement, of the fundamental material interests that are reasonably argued to be 
universal and compelling,’ see KG Young, Constituting economic and social rights (2012) 2  
10 See C Scott ‘Bodies of knowledge: A diversity promotion role for the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ in P Alston and J Crawford (eds.) The future of UN human rights monitoring (2000) 403, at 404-
422. He argues for a system of dialogical interactive diversity in the interpretation of legal instruments 
premised on the idea that ‘superior collective judgment is exercised when multiple perspectives are 
encouraged to interact with each other,….thus facilitating universalism’, at 406. 
11 Scott (n 10 above) 421. 
12 Scott (n 10 above) 406, who avers that the implicit and explicit exclusion of the voices of marginalised 
sections of society demonstrates the pervasive partiality of the law. 
13 See S Chambers, Reasonable democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the politics of discourse (1996) 190, 
who submits that decisions resulting from deliberative processes are more likely to be implemented and 
viewed as legitimate as they are embedded in the convictions of the participants, for they will have been 
convinced that there are good reasons for the choice of the particular decision. 
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Secondly, dialogical constitutionalism also encompasses the “living tree” constitutional 
doctrine which views the Constitution not as a normative positive law document that creates 
government institutions and defines rules for the conduct of State functions, but as an 
expression of the deepest values as well as beliefs of the people, constituting their character 
and sensibilities, and allowing for the possibilities of self-revision and transformation over time 
as the nation develops.14 This doctrine is especially crucial in the interpretation of the 
entrenched SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution as it allows for their evolutive interpretation 
taking into account developments in law at both the national and international level.15 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism thus engenders the responsibilities of all the 
institutions of the State and the people to work together towards the development of 
constitutional meanings that reflect the deeper values and beliefs of that society. Hanna Pitkin 
contends that in this way, the Constitution reflects the people, activating and empowering them 
as responsible co-founders of the nation.16 In so far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, a 
dialogical approach, which entrenches the centrality of the people in constitutional discourse, 
enhances the creation and entrenchment of a deep societal culture of respect for and protection 
of human rights, as it ensures widespread participation in the development of the meaning, 
scope and content of rights.17 Waldron affirms the importance of this societal culture by noting 
that constitutional history shows that ‘paper declarations are worth little if not accompanied by 
the appropriate political culture of liberty’.18 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in this chapter envisages the 
development of the meaning of the entrenched SERs at three levels, firstly, at the political level 
in the development of the legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the implementation 
of the entrenched SERs; secondly, at the level of constitutional litigation in the courts; and 
thirdly, in the fashioning of judicial remedies subsequent to constitutional litigation. The 
development of the theory on these three levels is inspired by the constitutional review 
jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC), the Indian Supreme Court as well 
                                                            
14 M Tushnet ‘The possibilities of comparative constitutional law’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1269-85. 
15 M Sepulveda The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2003) 81-84. 
16 HF Pitkin ‘The idea of a constitution’ (1987) 37 Journal of Legal Education 167-68. 
17 Bateup – Dialogical promise (n 6 above) 1166. 
18 J Waldron, The dignity of legislation (1999) 84 
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as the South African Constitutional Court (SACC), which have all developed a progressive 
jurisprudence in the interpretation and enforcement of constitutionally entrenched SERs. 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. After this introductory section, the chapter 
delves into an exposition of the first level of dialogue in the political institutions of the State in 
section 4.2. This level of dialogue envisages the involvement of all the levels and institutions of 
the State in the development of constitutional meaning (aspects of coordinate construction),19 
and the involvement of the public in civic constitutional fora in an on-going societal project of 
democratic deliberation and decision-making (aspects of popular constitutionalism). Sections 
4.3 and 4.4 delve into the development of dialogue in the courts in the context of constitutional 
litigation (the second level of dialogue) and the design of constitutional remedies (the third level 
of dialogue) respectively. Section 4.5 undertakes an analysis of the transformative potential of 
the dialogical constitutionalism developed in the second and third levels of dialogue. Section 4.6 
looks at the viability of the model of dialogical constitutionalism developed in sections 4.2 – 4.4 
in dealing with the concerns that have been raised against the justiciability of SERs, and 
especially the judicial interpretation and enforcement of entrenched SERs. It undertakes an 
analysis of the viability of the dialogical constitutionalism approach in dealing with issues of 
polycentricity and judicial encroachment into the policy and budget spheres as well as the 
democratic challenges of the judicial review of SERs. The chapter ends with a conclusion in 
section 4.7. 
4.2 First level of dialogue: the development of the implementation framework for the 
entrenched socio-economic rights 
If the entrenched SERs are to achieve their objectives of reducing poverty and inequality, 
enhancing human dignity, and improving the standards of living of the Kenyan people, then the 
design and implementation of the government’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework 
must be right. In the design of the implementation framework, the political institutions must, of 
necessity and in accordance with their coordinate interpretative responsibility,20 infuse their 
interpretation of the nature, content, and extent of the SERs; determine whether or not to design 
                                                            
19 See K McLean, Constitutional deference, courts and socio-economic rights in South Africa (2009) 117-
18, where she affirms the coordinate responsibilities of all arms of the State to undertake constitutional 
interpretation in the implementation of their constitutional functions. 
20 See Chapter three, section 3.4 for a discussion of the theory of coordinate construction. 
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a minimum core content into the understanding and implementation of the SERs; design the 
requisite structures for the implementation and monitoring of the SERs; determine the 
prioritisation on the implementation of the different SERs taking into account available resources 
and other societal needs; and also apportion the available resources depending on the levels of 
need and vulnerability of the different societal groups.  
Constitutional dialogue must take root at this juncture and must bring together all 
societal stakeholders such as political institutions, civil society, academics and the public at 
large.21 Political institutions play an important constitutional role at this level of dialogue, as they 
are the ones constitutionally mandated to ensure that SERs are implemented.22 The 
Constitution only provides structures of government and enumerates a list of rights, but the 
fleshing out of those rights to respond to the day to day requirements of society is the duty of 
the political institutions to be undertaken through a framework of legislation, policy and 
programmes.  This is where the bulk of constitutional interpretation happens, and the political 
institutions must, of necessity, give meaning to the provisions of the constitution when designing 
the implementation framework. It is mostly when constitutional considerations are not properly 
incorporated in the formation of this framework that constitutional litigation occurs in the courts. 
The political institutions thus have an important coordinate role in constitutional interpretation, 
an interpretation that must be done properly, taking into account the threat of the judicial review 
of resultant legislation.23 
The Constitution vests the Legislature with the national legislative authority, and requires 
of it to protect the Constitution as well as to promote democratic governance.24 This legislative 
authority derives from the people, and must thus be exercised in a legitimate way, with the 
outright participation of the people in legislative decision-making on the enactment or 
                                                            
21 See Dixon (n 5 above) 401-02, who states that rights controversies are better resolved in deliberative 
processes that give effect to broader constitutional understandings. 
22 M Pieterse ‘On dialogue, translation and voice: A reply to Sandra Liebenberg’ in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (Eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 331, at 334, who contends that the political institutions 
have the democratic mandate, expertise and resources to define the scope of SER entitlements and to 
establish and operate a structural mechanism for their enforcement.  
23 Pickerill (n 6 above) chapters 3-5. 
24  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 94 as read with article 109. 
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amendment of legislation.25 The Constitution further expressly provides for democratic 
deliberation in the conduct of legislative business and in the resolution of the issues of concern 
to the people.26  
4.2.1 Public participation as a driver of dialogue in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
Public participation is an important component of popular constitutionalism.27 It espouses the 
concept of active citizenship, which entails equal participation in public affairs in the pursuit of 
the common good, a fundamental human good and the cornerstone of democracy.28 This was 
affirmed by Justice Albie Sachs in the South African Case of Minister of Health NO v New Clicks 
South Africa, where he stated as follows:29 
The right to speak and to be listened to is part of the right to be a citizen in the full sense of the 
word. In a constitutional democracy, dialogue and the right to have a voice on public affairs is 
constitutive of dignity. 
The right to participation, which has been termed the right of rights,30 is thus crucial in dialogical 
deliberation as it enables reasonable rights-bearers, in the exercise of their citizenship, to 
contribute to the development of constitutional meaning in the context of rights disagreements.31  
                                                            
25 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 94 (1) as read with articles 118-119. 
26 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 95 (2). See also Chambers - Reasonable democracy (n 13 
above) 185, who avers that the requirement for public participative in the business of the legislature is 
based on its responsibility as the guardian of the general interest.  
27 See LD Kramer ‘Popular constitutionalism, circa 2004’ (2004) 92(4) California Law Review 959, who 
defines popular constitutionalism as ‘a constitutional system where the role of the people is not confined 
to occasional acts of constitution-making, but includes active and on-going control over the interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutional law’. 
28 F Michelman ‘Law’s republic’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 1493, at 1503-1504. 
29 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 59/2004) 2006 (8) 
BCLR 872 (CC) (30 September 2005), para. 627. 
30 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 232. 
31 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 232 & 244. See Pieterse (n 22 above) 335-336, who also 
acknowledges the importance of beneficiary participation in constitutional dialogue as to the meaning and 
implementation of SERs. He however notes the reality that the voices of the poor and marginalised are 
always muted by their inability to access the legal system, their lack of rights-awareness, and their 
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Public participation is premised on the philosophical foundations of human rights, which 
are, the human capacity for self-conscious and reasoned choice, as well as purposeful reflection 
on the collective common good.32 The possession of this capacity is also the primary basis for 
democratic competence, indicating the close convergence between democracy and rights.33 
Participation entails respect for the political capacity and moral sense of justice of people to 
deliberate in, and determine, substantive and procedural questions of constitutional design, 
interpretation and implementation.34 Waldron emphasises the importance of societal 
participation in all decision-making by linking the right to participation to the values of autonomy, 
dignity and responsibility, values that augment the entire rights framework.35 He avers that the 
right to participation does not only mean the existence of popular elements at all levels and 
institutions of government, but that the popular elements must be decisive in the collective 
decision-making process.36 He further contends that ‘decisions about rights are best taken by 
those who have a sufficient stake in the matter to decide responsibly’.37  
The right to participation ingrains the principle of indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of rights, as even though it is a civil and political right, it has the capacity to 
enhance the realisation of SERs and other group rights. In international law, the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
scepticism of the political and judicial processes. This can be mitigated through massive social 
mobilisation and rights education.  
32 Beetham (n 2 above) 93. See also Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 14. 
33 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 282. 
34  Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 295-296. 
35 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 213. He contends that this right to participation involves 
participation on matters of high principle, such as the design of constitutional meaning, and not just 
participation in interstitial matters of social and economic policy. He thus criticizes the shifting of decision-
making involving important societal issues, such as the design of constitutional meaning, to the courts. 
For more on his arguments on rights, respect and distrust, see 221-223. 
36 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 235. See also Waldron – Dignity of legislation (n 18 
above) chapter 5 where he chronicles Aristotle and develops the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude” 
which contends that ‘the people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions by pooling their 
knowledge, experience and insight than a few of them’ and thus advocating the participation of citizens in 
deliberation and decision-making in a State, at 93-97. He further notes that the people’s ability to 
participate in deliberation led Aristotle to regard the capacity for reasoned speech as the mark of man’s 
political nature, at 98. 
37 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 250 & 253.  
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participation is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
especially in the provisions on the right to association, expression and the right to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs.38 The ICCPR article 25 not only guarantees the right to 
participation, but also entails the obligation of states to provide opportunities for public 
participation in government.39 
In the Kenyan context, popular participation in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
entrenched SERs is crucial if the rights are going to achieve their intended purpose of social 
emancipation, empowerment, and socio-economic transformation.40 The Constitution enshrines 
this right to participation in several provisions. In the preamble, the Constitution espouses the 
inalienable right of the people to determine how they want to be governed, and further contains 
the aspirations of the people to a government based on the values of human rights, equality, 
freedom, social justice, democracy and the rule of law.41 The Constitution states categorically 
that all public power derives from the people and must be exercised on behalf of, and for the 
benefit of the people.42 The very foundation of the State is based on values and principles which 
espouse deliberation and public participation in decision-making, and these values include: the 
rule of law, democracy and participation; good governance, integrity, transparency and 
accountability; human dignity, equity, social justice, equality, inclusiveness, non-discrimination, 
human rights, and the protection of the marginalised.43 The Constitution further provides that 
these values bind all persons and institutions that exercise public power, especially in instances 
of the interpretation and application of the Constitution; in the enactment, application and 
interpretation of any law; as well as in the making and implementation of public policy 
decisions.44 It is clear from the above provisions that public participation in the design of the 
                                                            
38 ICCPR, articles 19, 21, 22 & 25. See also the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, articles 9, 
13, and 25. For more discussion, see Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 6-7. 
39 See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT12/05) 2006 (6) 
SA 416 (CC), paras. 91-94. 
40 See Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 15, who contend that where citizens, through deliberations, are 
engaged more in self-government, they gain self-respect, autonomy and empathy for others, values that 
lead them to better envision the common good. 
41 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble, paras.6 & 7. 
42 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 1,  
43 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 10. 
44 As above. 
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legislative, policy and programmatic framework is a prerequisite if the SER implementation 
framework is to be legitimate.45 
The requirement for public participation in decision-making is further buttressed by 
article 118 of the Constitution which requires parliament to conduct its affairs in an open manner 
and be open to the media as well as the public, except in exceptional circumstances.46 It further 
requires parliament to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative as well as 
other businesses of parliament and its committees,47 and enshrines a right of the people to 
petition parliament on matters within parliament’s authority such as the enactment, amendment 
or repeal of legislation.48 This is aimed at enhancing accountability, responsiveness and 
openness in parliamentary processes.49 
The Constitution also envisages public participation in the design of the policy and 
programmatic frameworks for the implementation of the entrenched SERs, the mandate of the 
executive.50 Further the constitution requires public participation in public finance and allocation 
of resources to the various governmental projects. Article 201 contains the principles of public 
finance which require openness and accountability, including public participation in financial 
matters.51 Availability and allocation of resources play a major role in the fulfilment of SERs, and 
one of the reasons why there has been a failure in the realisation of SERs is due to 
misallocation of large portions of State resources to areas such as defence while allocation to 
social programmes has continued to dwindle. The above provision is thus key in enhancing 
deliberations and public participation in the budgeting process, and can be used as a tool to 
                                                            
45  The importance of public participation in the creation of legitimate laws is one of the cornerstones of 
Habermas’s theory of discourse as discussed in chapter three, section 3.2.1 above.   
46 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 118 (1) (a) & (2). 
47 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 118 (1) (b); see also article 196 on County Assemblies. 
48 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 119 (1), article 119 (2) requires parliament to devise a procedure 
for the exercise of this right. 
49  See Doctors for life, paras. 111 & 121; New Clicks and Others, paras. 111-113. 
50 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 129 which provides that executive authority derives from the 
people of Kenya, must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution, and for the well-being and 
benefit of the Kenyan people. See also, article 232 (1) (d) which calls for the involvement of the people in 
policy making. 
51 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 201 (a). 
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advocate for the prioritisation of social spending with the objective of enhancing the 
implementation of the entrenched SERs, especially for marginalised and vulnerable 
communities.  
An expansive understanding of the right to participation, as discussed above, entails the 
possibility of individuals or groups of persons accessing the courts to vindicate their right to 
participation in instances of failure of the political institutions to provide opportunities for 
participation. The justiciability of the right to participation can be extracted from the 
Constitutional requirement that public power, legislative or executive, be exercised in 
accordance with the Constitution.52 This, taken together with the mandate of the High Court to 
adjudicate rights infringement and to determine constitutional questions relating to the exercise 
of constitutional power by other organs of the State,53 thus makes it possible for the Court to 
enforce public participation in legislative and executive decision-making. 
The requirement for public participation as discussed above fits neatly into the 
requirement of meaningful engagement as has been developed in the SACC SER jurisprudence 
as discussed in chapter three, section 3.5 above. The justiciability of the right to participation in 
public decision-making has been further affirmed by the SACC in a series of cases dealing with 
public participation in legislative activities, the leading case being, Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (Doctors for life).54 The case dealt with the 
failure of the National Council of Provinces and some provincial legislatures to facilitate public 
                                                            
52 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 93 (2) & 129 (1). See S Liebenberg ‘Engaging the paradoxes of 
the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: The possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful 
engagement’ (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 1, at 11, who affirms the role of courts in 
preserving the conditions for fair and equitable participation in decision-making processes through the 
adjudication of the constitutional right to participation, freedom of association and expression, access to 
information as well as the right to just administrative action.  
53  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 165 (3) (b) and (d) as read with articles 22 and 23. 
54 Other cases dealing with public participation in parliamentary processes include: Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (Glenister II); Matatiele Municipality and 
Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC); Merafong 
Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (5) SA 171 
(CC); and Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC). 
 
 
 
 
173 | P a g e  
 
participation in the development of four health statutes.55 The SACC held that there was 
insufficient public participation on two of the four statutes and ordered a suspended invalidation 
to allow relevant legislative bodies to consult the public and amend the statutes accordingly.56 
The Court affirmed that the duty to facilitate public participation requires parliament to provide 
citizens with meaningful opportunities to be heard in the making of laws that govern them, 
contending that the Constitution demanded no less.57 The Court further affirmed that even 
though the enforcement of public participation in the legislative process by the courts interferes 
with the autonomy of parliament, and might be an affront to the principle of separation of 
powers, it is a crucial component of, and is integral to the concept of democracy as enshrined in 
the SA Constitution.58 This, the Court said, is due to the supremacy of the Constitution and the 
role of the courts as guardians of the rule of law.59  
To achieve the requisite level of participation in deliberation and decision-making, 
massive social mobilisation as well as empowerment through political and human rights 
education of the citizenry is mandatory, both for the government60 and NGOs working in the 
                                                            
55 Doctors for life, at paras. 36-37.  
56 Doctors for life, at paras. 198-214. 
57 Doctors for life, para. 145. See also Glenister II, paras. 31 & 32, where the Court held that 
parliamentary obligation does not just entail the holding of hearings, but must also provide citizens with an 
opportunity to influence the decisions of the law-maker. It thus stated that meaningful engagement 
entailed the legislature listening to the concerns, values and preferences of the people, and considering 
this in the shaping of decisions and policies, without which the right to public participation has no 
meaning. 
58 Doctors for life, at para. 32 See further the concurring judgment of Sachs J where he affirms that active 
and on-going public participation is a constitutional obligation in the legal sense, and not just legislative 
etiquette or good governmental manners, at para. 231. 
59 The Court, however, stated that in determining the level of scrutiny of parliamentary obligation to 
involve the public in parliamentary processes, the court must balance, on the one hand, the need to 
respect parliamentary institutional autonomy, and on the other, the right of the public to participate in 
public affairs, Doctors for life, at para. 146. See also Glenister II, at para. 31. 
60  This is supported by the findings of the SACC in Doctors for life, paras. 129-134, where they affirm a 
second aspect of the duty to facilitate participation as requiring the State to take measures to ensure that 
people have the ability to take advantage of the participation opportunities provided.  
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area of SERs.61 This requirement dovetails with Habermas’s requirement, in his discourse 
theory, for an engaged citizenry which finds its basis in the associations of a civil society.62 
William Forbath contends that for these associations of civil society to achieve their purpose, 
they must be democratic and efficacious, that is, their deliberation must have tangible effects in 
government decision-making.63 Deliberative democracy, thus, requires an active and a well-
informed citizenry who espouse deliberative competence and aptitude, and who are able to 
think critically about their own conception of the good.64 
Some of the benefits of citizen participation in political decision-making include: ensuring 
an active citizenry as well as empowering voiceless, marginalised and vulnerable groups; 
enabling citizens to identify themselves with government institutions, legislation and policy; 
enhancing civic dignity as well as fostering the spirit of democratic and pluralistic 
accommodation; enhancing legislative legitimacy; and acting as a counterweight to secret 
lobbying and influence-peddling.65  
                                                            
61 Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 19, who contend that to respond to the viability and temporal 
concerns of the engagement of the masses in deliberation, mobilization of people into groups that form 
authentic positions through dialogue and negotiate solutions is key in achieving successful decision-
making through deliberation.  
62 J Habermas, Between facts and norms: Contribution to the discourse theory of law and democracy, 
translated by William Rehg (1996) 301. See also W Forbath ‘Short-circuit: A critique of Habermas’s 
understanding of law, politics and economic life’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 1441, at 1446-47, 
who contends that the role of such engaged association of civil society is to counter the power of 
privileged elites as well as concentrated interests through enabling broad-based citizen deliberation and 
action. 
63 Forbath – Short-circuit (n 62 above) 1447. He further submits that to enhance efficacy, the associations 
must have a legal mandate and institutional role to engage in deliberation in law and policy formulation as 
well as in the on-going interpretation and implementation of laws and policies. 
64 D Weinstock & D Kahane ‘Introduction’ in D Kahane et al (eds.), Deliberative democracy in practice 
(2010) 1, at 6-7; Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 15, who aver that dialogic deliberation requires a 
connection and engagement of the people with one another to develop view-points and positions, and to 
decide public issues through public debate. 
65 Doctors for life, at paras. 115 & 234-235. 
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4.2.2 Structures for public deliberation  
Deliberation does not occur in the abstract, but within a concrete institutional context. The 
responsibility to engender participative deliberation in the design and implementation of the SER 
legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks is the responsibility of political institutions, as 
has been discussed above. However, in Kenya, the right to public participation in these 
institutions is always honoured more in breach than in compliance. This is because the Kenyan 
legislative and executive structures lack the requisite capacity and resources to meaningfully 
engage with societal actors.66 This is further exacerbated by the fact that these institutions have 
historically been used to serve elitist interests, and are thus horribly unrepresentative of the 
interests of, and lack accountability towards, the ordinary citizens whom they are supposed to 
serve.67 The question then is how to design an efficient deliberative structure to complement the 
role of parliament and the executive in enhancing public participation in societal decision-
making. 
 One of the major challenges of theories of deliberative democracy is the design of 
deliberative structures.68 This is especially due to the large number of people in modern 
                                                            
66 See Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 61, who affirm that the problem of lack of capacity, contested 
legitimacy, minimal resources and a poor party system are some of the challenges bedevilling legislatures 
in nominal democracies, limiting their effectiveness as policy-makers and as checks on the executive. 
They further contend that these legislatures suffer from weak committee systems, have no or weak links 
with civil society or policy think-tanks and thus have no ability to formulate important policy initiatives, at 
62.  
67 See M Kiai ‘The crisis in Kenya’ (2008) 19(3) Journal of Democracy 162, at 164.  
68 See Chambers – Reasonable democracy (n 13 above) 195-197, who contends that even though 
deliberation depends on institutionalising the necessary procedures and conditions for dialogue, citizen 
willingness as well as ability to participate actively in dialogue both informally and within the designed 
formal structures of deliberation is the key to dialogic decision-making. She enumerates some ways of 
enhancing dialogue by including the excluded voices through: democratising the media, setting up 
deliberative public opinion polls, empowering the powerless, decentralising decision-making, and 
establishing public commissions to canvass public opinion. See also J Bohman ‘The coming of age of 
deliberative democracy’ (1998) 6(4) Journal of Political Philosophy 400, at 415ff who calls for the exercise 
of institutional imagination in figuring out which decentralised process of decision-making are possible 
within constitutional political structures and which are thus capable of enhancing opportunities for 
deliberation and participation within on-going collective enterprises, at 416. 
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societies, and the time constraints within which decisions have to be made.69 Another concern is 
the need for the requisite connection between the deliberative structures proposed and the 
existing governmental decision-making structures such as parliament and the executive. This 
connection is important as it will ensure that the deliberation that occurs in the proposed 
deliberative structure has an impact on, and guides, legislative as well as policy decision-
making in the political institutions of the State. It is proposed, therefore, that to meet the above 
challenges, a governmental commission should be designated to compliment the deliberative 
roles of the political institutions of the State. The responsibility of the commission will be to 
receive draft bills and policy documents from the relevant political institutions of the State, 
meaningfully engage the public on those documents through public hearings and submissions, 
prepare a report with proposed amendments to the draft bills or policy documents in accordance 
with the views resulting from the societal dialogue, and then submit the report to the relevant 
political institution for action. 
 The proposal to establish a commission raises the next challenge about how it is to be 
designed. Should it be an ad hoc commission created for the specific purpose, or can the 
responsibility be undertaken by one of the more permanent commissions that is either 
constitutionally entrenched or that has legislative backing? Due to challenges of the multiplicity 
of institutions and the problems of coordination that this engenders, it is proposed that the task 
of enhancing public participation and deliberation should be undertaken by a commission that 
has already been established, has constitutional or legislative backing, and already has the 
capacity, mandate, ability and the experience to undertake the same.70 These criteria lead us to 
two already functional commissions, the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution 
(CIC), and the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (KNHREC). 
                                                            
69 Weinstock & Kahane (n 64 above) 7. 
70 The choice of an already existing institution and not a new institution is to avoid further institutional 
disintegration with regard to human rights and to enhance the economies of scale on the efficient use of 
human and financial resources. 
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i) Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution  
The CIC was established under the 2010 Constitution71 and it has a direct mandate to enhance 
the implementation of the Constitution. Its mandate includes the following: monitoring, 
facilitating and overseeing the development of a legislative and administrative framework 
requisite to the implementation of the Constitution; the coordination of, and collaboration with, 
other relevant actors in the achievement of its functions, especially liaising with the Attorney 
General as well as the Kenya Law Reform Commission in the preparation and tabling of bills in 
parliament;72 engaging with parliament, through the Constitutional Implementation Oversight 
Committee – a Select Committee of Parliament on the progress made in the implementation of 
the Constitution; and undertaking any other duties provided for by the Constitution or other 
written law.73 
 The viability or otherwise of the CIC undertaking the role of enhancing participative 
deliberation in the development of the constitutional implementation framework was raised by 
the former adviser of the Prime Minster, Miguna-Miguna, when he stated that the mandate of 
the CIC did not include that responsibility.74 In his response, the Chairperson of the CIC, 
Charles Nyachae, elaborated on the constitutional mandate of the CIC, and argued that the 
involvement of the public in the constitutional implementation process through nation-wide 
consultations, hearings, workshops and other relevant fora was a major role of the CIC.75 He 
argued that the CIC, as a public organ, must espouse the national values and principles of the 
Constitution, which includes public participation, and that attempts to oversee the 
                                                            
71  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, sixth schedule, section 5; and The Commission for the Implementation 
of the Constitution Act, No. 9 of 2010 (CIC Act), available at 
http://cickenya.org/sites/default/files/downloads/CIC%20Act.pdf (accessed on 8 June 2012). 
72 The CIC Act, section 27 engenders a duty for all public officers, State organs and State officers to 
cooperate with the CIC in the implementation of its mandate. 
73 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, sixth schedule, section 5(6) as read with section 4; The CIC Act, 
section 4. 
74 Miguna-Miguna ‘The Commission on the Implementation of the Constitution is failing in its core 
mandate’ published in the Star Newspaper on 3rd May 2011, available at 
http://jukwaa.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=general&action=print&thread=5389 (accessed on 8 June 
2012). 
75 C Nyachae ‘Fact or myth: The role of CIC under the Constitution’ available at 
http://www.cickenya.org/opeds/fact-or-myth-role-cic-under-constitution (accessed on 8 June 2012). 
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implementation of the Constitution without espousing those values would be a violation of the 
Constitution.76 He further contended that the oversight role requires interaction between the 
CIC, other constitutional actors, and the public in general as all parties must be engaged in a 
collaborative process of implementation.77 To further elaborate on its mandate in enhancing 
public participation in the law making process, the CIC has developed an informational flyer 
“understanding the journey of the Bills” which outlines its role at each of the stages of the 
legislative process.78 This indicates that the CIC is already undertaking this role with regard to 
other legislation aimed at implementing the Constitution. It would thus not be beyond them to 
undertake the same function in relation to the implementation framework of the entrenched 
SERs. 
Despite its competencies and the efforts it is already making to enhance public 
deliberation in the Constitutional implementation process, especially the holding of nation-wide 
public hearings on important constitutional implementation bills, it is a temporary body whose 
mandate is set to expire five years after its establishment, though there is a possibility of 
parliament passing a resolution to extend its life.79 The above challenge, coupled with the fact 
that the CIC has no branches in other parts of the country and has also not developed an 
extensive collaborative network with other societal organisations such as civil society 
organisations, militates against it taking up the daunting participative deliberation role that is 
envisioned by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism. 
ii) Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission 
KNHREC is a permanent, constitutionally entrenched body which has an extensive human 
rights mandate,80 and the requisite independence, capacity, expertise and practical experience 
necessary to undertake the deliberative function.  Its mandate, relevant to this role, includes the 
                                                            
76 As above, para. 5.  
77 As above. 
78  CIC, ‘Law making process: Understanding the journey of the Bills’ available at 
http://www.cickenya.org/law-making-process (accessed on 8 June 2012).  
79 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, sixth schedule, section 5(7); CIC Act, section 29(1). This five-year 
period can even be shorter if it is perceived that the CIC has already exhausted its mandate, at which 
time it is constitutionally expected to be wound up.  
80 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, part 5, article 59; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, 
2011 (KNCHR Act), sections 3 & 4.   
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following: promotion of the protection and observance of human rights in public and private 
institutions; monitoring and reporting on the observance of human rights; undertaking research 
on human rights and making recommendations aimed at improving the function of State 
institutions; ensuring State compliance with treaty obligations; and, performing any other 
function prescribed by legislation.81  
The human rights mandate of KNHREC is further enhanced in chapter fifteen of the 
Constitution with added responsibilities to protect the sovereignty of the people, secure the 
observance by all State organs of democratic values and principles, and promote 
constitutionalism.82 To enable it to undertake these responsibilities, the Constitution further 
entrenches KNHREC’s independence by stating that it is subject only to the Constitution and the 
law, and should not be subjected to any direction or control by any person or authority; and also 
ensures its financial independence.83 
Further to their mandate, the KNHREC also has other competencies that make it an 
ideal commission to undertake the task of complementing the deliberative efforts of the political 
institutions of the State. Firstly, it has built expertise on SERs through its Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Department (ECOSOC), which has undertaken extensive research on, and has 
continuously engaged both government institutions and civil society actors, on the realisation of 
SERs in Kenya prior to the enactment of the 2010 Constitution.84 Secondly, it already 
undertakes a human rights audit of all parliamentary bills before they are passed into law 
through its Research and Compliance Department, and this role can be extended to include 
public participation in the auditing process on SER draft bills and policy documents.85 Thirdly, 
KNHREC has held numerous nation-wide consultative fora on specific human rights challenges, 
and especially in the development of the Kenyan Human Rights Policy.86 This, coupled with its 
extensive and continuous human rights advocacy and education, has expanded its outreach to 
all parts of the country. Lastly, KNHREC already has three established and functioning branch 
                                                            
81 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 59 (2); KNCHR Act, sections 8& 28-44. 
82 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 248 (2)(a) and 249(1).  
83 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 249(2) & (3).  
84 See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights website, 
http://www.knchr.org/Departments/Economicsocialandculturalrights.aspx (accessed on 3 June 2012).  
85 As above. 
86 As above. 
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offices in different parts of the country, giving it a wide coverage and reach of the majority of 
citizens.87 
The above competencies place the KNHREC in good stead to complement the 
participatory role of the political institutions of the State. However, facilitation of participation in 
societal decision-making is a massive task and if the Commission is to be successful at it, there 
is need for further enhancement of their resource base, especially human and financial, so as to 
enable them to establish more offices in the different devolved county units, to hire more staff, 
and to finance the costly and time consuming deliberative process. The expansion of the 
KNHREC capacity as indicated above is not only beneficial to participative deliberation, but is 
also beneficial to the entire human rights project as the proposed KNHREC county offices would 
be involved in the monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights at those levels, hence 
ensuring better rights implementation. 
 The choice of the Commission in enhancing deliberation is supported by the role that 
has been played by comparative Chapter Nine institutions in the South African context.88 In 
assessing the comparative advantage of these SA institutions, Czapanskiy and Manjoo contend 
that they ‘have the means to provide a forum for public education, are able to facilitate public 
participation, and can mediate easier access to the relevant legislative structures for civil society 
actors’.89 They document the facilitation of discussion and consultations around the Older 
Persons Bill 2003 by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) which commenced 
in 2001 and lasted until 2006.90 
                                                            
87  This information was gained from my experience having worked at the two bodies that were merged to 
form this monolithic Commission, being the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and the Kenya 
National Commission on Gender and Development. 
88 These are the institutions that were created under chapter 9 of the 1996 South African Constitution with 
the objective of supporting constitutional democracy and they include, The Public Protector, The Auditor-
General, The Electoral Commission, The South African Human Rights Commission, The Commission for 
Gender Equality, and The Commission for the Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities. 
89 Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 26. 
90 Czapanskiy & Manjoo (n 1 above) 26-29. The results included: reception of over 300 submissions from 
individuals and organizations; development of cooperation and coordination between institutions and 
organizations working in specified areas; establishment of civil society forums to advocate for the relevant 
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The importance of a complimentary body to facilitate public deliberations is further 
evidenced by the illustration provided by Gutmann and Thompson on publicly funded medical 
aid in the state of Oregon, United States.91 In determining medical conditions covered by the 
funded medical aid, the Oregon Health Services Commission developed a list of conditions 
ranked mainly on the basis of utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, with treatment lower on the list 
regarded as less cost-beneficial and thus less likely to receive funding.92 Even though the 
ranking was a good faith attempt to maximise the welfare of the majority of citizens within the 
context of limited resources, it caused a massive outcry as most citizens were of the opinion 
that the list was unreasonable, unjust and unfair.93 The Commission then employed a wide and 
dynamic process of deliberation through community meetings, presentation of submissions and 
proposals, the incorporation of public proposals into the medical aid policy, followed by more 
deliberations and revisions, leading to a final list that was more acceptable across the board.94 
 Contrast the above process with the lack of dialogue and public participation in the 
adoption of the renal dialysis policy guidelines by the Kwa-Zulu Natal hospital leading to the 
filing of the Soobramoney case.95 The above example shows that if the dialysis policy had been 
subjected to public deliberation in a wide consultative process, either a better policy would have 
been designed based on the different principled reasoned arguments and proposals that would 
have been made by the participants, or the policy would have been more legitimate. The case 
may thus not have been filed, and even if it were to have been filed, the judgment would not 
have led to the vilification of the SACC as being anti-people.96 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
issues; emancipation and empowerment of the citizenry leading to increased direct interaction with 
parliamentary legislative procedures; amendment of the Bill to reflect societal concerns and prioritizations; 
and the building of coalitions and community solidarity in rights protection. 
91 Gutmann & Thompson (n 8 above) 17-18. 
92 As above. 
93 As above. 
94 As above. 
95 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
96  See KG Young ‘A typology of economic and social rights adjudication:  Exploring the catalytic function 
of judicial review’ (2010) 8(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 385, at 395; A Sachs ‘Social and 
economic rights: Can they be made justiciable? (2000) 53 Southern Methodist University Law Review 
1381, at 1386, who contends that the public were angry with the Court as they felt that the Court could 
have done much more to save lives; C Scott & P Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a 
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 A commission can thus play an important role as a structure of deliberation supportive of 
the other decision-making institutions of the State such as the legislature, the executive and 
even the courts. Where issues arise as to the content of proposed legislative or policy 
frameworks aimed at the implementation of the entrenched SERs, the political institution 
involved should either, on their own (parliament through its committees or the executive through 
its relevant ministries or institutions), engage the public directly in deliberations or seek the 
assistance of the Commission in undertaking public deliberation on the proposed bill or policy 
document. In this way, the capacity of the people for self-government and civic responsibility is 
enhanced in tandem with the increased legitimacy and chances of implementation of the 
resultant law or policy.  
4.2.3 Decision-making in deliberative structures  
The next major challenge after the design of a deliberative structure is how decisions are to be 
made in the structure. Traditional deliberative democrats have always argued that deliberation 
should be aimed at the achievement of consensus.97 However, due to the presence of genuine 
and good faith disagreements engrained into the very nature of rights, coupled with the 
constraint of time within which decisions have to be made, consensus may not always be 
achievable. The question then is, how does society break the deadlock or bottlenecks created 
during deliberation so as to reach a societally agreeable decision? Voting has been suggested 
by some deliberative scholars as one way in which such deliberative bottlenecks can be 
overcome.98 Jane Mansbridge et al for example contend that deliberation should be 
complementary rather than antagonistic towards other democratic decision-making mechanisms 
that are not themselves deliberative, such as voting, fair-bargaining and negotiation.99 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 206, 250. 
97 For an elaboration of this, see Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 11-14. 
98 See J Habermas ‘Three normative models of democracy’ (1994) 1(1) Constellations 1, at 5, who 
acknowledges that there are political values and interests that stand in conflict with each other without 
prospects of consensus and which cannot effectively be balanced by discourse.  He contends that such 
conflicts should be subjected to empirical references (voting) after effective practical deliberations so as 
achieve the common good in a manner compatible with universalistic principles of justice. 
99 J Mansbridge et al ‘The place of self-interest and the role of power in deliberative democracy’ (2010) 
18(1) The Journal of Political Philosophy 64, at 64-65. See also Weinstock & Kahane (n 64 above) 6, who 
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In discussing the link between deliberation and voting, Waldron outlines the classical 
divergence between the two concepts, elaborating the characteristic of deliberation as aimed 
towards consensus, while voting only takes place when there is a dissensus.100 In analysing the 
writings of deliberative scholars, Waldron discerns an aversion to voting;101 noting their concern 
that this entails accepting that reasoned merit-based discussion has failed to resolve a 
problem.102 These deliberative scholars, he argues, view voting as a shift from the qualitative 
consideration of substance that is the hallmark of deliberation, to the quantitative counting of 
numbers, which is an arbitrary process of decision-making on a statistical basis.103 He injects a 
sense of reality into the whole debate by stating that voting is a natural culmination of 
deliberation.104 He thus contends that there may be no other available option but to vote in a 
deliberative decision-making process where there is an unredeemed plurality of reasoned 
opinions where a single cause of action is requisite.105 
Waldron further contends that voting in the context of deliberation is not only an effective 
decision-making procedure, but a respectful one as it respects individuals by taking seriously 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
aver that for deliberative democracy to attain maturity, deliberation should take pluralism seriously, and 
be much more inclined to morally acceptable compromises rather than to always insist on consensus; 
Bohman (n 68 above) 412ff, who states that deliberation must come to terms with other existing 
democratic practices such as voting and representation.  
100 J Waldron ‘Deliberation, disagreement and voting’ in H Hongju-Koh& RC Slye (eds.) Deliberative 
democracy and human rights (1999) 210, at 211-212. 
101 See however, Deliberative democrats such as Habermas – Between facts and norms (n 62 above) ix; 
JS Fishkin, Democracy and deliberation: New directions for democratic reform (1991) 4; J Cohen 
‘Deliberation and democratic legitimacy’ in A Hamlin & P Pettit (eds.) The good polity: Normative Analysis 
of the State (1989) 17-34, who, even though recognising the place of voting in public decision-making, 
argue that voting should not be aimed mainly at the aggregation of personal preferences, but must be 
preceded by public discourse in a democratic process in which citizens become informed through 
reasoned arguments  and espouse more general interests. 
102  Waldron - Deliberation and voting (n 100 above) 211-212. 
103 Waldron - Deliberation and voting (n 100 above) 211-212. See also Waldron – Dignity of legislation (n 
18 above) 125-126 & 151-156, who contends that voting, a majority principle, is inherent, and has 
endured and prevailed, in all deliberative institutions consisting of more than one individual who regard 
each other as equals. 
104 Waldron – Deliberation and voting (n 100 above) 211-212. 
105 As above. 
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the reality of their principled disagreement about justice and the common good, while at the 
same time also treating them as equals in the authorisation of political action.106 He avers that 
even in the supposedly principled deliberative organ of the State such as the courts, decisions 
are made by voting.107 
Amy Gutmann agrees with Waldron that voting is an essential and important component of 
deliberative democracy because it acknowledges that reasonable disagreements may result 
from a deliberative process.108 She argues that the importance of voting is to focus the minds of 
the participants on the need to decide, and that deliberation without voting does not make much 
sense.109 Carlos Rosenkrantz further agrees that voting may be a necessary part of deliberation, 
but avers that voting must be preceded by a well-informed process of deliberation, and that 
without this, the resultant majoritarian vote would have no epistemic value.110 Rosenkrantz’s 
                                                            
106 Waldron – Dignity of legislation (n 8 above) 158-162. See also CJ Nemeth ‘Differential contributions of 
majority and minority influence’ (1986) 93 Psychology Review 23, who argues that: 
[m]ajorities foster convergence of attention, thought, and the number of alternatives considered. 
Minority viewpoints are important, not because they tend to prevail but because they stimulate 
divergent attention and thought. As a result, even when they are wrong they contribute to the 
detection of novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better. The 
implications of this are considerable for creativity, problem solving, and decision making, both at 
the individual and group levels. 
107 Waldron – Deliberation and voting (n 100 above) 215-16. See also Waldron – Dignity of legislation (n 
18 above) 128-129, where he contends that the only difference in the shift of decision-making on 
constitutional issues from the legislature to the courts is a shift of constituency, as the decision-making 
method, by voting, remains the same. 
108 A Gutmann ‘Deliberative democracy and majority rule: Reply to Waldron’ in H Hongju-Koh& RC Slye 
(eds.) Deliberative democracy and human rights (1999) 227, at 228-229. 
109 As above. 
110 CF Rosenkrantz ‘The epistemic theory of democracy revisited’ in H Hongju-Koh & RC Slye (eds.) 
Deliberative democracy and human rights (1999) 235, at 239. A decision with epistemic value is that 
which is informed by proper knowledge, reason, understanding and access to all relevant information by 
the decision-making body with the aim of achieving the best possible outcome, see generally D Fallis 
‘Epistemic value theory and social epistemology’ (2006) 2(3) Episteme 177-188.  
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arguments are buttressed by Bernard Manin who similarly contends that majority rule can only 
be justified when preceded by sincere and fair deliberation.111 
Though the building of consensus is the major aim of deliberation, the controversies 
associated with SERs make it likely that there will be principled disagreements as to their 
nature, scope, content, prioritisation and even the design of their implementation framework. 
The aim of deliberation in this context is thus to filter out instances of raw interests and 
preferences, engender learning and compromise and come out with proposals that better 
espouse the common good. It is these proposals that will thus be subjected to voting, with the 
proposal with the biggest support becoming the decision of the participants, and by extension, 
the decision of society.  
4.3 Second level of dialogue: Deliberation in the context of constitutional litigation 
4.3.1 Constitutional litigation as a dialogue 
The second and third levels of dialogue envisage the court as an important facilitator of 
constitutional dialogue and deliberation.112  This dialogical function of the court is acknowledged 
by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn who contend that judges, in undertaking constitutional 
review, must be deliberation respecting, meaning that they should listen to, dialogue with, and at 
times defer to the democratic process composed of the executive, legislators, officials and the 
                                                            
111 B Manin ‘On legitimacy and political deliberations’ (1987) 15 Political Theory 357-362. See also 
Bohman (n 68 above) 416-417. 
112  See Young – Typology of SERs adjudication (n 96 above) 387ff, who terms this function of the court 
as catalytic, as it opens up inter-branch and societal dialogue between the courts, political institutions and 
society at large, making the achievement of a rights-protective outcome more likely.  See also Pieterse (n 
22 above) 336-337 & Liebenberg – Engaging the paradoxes (n 52 above) 11-13, who both acknowledge 
the twin role of the courts as participants in rights dialogue and also as a venue where the voices of all 
societal actors can be heard simultaneously on equal footing with regard to the meaning and 
implementation of SERs; C Bateup ‘Reassessing the dialogic possibilities of weak-form Bills of Rights’ 
(2009) 32 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 529, at 587ff, who contends that the 
courts, through judicial review, play an important role in a constitutional system  as judicial decision spark 
or continue broader societal discussions about constitutional meaning as well as the particular rights and 
values at stake in specific cases. 
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public, as these are the most legitimate ways in which constitutions evolve.113 They submit that 
the work of the judges in such a system is to facilitate, and occasionally guide, the political 
institutions, and the people, in the development of constitutional meaning.114 Their summation is 
that ‘judicial review should avoid closing off democratic deliberation, should respect the products 
of such deliberation, and should create constitutional floors only when supported by deliberation 
among a wide array of represented interests’.115 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel also affirm the importance of the courts and constitutional 
review in a constitutional democracy, contending that ‘some form of judicial finality is essential 
to the rule of law, which is necessary for a functional democracy’.116 They argue that judicial 
review and popular constitutionalism are interconnected, interdependent and mutually 
supportive in an overally beneficial way in the development of constitutional meaning.117 The 
concern for Post and Siegel is, therefore, how to strike a ‘viable balance between the rule of law 
and the people’s authority to speak to issues of constitutional meaning’.118 They propose 
constitutional dialogue as the practice that can viably create the requisite balance between 
these competing claims.119 
Even though courts have not traditionally been dominant actors in the sphere of socio-
economic policy, judicial rule-making, and to a certain extent judicial policy formulation, has 
always been a part of the courts’ role, especially in the formation of the common law.120 Judicial 
                                                            
113 WN Eskridge & J Ferejohn ‘Constitutional horticulture: Deliberation-respecting judicial review’ (2009) 
87 Texas Law Review 1273, at 1275. 
114 As above. 
115 As above. 
116 R Post & R Siegel ‘Popular constitutionalism, departmentalism and judicial supremacy’ (2004) 92(4) 
California Law Review 1027, at 1029. 
117 As above. They further affirm the important role played by judicially enforceable rights in guaranteeing 
conditions for popular constitutionalism, and also affirm the important vital role popular constitutionalism 
plays in the articulation of fundamental values entrenched in judicially enforceable rights, at 1036-1037.  
118 Post & Siegel (n 116 above) 1029. 
119 Post & Siegel (n 116 above) 1041. They contend that dialogue, in this sense, is achieved through ‘a 
complex negotiation between deference and disagreement, between the comity necessary to instantiate a 
legal constitutional order and the autonomy necessary to give that order life and vibrancy’, at 1041-1042. 
120  V Gauri ‘Fundamental rights and public interest litigation in India: Overreaching or underachieving?’ 
(2010) 1 Indian Journal of Law and Economics 71, at 76. See also K Klare ‘Legal culture and 
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engagement with SERs thus spurs on inter-branch and societal dialogue by introducing the 
language of rights, elaborating the guidelines within which the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework should be developed, and providing a forum for debate.121 This is 
acknowledged by Varun Gauri and Daniel Brinks who contend that in adjudicating on SERs, the 
courts do not make final all-or-nothing decisions that usurp the functions of the political 
institutions, but design open-ended and interactive decisions that enable these institutions to 
respond in the adoption or reformulation of policy.122  
Sandra Liebenberg contends that SER adjudication has the potential to enrich 
democracy due to the following reasons. First, it creates a forum where the voices of poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised groups can be heard and the impact of legislation as well as 
policies in their lives receive serious and reasoned consideration in accordance with 
constitutional norms, values and principles. Secondly, it facilitates meaningful societal 
participation in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of government’s social 
programmes through the vindication of the right of public participation in decision-making as well 
as enhancing transparency and accountability in public decision-making processes. Thirdly, it 
enhances the development of common and customary law through their infusion with 
constitutional values and principles to augment the protection of the poor, marginalised and 
vulnerable in the private sphere. Lastly, it ensures that the State is more responsive to systemic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights 146 at 146-47, who 
acknowledges that adjudication is an important part of the law-making process in democratic societies, as 
a site of law-making activity. 
121 Gauri (n 120 above) 76. See also S Fredman, Human rights transformed: Positive rights and positive 
duties (2008) 149, where she avers that adjudication in courts creates a space for democratic deliberation 
among equal citizens; Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 81-82, who contend that the CCC has been 
able to espouse these requirements in its work, creating a detailed guideline for the other branches of 
government on how to implement rights as well as having a constant engagement with governmental, 
NGO and other civil society actors, on rights protection. 
122 V Gauri & D Brinks ‘Introduction: The elements of legalisation and the triangular shape of social and 
economic rights’ in V Gauri & D Brinks (eds.), Courting social justice: Judicial enforcement of social and 
economic rights in the developing world (2008) 1, at 3-4. They divide the public interest litigation life-cycle 
into four stages: filing of cases in court (legal mobilisation); judicial decision; bureaucratic, political or 
private-party response; and follow-up litigation. They contend that these four stages are interdependent 
and mutually self-supporting, engendering societal dialogue in the litigation process. 
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socio-economic deprivations and subordinations.123 Despite the above progressive potential of 
SER adjudication, Liebenberg acknowledges that SER adjudication can have debilitating effects 
on participatory and deliberative democracy due to the following reasons. First, the courts may 
adopt a narrow interpretation of SERs, excluding the most important needs of the most poor and 
vulnerable in society thus leaving them bereft of the protection that was envisaged in the 
entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the Constitution. Secondly, a formalistic adjudicative culture 
and practices which entrench the private-public dichotomy may impose weak accountability on 
private institutions, detracting from the protection against socio-economic deprivation in the 
private sphere. Thirdly, the appearance of normality and inevitability associated with judicial 
pronouncements can inhibit societal dialogue as to the broad understanding and alternative 
societal interpretations of the entrenched SERs, thus limiting the transformative potential of a 
constitution. Lastly, a purely court-facilitated process of SER realisation has the potential to 
induce lethargy in the political institutions and thus lead to the abdication of their responsibility 
as the primary implementers of SERs as discussed in the first level of dialogue above.124 
Despite the above challenges, Liebenberg insists that judicial adjudication of SERs has the 
potential to achieve social transformation, and suggests that courts must seek to stimulate 
participatory strategies without abdicating their responsibility to critically assess government 
compliance with its SER obligations.125 
 Therefore, the second level of dialogue occurs in the adjudication of SER cases in which 
the interpretation of the SER provisions are in issue.126 The courts take the institutional role of 
facilitators of dialogue as they depend on individuals, groups or organisations to initiate 
constitutional litigation by filing cases in the courts.127 Dialogue at this level reflects the 
                                                            
123 S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 37-38. 
124 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 39-42. For an incisive and 
elaborate analysis of the limitations of adjudication in the context of the realisation of SERs, see M 
Craven ‘Assessment of the progress on adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights’ in J Squires, 
M Langford & B Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social 
and cultural rights (2005) 27-42. 
125 As above. 
126 This is the aspect of dialogue as is envisaged by the use of the “dialogical metaphor in Canada as 
discussed in chapter three, section 3.3 above. 
127 See S Gloppen ‘Public interest litigation, social rights and social policy’ in AA Dani & AD Haan (eds.) 
Inclusive states: Social policy and structural inequalities (2008) 343, at 345-354, who contend that for 
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argument by Peter Häberle that ‘he who has the power of pleading, has the power of 
interpretation’, which basically means that pleadings in constitutional litigation are based on 
particular competing understandings or interpretations of the constitutional provision in issue.128  
This level of dialogue is envisioned by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution which provides for 
the role of the Court as the guardian of the Constitution.129 The Constitution entitles a wide 
range of parties to initiate the judicial review process in the Courts, especially in relation to the 
infringement of the Constitution.130 In addition to individuals whose rights have been 
contravened or whose rights are threatened with contravention, the Constitution expands its 
standing jurisdiction to also entertain class actions and public interest litigation (PIL), as well as 
grant amici curiae status.131 The wide array of persons capable of instituting or participating in 
constitutional litigation enhances the level of dialogue in the development of constitutional 
meaning on the entrenched SERs, making it possible for the courts to be persuaded to adopt an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
litigation to be a successful tool in social transformation, the following aspects must be present: 
identification and articulation of SER cases in the courts; responsiveness and acceptance by the courts of 
the mandate to adjudicate SER claims; the fashioning of effective remedies to tackle the root causes of 
SER deprivations; and, the acceptance, implementation and enforcement of court judgments to achieve 
structural changes through social policy and political practices.  
128 See A Sajo ‘Constitutional adjudication in light of discourse theory’ (1995-1996) 17 Cardozo Law 
Review 1193, at 1201; GG de la Vega ‘Two different approaches in constitutional interpretation with 
special focus in religious freedom: A comparative study between Germany and the United States’ (2008) 
122 Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado 795-833. 
129  The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, articles 23 & 165. 
130 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, articles 22 & 258. 
131 As above. The Kenyan Courts have undertaken a lenient stand in relation to the awarding of costs in 
constitutional litigation dealing with matters of public interest. In the case of John Harun Mwau & 3 Others 
v Attorney General & 2 Others, High Court Petition No. 123 of 2011, the Court held as follows: 
The intent of articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution is that persons should have free and 
unhindered access to this court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Similarly, article 258 allows any person to institute proceedings claiming the Constitution has 
been violated or is threatened. The imposition of costs would constitute a deterrent and would 
have a chilling effect on the enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 
This above stand on costs was further affirmed by the High Court in the case of Consumer Confederation 
of Kenya (COFEK) v Attorney General & 4 Others, High Court Petition No. 88 of 2011, at paras. 43-46.  
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interpretation that is reflective of the hopes and aspirations of the people as entrenched in the 
Constitution.132 
 Dialogue at this level does not only involve the courts and the people (litigants); it is a 
tripartite dialogue that also entails the participation of the executive, as the defender and 
implementer of government policy. In constitutional litigation on SERs in Kenya, the government 
defender will almost always be the Attorney-General (AG),133 and in the few cases where SER 
issues arise in the context of criminal litigation, the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.134 The Constitution confers on the AG the duty to promote, protect and uphold the 
rule of law, and defend the public interest,135 a role which, taken together with the fact that 
he/she is a public servant exercising delegated authority from the people, requires that she/he 
uses the conferred powers to enhance the public good, and not merely to espouse the views of 
the executive. 
 At this level of dialogue, the Courts should adopt a “strong rights approach” which entails 
a principled, substantive and expansive interpretation of entrenched SERs.136 This would 
involve the court undertaking a clear demarcation of the content, scope and extent of 
                                                            
132 See Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 347 who affirms that lenient standing criteria is a 
feature of all the jurisdictions in which social rights litigation has been able to achieve social 
transformation such as in Colombia and India. See also Gauri (n 120 above) 71; S Shankar & PB Mehta 
‘Courts and socio-economic rights in India’ in V Gauri & D Brinks (eds.) Courting social justice: Judicial 
enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world (2008) 146, at 149-150; E Ordolis 
‘Lessons from Colombia: Abortion, equality and constitutional choices’ (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 263, at 266. 
133 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 156, which empowers the AG, as the principal legal advisor of 
the government, to represent the State in legal matters in court; and,  to appear, with the leave of the 
court as a friend of the court in cases in which the State is not a party.  
134 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 157. 
135 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 156 (6). 
136 See M Tushnet ‘Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial review’ (2003-2004) 82 Texas Law 
Review 1895, at 1903, where he argues that the SACC rejected a strong version of substantive SERs 
and that most of its decisions have been weak substantively and remedially as they lacked breadth, 
coerciveness as well as remedial timing.  
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entrenched SERs, including the delineation of the minimum core content of the rights.137 It 
would further involve the court undertaking a strict use of the limitation clause, be they internal 
limitations on the availability of resources or external limitations to rights as is espoused in 
section 24 of the 2010 Constitution.138 Dialogue here will entail the court adopting a two-stage 
approach to litigation, with the parties to the case adducing evidence in court to make an 
affirmative case of a violation of an entrenched SER, and the government adducing evidence to 
rebut the allegation of violation of that SER at the first stage. This stage must entail a principled 
focus on the nature, scope and content of the right in question and whether the impugned 
legislation or conduct infringes the right in question.139 Should the court decide that a violation 
has occurred, the dialogue will then shift to the second stage where the political institutions will 
be required to adduce evidence indicating that the limitation of the right is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in 
accordance with article 24 of the Constitution.140 If the court holds that the justification does not 
cure the violation of the right, it must then, of necessity, make orders as to remedies, leading us 
to the third level of dialogue. 
 In undertaking their duties at this level of dialogue, especially in reviewing the SER 
implementation framework designed by the political institutions, the courts must have in mind 
the doctrine of coordinate construction, and the competence as well as the responsibility of the 
other branches of government in the development of constitutional meaning.141 The courts must 
thus, where reasonable, defer to and respect the meaning of entrenched SERs developed by 
the political institutions unless there are clear failures of foresight, perspective, accommodation 
or responsiveness; at which point the courts must intervene so as to generate new ideas and 
perspectives or to instil equilibrium into the political process.142 This follows from the democratic 
                                                            
137 For a detailed discussion of why Kenya should adopt the minimum core approach to SERs, see 
chapter two, section 2.5 above and chapter five, section 5.3.     
138 For an elaborate discussion of limitations in the Kenyan context, see chapter two, section 2.6.  
139 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 141. 
140  This is the aspect of dialogue espoused in the Canadian context as discussed in chapter three, 
section 3.3 above. See also Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 396. 
141 For an exposition of the doctrine of coordinate construction, see chapter three, section 3.4 above. 
142 Dixon (n 5 above) 407; Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 392- 398. In the Kenyan 
case of John Kabui Mwai & 3 Others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 Others, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 15 of 2011, 6, available at 
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authority and epistemic superiority of the political institutions, coupled with the involvement of 
the public in a cooperative and deliberative undertaking to design the implementation framework 
as discussed in the first level of dialogue above. Deference to the political institutions will 
enhance the legitimacy of the courts’ involvement in SER adjudication as it effectively responds 
to concerns of democratic legitimacy of policy making by the courts, separation of powers 
concerns, and the concerns of judicial competency to adjudicate polycentric matters.143 The 
Constitution requires this deference in the adjudication of SERs, especially on the allocation of 
resources.144  
The court should, however, not abdicate its responsibility as the ultimate protector of 
rights and the guardian of the Constitution, on the basis of respect and deference where the 
political institutions are intransigent, incompetent or inattentive to their responsibility to realise 
SERs. It must retain sufficient latitude to undertake more drastic constitutionally availed 
remedies such as mandatory injunctions (structural interdicts) and the exercise of supervisory 
jurisdiction to ensure that SERs are realised.145 The need for the courts not to abdicate their role 
in adjudication was affirmed by Justice McLaughin, in the Canadian context, in the following 
terms:146 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/83548.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013), the High Court 
acknowledged the SERs entails the prioritisation of government expenditure, and that in instances of 
resource limitations, the political institutions of the State must be accorded the appropriate deference to 
determine the best way of meeting their constitutional obligations. 
143 Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 392. She avers that deference enables 
governmental institutions to fulfil their appropriate constitutional roles and responsibilities without 
impinging on each other, at 393. 
144  The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(c). 
145 For an extensive discussion on the use of structural interdicts in the realisation of SERs, see C 
Mbazira, Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa (2009) chapter six. 
146 RJR MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199 para. 136, also quoted in McLean – Constitutional 
deference (n 19 above) 175-76. See also Dixon (n 5 above) 406, who contends that courts have a direct 
responsibility, using their communicative and coercive powers, to counter blind spots and burdens of 
inertia in the political processes, and failure to do so has two consequences for the courts: first, they will 
be implicated directly in illegitimate State coercion due to their constitutional mandate to undertake 
authoritative judicial decision-making in instances of rights violations; and secondly, courts’ failure actively 
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Care must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far. Deference must not be carried 
to the point of relieving the government of the burden which the Charter places upon it of 
demonstrating that the limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable. 
Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problems within the limiting 
framework of the Constitution. But the courts also have a role: to determine, objectively and 
impartially, whether parliament’s choice falls within the limiting framework of the Constitution. The 
courts are no more permitted to abdicate their responsibility than is parliament. To carry judicial 
deference to the point of accepting parliament’s view simply on the basis that the problem is 
serious and the solutions difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in the constitutional 
process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which our Constitution and nation is founded. 
The above quote, which is basically self-explanatory, stresses the important role which the 
courts play in the entire constitutional structure, a role that must not be sacrificed on the altar of 
blanket deference. 
4.3.2 Which way for Kenya - Individualised or structural litigation? 
The viability and effectiveness of dialogue at this level in achieving socio-economic 
transformation will depend a lot on the litigation strategy to be adopted by the prospective 
litigants. A choice of litigation strategy must aim at the overall achievement of the transformative 
agenda, which is, shielding the poor, marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups from 
the uncertainties and harshness of a pure market model, and extending to them the benefits of 
public goods and services.147 A distinction can be drawn between two strategies - the 
individualised strategy as has been used in access to health in Brazil, and the class 
action/public interest litigation which is the hallmark of SER litigation in Colombia and India.148 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
entrenches the unequal status quo and makes it harder for individuals and social movements to contest 
the legitimacy of the status quo. 
147 DM Brinks & W Forbath ‘Commentary: Social and economic rights in Latin America: Constitutional 
Courts and the prospects for pro-poor interventions’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1943, at 1949. 
See also A Nolan ‘Litigating housing rights’ Conference on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9-10 
December 2005, at 11-12, available at http://www.ihrc.ie/publications/list/aoife-nolan-litigating-housing-
rights-conference-o/ (accessed on 26 September 2012), who emphasises the importance of proper case 
selection in SER litigation, as poorly chosen litigation strategies may lead to adverse precedents that may 
take years to reverse. 
148 See C Rodriguez-Garavito ‘Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on socio-economic 
rights in Latin America’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1669, at 1671, who calls public interest 
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 Concerns have been raised about the viability of individualised interest litigation in 
achieving social transformation. Critics argue that the strategy makes it harder for indigent, 
voiceless and marginalised individuals and groups to benefit from SER programmes at the 
expense of middle class litigants.149 Daniel Brinks and William Forbath contend that private 
individual litigation has the potential of producing beneficiary inequality and may operate as a 
rationing device in which access to social goods and services is a preserve of those with 
sufficient resources and the ability to access courts and retain private advocates.150 Paola 
Bergello also concur, contending that continued individual litigation exacerbate intra-policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
litigation (PIL) cases “structural cases” and demarcates their features as: involving the violation of the 
rights of a large number of people; implicating multiple State institutions and agencies whose failure in 
policy development and implementation contribute to the rights violation; and, engendering the adoption 
of structural injunctive remedies requiring government’s coordinated action to protect the entire affected 
population, and not only of the litigants. On India, see S Muralidhar ‘The expectations and challenges of 
judicial enforcement of social rights: India’ in M Langford (ed.), Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging 
trends in international and comparative law (2008) 102, at 106 & 108-109, who indicates that the 
development of PIL in India was entirely a judge-led and judge-dominated movement. 
149  Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 359-360, who argues that PIL in India has seen 
stronger middle class groups upstage the concerns of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in 
accessing the courts. DP Chong ‘Five challenges to legalising economic and social rights’ (2009) 10 
Human Rights Review 183, at 190, similarly argues that SER litigation amplifies the reproduction of social 
inequalities as judgment in favour of one group necessarily leads to deterioration of the conditions of 
other groups who may not have access to the justice system or a leverage on the State’s scarce 
resources.  For an affirmation of this claim, see B Rajagopal ‘Pro-human rights but anti-poor? A critical 
evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a social movement perspective’ (2007) Human Rights 
Review 157ff; F Hoffman & FR Bentes ‘Accountability for social and economic rights in Brazil’ in V Gauri 
& DM Brinks (eds.) Courting social justice: Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the 
developing world (2008)100, at 119-132; OM Ferraz ‘Harming the poor through social rights litigation: 
Lessons from Brazil’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1643. 
150 Brinks & Forbath (n 147 above) 1946-1950. See also DM Brinks & V Gauri ‘A new policy landscape: 
Legalising social and economic rights in the developing world’ in V Gauri & DM Brinks (eds.) Courting 
social justice: Judicial enforcement of social and economic rights in the developing world (2008) 303, at 
336-342, who undertake an extensive analysis of this issue and submit that even though the middle class 
are always the direct beneficiaries of SER litigation, class action litigation always leads to massive 
structural adjustments in policy and implementation procedures, indirectly benefiting even the poor non-
litigating majorities 
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inequalities.151 The unviability of providing individualised benefits in the context of SER 
adjudication was also affirmed by the SACC in the Soobramoney case where the Court held as 
follows:152 
The State has to manage its limited resources in order to address all these claims. There will be 
times when this requires it to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than 
to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals within society. 
 Even though individualised litigation has denigrating effects on the potential for 
transformative litigation, the other extreme - where the courts are absolutely oblivious to the 
individualised concerns of litigants - also has adverse effects on the fulfilment of SERs. This is 
exemplified by the reasonableness approach to SER litigation through which the SACC has 
consistently shown chariness and a lack of concern to individual litigants,153 and has instead laid 
                                                            
151 P Bergallo ‘Courts and social change: Lessons from the struggle to universalise access to HIV 
treatment in Argentina’ (2010-2011) 89 Texas Law Review 1611, at 1640-1641.  
152 Soobramoney case, para. 31. See also Grootboom case, para. 95, & TAC case, paras. 34-36. The 
unviability of providing purely individualised remedies in the context of SER litigation has also been 
affirmed in the High Court of Kenya in the case of John Kabui Mwai (n 142 above) 6, where the Court 
stated as follows: 
One of the obstacles to the realisation of [SER] is the limited financial resources on the part of the 
government. The available resources are not adequate to facilitate the immediate provision of 
socio-economic goods and services to everyone on demand as individual rights. There has to be 
a holistic approach to providing socio-economic goods and services that focus beyond the 
individual.  
The holistic approach advocated here can be interpreted to entail a mix of individual and structural 
remedies in accordance with the specific context of particular cases, the approach proposed below. 
153 See Pieterse (n 22 above) 341 and D Brand ‘Proceduralisation of South Africa’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for?”’ in H Botha et al (eds.) Rights and democracy in a 
transformative constitution (2003) 33, at 46, who both contend that the failure of the SACC to adopt the 
minimum core approach, and its consequent adoption of the reasonableness approach, was partly 
motivated by its aversion to the notion of individual entitlements.  Pieterse further argues that this 
approach stifles dialogue as individuals and organisations find it worthless to participate in the 
identification and elaboration of rights claims as the courts will not award to them any immediate and 
tangible relief, at 343-344. See also J Dugard ‘Courts and the poor in South Africa: A critique of systemic 
judicial failures to advance transformative justice’ (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 214, 
at 215ff who contends that the South African judiciary has remained relatively untransformed due to its 
 
 
 
 
196 | P a g e  
 
emphasis on assessing whether government policies and programmes aimed at the realisation 
of rights have taken into account the needs and circumstances of the most vulnerable groups.154 
Frank Michelman terms the adoption and application of supposedly “objective legal standards” 
such as “the reasonableness standard” as flights from responsibility, aimed at absolving judges 
from responsibility for the fate of individual parties, as well as the absolution of the responsibility 
of judges for their contribution to socially unequal or conflictual outcomes.155 In her analysis of 
the jurisprudence of the SACC, Katherine Young terms this a “weak court approach” which is 
basically aimed at the court’s self-protection.156 Sandra Liebenberg also affirms the inability of 
the reasonableness approach adopted by the SACC to be used to elicit benefits for an individual 
or a class of individuals.157 
 The strategy being advocated here is a mix of the two extremes, that is, where litigants 
mostly concentrate on structural litigation through the preparation of test cases on SER issues 
of most concern to the people.158 To enhance the viability of this approach, the courts must 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
institutional unresponsiveness to the problems of the poor and its failure to advance transformative 
justice, and thus its general failure to collectively act as an institutional voice of the poor. 
154 Brinks & Forbath (n 147 above) 1952; Dugard - Courts and the poor in South Africa (n 153 above) 
236ff. See also Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 395; Scott & Alston (n 96 above) 
254-55, who contends that chariness toward the needs of individual litigants has a chilling effect on SER 
litigation by individual claimants.  
155  F Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1985 Term, Foreword: Traces of self-government’ (1986-1987) 100 
Harvard Law Review 4, at 15.  
156 Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 391. See also T Roux ‘Principle and pragmatism 
on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2009) 7(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 106, 
who similarly states that the reasonableness approach was basically a pragmatic approach adopted by 
the SACC for institutional protection. 
157 S Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights: Revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate’ in 
S Woolman & M Bishop (eds.), Constitutional conversations (2008) 303, at 304. See also Tushnet – 
Social Welfare Rights (n 136 above) 1905. 
158 Brinks & Gauri – A new policy landscape (n 150 above) 340; Gauri & Brinks - Introduction (n 122 
above) 15, who contend that in order to produce a “rights revolution” repetitive and coordinated litigation 
is a requirement, a feat that cannot be achieved by individuals litigating on their own, and which, 
therefore, requires a PIL organisation that can undertake a prolonged and strategically planned litigation 
campaign; Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 348, who avers that the key to success here 
is the “associative capacity” that is, the capacity to join forces and resources both human and financial, 
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establish proper guidelines and outline correct parameters for the acceptance and adjudication 
of PIL cases so as to curtail the filing of frivolous and vexatious petitions.159 Furthermore, in 
adjudicating these test cases, the courts should issue remedies that balance individualised 
concerns of litigants and all other similarly placed individuals, while at the same time responding 
to the structural concerns that militate against the realisation of SERs for the masses.160 In 
support of this remedial approach, Iain Currie and Johan de Waal contend that constitutional 
violations do not only cause harm to individuals, but causes harm to the entire social spectrum 
as they impede the realisation of the constitutional project aimed at the creation of a just and 
democratic society.161 This is further affirmed by Sandra Liebenberg who similarly states that 
constitutional remedies should not only be aimed retrospectively at the vindication of the right-
violations that have already occurred, but must also be aimed at deterring future violations of 
the right in respect of all people.162 The aim of the test cases, especially the initial ones, should, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
undertake societal mobilisation around the issues of concern, and engage in media campaigns to 
enhance knowledge and awareness of the test cases and their intended social impact. Gloppen 
emphasises the importance of social mobilisation at all the levels of litigation, contending that it is easier 
for judges to adopt progressive judgments if a case has already been “won in the streets, at 355. See 
also Dugard - Courts and the poor in South Africa (n 153 above) 216-226, who calls for a comprehensive 
system of legal representation for poor people to enable their issues to be adequately, equally and 
effectively articulated so as to promote parity in the legal process;  Roux (n 156 above) 123-125; Nolan (n 
147 above) 14; and S Leckie ‘The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the right 
to adequate housing: Towards an appropriate approach’ (1989) 11 Human Rights Quarterly 522 at 528-
31. 
159  See Gauri (n 120 above) 75-76 who argues that the lack of such a guideline has led to the Indian 
Supreme Court entertaining frivolous PIL petitions, to the detriment of the real administration of justice. 
He documents calls by the bench for the establishment of PIL parameters and also indicates that a 
Parliamentary Bill was tabled in 1996 to regulate PIL in the Indian Courts. See also Dugard - Courts and 
the poor in South Africa (n 153 above) 226ff, who calls for the judiciary in South Africa to promote PIL and 
limit systemic barriers to its use. 
160 See Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 344 who affirms that PIL is aimed at the 
transformation of not only the individual litigant, but also similarly situated individuals through the 
alterations of structured inequalities and power relations. It is thus aimed at the transformation of social 
policy, public discourse on social rights, and the development of progressive jurisprudence.  
161 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 196. 
162 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 378. 
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therefore, be to tackle government’s structural and institutional deficiencies that result in the 
non-realisation of SERs, with the consequential objective of ensuring policy changes, shattering 
the bureaucratic bottlenecks, and enhancing inter-branch and societal dialogue in the design of 
SER implementation frameworks.163  
 The need for a mixed litigation strategy to enhance the achievement of the 
transformative aspirations of a transformative constitution is also acknowledged by David 
Bilchitz who identifies both the positive and negative consequences of each of the specific 
litigational strategies mentioned above.164 He advocates a flexible approach in which the courts 
make orders that are just and equitable in light of the facts and context of each particular 
case.165 He proposes that in litigation challenging an existing SER implementation framework, 
the court should proceed and grant individual remedies requiring the inclusion of the litigants 
and similarly placed individuals into the existing programmes, so as to enhance the equality of 
treatment and to respect the principle of equal importance of all people.166 He further proposes 
that in litigation where there is no existing SER framework, the court should order the State to 
adopt a policy and develop a programme aimed at the provision of the right in question to all 
similarly situated individuals.167 He contends that this ensures that all individuals benefit from 
the State’s programmes in an orderly and systematic manner.168 
 The viability of the litigation and remedial approach discussed above is evidenced by the 
Indian right to food (PUCL) case, which concerned the failure of the government to put in place 
measures to ameliorate extreme hunger and malnutrition caused by drought and famine.169 In 
                                                            
163  See Bergallo (n 151 above) 1614-1615 & 1631-1638 who, writing in the context of SER litigation in 
Argentina, contends that while the earlier collective PIL on the right to health were able to inspire policy 
changes and fostered inter-branch dialogue in the formulation solutions, later litigation did not have this 
effect. 
164 D Bichitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2007) 203-206. 
165 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 204. 
166 As above. The case that best illustrates this point is the Khosa case.  
167 As above.  
168 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 205. 
169 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, (Writ Petition [Civil] No. 196 of 2001) available at 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html (accessed on 3 September 2012). For a more elaborate 
discussion of this case, see chapter six below. 
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reacting to this situation, the Indian Supreme Court made extensive preliminary orders requiring 
the government to introduce midday meals in all government assisted primary schools; provide 
food security benefits through a card system and nationwide food security schemes to the most 
vulnerable groups; and to increase its budgetary allocations to schemes aimed at enhancing 
employment.170 To ensure that these orders were fulfilled, the Supreme Court proceeded to 
appoint two commissioners to monitor their implementation, and to work with both the 
government and non-governmental organisations to enhance the realisation of the right to 
food.171 Through this monitoring mechanism, the court was further able to make follow-up orders 
in instances where implementation was either slow or had not taken off.172 David Bilchitz 
contends that the PUCL case portrays the positive benefits that properly balanced SER litigation 
can have in enhancing the realisation of SERs, by shattering bureaucratic bottlenecks as well as 
placing SER issues on the political agenda.173  
Within this litigation framework, the entire societal context and circumstances should be 
brought to bear in a deliberative system of decision-making where even individuals, groups and 
organisations not party to the specific litigation have an opportunity to contribute freely and 
equally to the elaboration and design of remedies to address the violation of, or non-realisation 
of SERs, as discussed below in relation to the third level of dialogue.174 This dialogic system has 
the potential to represent the million faceless poor who are too indigent to undertake litigation of 
their own, and to ensure that their situation is brought to bear in national decision-making, as is 
illustrated by the PUCL case above.175 This is exemplified by the structural decision-making 
                                                            
170 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 241-242; Chong (n 149 above) 187. 
171  Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 241-242. 
172 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 245. 
173 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 242-243. 
174 Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 391, who also envisions review dialogue in a web 
involving the courts, political institutions, litigants, similarly placed individuals and groups, other parties 
who may be harmed or helped by the prospective remedies, and the general public. 
175 Dugard - Courts and the poor in South Africa (n 153 above) 226ff. See also J Easterday ‘Litigation or 
legislation: Protecting the rights of internally displaced persons in Colombia (2008) 36-38, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/jennifer_easterday/1 (accessed on 3 September 2012), where she affirms the 
decision by the CCC in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) case did not only apply to the specific 
applicants in the case, but was directed at the amelioration of the conditions of all IDPs in Colombia. 
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approach that entails strong rights, moderate remedies and a strong monitoring system as 
exemplified by the practice of the CCC whose jurisprudence is discussed below.  
4.4 Third level of dialogue: the designing of constitutional remedies 
The third level of dialogue deals with the type of remedy the courts adopt and the kind of 
monitoring mechanisms that the courts will establish to ensure the implementation of the 
adopted remedies.176 It entails courts adopting “moderate remedies” which are in line with the 
concept of separation of powers, and which only outline the broad goals and procedures to be 
implemented by the political institutions.177 In adopting this form of remedy, the Court 
acknowledges and defers to the constitutional responsibility and institutional competence of the 
political institutions in designing, planning and implementing SER policies.   
4.4.1 Remedies  
Some of the remedial approaches that allow the court to undertake its facilitative role, and which 
are expressly provided for in the Constitution include a declaration of rights; injunctions, 
including mandatory injunction/structural interdicts; and declarations of invalidity, which include 
suspended declarations of invalidity.178 The courts must of necessity exercise judicial discretion 
as to the remedy to apply in any particular case. In exercising that discretion the courts will be 
guided not only by the particular facts of the case and the contextual as well as historical 
circumstances of the litigants, but also on the need to ensure that remedies issued in any 
particular case are effective, just, equitable and appropriate.179 An appropriate remedy, 
according to Justice Ackermann of the SACC, is that relief which is required to protect and 
                                                            
176 See Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 354 who states the importance of creativity of 
courts in designing remedies and developing innovative follow-up monitoring mechanisms to enhance 
implementation of rights, pointing at the creativity of the Indian Supreme Court, the Colombian and the 
Costa Rican Constitution Courts in this area. 
177 Tushnet – Social welfare rights (n 136 above) 1910 ff; Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1676. See 
also McLean – Constitutional deference (n 19 above) 187-88. 
178 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 23(3).  
179 See K Roach & G Budlender ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: When is it appropriate, just, 
equitable’ (2005) 122(2) South African Law Journal 325, at 345-51. 
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enforce the Constitution.180 Even though an expansive elaboration of these remedies is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, a brief analysis of their dialogical character is necessary.181  
First, a declaration of rights is an optional order which the court can make to determine 
rights in particular circumstances, even in instances of mootness of a legal question with regard 
to the litigating parties, but which does not entitle the claimants to any enforceable relief.182 
According to the SACC, it ‘is a flexible remedy which can assist in clarifying legal and 
constitutional obligations in a manner which promotes the protection and enforcement of 
[constitutional values]’.183 In making this order, the court allows the political institutions of the 
State to put in place measures to either realise the right in question or to fulfil the obligation so 
declared, taking into account their institutional comparative advantages as well as the many 
legitimate options available for the realisation of the right in question.184  
However, Liebenberg acknowledges that purely declaratory orders, without any other 
complementary remedy, may have adverse effects on the immediate needs of the claimants 
and similarly situated people, a fact that must be weighed against the benefits of the order when 
the court is undertaking SER adjudication.185 The limit of a purely declaratory order was also 
                                                            
180 See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997) 3 SA 786 (CC), paras. 19 & 69. 
181 For an extensive discussion of these remedies in the context of South Africa, see Liebenberg - 
Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 377-462. 
182 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 397-399. She argues that 
some of the reasons for the making of declaratory orders are, to provide an authoritative confirmation of 
the violation of the relevant constitutional rights and to deter future violations of rights. 
183 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC), para. 107.  
184 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 398ff. see also K Roach 
‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ in J Squires, M Langford & B 
Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights 
(2005) 111,  at 113-116, who analyses the preferred use of declaratory remedies by the courts in 
Canada, especially the Canadian Supreme Court, in the context of cases dealing with rights entrenched 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
185 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 408-09. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of the declaratory orders made on the Grootboom judgment, see 
399-407. 
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emphasised by Justice Iacobucci of the Canadian Supreme Court, who, in his dissenting 
opinion in a Canadian case held as follows:186 
Declarations are often preferable to injunctive relief because they are more flexible, require less 
supervision, and are more deferential to the other branches of government. [However, they] can 
suffer from vagueness, insufficient remedial specificity, an inability to monitor compliance, and an 
ensuing need for subsequent litigation to ensure compliance. [They are thus] inadequate and 
place an unfair burden on successful litigants in cases of grave systemic problems and when 
administrators have proven themselves unworthy of trust. 
Secondly, the suspended declaration of invalidity acknowledges the institutional and 
constitutional competency of the political institutions to deal effectively with a violation of a right 
by pointing out the violation and allowing these institutions to put in place measures to rectify 
the violation in the first instance.187 This declaration envisages the continuation of an 
unconstitutional state of affairs for the period specified in the order, and thus allowing the 
political institutions to rectify the situation though a legislative sequel or executive action, failing 
which the declaration takes effect invalidating the previous unconstitutional state of affairs.188  In 
analysing this remedy, Liebenberg avers that it is appropriate in two instances, the first being 
when an order of immediate invalidation will result in an unacceptable legal situation, such as 
the creation of a lacuna in the legal system, and the second instance being when it is 
appropriate to afford the political institutions, due to their institutional and constitutional 
competence and comparative advantage, the opportunity to adopt the requisite comprehensive 
and balanced scheme to cure the unconstitutional state of affairs.189 She contends that this 
order, especially its application in the second instance, has the effect of enhancing dialogue as 
it allows policy choices for the realisation of SERs to be made in democratic and collaborative 
deliberative structures where all societal concerns and interests are brought to bear on 
collective societal decision-making.190 She, however, calls for an appropriate balance to be 
struck between the benefits to be achieved by the suspension of the order vis-à-vis the burden 
                                                            
186 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice) (2000)2 SCR 1120, paras. 258-
61, as quoted in Roach & Budlender (n 179 above) 339. 
187 Roach & Budlender (n 179 above) 339-40; Roach – Crafting remedies for SERs (n 184 above) 123ff. 
188 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 389-90. 
189 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 390. 
190 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 390-91.  
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placed on the claimants and similarly situated individuals in allowing the unconstitutional state of 
affairs to subsist for the suspension period.191 She thus suggests that interim measures should 
be put in place to cushion the claimants from the adverse effects that may result from the 
suspension of the order.192 
Thirdly, the courts can also adopt the more coercive mandatory injunctions where there 
is a manifest failure or delay by the political institutions in the execution of previous, less 
coercive SER orders of the court.193 Liebenberg contends that two types of orders can be made 
in this instance, the first being an order for the provision of benefits or services, and the second 
being an order requiring dialogue and deliberation with the affected communities (“meaningful 
engagement”).194 She argues that a mandatory order can be made by the courts in the following 
three situations: where few policy alternatives for the remedy of the violation exist; where the 
type of violation requires ‘the provision of direct, speedy and concrete form of relief’; and where 
compliance with the court order is possible through the adoption of straightforward and 
expeditious measures.195 
4.4.2 Retention of jurisdiction and the exercise of supervisory powers 
The remedy which almost always envisages the court retaining jurisdiction and exercising 
supervisory powers to ensure that its orders are complied with by the political institutions is the 
                                                            
191 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 391-97. She further states 
that in suspending an order, the courts should not leave parliament to their own devices, but must lay 
down the normative parameters within which the resultant legislative sequels or executive action must 
meet, at 93. See also Roach & Budlender (n 179 above) 340-41. 
192 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 391-97. See also Roach – 
Crafting remedies for SERs (n 184 above) 125-126. 
193 See TAC case, para. 112, where the SACC affirmed its authority to issue mandatory injunctions in 
appropriate cases when the State’s obligations are not being performed diligently and without delay. See 
also Mbazira (n 145 above) 170-71 who contends that the mandatory injunction is a positive remedy that 
can be used to remedy either negative or positive violations of SERs; Roach & Budlender (n 179 above) 
325, where they affirm the authority of both the SACC and the Canadian Supreme Court to issue 
mandatory injunctions and to retain supervisory jurisdiction in the adjudication of constitutional cases.  
194 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 410-424. For a discussion 
on ‘meaningful engagement’ see chapter three, section 3.5 above. 
195 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 414. 
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structural interdict.196 It involves the court either issuing a reporting order requiring the parties to 
account to it periodically on the implementation of the judgment, or an order requiring the parties 
to engage with each other and come up with an implementation plan to be adopted by the court 
for the vindication of the right at issue.197 The remedy envisages the court establishing a 
judgment monitoring commission, as is the practice in the Indian Supreme Court198 and the 
CCC,199 where the substance of the remedy is elaborated in deliberative processes involving the 
political institutions and a broader spectrum of societal stakeholders, including those who were 
not directly involved in the litigation.200 The use of the structural interdict thus spurs on dialogue 
between the courts, the political institutions and other societal actors.201 
                                                            
196 For an extensive discussion of the structural interdict in the enforcement of SERs, see Mbazira (n 145 
above) chapter six, especially 176ff. He avers that the main purpose of the structural interdict is to 
respond to, and remedy, systemic violations within institutional or organisational settings, with the aim of 
achieving long-term structural reforms. 
197 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 424; Mbazira (n 145 above) 
178; Roach – Crafting remedies for SERs (n 184 above) 113 & 117ff. 
198 The Indian Supreme Court has established an enviable dialogical decision-making technique on 
environmental litigation. When dealing with such matters, the Court usually relies on the opinions and 
recommendations of expert bodies, such as the National Environmental Engineering Research institute. 
The reports of the expert bodies are then subjected to objections by government or other societal actors 
before it is adopted as the judgment of the Court. In this way, the criticism of a lack of expertise or bias on 
the part of the Court cannot be upheld. See Muralidhar (n 148 above) 110; Shankar & Mehta (n 132 
above) 174-176. 
199 A case in point is the Commission Monitoring Public Policy on Forced Displacement, a coalition of 
NGOs that was assigned to monitor the implementation of Decision T-025, the IDP case, see Rodriguez-
Garavito (n 148 above) 1685. 
200 See Mbazira (n 145 above) 187-88 & 215-17, who gives an example of the United States case of 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v Pennsylvania, 334 F Supp 1257, where the Court, in 
addition to conducting public hearings, also established an advisory panel composed of all the interested 
groups to design the Court’s remedy.  
201 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1676. See also Tushnet – Social welfare rights (n 136 above) 1911, 
who contends that in follow-up decisions, in light of the experience of the implementation of the original 
order, the court can either set up more specific timelines or identify more specific benchmarks for official 
use, or loosen up the requirements to accord with the realities as they have developed; Dixon (n 5 above) 
412, who contends that the supervisory role, coupled with its time-sensitive dimension, ensures that the 
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The adoption of moderate structural remedies opens up opportunities for societal 
deliberation on policy alternatives capable of effectively and sustainably fulfilling the rights in 
question.202 The substantive content of the policy, including fiscal and budgetary imperatives, 
are thus not contained in the judgment, but are discussed and designed in an inclusive and 
participatory deliberative remedial commission and also during the monitoring process. To 
undertake this role, Ellen Wiles advocates the formation of a commission of experts on SERs, 
whose responsibility is to spearhead a cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary engagement with 
SER decisions of the Courts, undertake a hands-on supervision of the implementation of 
resultant plans and policies by the political institutions, and also undertake periodic reporting of 
progress to the court.203 A similar structure, A Social Rights Council, was envisaged in the 
Canadian Alternative Social Charter, with the aim of enhancing the extent and quality of social 
and political dialogue on SERs.204 In the Kenyan context, however, it is proposed that the above 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
political institutions prioritise the implementation of the orders of the courts and also mobilises a broad 
coalition of political actors to pressurise the political institutions to act to remedy rights violations.  
202 See Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 434-38, who 
summarises some of the dialogical advantages of structural interdicts to include the following: the 
granting of a margin of appreciation to the political institutions of the State with the active participation of 
other societal actors to design and implement concrete plans to remedy constitutional violations; in 
defining only the broader goals to be achieved and leaving the detail to be decided on by the political 
institutions, the order is respectful of the doctrine of separation of powers; the order enhances the 
constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and openness in governance, thus improving the 
quality of government; it is responsive to the polycentricity concerns raised against the judicial 
enforcement of SERs as it allows collective deliberation and decision-making that involves all societal 
actors with different expertise and life-experiences; the order is more capable of enhancing the inclusion 
of previously marginalised groups; and it is the most appropriate order to respond to systemic and 
structurally entrenched violations of SERs. 
203 E Wiles ‘Aspirational principles or enforceable rights: The future for socio-economic rights in national 
law’ (2006-2007) 22 American University International Law Review 35, at 54-56 & 63. She further argues 
that this commission may also undertake other important duties such as provision of relevant statistical 
and substantive information to the court to help it in the design of remedies, as well as undertake impact 
assessment analysis to enable the court to anticipate the potential policy and budgetary consequences of 
its decisions, thus responding to the polycentric challenges of SER adjudication.  
204 J Nedelsky & C Scott ‘Constitutional dialogue’ in J Bakan & D Schneiderman (eds.) Social justice and 
the Constitution: Perspectives on a social union for Canada (1992) 59, at 65-66, who argue that the 
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responsibility can be undertaken by the KNHREC as discussed in section 4.2.2 above, and as is 
the practice in the South African Context with regard to the role of the South African Human 
Rights Commission.205 
4.5 Analysis of the transformative potential of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
in the second and third levels of dialogue 
The facilitative role of the courts, as is discussed in the second and third levels of dialogue, is 
envisioned by Keith Whittington who argues that the judiciary’s most useful role in SER 
adjudication is in framing constitutional disputes for extra-judicial resolution and in enforcing the 
principled decisions reached elsewhere, rather than in autonomously and authoritatively 
defining constitutional meaning.206 He bases his argument on the fact that in the context of 
reasonable societal disagreement about the nature and content of constitutionally entrenched 
rights, it is more appropriate to allow wide and democratic societal participation in the fashioning 
of constitutional meaning, than to entrust such important societal decisions to an elite judicial 
body that will then impose its own ruling on the people at large.207 
According to Rodriguez-Garavito, adjudicative dialogue is strengthened by the 
reservation of the power of the court to make ‘new decisions in light of progress and setbacks in 
the process [of the implementation of the original judgment], and [to] encourage discussion 
among actors in the case through deliberative public hearings’.208 Therefore, for the courts to 
enhance deliberation in decision-making on the implementation of SERs, as envisaged in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Council would undertake its mandate in the context of on-going debate between all sectors of society, 
especially marginalised and vulnerable groups, as well as the executive and legislative institutions. 
205 Wiles (n 203 above) 62-63. See also Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 
123 above) 402-03, who elaborates on the extensive efforts undertaken by the SAHRC to monitor the 
implementation of the Grootboom judgment, and the difficulty they faced due to the failure of the SACC to 
retain a supervisory jurisdiction over the case. 
206 KE Whittington ‘Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation: Three objections and responses (2002) 80 
North Carolina Law Review 773, at 846. 
207 As above. See also Young – Typology of SER adjudication (n 96 above) 412, who states that in 
undertaking a facilitative or catalytic role, the court enhances the opportunities for social transformation by 
enabling the political institutions, interests groups, social movements and society at large to deliberate 
and engage in problem-solving aimed at the achievement of a societal common good. 
208 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1691. 
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last two levels of dialogue, it must adopt a strong rights approach affirming, not only the 
justiciability of the SER in question, but also its content, scope and extent. After delineating a 
strong content to the right, and holding that the right has been violated, the courts should then 
adopt a moderate remedy which lays out a clear roadmap, in terms of objectives to be achieved 
and the benchmarks and indicators to monitor progress, while leaving the specific policy 
decisions to be adopted to a deliberative process involving active public participation. Lastly, the 
courts must develop a strong court-facilitated monitoring process involving the use of 
participatory mechanisms such as implementation and supervisory commissions, public 
hearings,209 progress reports and follow-up decisions.210  
The importance of the adoption of a supervisory role by the courts is illustrated by David 
Bilchitz in his discussion of the Grootboom case.211  He states that the failure of the Court to 
undertake supervision led to more than a three year delay in the implementation of the 
Grootboom order by the concerned State organs, necessitating subsequent litigation in the High 
                                                            
209 See Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 76- 79, who analyses the extensive monitoring process 
undertaken by the CCC in the Mortgage case, where the Court held public hearings with senior public 
officials, including the Ombudsman, the Minister of Housing, the Head of the Central Bank and others 
taking part in a public discourse on how best to reform the housing finance system in Colombia. The 
Court also requested and received written submissions and other written representations from the entire 
societal spectrum including economists, academics, public officials and civil society groups, ensuring that 
it had sufficient information on how to deal with the mortgage crisis.  The authors submit that the courts’ 
efforts were instrumental in restructuring the Colombian housing finance system to the benefit of citizens. 
210 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1692. See also Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 79ff, who, in 
analysing the jurisprudence of the CCC, contend that its practice of retaining supervisory jurisdiction  is in 
line with the Court’s vision of the Constitution as a transformative document, and the Court’s role as a 
facilitator of constitutional dialogue which engenders societal cooperation in social transformation; 
Muralidhar (n 148 above) 109, who illustrates the importance of supervisory jurisdiction in the Indian 
context by discussing the case of CEHAT v Union of India (2001) where the Court, in an attempt to 
prevent female foeticide, sought a strict implementation of the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques 
(Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994, and adopted a “continuing mandamus” technique which 
enabled the Court to exercise a continuing jurisdiction over the matter, making periodic orders from time 
to time to enhance the implementation of its judgment. 
211 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 151-52. 
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Court, vide City of Cape Town v Rudolph.212 In this case (first Rudolph decision), the High Court 
adopted a structural interdict, ordering the City to provide the Court with a report of the steps it 
had taken to comply with the order within four months of the issuance of the order.213 Bilchitz 
states that in the subsequent order following the first Rudolph judgment (second Rudolph 
decision),214 the City acknowledged its responsibility to provide housing for those in most 
desperate need and had undertaken actual steps to implement its obligations, though it had not 
fully implemented the first order.215 Bilchitz decries the failure of the Court in the second 
Rudolph decision to continue with the structural interdict as issued in the first Rudolph decision, 
stating that this was likely to adversely impact on the overall implementation of the two Rudolph 
decisions.216 
Rodriquez-Garavito provides a further illustration of the transformative potential of 
dialogical adjudication in the realisation of SERs in the Colombian context. He analyses the 
monitoring process established by the CCC in its Decision T-025 of 2004 better known as the 
Colombian internally displaced persons (IDP) Case217 which traversed a period of seven years, 
entailed 21 follow-up public hearings involving a wide array of participants, governmental and 
non-governmental, and engendered over 100 follow-up decisions by the Court leading to a fine-
                                                            
212 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C). See Bilchitz – Poverty and 
fundamental rights (n 164 above) 151. 
213 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 152. 
214 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C). 
215 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 164 above) 152. 
216 As above. Bilchitz similarly critiques the SACC’s lack of adoption of supervisory jurisdiction in the TAC 
case and instead expressing confidence in the good faith of the State to execute the Court’s orders. He 
contends that the basis of this failure is the inability of the reasonableness approach to place the critical 
societal interest protected by the entrenched SERs into sharp focus, a failure which led to the delay in the 
implementation of the Court’s orders in certain provinces (Limpopo and Mpumalanga) with continued 
devastating effects to the health and well-being of mothers and babies, at 163. For a more elaborate and 
extensive critique of the application of the structural interdict in the South African context, see Mbazira (n 
145 above) 198-212; Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 123 above) 424-434.  
217  Corte Constitucional[C.C.][Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, SentenciaT-025/04 (slip op.at 1), 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm.  Case in Latin, but has 
extensively been discussed by Rodriguez Garavito (n 146 above). See also Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 
above) 80ff. 
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tuning of the original court orders in the light of implementation progress and change in 
contextual situations.218 
The case, resulting from the consolidation by the CCC of 1,150 constitutional complaints 
(tutelas)219 by IDPs, led to a declaration that the humanitarian situation that had been caused by 
the persistent displacement of Colombians as a result of the internal armed conflict was “an 
unconstitutional state of affairs”.220 To respond to the deplorable conditions that the IDPs were 
living in, the Court ordered a series of long-term structural remedies. Firstly, the government 
was ordered to formulate a coherent plan to tackle the IDP humanitarian situation. Secondly, the 
Court made an order that the administration calculate the requisite budget to tackle the IDP 
situation, and to undertake all possible measures to access the requisite resources and apply 
them to the problem. Lastly, the Court ordered that the government guarantee at least the 
survival level content of the most basic rights of food, education, healthcare, land and housing 
for the IDPs.221 
As a result of the court-facilitated monitoring, the decision was able to achieve several 
results. It increased the focus, collaboration and coordination between the different government 
agencies and departments whose mandate and functions directly or indirectly affected the 
conditions of the IDPs. The coordination led to the elaboration, development, financing and 
implementation of a rights-based national policy on IDPs – The National Plan for 
Comprehensive Care for People Displaced by Violence. The implementation of the national plan 
was further enhanced by a massive increase in the national budget allocation to programmes 
                                                            
218 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1694. See also Easterday (n 175 above) 30-33, who lists some of 
the areas that the Court has emphasised on the protection of IDPs. 
219 A tutela is an innovative writ of protection of fundamental rights enshrined in article 86 of the 
Colombian Constitution and which can be filed by any person whose fundamental rights are threatened or 
violated, and requires immediate protection. It engenders a summary proceeding with the judge obliged to 
provide a resolution within ten days of a writ being filed. See M Sepulveda ‘The Constitutional Court’s role 
in addressing social injustice’ in M Langford (ed.) Social rights jurisprudence: Emerging trends in 
international and comparative law (2008) 144, at146. 
220 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1669-1670. An unconstitutional state of affairs is a situation of 
massive and widespread violation of several constitutional rights associated with systemic failure in State 
action, see Sepulveda – The Constitutional Court’s Role (n 219 above) 148. 
221 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1682. 
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dealing with IDPs, which, in 2010, was over ten times the budget that was available in 2003 
before the judgment. The adoption of the decision further led to the formation of a coalition of 
NGOs to monitor the judgment and engage with the government and to report to the Court on its 
implementation – The Monitoring Commission on Public Policy on Forced Displacement.222 
Rodriguez-Garavito compares and contrasts the effects of the above judgment with two 
other structural judgments of the CCC, Decision T-153 of 1998, which dealt with prison 
conditions;223 and Decision T-760 which dealt with the right to health.224 In Decision T-153, the 
Court did not put in place a court-facilitated monitoring process, while Decision T-760 was 
accompanied by an elaborate court-facilitated monitoring process like in the IDP case.  He 
concludes that the social transformative impact of Decision T-153 was lower than that of the IDP 
case and Decision T-760, due its lack of a court-facilitated monitoring process.225 This is an 
indication that a court-facilitated monitoring process plays an important role in the overall 
implementation of structural injunctive remedies, thereby leading to a higher social 
transformative impact with regard to access to SERs, reduction of poverty and inequality as well 
as the overall enhancement of social justice. 
In a normal, properly working democracy, the three levels of dialogue will always follow 
each other, either as a result of failure of dialogue at the first level,226 or consequential to the 
                                                            
222 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1683-1688. See also Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 81; 
Easterday (n 175 above) 1 & 26, where she avers that the real breakthrough in the IDP case was that it 
granted IDPs greater access to the courts and thus augmenting their political voice and giving them the 
ability to engage in dialogue with the government to enforce their rights. She further contends that IDP 
empowerment and participation in the political process enhanced the government’s responsiveness to the 
protection of their rights, at 42-43. 
223 In this judgment, the Court declared that an unconstitutional state of affairs existed with regard to 
prison conditions in Colombia and adopted structural remedies, see Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 
1675. 
224 In this judgment, the Court issued a set of structural injunctive remedies to address long-standing 
legislative and administrative bottlenecks that crippled the healthcare system, see Rodriguez-Garavito (n 
148 above) 1675. 
225 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1675. 
226 Wiles (n 203 above) 40, who argues that SER litigation is minimised if the political institutions of the 
State put in place optimal implementation frameworks and ensure their faithful observance. She further 
contends that the role of courts in policy formulation is important as a rights-based approach to policy 
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dialogue in relation to the second and third levels. Litigation, at the second level, is thus a latent 
resource for the shattering of bureaucratic blockages in the political institutions of the State.227 
Rodriguez-Garavito summarises the important social transformative effects of litigation as 
follows:228 
Direct material effects (formulation of a policy ordered by the court); indirect material effects 
(intervention of new actors in the debate); direct symbolic effects (reframing of media coverage 
using rights language); and indirect symbolic effects (the transformation of public opinion on the 
matter). 
Litigation, though not a panacea for the enforcement of SERs,229 has thus played a prominent 
role in social transformation in India and Colombia. The Colombian reproductive health case, 
Decision C-355/2006,230 is a good case in point. The case is situated within the context of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
formulation has an ameliorative effect on political decision-making as it ensures increased precision in 
diagnosing problems and prescribing future developments, thus leading to greater streamlining and 
rationality, at 44. 
227 Bergallo (n 151 above) 1616; S Gloppen ‘Litigation as a strategy to hold governments accountable for 
implementing the right to health’ (2008) 10 Health and Human Rights 21, at 24-25, who contends that to 
be successful, SER litigation must not only improve the situation of the litigants (material success), but 
must also improve the situation of similarly situated non-litigants (social success). 
228 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1681. See also Muralidhar (n 148 above) 117-188 who summarises 
the benefits of PIL in India to include: availing a forum for public discourse on suppressed societal issues; 
catalysing change in government legislation and policy; devising of benchmarks and indicators for 
monitoring of SER implementation; as well as development of human rights jurisprudence which is in line 
with the developments in international law.  
229 See Chong (n 149 above) 190, who affirms this by contending that litigation as a strategy falls 
significantly short of the actual implementation of SERs, and that the courts were a particularly weak 
mechanism for SER enforcement; Gloppen - Litigation as a strategy (n 227 above) 23ff, who contends 
that litigation is not designed to hold governments accountable for SER implementation, and that even 
though it can enhance government response to “policy and implementation gaps,” it may undermine 
equity, long-term planning and rational priority-setting, thus weakening the overall justice of the SER 
implementation system. 
230 Sentencia C-355 de 2006 Corte Constitucional [C-355/2006 case], available online at < 
www.constitucional.gov.co/corte/>.Case in Latin, but discussed extensively in Ordolis (n 132 above). 
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predominantly Catholic country with strong attitudes towards and a stigma against abortion,231 a 
total and blanket prohibition on abortion, an estimated 350 000 illegal abortions annually, and 
reports that 15 per cent of maternity deaths were abortion-related, making abortion the second 
highest cause of maternal deaths.232 The CCC, after litigation that involved numerous 
submissions from many of the societal actors including the Attorney-General, declared this 
situation an unconstitutional state of affairs as the complete prohibition of abortion was unduly 
restrictive.233 The Court thus legalised abortion in three circumstances, that is, when the life of 
the mother is at risk, when the foetus is malformed such that it cannot viably live independently, 
and when the pregnancy is as a result of a criminal act such as rape or incest.234 
The above decision further led to the adoption of a set of policy regulations, Decreto 
Numero 4444 de 2006, aimed at establishing the parameters for the provision of abortion 
services within the confines of the decision.235 The regulations ‘outlined a wide scope of 
applicable rights and responsibilities, set out specific measures to ensure women's access to 
abortion services, and established an enforcement system to sanction violations of the 
regulation’.236 Thus through litigation, the reproductive rights of women, and by extension their 
right to life and equality, improved significantly as the Court has continued to issue judgments in 
instances of failure of service providers to observe the government’s policy framework as 
outlined in the regulations.237 
                                                            
231  This is exemplified by the public excommunication from the Catholic church of the judges involved in 
the case, and a further threat of excommunication to all those who undertake, foster or assist abortion, 
see Ordolis (n 132 above) 287. 
232 Ordolis (n 132 above) 265-266. 
233 Ordolis (n 132 above) 266. 
234 Ordolis (n 132 above) 263. 
235 Ordolis (n 132 above) 275. 
236 Ordolis (n 132 above) 275 - 278. The regulations made abortion services available to all women in 
Colombia, regardless of their ability to pay and did this by either subsidising or wholly subsuming the 
costs of the services. 
237 A case in point is Decision T-209/2008 where a service provider refused to provide abortion services 
to a 13 year old girl who had become pregnant due to rape. The CCC upheld the right of the girl to access 
abortion services, fined the hospital and ordered compensation for the girl, see Ordolis (n 132 above) 
277. 
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There are many advantages to the Kenyan Courts adopting this dialogical approach to 
litigation and the fashioning of remedies. First, the approach enhances the transparency and 
inclusiveness of decision-making processes in the legislative and policy spheres, leading to 
good governance and encouraging social transformation. Secondly, it empowers societal and 
governmental actors to act together in a collaborative and coordinated way in their efforts to 
realise entrenched rights, especially SERs. Thirdly, it transforms socio-economic deprivation 
into a rights-based dialogue, and thus gives a voice to marginalised groups to advocate for their 
SERs as entitlements. Lastly, it leads to the coalescing of interested social movements and non-
governmental organisations into networks aimed at influencing the government’s SER policy 
with the objective of enhancing social justice.238 
4.6 The theory of dialogical constitutionalism and challenges to the judicial adjudication 
of socio-economic rights 
Concerns abound as to the institutional and constitutional competencies of courts to adjudicate 
SER cases, the two most prominent ones being separation of powers concerns and 
polycentricity challenges.239 The theory of dialogical constitutionalism has been developed with 
the main objective of responding to these concerns.240  This section entails a brief discussion of 
the viability of the theory in responding to the above concerns. 
4.6.1 Dialogical constitutionalism and polycentricity concerns 
Lon Fuller defines a polycentric matter as one in which a decision would have wide unforeseen 
consequences for a multitude of other people who are not before the court.241 Fuller contends 
that judges may not have the competence to adjudicate on matters that have the effect of 
“creating new aims for society” or imposing on society “new basic directives” due to the limited 
                                                            
238 Brinks & Forbath (n 147 above) 1953; Gloppen - Public interest litigation (n 127 above) 356-359. 
239 See chapter three, section 3.1 above. See also Gauri (n 120 above) 74 where he chronicles some of 
these criticisms that have been adduced against judicial activism and the adjudication of SERs and 
environmental rights by the Supreme Court of India. 
240 See also Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 5 above) 64, who similarly contends that the dialogue model is 
the most effective in making the enforcement of SERs possible while at the same time addressing 
concerns of judicial capacity and legitimacy in the adjudication of SERs cases. 
241 L Fuller & KI Winston ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 (2) Harvard Law Review 353, at 
353. 
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societal participation that is intrinsic to the traditional court adjudication process.242 Fuller 
acknowledges that polycentricity concerns straddle all adjudicated controversies, but argues 
that the main issue is the degree of consequential effects a judicial decision will have.243 He 
contends that if polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant, decision-
making on such matters is beyond the proper limits of adjudication.244 In his analysis of Fuller’s 
polycentricity argument, Allison contends that the polycentricity argument engenders judicial 
restraint at two levels: firstly, if a court has a choice in law, it must avoid choosing solutions that 
may entail complex unintended consequences; and, secondly, the court must not change the 
law if that would lead to complexity in legal development.245 
 Polycentricity concerns have had an actual, and in my opinion detrimental, impact in the 
implementation of constitutional SERs, especially in South Africa. Due to these concerns, the 
SACC has steadfastly refused to adopt the minimum core approach in the implementation and 
enforcement of SERs, instead relying on the reasonableness approach that has not been very 
effective in the achievement of the social transformation that was the objective of the 
entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 1996 SAC.246 These concerns are apparent in the 
Treatment Action Campaign case where the SACC held that courts were ill-suited to adjudicate 
                                                            
242 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 392; JF Allison ‘Fuller’s analysis of polycentric disputes and the limits 
of adjudication’ (1994) 53(2) Cambridge Law Journal 367, at 370. 
243 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 398. 
244  As above; R Bone ‘Fuller’s theory of adjudication and the false dichotomy between dispute resolution 
and public law models of litigation’ (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 1273, at 1311 footnote 142, 
where he chronicles four situations which Fuller noted were inappropriate for adjudication: ‘defining 
conduct punishable as a crime; where opinion in the society is deeply divided on issues affecting law, 
government and economic organisation; where society is undergoing rapid and disruptive change; and, 
where the decision is “managerial” in nature’. 
245 Allison (n 242 above) 370-371. 
246 Mbazira (n 145 above) 43-44 & chapter three, section 3.2; Liebenberg – Revisiting the reasonableness 
review (n 157 above) 304-305. Adverse impacts of the reasonableness approach can be seen in the case 
of Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC), where 
the SACC failed to adopt the minimum water entitlements of the Applicants as was ordered by both the 
High Court (50 litres per person from 25 litres) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (42 litres per person), to 
the detriment of the Applicants. 
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upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and economic consequences for the 
community.247 
 Fuller contends that a “mixed form of adjudication” can resolve the polycentric 
difficulty.248 He argues that a process of collaborative decision-making over-time, subject to 
reformulation and clarification as problems not previously foreseen arise, is capable of 
responding to polycentricity concerns.249 He mentions two ways in which polycentric matters can 
be resolved, that is, through managerial direction and through reciprocity, two important 
components of the model of dialogical constitutionalism developed in this chapter.250 Fuller 
further notes that the majority principle on its own is incapable of solving polycentric problems, 
and that there is a need for societal deliberation involving the affected people, before a voting 
decision can be taken on the deliberative options identified.251 He submits that such 
deliberations can be undertaken by the political institutions through the conduct of public 
hearings where reasoned views of the affected population are heard and incorporated in the 
decision-making process.252 It is this strand of thought that logically points to the viability of the 
theory of dialogical constitutionalism in responding to the polycentricity concerns of judicial 
adjudication of SERs. 
                                                            
247 Treatment Action Campaign case, para 38. 
248 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 396. 
249 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 398. See also Allison (n 242 above) 380-382, who expands on Fuller’s 
argument by contending that adjudication can espouse collaborative expert investigation, requiring the 
adjudicator not only to consider the litigating parties, but also to consider the possible societal implications 
of court judgments, and thus provide an opportunity for other affected members of society to participate in 
the adjudication process (amici curiae).  He argues that the advantage of the above model of adjudication 
is: to make polycentricity concerns the object of judicial investigation and thus enabling the adjudicator to 
better design solutions that do not have adverse societal repercussions; and to better enable a judge to 
properly demarcate and give effect to rights in a polycentric setting. 
250 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 398-399. 
251 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 399-400. See also Bone (n 244 above) 1283, 1286 & 1288-1290, who 
chronicles Fuller’s belief that securing a working social order was a continuous process that required the 
active participation of all citizens. He states that interactive participation was critical in Fuller’s theory due 
to its close connection to human capacity for reason. 
252 Fuller & Winston (n 241 above) 400. 
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 The polycentricity problem, as a limit to adjudication in social redistribution, is not viewed 
by Fuller as an insurmountable obstacle to the judicial adjudication of SERs. He recognises the 
need to address social inequalities and advance social justice, but contends that adjudication 
should not be undertaken in an environment where such inequality and injustices exist ‘unless 
the abstract principles of justice supporting social change could be teased out of existing 
practices and were thus already shared, at least implicitly’.253 It can be argued that the above 
requirement for the existence of abstract principles of justice has been achieved in the 
continued acknowledgement of SERs as an intrinsic part of human rights, the recognition of 
their justiciability, and the acknowledgment of the role of the courts in their enforcement, as is 
evidenced by their continued entrenchment in binding international and regional human rights 
instruments, and as justiciable constitutional rights in many of the new world constitutions. In the 
Kenyan context, the “abstract principles of justice supporting social change” that Fuller required 
for judicial adjudication of SERs can be seen in the entrenched justiciable SER provisions in the 
2010 Constitution together with the other supporting principles that guarantee their enforcement. 
The Courts have also been given a direct mandate to engage in the adjudication and 
enforcement of the entire corpus of human rights, SERs being an intrinsic component thereof. It 
can thus be confidently said that the requisite necessities for judicial engagement with SERs in 
Kenya are already in place, and that the courts can undertake adjudication of SERs aimed at 
enhancing social justice. 
The presence of entrenched SER provisions and the constitutional mandate of the 
courts to undertake adjudication of SERs are, however, not enough. The courts must still take 
into account the diverse effects that SER judgments have on other related governmental 
policies and programmes. The theory of dialogical constitutionalism provides this missing link, 
as it ensures that the courts are able to facilitate the participation of a wide section of society 
through public interest litigation, through their ability to allow other concerned parties to take part 
in the litigation as amici curiae, and also through their ability to engage experts in the area of 
concern and thus receive relevant information254 on the probable societal impact of their 
                                                            
253 L Fuller The law in quest of itself (1940) 115-117. 
254 One of the recurrent themes against judicial enforcement of SERs has been the concern that judges 
do not have access to large amounts of information or statistical data from where they can competently 
engage with and address the possible adverse societal repercussions that may be consequential of their 
adjudication on SERs, see Mbazira (n 145 above) 43. 
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judgments.255 Further, the proposal that judgments only lay the basic framework and indicators 
for implementation, and leave the design of the specific implementation structures to societal 
actors in deliberative settings, also ensures that all the relevant societal concerns are brought to 
bear in the implementation of court judgments on the entrenched SERs.  
The supervisory role, as envisaged by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, further 
enables the court to deal with unforeseen polycentricity problems as the court retains the 
particular SER case in its docket and is able to revise its orders and give more directions in the 
implementation of its judgment as the circumstances change or as new situations come to light. 
This can be seen in the Colombian IDP judgment, as discussed above, which traversed a period 
of seven years, entailed 21 follow-up public hearings involving a wide array of participants, 
governmental and non-governmental, and engendered over 100 follow-up decisions by the 
Court leading to the fine-tuning of the original court orders in light of implementation progress 
and change in contextual situations.256 
4.6.2 Dialogical constitutionalism and democracy concerns 
Democratic concerns of judicial review have permeated philosophical and legal argument for a 
considerable length of time. These concerns, espoused in the language of the “counter-
majoritarian dilemma,” presuppose that when judges apply constitutional provisions to review 
legislative decisions made by the representatives of the people, self-governance is 
compromised.257 James Thayer expresses these concerns by arguing that judicial review 
compels the legislature to defer to the judiciary in the interpretation of rights instead of engaging 
in an independent and analytical exposition of constitutional values.258 Thayer’s concerns are 
echoed by Alexander Bickel who contends that judicial review has the tendency to weaken 
democratic governance in the long run.259 Bickel states as follows:260 
                                                            
255 Mbazira (n 145 above) 48-50. 
256 Rodriguez-Garavito (n 148 above) 1694. 
257 R Dworkin ‘The moral reading and the majoritarian premise’ in H Hongju-Koh& RC Slye (eds.) 
Deliberative democracy and human rights (1999) 81, at 107. 
258 JB Thayer ‘The origin and scope of the American doctrine of constitutional law’ (1893) 7 Harvard Law 
Review 155-56. 
259 AM Bickel The least dangerous branch: The Supreme Court at the bar of politics, 2nd edition (1986) 21. 
260  Bickel (n 259 above) 16-18. 
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When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive, it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of here and now; it 
exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it... The essential reality is 
that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy. 
Mark Tushnet has portrayed judicial decision-making on SER issues as “policy 
distortion” and “democratic debilitation”.261 Christopher Zurn further chronicles criticisms of 
judicial review as being paternalistic, and thus undemocratic, because it denies citizens a role in 
the mutual determination of collective decisions as part of a common venture of self-rule.262 
Jeremy Waldron on his part insists that judicial review has a corrosive and denigrating effect on 
public debate as it removes important societal disagreements from the public forum.263 To 
respond to the above concerns, Waldron advocates the importance of “practical political 
deliberation” aimed at making binding collective societal decisions.264 
Proponents of judicial review have on the other hand pointed out the important role it 
plays in constraining public decision-making so as to enhance the protection of fundamental 
rights, and to protect minorities from the vagaries of majoritarian decision-making. Some of the 
major arguments that have been fashioned in support of judicial review, and which denigrate 
majoritarian decision-making, include: the doctrine of pre-commitment;265 the principle of nemo 
                                                            
261 M Tushnet ‘Policy distortion and democratic debilitation: Comparative illumination of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty’ (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review 245, at 247, who argues that judicial review 
distorts policy decision-making by injecting numerous constitutional norms into the law-making process, 
supplanting legislative consideration of other important policy concerns; and that it debilitates legislative 
decision-making as legislators fail to consider the constitutional implications of legislation with the hope 
that the courts will strike them down if they do not meet constitutional muster. 
262 Zurn (n 8 above) 4-5.  
263 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 289. See also Zurn (n 8 above) 32, who argues that 
judicial review weakens democracy and the collective capacity for self-government over time as citizens 
and their representatives abdicate their responsibility to engage in deliberations of important societal 
concerns, leaving those principled value-laden decisions to be made by the courts. 
264 Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 291. 
265 The doctrine is based on the idea that the entrenchment of judicial decision-making into a constitution 
is a decision made democratically by the people themselves, and so the use of that power by the courts 
does not detract from democracy. For an extensive discussion and rebuttal of this doctrine, see Waldron 
– Law and disagreement (n 8 above) Chapter twelve. 
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iudex in causa sua;266 the tyrannical and self-interest nature of majoritarian decision-making;267 
as well as the need for a single authoritative constitutional decision-maker so as to avert 
interpretive anarchy, and to enhance the principle of legality as well as the rule of law.268 
Taken at its most simple level, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is basically the paradox 
of constitutional democracy which entails a reconciliation of the constitutional demand for the 
rule of law vis-à-vis the democratic demand that people govern themselves.269 Constitutional 
democracy is the very fulcrum in which the theory of dialogical constitutionalism rotates, and is 
the basis upon which its response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma is premised. 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism is based on the understanding of the core 
concept of democracy as “self-government”, that is, popular control over collective decision-
                                                            
266  The principle is based on the idea that allowing the majority to determine constitutional meaning 
through deliberation in effect makes them judges in their own cause. This reflects the distrust of 
majoritarian decision-making in instances where rights and minority protection are concerned. Waldron, 
however, contends that this argument is flawed, as constitutional decisions still have to be made by 
members of the community (by judges in instances of judicial review), who also have the same or similar 
disagreements about rights as members of the community. For a discussion, see Waldron – Law and 
disagreement (n 8 above) 296-298. 
267  To counter this argument, Waldron proposes an understanding of majoritarian decision-making using 
a model of “opinionated disagreement” a ‘noisy scenario in which men and women of high spirits argue 
vociferously and passionately about what rights we have, what justice requires, and what the common 
good amounts to, motivated in their disagreement not by what is in it for them, but by the desire to get it 
right’. See Waldron – Law and disagreement (n 8 above) 305.  
268 L Alexander & F Schauer ‘On extrajudicial constitutional interpretation’ (1997) 110(7) Harvard Law 
Review 1359, at 1379. 
269 M Tushnet, Weak courts, strong rights: Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative 
constitutional law (2008) xi, who describes this reconciliation of democratic self-governance and 
constitutionalism as a model of weak-form judicial review. In this weak-form review, the courts retain the 
constitutional responsibility to undertake an assessment of legislation vis-à-vis constitutionally protected 
rights while the legislature retains the authority to have the last word.  See also F Michelman, Brennan 
and democracy (1999) 5-6, who discusses this paradox of constitutional democracy and avers that if legal 
legitimacy derives from citizens’ participation in law-making, then the insulation of fundamental rights from 
the dialogical processes is a misnomer. 
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making by citizens in terms of the equality of all citizens.270 The very entrenchment of SERs in 
the Constitution as justiciable rights and the authority given to the courts to monitor their 
enforcement was an act of popular self-government,271 as the Constitution was promulgated 
after extensive deliberation transcending a considerable space of time, which culminated in a 
plebiscite vote.272 Judicial enforcement of SERs is, therefore, an intrinsic component of 
democracy as it plays an important role in citizen empowerment to achieve these core aspects 
of democracy.273 
                                                            
270 Beetham (n 2 above) 90-91. 
271 This role of the court is based on express popular sovereignty and was the basis of the arguments of 
Chief Justice Marshal in the United States, where he argued that the democratic source and authority of 
the Constitution as a promulgation of the people only engenders the role of the court to protect and 
enforce the will of the people against the majoritarian political institutions, see S Gardbaum ‘The new 
commonwealth model of constitutionalism’ (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 707, at 754. 
272 Brinks & Gauri – A new policy landscape (n 150 above) 342; P Hogg, A Bushell-Thornton & WK Wright 
‘Charter dialogue revisited – or “much ado about metaphors”’ (2007) 45(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 
at 27-29; J Goldsworthy ‘Judicial review, legislative override and democracy’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law 
Review 451, at 459. Stephen Holmes, in his analysis of the 1993 Russian Constitution, however, argues 
that the legitimacy of a constitution derives from its consequences and not from its source. He contends 
that constitutional legitimacy depends on the ability of the constitution to enhance decent and effective 
government, and that proper ratification of a constitution is not through prior ceremonial referenda, but by 
the constitution being voluntarily used, over time, to organise successful public deliberation and decision-
making. See S Holmes ‘Constitutionalism, democracy and State decay’ in H Hongju-Koh& RC Slye (eds.) 
Deliberative democracy and human rights (1999) 116, at 123. 
273 See S Woolman & H Botha ‘Limitations: Shared constitutional interpretation, an appropriate normative 
framework and hard choices’ in S Woolman & M Bishop (Eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 149, 
who, in analysing the jurisprudence of the SACC in the cases of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of SA: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) and K v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC), state that ‘every exercise of power derives its force 
from basic law, and needs to be justified by reference to the basic law; and that only open and public 
processes of rational deliberation produce acceptable forms of justification’. See also Beetham (n 2 
above) 92, who avers that massive socio-economic inequality, which is the main reason for the 
entrenchment in the Constitution of justiciable SERs, is incompatible with the principle of equality of 
citizens as it severely compromises equal participation in collective decision-making, at 96-97. 
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The theory of dialogical constitutionalism does not envision the courts as ultimate 
interpreters of the Constitution aiming to foreclose debate once they have dealt with an issue, 
but envision the courts as forum of societal deliberation as to the meaning of SERs, providing a 
voice to the poor, marginalised and vulnerable sections of society who do not have a voice in 
the political processes.274 The theory envisions the courts achieving this goal by encouraging 
the filing of PIL or class action cases aimed at the structural bottlenecks that delay the 
realisation of SERs, and then adopting progressive structural remedies aimed at shattering 
these bottlenecks, and thus facilitating progressive policy changes in government so as to 
enhance the realisation of the entrenched SERs. It further envisages the courts adopting 
moderate structural injunction remedies aimed at laying out clear roadmaps, objectives, 
indicators and benchmarks that government policy must achieve, while leaving the specific 
policy decisions to be designed and adopted in deliberate decision-making processes that 
engender the participation of all societal stakeholders, including those most likely to be affected 
by the developed legislation and policy framework.  
To ensure continued societal dialogue in the implementation of SERs, and to respond to 
changes in societal circumstances, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism envisages the 
courts undertaking a supervisory role and appointing monitoring commissions to help it monitor 
implementation and ensure compliance with its decisions.275 In this way, the courts’ role does 
not debilitate political decision-making, but enhances democracy by ensuring that proper checks 
and balances are in place to promote good governance, as well as accountability and 
transparency in public decision-making.276 The theory of dialogical constitutionalism thus 
acknowledges that even though the political institutions have the majoritarian mandate of the 
people to govern, their use of public power is governed, guided and restrained by the 
                                                            
274  Brinks & Gauri – A new policy landscape (n 150 above) 343; Woolman & Botha - Limitations (n 273 
above) 150, who argue that the role of the courts in the dialogical process is to develop, through 
reasoned engagement with the constitutional text, a normative framework of sufficient density to guide the 
political institutions and society at large, while the role of the political institutions and the public is then to 
engage with the normative framework to make it reflective of constitutional and societal values and 
principles. 
275 Brinks & Gauri – A new policy landscape (n 150 above) 343-349. 
276 See Rosenkrantz (n 110 above) 242, who, in discussing the justifications for a constitution, avers that 
the democratic systems need constitutional restrictions to function optimally as democracy cannot work in 
its purest form. 
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constitution. Dworkin supports this understanding by stating that even though collective 
decisions should be made by political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices 
treat all individuals equally, other institutions and procedures that better protect and respect the 
autonomy, inviolability and dignity should be resorted to if the political institutions fail to abide by 
the democratic requirement of the equal status of all citizens.277 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism thus envisages a shared project of 
constitutional design and development that entail the role of all government institutions and 
societal actors in the interpretation of the entrenched SERs. Increased coordination and 
collaboration in decision-making aimed at solving societal problems, coupled with the 
empowerment of individual citizens, as well as the political institutions, have the advantage of 
instilling civic virtue in citizens, leading to the entrenchment of good governance and 
democracy. This is acknowledged by Woolman and Botha who submit that the advantage of this 
approach is that it mediates the competing doctrinal claims of constitutional supremacy and of 
separation of powers.278 
4.7 Conclusion 
The concepts of rule of law and judicial protection of fundamental human rights have always 
existed in tension with concepts of popular sovereignty and democracy.279 Even though these 
concepts form important pillars of the doctrine of constitutional democracy,280 the tension has 
                                                            
277 R Dworkin, Freedom’s law: The moral reading of the American Constitution (1997) 96. 
278 Woolman & Botha - Limitations (n 273 above) 162. See Dworkin – Freedoms law (n 277 above) 93, 
who also contends that the best method of constitutional interpretation is that which strikes the right 
balance between protecting essential individual rights while at the same time engendering the requisite 
deference to popular will. 
279 C Cronin ‘On the possibility of democratic constitutional founding: Habermas and Michelman in 
dialogue’ (2006) 19(3) Ratio Juris 343, at 343. 
280  See for example F Michelman ‘Politics as medicine: On misdiagnosing legal scholarship’ (1981) 90 
Yale Law Journal 1224, at 1225, who acknowledges the importance of the concept of the rule of law to 
the legitimacy of democratic political institutions; and F Michelman ‘Bringing the law to life: A plea for 
disenchantment’ (1988-1989) 74 Cornell Law Review 256, at 259-260, who acknowledges that 
constitutionalism, as a normative political theory, is characterised by a dual commitment to a government 
of laws (rule of law) and to popular self-government (democracy).  
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not really been resolved.281 This tension is at its highest level in the implementation and 
enforcement of constitutionally entrenched SERs, especially due to their perceived policy and 
programmatic nature, as well as attendant concerns of judicial competence and democratic 
legitimacy on their adjudication. These concerns have led to the development, in this chapter, of 
a theory of dialogical constitutionalism, which encompasses the role of all the institutions of the 
State, civil society and citizens in a joint, cooperative and collaborative enterprise of developing 
the constitutional meaning of the entrenched SERs.   
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism, as developed in this chapter, is based on the 
value-laden nature of constitutional interpretation and the inherence of legitimate disagreement 
in the meaning, scope and content of SERs, which necessitates that all societal actors be 
actively involved in the development of their meaning. The theory envisages this involvement at 
three levels of dialogue, firstly, in the development of an SER implementation framework where 
the political institutions, with the participation of civil society and other constitutional actors 
infuse their understanding of the SER provisions into the implementation framework. This level 
of dialogue acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the implementation of the 
entrenched SERs is the mandate of the political institutions, and that the bulk of constitutional 
interpretation occurs at this level as the political institutions develop the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework for the implementation of SERs. The Constitution mandates the 
involvement of the public at this level, requiring that the political institutions create adequate 
opportunities for the public to participate in the legislative and executive decision-making 
processes. The chapter acknowledges the difficulty in the design and development of 
deliberative structures in modern societies due to the large number of people, the inherent 
nature of legitimate societal disagreements about rights, structural challenges, and the need for 
decisions to be made in a timely manner. Further, even though acknowledging that the primary 
responsibility for enhancing public participation in governmental decision-making is the 
responsibility of the political institutions, the chapter fashions a proposal that the Kenya National 
Human Rights and Equality Commission, due to its comparative advantages and constitutional 
                                                            
281 See for example Michelman – Traces of self-government (n 155 above) 73, who argues that the 
mediation of these tensions is difficult to articulate in theory or to envision in practice, but that several 
investigations show that they are better mediated through dialogue and practical reason. See also 
Michelman – Law’s republic (n 28 above) 1500-1501.  
 
 
 
 
224 | P a g e  
 
entrenchment, exercise a complementary role in facilitating public participation in governmental 
decision-making.     
The second level of dialogue envisaged by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism is in 
SER litigation where the courts act as both facilitators and societal fora in which deliberation 
aimed at ascertaining the meaning, content and scope of SERs takes place. It is based on the 
idea that in making their submissions to the courts in SER litigation, the litigants and third 
parties are actually propagating their competing, but legitimate, understandings of the meaning 
of the entrenched SERs. The role of the courts in this level is based on their constitutional 
mandate as the guardians of the Constitution and the protectors of fundamental rights. This role 
is further enhanced by the wide standing provisions of the Constitution which allow a multitude 
of different societal actors to take part in litigation either as parties (including the AG as the chief 
government defender), amici and other interveners, thus spurring on societal dialogue. The 
chapter proposes that the courts, in undertaking their role, adopt a “strong rights approach” 
which entails a principled, substantive and expansive interpretation of the entrenched SERs with 
the aim of enhancing social justice and thus achieving the transformative aspirations of the 
Constitution. The chapter further proposes that in undertaking their role, the courts should adopt 
a dialogical framework of litigation which is a mix between individualised litigation and structural 
litigation, with the objective of ensuring that the courts balance individualised concerns of 
litigants and all other similarly placed individuals, while at the same time responding to the 
structural concerns that militate against the realisation of SERs for the masses.  
The third level of dialogue follows from SER litigation discussed in the second level, and 
it envisages the courts adopting moderate remedies and strong monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure that their SER judgments are implemented by the political institutions. It is based on the 
idea that judicial adjudication should not foreclose societal dialogue as to the meaning of SERs, 
but that it must respect and defer to the societal conception of rights unless there is failure of 
foresight, accommodation or responsiveness. It thus envisages the courts adopting dialogue-
enhancing remedies such as the declaration of rights, suspended declarations of invalidity, 
mandatory injunctions as well as structural interdicts, where appropriate, taking into account the 
requirements that remedies be just, equitable and effective. The adoption of structural remedies, 
of necessity, envisages the courts retaining jurisdiction and establishing strong monitoring 
mechanisms to enhance the implementation of their decision. It also ensures that appropriate 
societal structures of deliberation aimed at the amelioration of SER violations are established. 
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Lastly the chapter undertakes an analysis of the viability of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism to respond to separation of powers and polycentricity concerns, two 
challenges that have traditionally been fashioned against the judicial enforcement of SERs. On 
polycentricity, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism envisages wide societal participation in 
the adjudication process during litigation and at the remedy formulation stage, as well as in the 
judgment monitoring stage. This ensures that the courts are able to take into consideration all 
the interests that may be affected by its judgment, engage experts to enlighten it as to the 
potential effects of any court order, access relevant information and statistical data, as well as 
modify its orders taking into account new facts or changes in circumstances during 
implementation. Taking the above into account, the courts will thus be able to effectively 
respond to any polycentric concerns that may arise due to court orders made in the 
enforcement of SERs. On the separation of powers challenges, the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism contends that the very entrenchment of the adjudicatory role of the judges in 
the Constitution, a document passed with the active and extensive participation of the people, 
was a clear endorsement of the judicial role in SER adjudication. This, taken together with the 
fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land which apportions powers and roles to all 
the institutions of the State, clearly entrenches the judicial review role of the courts as the 
guardians of the Constitution and protectors of rights. It thus submits that judicial review function 
of the courts is democracy enhancing as it inculcates good governance as well as institutional 
transparency and accountability in the exercise of public powers assigned by the Constitution.   
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism is thus aimed at enhancing inter-branch 
dialogue and cooperation in constitutional interpretation and enforcement; enhancement and 
broadening of democratic participation in the context of equality, fairness, impartiality and 
respect; increasing the quality of societal deliberations; and, ensuring that collective societal 
decision-making is principled and is based on publicly accessible reasoning and justifications, 
thereby enhancing democratic accountability.282 
 
 
                                                            
282 Zurn (n 8 above) 2. 
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Chapter five: A case for the adoption of a transformative and 
integrated approach in socio-economic rights adjudication in Kenya 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous two chapters, chapter three and four, proposed and developed the theoretical 
framework, that is, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, to provide a firm basis for the 
realisation of socio-economic rights (SERs) in the Kenyan context. This present chapter builds 
on the theoretical framework developed in these two previous chapters in proposing a 
transformative and integrated approach for the interpretation and enforcement of the entrenched 
SERs, a progressive interpretive approach aimed at enhancing the achievement of social justice 
and human development as well as to ensure the imporoved living standards for the Kenyan 
people.  
The entrenched SERs in the Kenyan Constitution creates a plethora of opportunities for the 
realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Constitution as discussed in section 
5.2.2 below. One such opportunity is the adoption of transformative adjudication through the 
espousal of a transformative and progressive approach of purposive interpretation that gives 
substantive content to the entrenched SERs. This ensures that the entrenched SERs are able to 
achieve their intended transformative goals of alleviation of poverty and inequality, the 
realisation of substantive equality as well as social justice.1 The potential of such a substantive 
interpretive approach for the realisation of the transformative aspirations of transformative 
constitutions is acknowledged by Sandra Fredman who contends that the open textured nature 
                                                            
1 The transformative potential in choosing a proper standard of interpretation and implementation is 
acknowledged by Joie Chowdhury who contends that the normative base provided by an approach 
serves as the foundation on which the implementation of that judgment will be understood and complied 
with by the political institutions of the State, and thus directly affects the degree to which courts can 
translate abstract rights into tangible realities, see J Chowdhury ‘Judicial adherence to a minimum core 
approach to socio-economic rights – A comparative perspective’ (2009) 1, available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=lps_clacp (accessed on 10 
October 2012).  
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of the equality principle and SERs makes it possible to achieve a great deal through 
interpretation.2  
The development of a progressive and purposive approach for the interpretation and 
enforcement of the entrenched SERs is the main theme and purpose of this chapter. After this 
brief introduction, the chapter delves into an analysis of the Kenyan Constitution as a 
transformative constitution in section 5.2. It starts with the definition of transformation and then 
elaborates on the understanding of the concept of a transformative constitution, especially how 
the concept has been development in the discussions relating to the 1996 South African 
Constitution (SAC). It then undertakes an analysis of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution using the 
transformative parameters that had been identified in the context of the SAC, concluding that 
the Kenyan Constitution can also be viewed as a transformative constitution. The section ends 
with an analysis of the link between the theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in 
chapters three and four of this thesis and the concept of transformative constitutionalism, and 
how this linkage influences the interpretive approach to be adopted in the adjudication of SERs 
in the Kenyan context. Section 5.3 undertakes an analysis of the two most-used approaches in 
the adjudication of SERs - the reasonableness approach and the minimum core approach - 
teasing out their functional positives and negatives in the adjudication of SERs. The analysis 
leads to the development of the proposed transformative and integrated approach for the 
adjudication of SERs in the Kenyan context, an approach that espouses the dialogical and 
democracy-enhancing aspects of the two prevailing approaches - minimum core and 
reasonableness. Section 5.4 entails an analysis of the link between the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism and the proposed transformative and integrated approach. Section 5.5 
concludes the chapter.  
5.2 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution as a transformative Constitution  
In order to understand the concept of transformative constitutionalism, we must first 
comprehend the transformation that is envisaged by transformative constitutions. Cathi Albertyn 
and Beth Goldblatt understand transformation to:3 
                                                            
2 S Fredman ‘Engendering socio-economic rights’ (2009) 25 South African Journal on Human Rights 413, 
at 427. 
3 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248, at 249. They 
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[r]equire a complete reconstruction of the State and society, including redistribution of power and 
resources along egalitarian lines… [through] the eradication of systemic forms of domination and 
material disadvantage based on race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality. It also 
entails the development of opportunities which allow people to realise their full human potential 
within positive social relationships. 
The above definition is supported by Sandra Liebenberg who contends that the transformative 
impetus is undergirded by a constitution’s objective to provide a legal framework aimed at 
addressing the historical injustices of the past on the one hand, while on the other hand 
prospectively aiming at the creation of a more just and equitable society in the present as well 
as in future.4 The prospective constructive role of the Constitution is aimed at the creation of a 
new social, economic as well as political order through the entrenchment of a democratic ethos, 
the restructuring of institutions of governance, the heightening of a commitment to social justice, 
and the scrupulous protection as well as enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.5  
Even though Kenya’s history and contextual situation differs from that of South Africa, 
poverty and inequality are rampant and endemic in both countries, as is discussed more 
elaborately in chapter one above. Therefore, the need for change in the social, economic and 
political structures of both countries are similar, if not the same. The definition of transformation, 
as discussed above in the South African context, is consequently adopted here in the analysis 
of the transformative potential of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
further contend that to tackle inequality, there is a need to reconsider assumptions as well as the realities 
of domination, and to re-examine and reform laws and institutions which entrench domination.  
4 S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 25. 
5 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 27. See also M Pieterse 
‘What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 South African Public 
Law 154, at 159, who contends that constitutional transformation in South Africa entails: 
[t]he dismantling of the formal structures of apartheid, the explicit targeting and ultimate 
eradication of the (public and private) social structures that reinforce inequality, the redistribution 
of social capital along egalitarian lines, an explicit engagement with social vulnerability in all 
legislative, executive and judicial actions, and the empowerment of poor and otherwise 
historically marginalised sectors of society through pro-active and context-sensitive measures 
that affirm human dignity.  
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5.2.1 Transformative constitutionalism and the 1996 South African Constitution  
The concept of transformative constitutionalism was first introduced in a discussion of the 1996 
SAC by Karl Klare,6 and it has generated much debate concerning the transformative 
aspirations of that Constitution.7 An analysis of the concept must therefore, of necessity, start 
with an analysis of its application in the South African context. 
Klare, in his exposition of the concept, commences his argument by contending that for 
judicial adjudication to contribute to the realisation of the transformative potential of a 
constitution, there must be a rethink of the role of legal culture as well as a radical 
transformation of understandings and approaches towards legal interpretation.8 Klare defines 
transformative constitutionalism as:9 
[a] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed (… in 
a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction. 
                                                            
6 K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 146. 
7 An exhaustive list of all the works around transformative constitutionalism in the SA context cannot be 
provided here. However, apart from the sources directly referred to in this section, the following are of 
importance: K van Marle ‘Transformative constitutionalism as/and critique’ (2009) 2 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 286-301; K van Marle ‘Meeting the world half-way: The limits of legal transformation’ (2004) 16 
Florida Journal of International Law 651-666; H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative 
constitutionalism (Part 1)’ (2002) Journal of South African Law 612-627; H Botha, A van der Walt & J van 
der Walt (eds.), Rights and democracy in a transformative Constitution (2003); and D Brand ‘Courts, 
socio-economic rights and transformative politics’ (2009) unpublished doctoral dissertation (on file with 
author). 
8 Klare (n 6 above) 152. He further avers that this ‘invites a new imagination and self-reflection about legal 
methods, analysis and reasoning consistent with [a constitution’s] transformative goals’…thus 
engendering new roles and responsibilities for the judiciary, at 156. See also D Moseneke ‘The fourth 
Bram Fischer memorial lecture: Transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 309, at 315-16, who not only acknowledges the constraints of liberal legalism in undertaking 
transformative adjudication, but also the conservative, predictable and inflexible South African legal 
culture, which he argues was intended to be transformed by the adoption of the Constitution.  
9 Klare (n 6 above) 150. See also Pieterse – Transformative constitutionalism (n 5 above) 155 where he 
expounds on a socio-democratic understanding of transformative constitutionalism. 
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Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change 
through non-violent political processes grounded in law. 
According to Klare, transformative constitutionalism is aimed at the creation of a ‘highly 
egalitarian, caring, multi-cultural community, governed through participatory, democratic 
processes in both [public and private] spheres’10. He thus envisions the constitutional project as 
encompassing both a vision of collective self-determination and a strong parallel vision of 
individual self-determination.11  
In Klare’s vision, for a constitution to engender transformative aspirations, it must contain 
a substantive (redistributive) conception of equality as well as entrench justiciable SERs;12 must 
engender positive State duties to combat poverty and inequality as well as promote social 
welfare; must provide for both vertical and horizontal application of the constitution in general, 
and the Bill of Rights in particular;13 must engender participatory governance; entail multi-
culturalism; be historically self-conscious;14 as well as envision transformative adjudication, that 
                                                            
10 Klare (n 6 above) 150 & 153.  
11 Klare (n 6 above) 153. 
12 This is based on the reasoning that a foundational law cannot be neutral with regard to the distribution 
of social and economic power as well as opportunities that enable people to exercise their complete rights 
as citizens, Klare (n 6 above) 154. See also P Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17(3) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 351, at 352-53, where he acknowledges the basis of the new society as 
substantive equality and states the centrality of the provision of social and economic goods and services 
as well as the levelling of the economic playing field as crucial to the achievement of the concept of 
transformative constitutionalism; Pieterse – Transformative constitutionalism (n 5 above) 159-61; Albertyn 
& Goldblatt (n 3 above) 249, who affirm the centrality of equality in achieving transformation, both as a 
value (giving substance to the vision of the Constitution) and as a right (providing the means/mechanism 
for achieving substantive equality.  
13 For an elaboration of the debate on the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to private law, see 
generally,  AJ van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South African 
property law (part 1)’ (2005) Journal of South African Law 655, at 660ff. He affirms the importance of 
horizontal application to the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the Constitution, at 663-64. 
14 See Langa (n 12 above) 352, where he contends that the constitutional goal to heal the historic past 
and provide guidance to a better future is the core of transformative constitutionalism as it contains the 
impetus to change. See also Pieterse – Transformative constitutionalism (n 5 above) 157-58 who 
contends that an understanding of a transformative constitution must entail an understanding of what the 
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is the creation of a new role and responsibilities for the judiciary through the transformation of 
adjudicative processes and methods.15 These transformative elements are affirmed by the 
former Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Dikgang Moseneke, who contends that a 
transformative jurisprudence must support a commitment to substantive equality, contextualise 
violations within actual societal conditions, re-order systemic and entrenched disadvantages, 
optimise human development, espouse the concept of the indivisibility and interrelatedness of 
rights, inclusive of SERs, as well as seek the attainment of the collective good through 
redistributive fairness.16 Theunis Roux, in his critique of transformative constitutionalism, also 
affirms the non-controversial nature of the essential elements of a transformative constitution as 
expounded by Klare.17  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
constitution aspires to transform from, and what it seeks to transform into; a historical justification for such 
transformation; as well as the means through which the transformation is to take place. 
15 Klare (n 6 above) 154-156. On the need for transformative adjudication, he is of the view that 
transformative goals in a new constitution cannot be met through old judicial mind-sets and 
methodologies that are not open to the promotion of substantive equality, a culture of democracy as well 
as transparent governance, at 156-166. He thus calls for a transformation of the legal culture so as to 
enhance transformative legal development, as ‘un-self-conscious and unreflective reliance on culturally 
available intellectual tools and instincts…may exercise a drag on constitutional interpretation, weighing it 
down and limiting its ambition and achievements in democratic transformation,’  at 166ff, especially 168. 
He further avers that even though a transformative approach to adjudication does not always guarantee 
politically and socially transformative outcomes, a progressive legal culture is a necessity for the long-
term success of transformative constitutionalism, at 170. See also Moseneke (n 8 above) 318, who 
acknowledges that the Constitution has created new possibilities in adjudication and calls on his judicial 
colleagues, especially at the High Court, to undertake the appropriate shift in legal culture so as to 
embrace and enhance the realisation of the transformative imperatives of the Constitution; H Botha 
‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 2)’ (2003) Journal of South African Law 
20-36, who calls for a change in the understanding of rights as boundaries to an understanding of rights 
as relations as well as an understanding of rights adjudication as dialogue, changes which have the 
potential of developing a relational, contextual and potentially transformative constitutional jurisprudence. 
16 Moseneke (n 8 above) 316-19. See also Langa (n 12 above) 355-58, where he proposes a change in 
legal education and a transformation of the conservative formalistic legal culture so as to enhance 
substantive legal reasoning and thus achieve the transformative potential of the Constitution. 
17 T Roux ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African Constitution: 
Distinction without a difference?’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 258, at 273-76.  
 
 
 
 
232 | P a g e  
 
Pius Langa, former Chief Justice of South Africa, further states that transformation must 
be open-ended and dialogical, envisioning a society that espouses civic virtue as well as 
political dialogue.18 He contends that:19 
[t]ransformation is not a temporary phenomenon that ends when we all have equal access to 
resources and basic services, and when lawyers and judges embrace a culture of justification. 
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates space in which 
dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly explored 
and created, accepted and rejected and in which change is unpredictable but the idea of change 
is constant. This is perhaps the ultimate vision of a transformative, rather than a transitional 
constitution. 
Transformation, as envisaged by the Constitution is thus not a short-term goal to be achieved 
through the adoption of certain specific activities, but a long-term continuous project to be 
achieved through the transformation not only of social, economic and political structures, but 
also by the change of attitudes and ways of life of the entire populace. 
Elsa van Huyssteen further broadens the concept of transformative constitutionalism, by 
pointing to the limits, and/or incapacities of the law on its own to achieve the transformative 
potential of the Constitution. She advocates an expansive understanding of transformative 
constitutionalism which encompasses wider social as well as political struggles and 
                                                            
18  Langa (n 12 above) 354. See also Pieterse – Transformative constitutionalism (n 5 above) 159, who 
affirms the open-ended nature of transformation, arguing that viewing transformation as a finite journey 
with a fixed starting and end point is overly simplistic. He terms transformation as a complex 
metamorphosis that involves a continuous redefinition of the old and new societal elements; U Baxi 
‘Preliminary notes on transformative constitutionalism’ a paper presented at the BISA Conference: 
Courting Justice II, Delhi, April 27-29, 2008, at 6, available at 
http://www.conectas.org/IBSA/UBNotesonTransformativeConstitutionalism.pdf (accessed on 4 October 
2012), where he argues that transformation is an epochal conception, making a series of breaks with the 
past and inaugurating a new order of things. 
19 Langa (n 12 above) 354. He affirms that the transformative nature of a constitution is not based on its 
peculiar history or socio-economic goals, but is based on its envisioning of a society that is open to 
change and contestation, that is, a dialogical society. See also Liebenberg – Adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (n 4 above) 29-30, who affirms the centrality of democratic dialogue and 
participatory public deliberation in the understanding of transformation. 
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contestations that feed into the judicial system.20 In acknowledging the important role which civil 
society plays in the overall project of transformation, she proposes a vision of transformative 
constitutionalism that does not solely rely on ‘a romantic view of the role of law and legal 
strategies in the processes of social transformation…[or] a government of judges’ but which 
engenders:21 
[a] “vigorous culture of civil action and democratised power” where the use of the Court as a 
forum of contestation over the distribution or exercise of power is only one element of broader 
social and political strategies for transformation.  
This is acknowledged by Justice Langa who contends that the responsibility of transformation 
cannot be borne by the courts alone, but must be coupled with sufficient legislative reforms, 
sustained positive executive action, as well as social mobilisation and reforms within civil society 
with the aim of achieving the transformative aspirations of the Constitution.22 Andre van der Walt 
also argues that to achieve transformation, ‘the abolition or reform of what was perceived as 
having been wrong in the past and the promotion and development of what is considered right 
for the future,’ there must not only be a configuration of judicial power, but also the 
entrenchment of a strong moral and political impulse in the executive and legislative branches 
aimed at social and legal transformation.23  
The above discussion provides us with a broad understanding of transformative 
constitutionalism and sets out the special elements that a constitution must encompass for it to 
be defined as a transformative constitution. The discussion also enlightens us as to the limits of 
adjudication in the achievement of the transformative potential of a constitution, indicating the 
requirement of political will at the political level as well as the political mobilisation and 
                                                            
20 E van Huyssteen ‘The Constitutional Court and the redistribution of power in South Africa: Towards 
transformative constitutionalism’ (2000) 59(2) African Studies 245, at 247. See also Baxi (n 18 above) 19-
20, who affirms the importance of direct self-help popular movements as well as mass movements of 
political or social service delivery protests which keep alive the transformative aspirations of 
transformative constitutions. 
21 Van Huyssteen (n 20 above) 259-61. She thus advocates the utilisation of alternative strategies for the 
achievement of social and material equality in contexts of severe and entrenched structural inequalities 
where law alone cannot bring about substantive equality. 
22 Langa (n 12 above) 358.  
23 Van der Walt - Transformative constitutionalism (Part 1) (n 13 above) 657-58. 
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participation of citizens in collective self-government. These insights lay the foundation for an 
analysis of the transformative potential of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution to be discussed below.  
5.2.2  An analysis of the Kenyan Constitution and the constitution-making process 
using the key elements of transformative constitutionalism 
The long struggle for constitutional reform in Kenya was basically underpinned by two important 
objectives. First, the reforms were intended to transform the political governance structures from 
authoritarianism to a culture of democratic decision-making where all exercises of public power 
was justifiable and aimed at the attainment of the common good. Secondly, reforms were aimed 
at the transformation of the classical liberal constitutional,24 economic and social structures that 
entrenched endemic poverty and pervasive inequality, into an egalitarian, caring society based 
on substantive redistributive equality, dignity, freedom, respect for human rights, the attainment 
of social justice and the improvement of the living conditions of all Kenyans.25 These objectives 
were entrenched in the 2010 Constitution, effectively making it a transformative Constitution.26 
                                                            
24 See Klare (n 6 above) 169, who defines a classical liberal constitution as that which is ‘individualistic, 
highly protective of private property, exceedingly few socio-economic rights, few affirmative governmental 
duties, little horizontality (…), no communitarian or caring ethos, and no affirmative commitment to [the] 
deepening [of the] democratic culture’.  
25 There are similarities to the South African context where the then Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa, 
Justice Mohamed, referring to the Interim South African Constitution, in the case of S v Makwanyane and 
Another (CCT3/94) 1995 (6) BCLR 665, para. 262 stated as follows: 
The South African Constitution…represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of [the] 
past, and represents a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, 
caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the Constitution.  
26 The transformative credentials of the Constitution is underscored by it being the supreme law of the 
land binding all State organs at all levels of government, its validity being beyond challenge in any court 
of law, it invalidating any law that is inconsistent with its provisions, as well as it entailing an obligation of 
all Kenyans to uphold, respect and defend it, see the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 2 & 3. See also J 
Biegon ‘Introduction: Socio-economic rights as one promise of a new constitutional era’ in J Biegon & G 
Musila (eds.), ICJ Judiciary Watch Report Volume 10: Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights 
under the new Constitution – Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2012) 3, who contends that the 
Constitution has been termed “progressive”, “historic”, and “revolutionary” as it fundamentally reshapes 
systems and structures of government as well as the horizontal and vertical relationships between 
citizens and the State; G Musila ‘Testing two standards of compliance: A modest proposal on the 
adjudication of positive socio-economic rights under the new Constitution’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.), 
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To affirm the transformative nature of the Kenyan Constitution, an analysis of its provisions, 
taking into account the essential elements as expounded in the South African context, is 
undertaken below. 
i) Substantive equality  
Equality is the foundational value that underpins the new constitutional dispensation, and it is 
the bedrock on which both political and socio-economic structures of the Constitution aimed at 
societal transformation are built. This can be expressly seen in the equality provisions in the 
2010 Constitution, beginning with the preamble which recognises the aspirations of all Kenyans 
to be governed by essential values such as human rights, equality, freedom, social justice, 
democracy and the rule of law.27 Equality as a value forms an intrinsic part of the national 
values and principles of the Constitution, which binds both State organs and private persons as 
discussed below.28 Equality further fortifies the Bill of Rights, which not only recognises it 
(equality) as one of the fundamental values that underpin the interpretation of entrenched 
rights,29 but also as an integral component of social justice, achievement of which forms the 
major basis for the entrenchment of fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.30  
Equality is also envisioned as a substantive right in the equality and freedom from 
discrimination provision in the Constitution which espouses equal protection of the law.31 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
ICJ Judiciary Watch Report Volume 10: Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights under the new 
Constitution – Challenges and opportunities for Kenya (2012) 55, at 59-60, who also acknowledges that 
the Constitution can effectively be termed a transformative Constitution even though there is no express 
word in the Constitution referring to it as such.  
27 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble para. 6. 
28 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 10, which contains values such as equity, social justice, 
inclusiveness, equality, non-discrimination, human rights and the protection of the marginalised.  
29 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(4). 
30 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 19(2). See also B Porter ‘The crisis of ESC rights and strategies 
for addressing it’ in J Squires, M Langford & B Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the 
litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 43, at 58-65 who, in the context of Canada, affirms 
the important link between a substantive conception equality and the realisation of SERs in the 
emancipation of the historically excluded and marginalised groups. 
31 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 27. It provides for equal opportunities and treatment for men and 
women in all sectors of life, but especially in political, economic, social and cultural spheres, at article 
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Constitution prohibits direct and indirect discrimination by both State organs and private persons 
on all the prohibited grounds of discrimination which include race, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, disability, culture, dress, language or birth.32 It recognises that 
there are individuals, groups and communities that have been adversely affected by past 
discrimination, and it obliges the State to put in place legislative and other measures, including 
affirmative action programmes and policies, to guarantee their equality rights as well as redress 
their past disadvantages.33 It specifically identifies these groups and the measures that must be 
put in place to remedy their situation in Part 3 of the Bill of Rights which is titled “specific 
application of rights”.34 
The Constitution further espouses equality in the private sphere, especially within the 
family by providing equality of status to the parties in a marriage,35 as well as with regard to land 
and property rights.36 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
27(3). To enhance the effectiveness of this provision, the Constitution further requires that the State 
enacts legislative and other measures to ensure that not more than two thirds of the members of elective 
and appointive bodies are of the same gender, at 27(8).  
32 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 27(4) & (5).  
33 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 27(6) & (7). In John Kabui Mwai & 3 Others v Kenya National 
Examination Council & 2 Others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 15 of 2011, 5-11, available 
at http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/83548.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013), the High Court 
recognised the importance of a substantive conception of equality in the achievement of social justice and 
the enhancement of human dignity, holding that a government policy aimed at providing more 
opportunities in national schools to students from public schools as opposed to students from private 
schools was legitimate as it was affirmative action aimed at achieving substantive societal equality and 
reducing the huge inequality gap between the rich and the poor in Kenya. 
34 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 52-57. 
35 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 45(3) 
36 See The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, Part  five, especially article 60 (1) which provides for equitable 
access to land, the security of land tenure, as well as the elimination of gender discrimination in law, 
customs and practices related to land, among others. Part five further requires, in article 68 (c) for 
parliament to enact legislation protecting matrimonial property,  especially the matrimonial home, in 
instances of divorce as well as protecting dependants and spouses of a deceased person having an 
interest in land. 
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The extensive entrenchment of equality provisions, though important is, however, not the 
panacea for the achievement of the transformative goals of the Constitution. There is need for a 
collective and concerted effort by the entire societal stratum, public and private, to adopt an 
expansive as well as a substantive conception and understanding of equality, as reliance on 
formal equality has the potential of entrenching the existing status quo and thus derail the 
transformative goals of the Constitution.37 The substantive conception of equality not only 
contextualises the interpretation of rights violations in relation to past systemic forms of 
domination within society (addressing the actual conditions of human life in context),38 but it also 
addresses structural disadvantages and maximises human development.39 
ii) Espousal of the concept of indivisibility and interrelatedness of rights 
One of the key features of the Kenyan Constitution is its entrenchment of a comprehensive Bill 
of Rights which not only encompasses the entire corpus of human rights (civil, political, social, 
economic, environmental, cultural and group),40 but also forms an integral part of the 
Democratic State and the framework for all social, economic and cultural policies of the State.41 
Further, the Bill of Rights is not exhaustive in its listing of rights and does not exclude any other 
                                                            
37 For a discussion of instances where a formal conception of equality had a negative impact on 
transformation, see Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 3 above) 250. 
38 Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 3 above) 261,  argue that for transformative adjudication to achieve this, it must 
entail the following: 
Firstly, the socio-economic conditions of the individuals and the groups concerned must be 
examined. Secondly, the impact of the impugned provisions on social patterns and systemic 
forms of disadvantage should be identified…Thirdly; the complex and compounded nature of 
group disadvantage and privilege must be understood by looking at grounds of discrimination in 
an intersectional manner. And finally, the historical context of the case must be fully appreciated 
and explored. 
39 Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 3 above) 250, 255 & 260ff.  They envision an equality jurisprudence which 
places difference and disadvantage at the centre of its conception, and views substantive equality rights 
as being remedial in nature, at 253 & 256. 
40 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 26-57. 
41 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 19(1). The reason for the recognition and promotion of human 
rights is to preserve human dignity, promote social justice and enhance the realisation of the full potential 
of all people, at article 19(2).  
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rights not expressly stated in the Constitution.42 This flexibility allows the Constitution to grow 
and encompass newly emergent rights as the country progresses. Even though the Constitution 
acknowledges the non-absolute nature of rights by indicating that rights can be legitimately 
limited, it provides a bulwark against State abuse of its power to limit constitutional rights by 
enumerating strict standards that must be met for the limitation to be legitimate.43 The espousal 
of the concept of indivisibility and interrelatedness of rights entails the recognition that rights are 
mutually self-supporting and that the achievement of transformation is only possible if the entire 
corpus of fundamental rights are realised. The importance of the concept of indivisibility and 
interrelatedness of rights was affirmed, in the South African context by the SACC in the 
Grootboom case where the Court held as follows:44  
The proposition that rights are interrelated and are all equally important is not merely a theoretical 
postulate. The concept has immense human and practical significance in a society founded on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The courts, the political institutions and the society at large must thus espouse a holistic 
understanding of rights.  
iii) The entrenchment of justiciable socio-economic rights as well as the adoption of positive 
State duties to combat poverty and inequality 
The Constitution reflects a commitment to the improvement of the living conditions and the 
achievement of the well-being, dignity45 and self-worth of all citizens.46 The values of human 
                                                            
42 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 19(3).  
43 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 24 (limitation) and 58 (derogations). For an elaborate 
discussion of limitation of rights in the Kenyan context, see chapter two, section 2.6 above.  
44 Grootboom, para. 83.  
45 Dignity is not only a value that underpins all sectors of the Constitution, but it is also a substantive right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights, see The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 28.  
46 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble para. 5, which entails a commitment to the nurturing and 
protection of the well-being of all. See John Kabui Mwai (n 33 above) 6, where the High Court of Kenya, 
in acknowledging the importance of the entrenched SERs held as follows: 
In our view, the inclusion of [SERs] in the Constitution is aimed at advancing the socio-economic 
needs of the people of Kenya, including those who are poor, inorder to uplift their human dignity. 
The protection of these rights is an indication of the fact that the Constitution’s transformative 
agenda looks beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality. There is a commitment to transform 
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dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and the 
protection of the marginalised are encompassed in the Constitution as values which bind all 
State organs at all levels of government as well as all persons in their interpretation and 
application of the Constitution; the enactment, interpretation and application of any law; as well 
as in the making or implementation of any public policy decisions.47 
The socio-economic situation of individuals and groups have a major impact on their 
ability to enjoy true freedom, to live dignified lives and to participate actively in collective self-
governance through the exercise of their citizenship rights. This is recognised by the 
Constitution in its entrenchment in the Bill of Rights of SERs such as the rights to health, 
adequate housing and reasonable standards of sanitation, adequate food and freedom from 
hunger, clean and safe water in adequate quantities, social security as well as education.48 The 
importance of work/labour in the realisation of improved standards of living, and thus the 
transformation of the socio-economic conditions of individuals and families, is also 
acknowledged by the Constitution, in its espousal of an extensive array of labour relation rights 
such as rights to fair labour practices, fair remuneration, fair working conditions, formation and 
participation in trade unions, as well as the right to strike.49 The inclusion of these rights in the 
Constitution as justiciable rights has been described by Godfrey Musila as perhaps the single 
most revolutionary aspect of the 2010 Constitution.50 He affirms the potential of the 
implementation of these rights to remedy the historical injustices of the past, to achieve social 
justice for marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups, as well as to achieve substantive 
equality as demanded by the Constitution.51  
However, the realisation of some of these entrenched SERs, especially the right to food 
and the right to adequate housing might engender conflict with the right to property which is also 
entrenched in article 40 of the Constitution. This is because property rights mostly entrench an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Kenya from a society based on socio-economic deprivation to one based on equal and equitable 
distribution of resources. This is borne out by articles 6(3) and 10(2)(b). 
47 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 10. 
48 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 43 & Part 3 of the Bill of Rights for their application to specific 
groups. 
49 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 41. 
50 Musila (n 26 above) 55 & 59. 
51 As above.  
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exclusive bundle of rights to the owners of property without looking at how the property was 
acquired in the first place or any other interests that may have been appurtenant to the property 
prior to its acquisition by the owners, thus entrenching the unequal and historically unjust status 
quo prevailing before the enactment of transformative constitutions. The courts will have to 
adopt transformative adjudicatory balance52 when dealing with cases in which such conflicts are 
at issue, so as to keep alive the transformative aspirations of the Constitution by ensuring that 
poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups have equitable access to land and 
other production resources.53 
Further to the inclusion of justiciable SERs, the adoption of positive duties by the State 
also indicates a paradigm shift from viewing the State as a threat to human rights, towards the 
conception of the State as a guarantor of rights. This is reflected in article 21 of the Constitution 
which contains the State’s duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.54 In the realisation of SERs, the Constitution acknowledges the resource constraints that 
the country may face, it being a developing country, and adopts the standard of progressive 
realisation, requiring the State to take positive legislative, policy and other measures to enhance 
realisation.55 In the adoption of these obligations, the Constitution especially recognises the 
contextual and historical situation of the State, by calling for the prioritisation of the needs of 
vulnerable and marginalised groups and individuals, especially women, older persons, persons 
with disabilities, indigenous communities, and children.56 
                                                            
52 For an elaboration of this concept in the context of the right to housing, see chapter seven, section 7.6 
below.  
53 For a discussion of this conflict in relation to the right to food and the right to housing, see chapters six 
and seven below. 
54 The duty to fulfil its obligations in the realisation of human rights is further entrenched by the 
Constitutional requirement that the State to enact legislation aimed at fulfilling obligations under 
international law, see The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(4).  
55 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(2).  The standard of progressive realisation is discussed 
generally in chapter two, section 2.3 below and in specific instances in case studies on the right to food 
and the right to housing below.  
56 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(3). See the High Court case of John Kabui Mwai (n 33 above) 
5-11, where the Court acknowledged the importance of the protection of prior marginalised groups and 
upheld a government policy which provided a higher quota of opportunities in national schools to students 
from public schools as opposed to those in private schools.  
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iv) Vertical and horizontal application of the Constitution 
Unlike the classical liberal constitution of the past which only bound State organs, the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution is a welcome change from the past as it binds State organs as well as 
natural and legal persons. Article 2 of the Constitution, the supremacy clause, provides that the 
Constitution ‘is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all persons and all State organs at 
both levels of government’.57 Further to this, article 20(1) emphasises that the Bill of Rights 
‘applies to all law, bind all State organs and all persons’.58 This is a recognition of the pervasive 
role of private power, as is encompassed in common law as well as customary and religious 
laws, in the creation of endemic poverty, marginalisation and vulnerability among the majority of 
the Kenyan people, and the requirement that violations occurring in the private sector are also 
deserving of constitutional protection. It is also a recognition that in the globalising world where 
non-state actors have acquired as much power as States, there is a need to enhance the 
constitutional protections that are given to individuals in the private sector. 
The pervasive impact of private power on socio-economic deprivation has been 
recognised by Sandra Liebenberg who states that socio-economic resources have traditionally 
been distributed through private institutions such as the family and the markets.59 The 
consequence is that this distribution of socio-economic resources is insulated from critical public 
scrutiny and evaluation to ensure consistency with the normative public values and principles 
                                                            
57 See also the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 10, which provides that the national values and 
principles are binding on all State organs and all persons in their interpretation or application of the 
Constitution, their interpretation or application of any other law as well as the development or 
implementation of public policy; article 20(1) which provides for the binding nature of the Bill of Rights to 
all State organs and to all legal and natural persons; article 27(4) & (5) which prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination on the prohibited grounds for both State organs and private persons (discussed in the 
equality element above); as well as article 29 (c) which provides for the security of the person and 
protection from any form of violence, public or private.  
58 In relation to the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to private persons, article 20(1) is more 
expansive than section 8(2) of the SAC, which only provides for the horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights to private persons ‘if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right’. 
59 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 4 above) 59-60 and chapter 7. These are 
basically governed by the private law rules (common, customary and religious laws) such as land, 
property, contracts, family, and succession laws. 
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embodied in Bills of Rights, leading to the depoliticisation of social discourse on socio-economic 
needs and vulnerabilities.60 In providing for horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, the 
Kenyan Constitution aims to improve the development of common, customary and religious 
laws to enhance the accountability of private institutions to the normative values and principles 
entrenched in the Constitution, with the aim of achieving the transformative potential of the 
Constitution. In this context, Liebenberg contends the following:61 
The possibility of the horizontal application of the [SERs] invites a critical re-examination of the 
network of private law rules and doctrines. It invites the judiciary to participate, along with the 
legislature, in the transformation of common law institutions such as property and contracts, by 
considering the needs of those who are without access to basic resources, who are homeless 
and who lack bargaining power. 
She states that in this way, fundamental private law principles are subjected to re-evaluation 
and development so as to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the entrenched SERs.62 
The issue of direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights under the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution has already been affirmed by the Court in the case of Anne Nyokabi Muguiyi v NIC 
Bank which dealt with unfair and unjust working conditions, unfair dismissal and 
discrimination.63 The Respondent bank had raised a defence against the constitutional 
application stating that since they were a private person, they were unable to breach the 
fundamental rights of the Petitioner, which, according to them, could only be breached by the 
State and its organs.64 The High Court, relying on articles 2(1) (the supremacy of the 
Constitution), 20(1) (the application of the Bill of Rights to all law and its binding nature on all 
State organs and all persons) and 260 (which defined “person” to include ‘a company, 
association, or other body of persons whether incorporated or unincorporated) of the 
Constitution, held that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was for it to have both 
vertical and horizontal application.65 The Court thus held that the Petitioner had a right under 
                                                            
60 As above. 
61 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 4 above) 63.  
62 As above. 
63 Anne Nyokabi Muguiyi v NIC Bank, Petition No. 202 of 2011, judgment delivered on 26th September 
2012 (on file with author). 
64 Nyokabi, para. 12. 
65 Nyokabi, paras. 26-27. 
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article 22 of the Constitution to vindicate her rights and that if the Court was to find a private 
person to have violated fundamental rights, the Court had jurisdiction to grant appropriate 
remedies.66 
v) Democracy and participatory government 
Democracy and good governance, which inculcate collective self-government and popular 
participation, are the essential pillars of the Republic, and the glue that holds the diverse 
communities together. The essential nature of these values is expressly stated in the preamble 
of the Constitution which details them as part of the essential values on which Kenyans aspire 
to base their government.67 The Constitution entrenches the sovereignty of the people, stating 
that sovereign power is to be exercised directly by the people or through their democratically 
elected representatives, and that at all times, State power must be exercised for the collective 
benefit of all Kenyans.68 It calls for the establishment of a multi-party system of government 
based on the values of democracy, the rule of law, participation of the people, good 
governance, integrity, transparency, and accountability.69  
Democratic imperatives and the need to enhance participatory collective self-
government are at the heart of the devolution project in the Kenyan Constitution. The objectives 
of devolution, as espoused in the Constitution, include the need to promote the democratic and 
accountable use of power; to give the power of self-governance to the people and enhance 
participatory decision-making in the exercise of State power; to recognise the right of 
communities to manage their own affairs and further their own development; to enhance the 
promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable and marginalised communities; to facilitate 
the decentralisation of State organs, functions and services so as to ensure easy access to 
proximate government services; to fast-track socio-economic development and promote 
equitable sharing of State resources; and lastly, to enhance checks and balances in the 
exercise of public power and thus promote substantive separation of powers.70 These objectives 
                                                            
66 Nyokabi, para. 27. 
67 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble paras. 6 & 7. 
68 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 1. 
69 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 4 & 10 as well as Chapter Seven of the Constitution 
(Representation of the people).  
70 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 174.  
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are further buttressed by the guiding principles of devolution which requires the devolved levels 
to be guided by the principles of separation of powers, respect for the democratic imperatives of 
the Constitution, effective governance and delivery of services, as well as representational 
equity in the devolved systems.71  
The devolution of power and services is a massive improvement from the old 
Constitution which entrenched a top-heavy system of centralisation of State power and 
resources, a system which resulted in the creation of a predatory State rife with poor 
governance; lack of accountability; failure of service delivery; corruption; the colonisation of 
State power and resources by the rich minority at the expense of, and with adverse effects to, 
the majority poor; land grabbing and unaccountable allocation of government land; among many 
others. Devolution is thus an attempt by Kenya to break from the past and move towards a 
transformed nation where all citizens are equally valued and protected.  
Several substantive rights critical to democracy and public participation in government 
are also entrenched in the Constitution, such as freedom of expression,72 freedom of the 
media,73 access to information,74 freedom of association and assembly,75 as well as political 
rights.76 Public participation in legislative and executive decision-making at all levels of 
government is also expressly provided for in the Constitution.77 
 
 
                                                            
71 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 175. These principles are further enhanced by the principle of 
cooperation between all the levels of government in the conduct of their affairs, at article 189. 
72 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 33. 
73 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 34. 
74 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 35 & 232(1)(f). 
75 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 36 & 37. 
76 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 38, which include participation in the activities of a political party; 
right to a free, fair and regular elections; and the right to vote and vie for elective political positions. 
77 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 94(1) as read with 118-119; 95(2); 196 (participation in county 
assemblies); 201(a) (public participation in public finance), 232(1)(d) (involvement of the people in policy-
making process by the Public Service). For a more elaborate discussion of public participation in societal 
decision-making, see Chapter four, section 4.2.1 above.  
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vi) Recognition of multi-culturalism 
Kenya is a country with a diversity of communities which have co-existed mostly peacefully 
throughout the currency of the Republic, and this is recognised by the Constitution which 
reflects the pride of the Kenyan people of their ethnic, cultural and religious diversity and 
expresses their desire to live together in peace and harmony as one indivisible sovereign 
nation.78 The Constitution calls for the promotion and protection of the diversity of languages, 
and especially the development of indigenous languages.79 It recognises culture as the 
foundation of the nation as well as the cumulative civilisation of the Kenyan people and calls for 
the promotion of cultural expression through literature, art, science, communication, mass 
media, and publications.80 It provides for the freedom of conscience, religion, belief, thought as 
well as opinion as substantive rights within the Bill of Rights.81 It further provides for cultural and 
language rights as substantive rights.82 This is a reflection of the equality and equal worth of all 
people from all sectors, communities as well as religions. 
vii) Historical self-consciousness  
The Constitution recalls the struggle against colonialism and acknowledges that the Republic 
was created as a result of a struggle where sacrifices were made and lives were lost.83 It further 
acknowledges that there are individuals, groups and communities that have suffered different 
kinds of discrimination in the past and calls on the State to put in place measures, including 
legislative and policy measures as well as affirmative action programmes to redress the 
disadvantages suffered by these groups.84 
 
 
                                                            
78 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, preamble para. 3. 
79 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 7(3).  
80 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 11. 
81 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 32.  
82 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 44. 
83 The 2010 Constitution, preamble para. 2 which honours the heroes and heroines of the struggle which 
brought freedom and justice to the Republic. 
84 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 27(6)-(8).  See also Part 3 of the Bill of Rights which provides for 
the specific application of rights to these groups.  
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viii) Imperatives for the adoption of a transformative approach to adjudication 
One of the key elements of the Constitution is the prominent role it gives to the courts in the 
realisation of the transformative potential of the Constitution. This is especially due to the fact 
that the courts are the guardians of the Constitution,85 the supreme law binding on all State 
organs as well as all natural and legal persons.86 The courts have an especially prominent and 
transformative role in the interpretation and enforcement of the Bill of Rights, which gives them 
the authority to develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to fundamental rights,87 
as well as to adopt the interpretation that most favours the enforcement of fundamental rights 
during adjudication.88  
The Bill of Rights provides the courts with several transformative means and guidelines 
to direct it in the enforcement of fundamental rights during adjudication, and these require the 
courts to promote:89 
                                                            
85 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 23 & 165(2)(b) which gives the courts jurisdiction to vindicate 
the rights in the Bill of Rights, and further provide a range of remedies available to the courts in their 
undertaking of adjudication on rights such as declaration of rights, injunctions, conservatory orders, 
declaration of invalidity of laws that infringe or threaten the realisation of rights, compensation as well as 
orders of judicial review; article 159(2)(e) which provides that one of the principles to guide the exercise of 
judicial authority is the promotion and protection of the purposes of the Constitution; article 169(2)(d) 
which entrusts the courts with the jurisdiction to adjudicate questions related to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the determination of validity of laws, policies as well as governmental actions  in relation 
to the Constitution.  See also Musila (n 26 above) 65-66. 
86 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 1. See also article 20(1) which further provides for the binding 
nature of the Bill of Rights to all State organs and to all legal and natural persons. 
87 This can be done by infusing the common law and customary law with the values that underpin the 
Constitution such as dignity, equality, equity, freedom and the protection of the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups and communities. 
88 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(3).  
89 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(4). These guidelines are further entrenched by article 259(1) 
which states that the Constitution is to be interpreted in a manner that: 
(a) promotes its purposes, values and principles; 
(b) advances the rule of law, and the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of 
Rights; 
(c) permits the development of the law; and 
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(a) the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, 
equity and freedom; and, 
(b) the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Further to the above, and in relation to the SERs entrenched in article 43 of the Constitution, 
especially in instances where the State claims the unavailability of sufficient resources to 
implement SERs, the courts are to be guided by the following principles: that it is the duty of the 
State to prove insufficiency of resources; that in resource allocation, the context and 
vulnerability of individuals and groups must be a guiding factor; and that the courts should 
accord deference to the political institutions in relation to the choice of policies and programmes 
aimed at the realisation of SERs.90 
 Further, the Constitution contains a “development clause” in article 20(3)(a) which 
requires the courts to ‘develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to a right or 
fundamental freedom’. This provision is buttressed by the supremacy clause, which in effect 
encompasses the doctrine that all law, including common, customary and religious laws, derive 
their force from and are subject to constitutional controls.91 In effect, the “development clause” 
thus requires that the common, customary and religious laws (which are the laws governing 
access to socio-economic resources in the private sphere) be developed in compliance with the 
constitutional values and principles. This gives the courts a wide interpretive freedom to achieve 
the transformative aspirations of the Constitution in all spheres of life, especially the private 
sphere.92 This is because it places a positive duty on judges to renovate and revitalise the part 
of the legal system that has traditionally been governed by the common law and African 
customary law - rules and principles indelibly stained by the historical injustices of the past and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(d) contributes to good governance. 
The importance of these guidelines in the adjudication of rights in the Bill of Rights was affirmed by the 
High Court of Kenya in the John Kabui Mwai case (n 33 above) 5-6; and Federation of Women Lawyers 
(FIDA-K) & 5 Others v Attorney General & Another, High Court Petition No. 102 of 2011, at 14. 
90 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5).  
91 For an affirmation of this principle in the SA context with a similar constitutional “development clause”, 
see the SACC case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC), para. 33. 
92 See D Davis & K Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law’ (2010) 
26 South African Journal on Human Rights 403, at 409ff. 
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which are predominantly oriented towards the protection of the powerful as well as the 
maintenance of existing distributional status quo –by infusing their interpretation and application 
with the constitutional values and principles that populate the Constitution.93  
The imperatives for the development of the common law has been widely discussed in the 
context of South Africa, which has a similar “development clause” to that in the Kenyan 
Constitution.94 In this context, the SACC was especially forthright in holding that common law 
rules and principles are subject to the SAC, the then President of the Court, the Late Chief 
Justice Chaskalson, holding as follows:95 
There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all 
law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional 
control.  
The SACC further buttressed this position by affirming the duty of judges to develop the 
common law in line with the Constitution when it held in the Carmichele case that:96  
 [c]ourts must remain vigilant and should not hesitate to ensure that the common law is developed 
to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights; 
 The duty of judges to develop the common law arises whether or not the parties in the particular 
case request the court to do so; 
 The responsibility of the courts to develop the common law conformably to s 39(2) objectives is 
not optional or discretionary, but an obligation. 
                                                            
93 Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 410-412. For an extensive discussion on the jurisprudence of the South 
African courts in the implementation of a similar “development clause” see Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 
Part V, from 449ff. 
94 For an extensive analysis of the public/private divide and how it detracts from the achievement of the 
transformative potential of the entrenched SERs in a constitution, see Liebenberg - Adjudication under 
transformative constitution (n 4 above) 59-63 & chapter 7 and the accompanying texts. 
95 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa (2000) (2) SA 674 (CC), para. 44.  
96 See Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 463, analysing the Carmichele case, paras. 36 & 39. To give effect to 
the SACC’s dicta in Carmichele, Davis and Klare propose that the inquiry whether the common law 
respects and promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must become a routine step of 
analysis in every common law case, at 467. For similar arguments in this line of thought, see JC 
Froneman ‘Legal reasoning and legal culture: Our vision of law’ (2005) Stellenbosch Law Review 3, at 17. 
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Davis and Klare further contend that to realise the transformative potential of the “development 
clause” there is a need for adjustment in the education of lawyers, both in law schools, 
professional training institutions and in all aspects of continuing legal education, to equip them 
with substantive skills and capabilities demanded for the reformulation and revitalisation of the 
common law.97  
The need for a fundamental shift in legal education, from conservative formalistic 
reasoning to substantive reasoning, is also affirmed by Geo Quinot, Professor of Public Law at 
the University of Stellenbosch, in his Inaugural Lecture titled “Transformative Legal Education” 
where he proposes the adoption, in South Africa, of a transformative theoretical legal framework 
to enhance the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 1996 SAC.98 Quinot envisions 
the following changes in legal education: adjustment of law curricula to reflect the new paradigm 
of constitutional supremacy; increased emphasis on fundamental rights and judicial review in 
law curricula; infusion of constitutional values into established areas of law, especially the 
private law subjects of property, torts and contracts so as to develop the common law; 
inculcation of substantive reasoning (innovation and creativity) among students with increased 
engagement with both legal and extra-legal materials such as context, values, morality, policy 
and politics; development of an interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach to legal 
education; and the transformation of teaching methodology from the pedagogy of authority to 
the pedagogy of justification (through the theory of constructivism).99  
The possibilities for the courts to undertake transformative adjudication are also 
enhanced by the broad standing provisions that allow a multitude of different actors to institute 
proceedings for the vindication of rights.100 The importance of the court’s “company” in 
                                                            
97 Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 463. 
98 G Quinot ‘Transformative legal education’ (September 2011) 5, available at 
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/teaching/files/2011/10/G-Quinot-Inaugural-Final2.pdf (accessed on 7 October 
2012).  
99 Quinot (n 98 above) 5ff. 
100 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 22, which provides for individuals whose rights are violated, 
infringed, denied or threatened; class actions, public interest litigation, as well as amici curiae. See also 
article 48 which obliges the State to ensure access to justice for all persons; article 50 which call for a fair 
hearing in the resolution of disputes; and article 258 which entails the right of every person to institute 
proceedings in instances of contravention or threat of contravention of the Constitution. 
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undertaking transformative adjudication is acknowledged by Upendra Baxi who states that 
‘ways of judicial disposition overall depends on how [the judge’s] “company” is constituted’.101 
The importance of the legal profession in transformative adjudication is also acknowledged by 
Karl Klare who extensively discusses the importance of the prevailing legal culture – the 
professional sensibilities, habits of mind, and intellectual reflexes of domestic legal actors - in 
the realisation of transformative constitutionalism.102 Klare further introduces the dialectic of 
freedom and constraint, arguing that while the transformative provisions of the SAC engender 
judicial freedom to achieve the transformative aspirations of the Constitution, the conservative 
and formalistic legal culture act as a constraint on judges, limiting their ability to espouse 
transformative adjudication and thus hampering efforts to achieve the Constitution’s egalitarian 
aspirations.103 
Henk Botha undertakes a very compelling analysis of freedom and constraint in 
adjudication which brings to light the important role which the legal culture of a particular 
national legal system plays in the ability of judges and “company” to give effect to the 
transformative objectives of progressive constitutions.104 He contends that the legal culture 
determines the deeply held assumptions about the nature of the legal materials, the role and 
functions of judges, as well as the relationship between law and politics.105 He argues that 
judicial decision-making is more constrained in a formalistic and conservative legal culture as 
                                                            
101 Baxi (n 18 above) 28. Judges’ “company” are simply the parties to constitutional litigation as well as 
other third parties who take part in the litigation at the second and third levels of dialogue as discussed 
more substantively in chapter four, sections 4.3-4.5 above. 
102 Klare (n 6 above) 151 & 166ff, where he states that legal culture and socialisation constrains legal 
outcomes irrespective of the substantive provisions of legal materials, and that it also affects the 
substantive development of the law. See also Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 403ff. They contend that even 
though a judicial commitment to constitutional values is key in achieving transformation, the most 
important aspect of transformative adjudication is the transformation of the judicial mind-set – “the 
inarticulate premises culturally and historically ingrained” – that determines judicial outlook, analytical 
methods as well as discursive repertoire, at 405. 
103 Klare (n 6 above) 149ff; Klare & Davis (n 92 above) 405-406. 
104 See H Botha ‘Freedom and constraint in constitutional adjudication’ (2004) South African Journal on 
Human Rights 249-283. 
105 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 251. See also Klare & Davis (n 92 above) 406; 
Froneman (n 96 above) 4. 
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judges’ interpretive attitudes and practices are shaped by their training and experience as 
members of the same legal culture, as well as by the possibilities of their progressive decisions 
being reversed on appeal by more conservative colleagues.106 
According to Botha, a conservative legal culture advocates the determinacy of legal 
rules and views them as ‘long straight boundaries that pre-determine the outcome of cases’ and 
which only allow judges the freedom to freely and progressively engage with the legal material 
and decide cases without being constrained by precedent where there is a gap/lacunae in the 
legal rules.107  This, he argues, is in line with a formalistic rule-centred approach which values 
formal equality, predictability and certainty at the expense of substantive equality and 
individualised justice.108  This type of adjudication propagates a view of law as distinctly and 
strictly separated from politics, and that law is sufficiently determinate to dispose of cases 
without the need for judges to have recourse to extra-legal considerations.109 
Botha convincingly argues that the above perception of adjudication is unrealistic due to 
the reality of the indeterminacy of law as well as the fact that legal materials do not apply 
themselves, but are construed by human beings, and their meaning depends on the interpretive 
attitudes, experiences, values and reflexes of the interpreter.110 He further argues against the 
                                                            
106 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 265. He explains that constraint is exerted in the 
requirement that judges justify their decisions by giving reasons, which must be able to satisfy members 
of their legal culture that their decision rests on a plausible interpretation of the available legal materials. 
107 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 255 & 267-75. 
108 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 272-73 
109 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 250. See also Klare & Davis (n 92 above) 407; 
Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 4 above) 44ff. For a judicial rebuttal of the 
notion that judges must not have recourse to extra-legal material in constitutional adjudication, see 
Justice Mokgoro, formerly of the SACC, who held in the Makwanyane case, paras.302-304 that: 
[t]he interpretive task frequently involves making constitutional choices by balancing competing 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This can often only be done by reference to a system of values 
extraneous to the constitutional text itself.... To achieve the required balance will of necessity 
involve value judgments. This is the nature of constitutional interpretation. 
110 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 255-56 & 273ff. see also Klare (n 6 above) 159-166, 
who affirms that legal materials do not self-generate their own meaning, and that interpretation is a 
meaning-creating activity; Davis & Klare (n 87 above) 436ff who aver that in the presence of gaps, 
conflicts and ambiguities, judges decide cases by making intermediate judgments or choices that are 
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strict perception of the determinacy of law, contending that it is contrary to the culture of 
justification and intelligible reason-giving that is demanded by the Constitution; it frustrates the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution and entrenches the status quo; and it induces 
normative closure.111 He is of the view that an acceptance of the reality of the indeterminacy of 
the law should free judges to critically engage with relevant legal materials with the aim of 
achieving substantive justice.112  
Botha further contends that freedom and constraint113  are not mutually exclusive but are 
graded categories in a continuum that allows judges to redraw existing legal boundaries and to 
affect a better balance between contradictory policies on a case by case basis through 
imaginative legal reasoning.114 He submits that this is the best way to achieve transformative 
adjudication, which he understands as the requirement that ‘legal interpreters remain open to 
different interpretations, to develop a more self-conscious style of adjudication which is 
characterised by a willingness to challenge deeply-held legal assumptions, and to articulate the 
moral and political beliefs through which their interpretations are filtered’.115 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
influenced by their socially-constructed sensibilities and controversial assumptions about political morality  
and social organisation. 
111 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 275-282. The language of “ a culture of justification” 
which reason-giving in the exercise of public power was first discussed in the transitional South African 
context by Etienne Mureinik in his oft-quoted article E Mureinik ‘A bridge to where?: Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 31, at 32.  
112 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 255-56. See also Davis & Klare (n 92 above) 443ff, 
where they contend that due to this freedom of choice, judges should take responsibility for the choices 
they make, and the effects/impact of those choices on the texture of social life as well as the distribution 
of power and well-being. 
113 He understands freedom as being associated with openness, flexibility and a willingness of judges to 
consider alternative interpretations as well as to take responsibility for their decisions. Constraint on the 
other hand is associated with judicial accountability and fidelity to law, and also with closure, rigidity, and 
a denial of judges’ responsibility for their decisions, see Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 
250. 
114 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 265. 
115 Botha – Freedom and constraint (n 104 above) 249 & 266. See also Froneman (n 96 above) 4-5, who 
similarly argues and further affirms the linkage between law and politics. 
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The analysis of freedom and constraint above reflects, and is applicable to, the Kenyan 
situation, as the Kenyan legal culture has been described as being conservative and 
formalistic.116 Therefore, to achieve the transformative potential of the Constitution, a new 
imagination, progressive thinking, as well as open, accountable and substantive legal 
reasoning117 has to be adopted by the courts and “company” when undertaking adjudication.118  
5.2.3  The link between dialogical and transformative constitutionalism and their 
influence in the choice of an interpretive approach 
Dialogical constitutionalism, as discussed in chapters three and four, is linked with 
transformative constitutionalism in so far as deliberative decision-making, infused by substantive 
public participation, is fundamental to the realisation of the transformative potential of a 
constitution. This link is acknowledged by Elsa van Huyssteen, writing in the South African 
context, when she stresses the need for meaningful democracy, which entails popular 
participation in political decision-making, government accountability, redistribution of resources 
and the creation of deliberative spaces for the legitimate expression of differences, in the 
realisation of the goals of transformative constitutionalism, that is, the shift in social, political and 
economic power relations necessary for the creation of active as well as dignified citizens.119 
This link is affirmed by Klare who avers that transformative constitutionalism is aimed at the 
achievement of a highly egalitarian, caring and multi-cultural community governed through 
participatory and democratic processes in both the public and the private sphere.120 The 
approach to be adopted by the courts in the interpretation and enforcement of the entrenched 
SERs must therefore, of necessity, be guided by both the transformative aspirations of the 
                                                            
116 Musila (n 26 above) 60.  
117 See Froneman (n 96 above) 6, who avers that substantive reasoning envisions a purposive and 
contextual engagement with legal materials with the aim of achieving substantive equality and social 
justice. 
118 See Klare (n 6 above) 156 & 170, where he submits that transformative adjudication requires a new 
imagination and self-reflection about legal methods, analysis and reasoning consistent with a 
constitution’s transformative goals, and that the judicial mind-set and methodologies are part of the law, 
and must be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture of democracy as well as 
transparent governance. 
119 Van Huyssteen (n 20 above) 247-48 & 250-51. 
120 Klare (n 6 above) 150. 
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Constitution and the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, with the ultimate aim of enhancing 
social justice and improving the standard of living of all Kenyans.  
It is submitted here that, taking into account the analysis of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution in line with the factors that lead to a constitution being referred to as transformative, 
the 2010 Constitution can safely be referred to as a transformative constitution. Therefore, to 
realise its transformative potential, the important elements, as discussed above, must be 
understood as interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and efforts must be made to achieve 
them not only by the courts, but by the entire spectrum of societal actors in a cooperative and 
dialogical context. For the courts, the main challenge is how to translate precepts into practice, 
in the context of interpretation, implementation and enforcement of fundamental rights, 
especially SERs, so as to achieve the transformative potential of the Constitution.121 This 
challenge leads us to the next section of this chapter, an elaboration of the proposed integrated 
approach to the interpretation of SERs in the 2010 Constitution.  
5.3 The proposed integrated approach to the interpretation and enforcement of socio-
economic rights in the Kenyan Constitution 
The realisation of the transformative potential of the Constitution requires that the courts adopt a 
progressive interpretive approach in the interpretation and enforement of the entrenched SERs. 
Two interpretive approaches have been discussed widely at the international level, the minimum 
core content approach developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR),122 and the reasonableness approach developed by the SACC.123 The integrated 
                                                            
121 This is the difficulty with achieving constitution-inspired transformation and it is acknowledged by 
Upendra Baxi (n 18 above) 8 who submits that: 
[i]t is a well-known fact that normative promises of any of the original inspirations continue to be 
betrayed by the everyday experience of life under the actual existing constitutions. This is 
scarcely a world-shaking discovery simply because outside the norms that constitute the promise, 
no possibility of naming its betrayal may exist! 
He contends that this betrayal exists when policy-makers and adjudicators fail to heed the transformative 
aspirations of the constitutional document in the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of 
fundamental rights. 
122 CESCR, General Comment No. 3,  para 10 
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approach proposed in this chapter combines the best of these two approaches to develop a 
substantive and transformative approach aimed not only at the effective realisation of the 
entrenched SERs, but also to respond to the pervasive challenges that have consistently been 
raised against the judicial adjudication of SERs, that is, concerns of separation of powers and 
polycentricity. Before the development of this approach, an exposition of the reasonabeness 
approach and the minimum core approach is necessary, and it is to this analysis that I now turn.   
5.3.1 Reasonableness approach 
The reasonableness approach has  been adopted by the SACC as the standard of scrutiny for 
the positive obligations arising from the entrenched SERs.124 The approach was first expounded 
by Justice Yacoob in the Grootboom case,125 a housing rights case brought under section 26 of 
the SAC. The Judge held that for a measure aimed at the realistion of SERs to be reasonable, it 
must be coherent, well-coordinated and comprehensive.126 He further emphasised that the 
Court was not bound to inquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could 
have been adopted by the government or whether public money could have been better spent, 
as the State had a wide variety of options to choose from in implementing its obligations under 
the Constitution.127 The Court thus held that the government programme in the Grootboom case 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
123 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (hereinafter 
Grootboom); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (hereinafter TAC); 
and Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (hereinafter Khosa). 
124 D Bilchitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2007) 142; D Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence or “what 
are socio-economic rights for?” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds.), Rights and democracy 
in a transformative Constitution (2003) 33, at 39; C Steinberg ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A 
review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264, 
at 265. 
125 Grootboom, paras. 21 & 34ff.  
126 Grootboom, para. 41. 
127 As above. This aspect of the reasonableness approach is apparent in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
article 20(5)(c) which, in providing guidance to courts on the interpretation and enforcement of the SERs 
in article 43 (as discussed in section 5.2.2 above), requires the courts not to interfere with State decisions 
concerning the allocation of available resources solely on the basis that the court would have reached a 
different conclusion. This in essence entrenches this aspect of the reasonableness test into the Kenyan 
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failed the reasonableness test mainly because it was not responsive to the short-term needs of 
those in desperate need, as a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom must seek 
to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all.128   
Sandra Liebenberg identifies the major components of the reasonableness approach, 
adopted by the SACC, as follows:129 
i) The programme must be a comprehensive and coordinated one, which clearly 
allocates responsibilities and tasks to different spheres of government and ensures 
that appropriate financial and human resources are available. It must also reflect the 
overall responsibility of national government in ensuring that the programme is 
adequate to meeting the State’s constitutional obligations. 
ii) The programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right. 
iii) Policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their conception and in their 
implementation. 
iv) The programme must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for 
short-term, medium-term and long-term needs. It must not exclude a significant 
segment of society. 
v) The programme must be responsive to the urgent needs of those in desperate 
situations. 
vi) There must be meaningful engagement with the affected communities and civil 
society in the design and implementation of programmes aimed at the realisation of 
SERs [Grootboom para. 87 and TAC para. 123].130  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
constitutional framework, the reasoning which I rely on in proposing the adoption of the integrated 
approach in the Kenyan context.  
128 Grootboom, paras. 44 & 83. 
129 S Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional 
law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009) 33-1, at 33-34. See also Liebenberg – Adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (n 4 above) 152 (footnotes omitted); D Bilchitz ‘Health’ in S Woolman et al 
(eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009) 56A-1, at 2 & 12-13; Brand (n 124 above) 
41; S Wilson ‘Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, homelessness and a new normality’ (2009) 
126(2) South African Law Journal 270, at 274-275. 
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vii) In instances of exclusion of specific groups from programmes aimed at the 
realisation of the right in question, reasonableness analysis must take into account 
the purpose of the right in question, the impact of the exclusion on the affected 
groups as well as the impact of the exclusion on the enjoyment of other intersecting 
rights such as equality, dignity and freedom [Khosa case, paras. 45-53].131  
 
 As has been pointed out by several authors, even though the Grootboom Court did not 
expressly take up the minimum core arguments made by the amici in the case, the inclusion of 
the requirement that State programmes must be responsive to the urgent needs of those in 
desparate situations espoused the idea, and the threshold, of the minimum core approach.132 
This can be gleaned from the Grootboom judgment where the Court stated that an 
understanding of reasonableness requires that the Bill of Rights be read as a whole because  
society values human beings and wants to ensure that people are afforded their basic human 
needs.133 In this context, the Court held as follows:134 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
130 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 153. The concept of 
meaningful engagement is discussed more substantively in the development of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism in chapter three above. 
131 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 158-59; Bilchitz – Health (n 
129 above) 14-15; K McLean, Constitutional deference, courts and socio-economic rights in South Africa 
(2009) 163.  
132 See Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 153; Steinberg (n 124 
above) 280; McLean – Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 182-83; R Dixon ‘Creating dialogue about 
socio-economic rights: Strong v weak form judicial review revisited’ (2007) 5 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 391, at  416; D Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its 
importance’ (2002) 118 South African Law Journal 484, at 498-99; Bilchitz - Poverty and fundamental 
rights (n 124 above) 140-42. He argues that the Grootboom court would not have reached the decision it 
did without a consideration of some level of minimum core, and undertakes an analysis to prove this 
point, at 144-46. To support this, he quotes from the Grootboom judgment at para. 44 where the Court 
holds that ‘[a] society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be 
a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality’. He concludes that in adopting this reasoning, 
the Court adopted the conception of “dignity as integrity” a conception of dignity which supports the 
adoption of the minimum core content of SERs, at 147-49. 
133 Grootboom, para. 44. 
134 As above. 
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Those whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, 
must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of the right. […] [T]he 
Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If the measures, 
though statistically succcessful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desparate, they may 
not pass the test.  
The Court proceeded to state that human beings must be treated as human beings, failing 
which the Constitution is worth infinitely less than the paper it is written on.135 This link portrays 
the possibilities of mutuality and interrelateness of the minimum core and the reasonableness 
approaches, and the possibility of their combined application in the proposed integrated 
approach to enhance the realisation of the entrenched SERs in the Kenyan Constitution.  
One of the advantages of the reasonabless approach is that its design allows courts to 
give the requisite deference and margin of appreciation to the political institutions in their 
development and implementation of a legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the 
realisation of SERs, and is thus respecful of the doctrine of separation of powers.136 It also 
envisages historical and contextual analysis in the adjudication of SERs, one of the major 
requirements for substantive transformative reasoning in the adjudication of SERs.137 An 
                                                            
135 Grootboom, para. 83. 
136 Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 11-12; Steinberg (n 124 above) 266; Liebenberg – Adjudication under 
a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 151 & 173. Liebenberg however submits that in instances where 
there are no reasonable democratic disagreements as to measures to be employed in the realisation of a 
particular SER, and the impact on the affected group is severe, the courts will apply more stringent 
standards of scrutiny and make more specific orders to enhance the realisation of the right in question. 
She avers that this was the situation in the TAC, at 157. 
137 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 152 & 174. She contends 
that in taking into account the historical and social-economic context in which litigation arises, the 
reasonableness approach ‘avoids closure and creates an on-going possibility of challenging various 
forms of socio-economic deprivation in a wide range of different contexts’, at 174. See also Bilchitz – 
Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 161-62, who, though acknowledging contextual analysis as 
one of the major strengths of the reasonableness approach, contends that the contextual analysis must 
be undergirded by some general standards for the appraisal of State actions in a variety of contexts, in 
the absence of which the reasonableness inquiry cannot amount to an adequate standard of scrutiny. 
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appreciation of history and context in adjudication can be gleaned from the SACC case of 
Soobramoney where the Court stated as follows:138 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Milions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate 
social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. 
These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to 
address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom 
and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions 
continue to exist, that aspiration will have a hollow ring.  
The appreciation of the historical and contextual situation of claimants in SER litigation enables 
the court to appreciate the lived experiences of the claimants, especially in relation to historical 
injustices, endemic poverty, inequality and marginalisation resulting from those injustices, and 
thus give an order that responds appropriately to their situation.139  
 Sandra Liebenberg contends that the reasonableness approach has synergies with the 
understanding of measures necessary for the realisation of SERs as espoused by the CESCR 
which requires such measures to be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant’ in accordance with General 
Comment Number 3, paragraph 2.140 Liebenberg further points to the adoption of the 
                                                            
138 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (hereinafter Soobramoney) 
para. 8. See also Brand (n 124 above) 41-42, who acknowledges that context plays an important role in 
the standard of scrutiny that the Court will adopt in any particular case, stating that factors that will 
influence the stringency or otherwise of the standard of scrutiny adopted include: the position of the 
claimants in society, the nature and importance of the interest affected, the nature and extent of alleged 
right violation as well as the nature of the impugned measure. 
139 See Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 174, who contends that 
the reasonableness review is flexible as it allows the courts to ‘adjust the stringency of its review 
standards informed by factors such as the position of the claimant groups in society, the nature of the 
resources or services claimed, and the impact of the denial of access on the claimant groups’ (footnotes 
omitted). 
140 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 151. 
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reasonableness standard in article 8(4) of the 2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which 
states as follows:141 
When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the 
reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. 
In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible 
policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant. 
Liebenberg’s submissions above encapsulate the positive attributes of the reasonableness 
approach in the realisation of SERs. It, however, does not deal effectively with the lack of 
content, and therefore the lack of clear guidance to States as to what exactly are the purposes 
and values that underpins the entrenchement of SERs, the very basis for the criticism of the 
reasonableness approach. The Optional Protocol also espouses both the reasonableness 
approach and the minimum core approach,142 an indication that the approaches are not 
exlusive, but can be employed to comprehensively and mutually support each other, with the 
result that SERs are more substantively enforced.  
 The reasonableness approach as adopted and used by the SACC has been criticised by 
several scholars. One of the ardent critics of the approach, David Bilchitz contends that the 
adoption of the approach mostly circumvents the task of developing the normative content of 
SERs, leading to the possibility that the entrenched SERs fail to have practical effects on the 
                                                            
141 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/docs/a.RES.63.117_en.pdf (accessed on 22 October 
2012).  
142 See CESCR Statement ‘An evaluation of the obligation to take steps “to the maximum of the available 
resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ E/C.12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/Obligationtotakesteps-2007.pdf (accessed 
on 22 October 2012), where the Committee states that: the State party must protect the most 
disadvantaged individuals and groups by adopting low-cost measures in instances of severe resource 
scarcity, para. 4; the obligation of the State to satisfy core obligations as a matter of priority, para. 6; & the 
requirement that steps taken must prioritise the concerns, precarious situation of as well as the needs of 
the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups, para. 8(f). These all reflect that even though 
the minimum core approach is not reiterated expressly in the Optional Protocol, it still forms a crucial 
component of the Protocol. 
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lives of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals as well as groups in society.143 Bilchitz 
argues that in failing to develop the content of SERs, the reasonableness approach fails to take 
into account the constitutional values, purposes and objectives that the entrenchment of SERs 
in the Constitution was intended to achieve, and instead only scrutinising the reasonableness of 
government measures for the realisation of SERs.144 Bilchitz thus calls for an analysis that 
requires the specification of some normative content to the rights independent of the notion of 
reasonableness.145  
Other critics such as Moellendorf and Liebenberg similarly argue that the failure to 
elaborate on the substantive normative content of rights coupled with the contention that the 
substantive rights incorporated in sections 26(1) and 27(1) are both defined and limited with 
reference to the State’s available resources has been criticised as allowing the State’s 
budgetary decisions to determine the content of rights instead of the constitutional commitments 
to human rights norms and values guiding the State’s economic policies.146  They contend that 
                                                            
143 Bilchitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 136. He proposes a reading of sections 26(1) 
& (2) as well as 27(1) & (2) of the 1996 SA Constitution in such a way that the reasonableness of the 
measures adopted in subsection 26(2) and 27(2) are assessed in relation to the rights provided in 
subsections 26(1) and 27(1), a reading that necessarily leads to an analysis of the content of the rights 
contained in the subsections 26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution, at 156-59. See also J Dugard ‘Courts 
and the poor in South Africa: A critique of systemic judicial failures to advance transformative justice’ 
(2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 214, at 235ff for similar arguments. 
144 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 136 & 160; Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 22. 
See also Liebenberg – Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 4 above) 139-140; I Currie & J de 
Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 577, footnote 46, where they argue that the reasonableness 
approach is no more than a relational standard which measures the ends against the means leaving the 
entrenched SERs empty. It thus provides for no more than a right to reasonable administrative action.  
145 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 136. See also chapter six where he develops 
the minimum core approach to SERs. 
146 D Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of socio-economic rights 
claims’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 327, at 332; Liebenberg – Adjudication under 
transformative constitution (n 4 above) 139-140; Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 
225-234. 
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this failure detracts from the realisation of the transformative aspirations of a transformative 
constitution.147 
 In responding to the arguments on the failure of the reasonableness approach to 
develop the content of rights, Carol Steinberg argues that the role of the courts in a 
constitutional democracy is to scrutinise and evaluate government policy, which requires the 
courts to develop standards of review as well as define standards of compliance, and not to be 
involved in policy formulation, which is decision-making based on the weight of numbers and the 
balancing of competing social goals.148 She contends that the development of the content of 
rights cannot rationally be characterised as scrutiny or evaluation, which in her conception, is 
the proper role of the court as stated above.149 
 It is contended that Steinberg’s arguments above may be a bit over-stated due to the 
following reasons. To begin with, the institutional and constitutional incapacity for courts to 
engage in legitimate policy formulation is often over-stated. The courts have for centuries been 
involved in law-making in the context of the development of the common law. This role of the 
courts is acknowledged by both the SAC and the Kenyan Constitution which expressly require 
the courts to further develop the common law in light of the constitutional values and principles 
as is discussed in section 5.2.2 (viii) above. It, therefore, does not make sense to turn around 
and say that the courts have neither institutional nor constitutional competence to engage in 
                                                            
147 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 4 above) 146. She further submits that 
the conflation of the two-stage constitutional analysis in positive SER adjudication, which results in the 
absence of a principled consideration of the content and scope of the SER in issue as well as the impact 
of rights violation on the claimants, leads to a disproportionate dependence on the State’s justificatory 
arguments, and thus the privileging of the politically dominant conception of rights at the expense of the 
conception of rights held by the politically voiceless poor and marginalised individuals and groups. She 
contends that this undermines the normative status of SERs vis-à-vis other constitutional rights as well as 
forecloses deliberative opportunities for claimants to participate in the development of the content and 
scope of the SER in question through the articulation of their own vision and understanding of the 
entrenched SERs in context of legitimate societal disagreements due to the indeterminate nature of 
rights, at 201. 
148 Steinberg (n 124 above) 282-283. For similar criticisms of the critics of the reasonableness approach 
of the SACC, see MS Kende, Constitutional rights in two worlds: South Africa and the United States 
(2009) 261-275. 
149 As above.  
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policy formulation, a role they have silently played for centuries. In fact it is better if they engage 
in policy formulation openly and transparently, giving clear reasons for their policy choices so as 
to enhance accountability and inculcate a culture of justification.  
Further, Steinberg’s argument that the court’s role only requires it to develop standards 
of review without developing the content of rights is self-defeating. It raises the question of how 
th courts will be able to develop these standards of review for the scrutiny of the government’s 
SER implementation frameworks without properly understanding the nature, scope, content, 
purpose, objectives and the values that underpin the constitutionally entrenched SERs. It is 
submitted here that some general guiding standards in the form of the content of rights, to be 
further developed in their application in specific factual circumstances, are required in the 
development of the court’s standard of review. Even though the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism, expounded in chapters three and four of this thesis, envisages the 
development of the content of SERs to be better undertaken by the political institutions with the 
requisite substantive participation of the people, it acknowledges that the courts, as the 
authoritative interpretors  and guardians of the Constitution, play a prominent role in the 
interpretation and enforcement of the justiciable SERs, a role which necessitates the 
development of the content of the SERs in the context of adjudication should the political 
institutions fail to do so.  
Bilchitz further contends that the reasonableness approach has a negative effect on the 
eventual orders that the SACC makes as the orders lack specificity, gives the State no guidance 
as to what it particularly needs to do to meet minimum essential goods and services for the 
most needy, and thus provide grounds for State delay, obfuscation as well as subterfuge.150 The 
                                                            
150 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 149-150; Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 24. 
Bilchitz also argues that failure to develop the content of rights, which directly leads to vague orders made 
by courts, is the main reason why the SACC has been reluctant to retain supervisory jurisdiction to 
ensure that its orders are implemented fully. On this basis he contends that ‘[O]ne has to know what has 
to be implemented in order to supervise the implementation thereof; or, at least, one has to have some 
determinate standards against which to evaluate what the government is doing in order to exercise 
effective supervision,’ at 164-66. For the Kenyan courts to be able to effectively exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction, it is submitted that they must adopt the integrated approach proposed here as it allows for the 
development of the content of SERs as well as a more substantive general standard for the scrutiny of 
the State’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of SERs. 
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reasonableness approach also tends to obscure the vulnerabilities of individuals in particular 
cases due to its failure to place the fundamental interests of individuals at the centre of its 
inquiry.151 This eschews the very reason for the entrenchment of justiciable SERs, which is to 
enhance the living conditions of all, especially through the provision of the minimum basic goods 
and services to the poor and vulnerable in society.   
Kirsty McLean also points out that the reasonableness approach entails a lower 
standard of scrutiny for postive SER obligations as compared to the proportionality test that is 
used for civil and political rights.152 She contends that the approach is restrictive and highly 
deferential to the political institutions with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of SERs, 
referring to it as a quasi-administrative review standard.153 She elaborates on the administrative 
law origin of the reasonableness approach by quoting the then Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson 
who, in discussing the reasonableness test, argued as follows:154 
Courts have to judge the issue of ‘reasonableness’. That is a legal principle that courts are often 
required to apply when there is a challenge to the validity of administrative action by the 
executive. In this way, policy is collapsed into principle, and techniques similar to those used in 
administrative law can be adopted to give effect to the constitutional standard of 
‘reasonableness’.   
She thus contends that the main reason for the adoption of the reasonableness approach was 
due to the perceived policy and programmatic nature of SERs which detracts from their full 
justiciability, thus calling for a lower standard of scrutiny, as well as the desire of the courts not 
to be bogged down with the challenges of counter-majoritarianism and polycentricity.155     
                                                            
151 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 160; Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 22. 
152 McLean - Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 143-44. She, however, acknowledges that the 
approach can be used at various levels of scrutiny, with the lowest level of scrutiny being “rationality,” the 
intermediate level being “proportionality” and the most rigorous level being “correctness” at 174.    
153 McLean - Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 126-27 & 167. 
154 A Chaskalson ‘From wickedness to equality: The moral transformation of South African Law’ (2003) 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 590, at 601, quoted in McLean – Constitutional deference (n 
123 above) 144. 
155 McLean – Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 144. Find further analysis of the reasonableness test 
at 172-76. 
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 Further, it can be argued that the adoption of the more fluid reasonableness standard, as 
opposed to the more substantive minimum core approach which may have engendered better 
protection of entrenched SERs, and thus the achievement of the transformative potential of the 
1996 SAC for marginalised and poor majorities, was as a result of the prevailing conservative 
and formalistic Roman-Dutch  legal culture in the Court.156 This conservatism – forming part of a 
cautious tradition of analysis which is formalistic, highly structured, technicist, literal and rule 
bound - is extensively discussed by Klare who discerns a disconnect between the SAC’s 
substantively transformative aspirations and the traditionalism of the prevailing legal culture in 
SA.157  Klare submits that this jurisprudential conservatism:158 
[m]ay induce a kind of intellectual caution that discourages appropriate constitutional innovation 
and leads to less generous or innovative interpretations and applications of the Constitution than 
are permitted by the text and drafting history. 
Klare’s contentions above are affirmed by Theunis Roux who also acknowledges that SA’s legal 
culture is formalist and that an approach to adjudication that masks its political nature, such as 
is the case with adjudication under the reasonableness standard, is likely to further entrench the 
formalistic legal culture and in the process fail to do interpretive justice to the Constitution.159  
                                                            
156 See Brand (n 124 above) 51. 
157 Klare (n 6 above) 166ff, especially at 170.  
158 Klare (n 6 above) 171. He clarifies his understanding of caution as not the unwillingness to take bold 
steps or the lack of moral courage, but the ‘reluctance to press legal materials toward the limits of their 
pliability, a tendency to underestimate the plasticity of legal materials, and an exaggerated concern to 
give the appearance of conforming to traditional canons of interpretive fidelity’. 
159 Roux – Transformative constitutionalism (n 17 above) 281 & 284. See also Van Huyssteen (n 20 
above) 257-58, who, writing before the Court’s adoption of the reasonableness approach in the 
Grootboom case, discerns a narrowness in the scope of the Courts jurisprudence on issues dealing with 
redistribution of economic and social resources, predicting, prophetically, that this would have a 
significant limiting impact on the development of a transformative notion of constitutionalism; Moellendorf 
(n 146 above) 327ff, who also warns that the restrictive interpretation of the concept of “available 
resources” in the Soobramoney case was likely to have a denigrating effect on future litigation concerning 
SERs, leading to the lowering of the status of SERs vis-à-vis CPRs. This warning has surely come to 
pass in the subsequent litigation on SERs by the SACC. 
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To enhance the achievement of the transformative aspirations of the SAC, Klare thus 
encourages the judges in the SACC to re-examine their adjudication practices to ascertain 
whether the Constitution affords them more scope for interpretive creativity and innovation than 
was apparent to them previously, with the aim of promoting democratic and egalitarian values 
enshrined therein.160 Similarly, Roux also advises the Court to redouble its efforts to develop a 
substantive moral reading of the SAC, which entails an elaboration of a discernible content of 
SERs, and the permissible grounds for their limitation.161 The Kenyan courts, in line with the 
integrated interpretational approach developed in section 5.3.3 below, should take Klare’s and 
Roux’s views seriously to ensure that they enhance the realisation of the transformative 
potential of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution in relation to the entrenched SERs. 
5.3.2 Minimum core content approach 
The minimum core content approach was developed by the CESCR in its General Comment 
Number 3 as follows:162 
The Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party…. If 
the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish the minimum core obligation, it 
would largely be deprived of its raison d’être.  
It has been further developed extensively and comprehensively by the Committee detailing the 
content of each of the socio-economic rights provisions in the Covenant.163 It has also been 
                                                            
160 Klare (n 6 above) 171-172. 
161 Roux – Transformative constitutionalism (n 17 above) 284. 
162 General Comment No 3, para 10. 
163 See for example: General Comment No. 4 on the right to adequate housing; General Comment No. 7 
on the right to adequate housing: forced evictions; General Comment No. 12 on the right to adequate 
food; General Comment No. 13 on the right to education; General Comment No. 14 on the right to the 
highest attainable standard of health; General Comment No. 15 on the right to water; General Comment 
No. 17 on the right of everyone to benefit from the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author; General Comment No. 18 on the right to 
work; General Comment No. 19 on the right to social security; General Comment No. 20 on the right to 
non-discrimination on access to economic, social and cultural rights; and, General Comment No. 21 on 
the right of everyone to take part in cultural life. Available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm (accessed on 21 June 2011). 
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reiterated in the Limburg Principles, principle 25 which posits that ‘State parties are obligated, 
regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for the minimum 
subsistence rights for all’.164 
It has been argued that the minimum core approach, with its clear specification of the 
minimum essential elements that the State must provide, gives the government a better 
standard with which to monitor implementation and provides better protection of SERs 
generally, and of the basic needs of vulnerable groups in particular.165 This is starkly captured 
by Brand who contends that the interpretation and enforcement of entrenched SERs should, in 
the first instance, be aimed at ‘the creation of a society that provides for everyone’s basic 
needs, and that protects everyone against deprivation’.166  He argues that a court, in 
undertaking SER litigation, must determine whether the State is pursuing its constitutionally 
mandated goal correctly in its policies, and in doing so must, of necessity, develop a substantive 
content to the entrenched SERs.167 This has also been affirmed by Sandra Liebenberg who, in 
                                                            
164 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, (hereafter Limburg principle).  Available at 
http://www.acpp.org/RBAVer1_0/archives/Limburg%20Principles.pdf (accessed on 9 October 2012). 
165 For a more complete development of the above arguments, see Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental 
rights (n 124 above) 150-166 & 221; Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 31-32, where he avers that one of 
the evils sought to be remedied by the introduction of the minimum core concept was the lack of practical 
benchmarks against which to evaluate State efforts at the realisation of entrenched SERs. 
166 Brand (n 124 above) 36-37. He emphasises that the real problem which efforts aimed at the realisation 
of SERs should target is deprivation and hardship itself. He contends that in adopting the reasonableness 
approach, a structural good governance standard leading to the proceduralisation of SER adjudication, 
the SACC distanced itself from the concrete particular realities of hunger, homelessness, disease and 
illiteracy that the entrenchment of SERs was intended to deal with. He enumerates the negative effects of 
this proceduralisation, which are: the failure to enhance the realisation of the transformative potential of 
the Constitution, the discouragement of future creative SER litigation aimed at effecting social change, 
the burdening of indigent litigants with the burden to prove the unreasonableness of State policy, the 
availability of limited tools for the courts to deal with subsequent SER litigation, and the lack of 
substantive standards to guide the State in future socio-economic policy-making, at 51-56. 
167 Brand (n 124 above) 44-51. He points out that the major failure of the SACC’s reasonableness 
approach is the failure to develop a substantive content for SERs. He states that due to this failure, the 
Court cannot, in the conduct of its reasonableness analysis, determine whether the State’s policy in 
question is capable of achieving the relevant right (as the substantive content of the essential referent 
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her analysis of the Soobramoney judgment, argues that the failure by the SACC to expound on 
the nature, scope and content of the right to health left the State with no clear guidelines for its 
implementation, thus adversely affecting the capacity of the right to exert a fundamental 
influence on the State’s decision-making concerning social programmes and budgetary 
allocations.168  
The minimum core approach further makes it possible for the courts to adopt a more 
stringent scrutiny in the evaluation of the State’s defences for the non-realisation of the 
minimum essential needs of the most vulnerable,169  makes it more feasible for the courts to 
provide the government with clear timelines within which to implement the court’s orders, and 
also enables the court to properly monitor and supervise compliance with its own orders.170 This 
is in line with the Constitutional requirement that the courts grant effective relief in instances of 
violations of constitutionally entrenched human rights and fundamental freedoms.171 
The minimum core approach is, however, not perfect, and it has also faced its fair share of 
criticism. One of the staunchest critics of the approach is the SACC which has persistently 
refused to adopt the approach in several SER cases that it has adjudicated.172 Some of the 
reasons for the Court’s refusal are as follows. Firstly, the Court held that due to the different 
contextual situation of individuals as well as their diverse and varying socio-economic needs, it 
is difficult to define the minimum core content.173 Secondly, the Court held that unlike the 
CESCR which had had extensive access to, and experience in scrutinising, several State 
Reports under the ICESCR to be able to comprehensively define the minimum core content of 
rights, the Court did not have such information or experience to be able to comprehensively 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
right is not developed), leaving the Court only with the option of evaluating whether the policy in question 
is rational, coherent, comprehensive and inclusive, among other good governance standards, at 48-49.  
168 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 142. 
169 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 146. 
170 As above. 
171 2010 Kenyan constitution, article 23. 
172 Grootboom case; TAC case; and, Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 
39/09) 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). See SA Yeshanew ‘Approaches to the justiciability of economic, social 
and cultural rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Progress and perspectives’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 317, at 322. 
173 Grootboom, paras. 32-33. 
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determine the minimum core content of rights given the diversity  of needs and circumstances of 
different groups.174 Thirdly, the Court stated that the textual construction of the relevant 
provisions of the South African Constitution did not support the adoption of the minimum core 
approach, as sections 26(1) and 27(1) did not give an independent and self-supporting positive 
right, but must be read in relation to sections 26(2) and 27(2) which basically limited/qualified 
the content of the rights to the standards of progressive realisation, resource availability as well 
as the reasonableness of government measures aimed at their realisation.175 Fourthly, the Court 
argued that it was not pragmatic to read the minimum core content into the SER provisions as 
this would impose unrealistic demands on the State due to the  impossibility of giving everyone 
‘access even to a “core” service immediately’.176 Finally, the court acknowledged its institutional 
incompetence to undertake the formulation of the minimum core content of rights, holding that 
                                                            
174 Grootboom, para. 31. 
175 Soobramoney, para. 24; Grootboom, para. 95; TAC, para. 32. The limiting of rights in this manner has 
been extensively criticised by several authors who argue that even though these standards should of 
necessity limit the obligations of the State, they should not limit the meaning, nature, content and the 
scope of SERs. See K McLean ‘Housing’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa, 2nd 
edition Original Service, volume 4 (2006) 55-1, at 55-9 – 55-12; Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 56A-9 & 
10, especially footnote 4. Bilchitz especially argues passionately for an independent determination of the 
content of rights separate from the determination of the obligations of the State which he avers are the 
ones limited by the availability of resources. He argues convincingly that the rationale for the recognition 
of fundamental rights is the need to protect the inherent basic human interests, which people have by 
virtue of their human characteristics and not by virtue of the resources at their command. He avers that 
the available resources only affect the capacity of people to realise these inherent rights, and not the 
rights themselves. He thus contends that an understanding of the content of rights separate from the 
issue of resources, the approach which he advocates, makes it possible to expect the State to take 
measures to realise the already present rights as soon as the problem of scarcity of resources is 
lessened, see Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 40-42 & 215-220. See McLean – 
Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 176-181 for similar arguments. Mclean provides four reasons for 
the adoption of her preferred reading. The two critical ones are that, first, the jurisprudential soundness of 
having a right not restricted by the availability of resources enables the court to align its interpretation of 
the scope of SERs in accordance with international and comparative norms, and further requires the 
State to justify failures to realise SERs. Second, it allows for a ‘wider socio-political understanding of 
rights as political or ethical claims against the State which stand, even where the State is not able to 
realise these rights fully,’ at 179-181.   
176 TAC, para. 35. 
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‘courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political inquiries 
necessary for determining the minimum core standards’.177 Despite the above reasons, the 
Court did not, however, completely reject ever elaborating the minimum core of SERs, holding 
that the minimum core might be used to dertermine the reasonableness of a State measure for 
the realisation of SERs in particular instances.178 
Liebenberg also provides a critique of the minimum core approach, arguing that the 
development of the minimum core content of SERs using only the basic survival standard does 
not guarantee certainty and clarity in the identification of priorities; results in either under- or 
over-inclusivity in the specification of core obligations; is unduly reductionist and detracts from 
the achievement of the aspirations of a transformative constitution; encourages minimalism 
which detracts from the expansive realisation of SERs where resources are available; is 
inflexible and unresponsive to the diverse needs and circumstances of differently placed 
individuals and groups; and also fails to take into account the interrelated character of needs.179  
Liebenberg, however, makes suggestions aimed at ameliorating some of these criticisms. 
She contends that instead of relying solely on the minimum survival standards in the elaboration 
of the minimum core content of SERs, the minimum core could be better developed by also 
taking into account the constitutional values of democracy, equality, human dignity, and 
freedom, values that underpin both the South African and the Kenyan Constitutions.180 The use 
of these values in the context of deliberative democracy in the political institutions, as is 
envisaged by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, can go a long way in ensuring that the 
minimum core content adopted in the SER implementation framework has taken these criticisms 
                                                            
177 TAC, para. 37-38. 
178 Grootboom, para. 33; TAC, para. 34. See also Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative 
constitution (n 4 above) 148-151 for a similar analysis. 
179 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 168-173. For an analysis of 
the origins and application of the basic needs/survival standard and its relation to the right to life in the 
interpretation of SERs, see KG Young, Constituting economic and social rights (2012) 35ff. 
180 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 169 & 173. See also Dixon 
(n 132 above) 399-401 & Young – Constituting SERs (n 179 above) 39-42, who similarly advocates an 
expansive interpretation of the minimum core, contending that a minimalist focus on biological survival 
misses the important connection between human dignity and human flourishing that are intrinsic to the 
the right to life. 
 
 
 
 
271 | P a g e  
 
into account. Liebenberg’s second suggestion, responding to the concerns of the 
interdependence of rights, is that care must be taken in the development of SER implementation 
frameworks so that an optimal development approach which takes into account and balances 
long-, medium- and short-term goals in the realisation of SERs for the entire populace is 
adopted.181 She avers that this optimal approach must achieve synergies between short-term 
measures aimed at the amelioration of the conditions of the most vulnerable and desperate in 
society, and the long-term programmes aimed at achieving the maximal sustainable and 
adequate realisation of the whole spectrum of SERs for the entire populace.182 This is the very 
balance that the integrated approach proposed in this chapter is aimed to realise in the 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of SERs.  
Kartharine Young further enumerates some general criticisms of the minimum core 
approach at the international level which include concerns that: it threatens the realisation of the 
long-term goals of development as it calls for the prioritisation of the short-term needs of the 
poor; it only directs attention at the developing world without any analysis of the implementation 
of SERs in developed countries; and that it ranks the different claimants of rights without any 
focus on government’s macro-economic growth and defence policies.183 Carol Steinberg adds to 
this by arguing that the minimum core approach restricts the policy choices of political 
institutions, putting them in what she calls “a constitutional straightjacket”.184 Steinberg further 
contends that the ‘prescriptive diachronic element of the minimum core position – that the rights 
necessarily entail the prioritisation of the delivery of minimum core obligations -’ does not take 
into account the legitimate diversity of competing views of the best available alternatives for the 
eradication of poverty, and the role of SERs in that endevour.185  
                                                            
181 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 172. 
182 As above. 
183 KG Young ‘The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of content’ (2008) 33 
Yale Journal of International Law 114. 
184 Steinberg (n 124 above) 274. 
185 Steinberg (n 124 above) 275. She contends that the reasonableness approach on the other hand, with 
its flexibility, context-sensitivity and incremental character based on a case-by-case development of 
SERs, has the capacity to take a legitimate diversity of views into account and facilitate a ‘more 
comprehensive and particularist analysis of the relative strengths of incommensurable developmental 
options and of the repercussions, in each instance, of prioritising certain interests’. She thus argues that 
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David Bilchitz extensively responds to the criticism of the minimum core approach provided 
above. He contends that the approach is aimed at the protection of the fundamental interests of 
individuals as well as the prioritisation and ameliorisation of the plight of the worst off, whose 
needs are not adequately met by the reasonableness standard that failes to recognise the equal 
importance of each person in society.186 He thus states that taking into account the weighted 
prioritisation he advocates, the minimum core is a flexible standard which takes into account the 
needs of the differently situated individuals and groups in society, and is thus not rigid and 
absolutist.187 On the difficulty of the principled minimum core in the realisation of certain rights 
such as the right to health, Bilchitz advocates the formulation of a pragmatic minimum threshold 
based on the cost of treatment required, availability of resources, the need for a balance 
between a preventive and curative strategy, equal opportunity of all in access to health services 
as well as the impact of the achievement of the pragmatic minimum threshold on the realisation 
of other rights and the achievement of other pressing societal needs.188 
5.3.3 An integrated approach to interpretation  
In deciding on the interpretive approach to be adopted by Kenya, the courts must firstly ensure 
that they adopt an approach that is not only respecful of Kenya’s history and context (economic, 
social and political), but that also engenders a generous and purposive interpretation189 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the choice between competing developmental paradigms is not a choice that courts are institutionally or 
constitutionally competent to make on their own. 
186 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124above) 208-213. He, however, rejects lexical 
prioritisation (the requirement that the minimum core must be fulfilled for all before maximal needs are 
attended to) and instead advocates weighted priorities, which requires that in instances where the 
minimum core cannot be fulfilled, the State must provide justifications for such failure, and that such 
justifications must be subjected to stringent scrutiny by the courts, at 212.  
187 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 213. 
188 Bichitz - Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 220-225. 
189 A generous and purposive approach to constitutional interpretation was adopted by the SACC in 
Makwanyane, paras. 9-10. It has also been adopted by the High Court of Kenya in the case of Federation 
of Women Lawyers case (n 89 above) 11, where the Court held as follows: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights the court must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Such an interpretation must 
be generous and sustainable to give individuals the full measure of the the fundamental rights 
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SERs so as to give expression to and enhance the realisation of the transformative aspirations 
of the Constitution. The Constitution itself gives the courts a clear guide on how the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, which encompass the SERs, should be interpreted. As has been discussed in 
section 5.2.2 above, article 20 provides that any approach adopted in interpreting the Bill of 
Rights must not only promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality, equity and freedom; but must also promote the spirit,190 purport191 and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. The Constitution further requires the courts to adopt an 
interpretation that most favours the implementation and enforcement of rights.192  
With the transformative aspirations of the Constitution in mind, I propose that Kenya adopts 
a two-tiered integrated approach to constitutional interpretation that not only gives content to 
SERs;193 but also promotes societal dialogue and public participation in their interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement, as is envisaged by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and freedoms and the court must take full cognizance of the social conditions, experiences and 
perceptions of the people of this country. 
190 The spirit of the Bill of Rights can be gleaned from article 20(2) which provides that “every person shall 
enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the greatest extent consistent with the 
nature of the rights or fundamental freedoms”. This calls for an expansive and generous interpretation of 
rights, and with regard to SERs, that they are given content as far as possible to enable them to achieve 
their desired goals and objectives.  
191 The purpose of the Bill of Rights is provided for in article 19(2) of the Constitution and it provides that 
“the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the 
dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of 
all human beings”. This is affirmed by the Kenyan case of Ibrahim Songor Osman v Attorney General & 3 
Others, High Court Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2011, at 7; and Federation of Women Lawyers case (n 
89 above) 14. 
192 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 20(3)(b). 
193 See McLean - Constitutional deference (n 131 above) 175, where she emphasizes the importance of a 
clear definition of the meaning, scope and content of rights as providing a meaningful framework for 
undertaking the reasonableness inquiry. The content of the rights developed, however, should not be 
viewed as a single and determinate truth, but must be understood as provisional and subject to a 
collective and collaborative adjustment by an epistemic community through deliberative dialogue, see 
Young – Constituting SERs (n 179 above) 4; Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 160.   
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as discussed in chapters three and four of this thesis.194 The first tier of the two-tiered integrated 
approach calls for Kenya, especially the political institutions, with the requisite substantive 
participation of the people, to adopt a minimum core approach which provides clear substantive 
content to the entrenched SERs, including the basic minimum essentials for a dignified life.195 
These processes of the development and incorporation of a substantive content of SERs in the 
                                                            
194 This envisages the courts giving due deference to the SER implementation framework as designed by 
the political arms of the State with the requisite substantive public participation by all sectors of society. 
This approach has been supported by the CESCR, especially following the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, in a statement where it stated that it will use a similar approach when 
considering communications under the Optional Protocol. See CESCR Statement ‘An Evaluation of the 
Obligation to take steps (n 142 above).  In the context of South Africa, aspects of this approach were 
proposed by David Bilchitz in his book, poverty and fundamental rights, as well as in book chapters and 
articles related to the book as referenced elsewhere in this chapter. It has been further elaborated on by 
Sandra Liebenberg in her book, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution, 
and related book chapters and articles also referenced in this thesis.  Reliance on the ideas of these 
authors is therefore acknowledged. However, while these authors envisage the substantive content of the 
rights to be developed by the courts, the integrated approach proposed in this chapter, taken together 
with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in chapters three and four, contends that the 
responsibility for the development of the meaning, content, scope as well as the elaboration of the values 
and purposes underpinning the entrenchment of justiciable SERs lies with the political institutions, with 
the substantive participation of all the sectors of society, in the development of the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework for the realisation of the entrenched SERs. The court only assumes a role when 
there is clear failures of foresight, perspective, accommodation or responsiveness, and even in those 
instances, the courts must provide an opportunity for the political institutions to adopt, develop and 
implement the specific measures aimed at the vindication of violations of SERs. 
195 Bilchitz – Health (n 129 above) 35-36, who suggests an understanding of progressive realisation to 
contain two components, the first being the adoption of a minimum core content so as to respond to the 
minimum essential needs of the most vulnerable in society, while the second component entails the duty 
of the State to take steps to ensure the maximal enjoyment of SERs for the entire population. This 
ensures that all societal needs and interests are taken into account in the development of the State’s SER 
implementation framework, and the failure to adopt such an interpretation loses coherence and also 
significantly weakens the protection which was intended by the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in a 
constitution. See Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 193ff. where he further 
advocates the understanding of progressive realisation to entail the movement from the realisation of the 
minimal interests protected by SERs towards the realisation of maximal interests. 
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implementation framework by the political institutions must be undertaken in a manner that 
ensures that the entrenched SERs have practical tangible benefits for the worst-off in society.196  
Three questions arise from the above proposal. Firstly, why should Kenya feel obliged to 
adopt the minimum core approach to SERs? Secondly, how will the content of the SERs be 
determined in practice and how is the adoption of the minimum core approach beneficial to the 
poor as well as vulnerable and marginalised individuals, groups and communities? Thirdly, how 
will the adoption of the minimum core approach by the political institutions impact on the work of 
the judiciary in relation to the protection and enforcement of socio-economic rights? I will 
proceed to deal with each of the questions in turn. 
 In dealing with the first question, it is important to point out that Kenya has ratified 
several international and regional human rights instruments providing for SERs. These include: 
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);197 The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC);198 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);199 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights200 and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa;201 and The African Charter on the 
                                                            
196 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 185. 
197 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976. Accented to by Kenya on the 1 May 1972, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (accessed on 22 June 2011). 
198 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 
20 November 1989. Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. Ratified by Kenya 
on the 30 July 1990, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (accessed on 22 June 2011). 
199 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions on 18 December 1979 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1981. Accented to by Kenya on 9 March 1984, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm (accessed on 22 June 2011). 
200 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions on 1 June 1981 and entered into force 
on 21 October 1986. Ratified by Kenya on 23 January 1992, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties 
(accessed on 22 June 2011). 
201 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 1 July 2003 and entered into force on 
25 November 2005. Ratified by Kenya on 6 October 2010, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties 
(accessed on 22 June 2011). 
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Rights and Welfare of the Child.202 The above instruments engender the obligation of the State 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil SERs.203  The Kenyan Constitution acknowledges all these 
international human rights instruments and all the general rules of international law accruing 
from them as forming part of Kenyan law.204  
In interpreting and developing the SERs provided for in the above instruments, the 
international institutions charged with their implementation, especially the CESCR, have 
adopted a minimum core approach to these rights.205 Even though the General Comments 
coming from the above international institutions with regard to the interpretation of rights only 
have persuasive value and are not legally binding, it is submitted that the State is 
constitutionally obliged to take them into account and adopt a minimum core approach to the 
SERs in the Constitution. Unlike South Africa, which has not ratified the ICESCR, Kenya has 
                                                            
202 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 1 July 1990 and entered into force on 
29 November 1999. Ratified by Kenya on 25 July 2000, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties 
(accessed on 22 June 2011). 
203 See for example General Comment No. 3 of the Committee on ESCR; para 9 of General Comment 
No. 28 of the CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States 
Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women’ available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47-GC2.pdf 
(accessed on 22 June 2011); and  article 1 of the African Charter as interpreted by the African 
Commission in case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria 
(hereafter SERAC case) paras 44-48,  (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR) 2001 Reprinted in Heyns and 
Killander (eds.) Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union’(2007) 251 at 255-256. 
See also Africa Commission ‘Draft Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/achpr/files-for-achpr/draft-pcpl-guidelines.pdf (accessed 22 June 
2011) which further strengthens the Commission’s adoption of the obligations to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil, page 6-7. 
204 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 2(5) & (6). For a more substantive discussion on the place of 
international human rights law in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction, see Chapter two, section 2.2 above. 
205 General Comment No. 3 ESCR, para 10 and the subsequent General Comments of the Committee on 
ESCR; African Commission’s Draft Principles and Guidelines on ESCR which provides that the obligation 
of State Parties to fulfil the minimum core content of rights in the Charter is an immediate obligation, see 
especially paras 16-17. The Draft principles further develop the content of the SERs enshrined in the 
Charter, see paras 45 ff. 
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ratified the same and is legally bound by it under international law, and the interpretation of its 
provisions by the CESCR must thus also have legal effect at the domestic level in Kenya.206 A 
similarly situated jurisdiction as Kenya is Colombia which, having ratified the ICESCR, not only 
adopted the minimum core approach as is expounded by the CESCR, but also extensively and 
comprehensively used the General Comments of the CESCR in its judgments on SERs as is 
dicussed in chapter two, section 2.5 above. 
 The issue at stake in the second question has been one of the major concerns that led 
to the SACC declining to adopt the minimum core approach to the interpretation of SERs.207 It 
raises the issue of how, in a diverse society with different understandings of minimum essential 
needs for human survival and well-being, there can be an imposition of a detailed and 
comprehensive theory of value to determine what the minimum core content of each of the 
SERs entail. However, the very entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the Constitution is an 
acknowledgment of the diversity of society and a realisation that different individuals and groups 
have different needs that must be provided for. These needs can be met either through the 
adoption of relevant legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks by the State to provide an 
enabling environment to allow people to be able to meet their basic socio-economic goods; or 
through the actual provision of basic socio-economic goods to individuals and groups in society 
that are unable to provide for themselves. This acknowledgment resonates perfectly with the 
international obligations of the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill SERs as discussed 
in the specific contexts of the right to food and the right housing in chapters six and seven 
                                                            
206 See, Liebenberg – Interpretation of SERs (n 129 above) 33-11, who makes this argument in relation to 
countries that have ratified the ICESCR. The Kenyan High Court in the Federation of Women Lawyers 
case (n 89 above) 46-48, especially at 47 where the Court states as follows: 
In our view, the minimum core obligation of the State is determined generally by having regard to 
the needs of the most vulnerable groups that are entitled to the protection of the right in question. 
In that case, however, the Court noted the difficulty of determining the minimum core of the right to 
affirmative action due to the varying needs and opportunities of the different vulnerable groups, and that 
these variations had to be holistically addressed. 
207 Grootboom, paras 32-33. 
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below. This, in essence, therefore places the responsibility for the development of the content of 
SERs squarely on the doorstep of the State, especially the political arms of government.208 
 How then will the political arms of government determine the contents of SERs? It is 
submitted that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of work has already been done in the 
international arena, especially by the CESCR and other international experts,209 to develop the 
minimum essential elements for most of the entrenched SERs. All the government needs to do 
therefore, and this can be done almost immediately without raising arguments about the 
availability of resources, is to use the available international material to develop the minimum 
essentials to the SERs in the Constitution, taking into account Kenya’s peculiar historical 
context, priorities and long term objectives.210 As a part of the process of developing the 
minimum core content of SERs, the State’s implementation framework must also incorporate 
the requisite achieveable targets, indicators, benchmarks and specific timelines to provide 
guidance in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the State’s implementation 
strategy and plan of action as well as enabling the public and other watchdog institutions to 
monitor progress.211 
 If the development of the minimim content of SERs is undertaken in an inclusive and 
deliberative process allowing for participation of all the Kenyan people in accordance with article 
10 of the Constitution and as discussed in chapter four above, the government will be able to 
                                                            
208 The approach of the resolution of rights-based controversies according to a majoritarian principle of 
democracy, provided that the democratic process are appropriately deliberative and inclusive in nature is 
supported by Dixon (n 132 above) 401-402. The approach is further supported by Frank Michelman who 
contends that “a commitment to constitutional democracy implies resolving normative disputes by 
conversation, a communicative practice of open and intelligible reason-giving, as opposed to self-
justifying impulse and ipse dixit”. See FI Michelman ‘Foreword – The Supreme Court 1985 Term: Traces 
of Self-Government’ (1986) 100 Harvard Law Review 34. 
209 See generally, S Chapman & S Russell (eds.) ‘Core obligations: Building a framework for economic, 
social and cultural rights’ (2002); P Hunt, Reclaiming social rights: International and comparative 
perspectives (1996). 
210 See Dixon (n 132 above) 416-417, who acknowledges the possibility of the domestication of a 
normative and conceptual account of the minimum core concept in the domestic arena so as to enhance 
the elaboration of the content of rights and to ensure improved protection and enforcement of SERs. 
Such a standard can then be developed further and perfected by the courts in specific SER adjudication.   
211 Liebenberg – Interpretation of SERs (n 129 above) 33-42. 
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develop a detailed and comprehensive standard detailing the minimum core content of each of 
the SERs that is inclusive and that is acceptable to all Kenyans. The minimum core contents 
developed by these arms of government will then be polished by the courts over time as and 
when cases dealing with specific SERs come to the High Court and other superior courts for 
interpretation. The advantage of an elaboration of the minimum core by the political institutions 
with the substantive participation of the people in a deliberative process is that it ensures that 
the meaning, content and scope of the rights are not permanent, but remain contingent and 
imcomplete so as to allow for their evolution to meet emerging societal contexts as well as new 
forms of injustices.212  
 The adoption of the minimum core approach by the State has the potential to enhance 
the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the Constitution as it has the capacity to 
breathe life into the abstract SER provisions and ensure that the State has clear criteria within 
which to structure its legislative, policy and programmatic implementation framework. Such 
criteria will ensure that both the citizenry and the government have a clear understanding of the 
extent of the rights provided by the constitutional provisions and a clear understanding of the 
duties imposed by these provisions, making it possible for them to engage the courts and other 
forms of political strategies to vindicate their SERs in instances of violation. Such criteria are 
also important for the donor community and other international agencies as they can then 
choose specific aspects within the criteria to fund, in the fulfilment of their solidarity obligations 
espoused under the duty of international cooperation and assistance. The criteria also make it 
possible for the State as well as civil society to develop indicators and benchmarks for 
monitoring and evaluating State programmes aimed at the realisation of SERs. 
 The third issue raised dovetails into the second tier of the two-tiered interpretation 
approach advocated in this chapter. The adoption of a minimum core by the political institutions 
will then make it easier for the courts to also adopt a practical, progressive and purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the entrenched SERs that ensures that the rights have a 
practical benefit to Kenyans without the counter-majoritarian and the polycentricity challenges 
that have bedevilled judicial enforcement of justiciable SERs in other jurisdictions. For the 
judiciary to achieve this objective, it is submitted here that they adopt an expansive 
reasonableness approach to assess the government’s legislative, policy and programmatic 
                                                            
212 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 180. 
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framework aimed at fulfilling SERs.213 The first level of analysis using this expansive 
reasonableness approach will assess whether the government programme has incorporated 
and implemented the minimum core that meets the needs of the most vulnerable in society. This 
recognises that if indigent and vulnerable peoples’ basic needs and interests are not catered for, 
all the other rights and fundamental freedoms become redundant.214 If the government 
framework has not been able to provide the minimum essential elements to the most vulnerable 
in society in the first instance, then the courts should, in the absense of any substantive 
countervailing reasons, hold it as being per se unreasonable.215 This is in line with the 
jurisprudence of the SACC in the Port Elizabeth Municipality case where the Court held as 
follows: 216 
It is not enough to have a programme that works in theory [or in the distant future]. The 
Constitution requires that everyone be treated with [equal] care and concern. If the measures 
taken, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of the most desperate, they 
may not pass the test. In a society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom it cannot be 
                                                            
213 A similar approach of giving content to socio-economic rights in the interpretation of the 
reasonableness approach is advocated for in D Bilchitz ‘ Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum 
core: Laying the foundation for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence ‘ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 9 & 11. 
214 Bilchitz – Towards a reasonable approach to minimum core (supra n 213 above) 12. Young – 
Constituting SERs (n 179 above) 82-83. 
215 The issue of the availability of resources does not arise in relation to the fulfilment of the minimum 
essentials of life, as has been evidenced by the progression in the socio-economic jurisprudence of the 
CESCR, see chapter two, section 2.5 above, especially footnote 276. See also Young – Constituting 
SERs (n 179 above) 82-84, who similarly advocates the same strategy and affirms that the minimum core 
approach is usefull in SER adjudication as it reverses the onus of proof in SER claims, in that claimants 
only have to prove that the minimum core of their SERs were not protected, at which point the onus is on 
the State to justify the limitation of the claimants’ rights as reasonable or to prove that adequate 
legislative, policy and programmatic steps have been put in place to enhance the realisation of the rights. 
The minimum core thus requires a large measure of scrutiny and a higher level of justification of failures 
to realise the SERs of the most vulnerable in society, turning “paper rights” into “practical realities”; and M 
Langford ‘Judging resource availability’ in J Squires, M Langford & B Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: 
Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 89, at 99-100, also with a 
similar proposition. 
216 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (CCT 53/03) 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), para. 29.  
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presupposed that the greatest good for the many can be achieved at the cost of intolerable 
hardship for the few, particularly if by a reasonable application of judicial and administrative 
statecraft such human distress can be avoided. 
 This first level of analysis is based on the idea that there are varying degrees of needs 
and thus varying degrees of fulfillment of rights. From this basis, it follows that the possibilities 
for the realisation of the maximal human interests and needs can only exist after the minimal 
survival needs have been met, for the basic sustainance needs must be met for human beings 
to survive. Therefore, the fulfillment of the most essential minimum levels of needs required to 
ensure survival must, of necessity, take precedence and be prioritised over the more extensive 
and maximal fulfillment of rights.217 This approach is supported by the CESCR in its General 
Comment Number 3 where it states that ‘a State party in which any significant number of 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter 
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant’.218  
 It is only after determining that the government’s SER implementation framework has 
sufficiently provided for the basic essential goods and services to the most needy and 
vulnerable groups that the court should proceed to review it under the other reasonableness 
benchmarks set by the SACC as discussed in section 5.3.1 above. The judiciary must assess 
                                                            
217 Bilchitz – Towards a reasonable approach to minimum core (supra n 213 above) 13. See also 
Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 172-73, where she 
acknowledges that the adoption of the minimum core approach indicates the need for a prioritisation of 
the urgent needs of marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups. She further avers that this 
prioritisation places a strict burden of justification on the State should it fail to meet the basic minimum 
essential needs of the most vulnerable individuals and groups in society, at 184. 
218 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para 10. The approach has also been envisaged by the Kenyan 
High Court in the Federation of Women Lawyers case (n 89 above) 48, where the Court stated as follows: 
An issue which would arise is whether the measures taken by the State or state organ to realize 
the rights awarded by Article 27 are reasonable. In that regard we think there may be cases or 
situations where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum 
core obligation to determine whether the measures taken or to be taken are reasonable and 
satisfy the needs and aspirations of all vulnerable groups. 
This indicates that the Court acknowledged the importance of both the reasonableness approach and the 
minimum core approach in the prioritisation of the needs of the most vulnerable in the society. 
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that the government’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework is supported by sufficient 
and cogent reasons and evidence, is rationally connected to the purpose it is aimed to achieve, 
and is objectively capable of furthering that purpose. It must also reveal the proportionality 
between ends and means, benefits and detriments for all groups of people, but especially for 
the poor and vulnerable groups.219 The judiciary must at this point use its coercive and concrete 
judicial powers to directly counter any failings or gaps in the legislative, policy or programmatic 
framework by using its powers of invalidation, reading-in or the provision of injunctive relief in a 
way which helps put individual rights-based claims on the broader public and political agenda.220 
In this way, the judiciary will have a much greater capacity and a direct responsibility in 
countering blockages in the government’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework, and 
also ensure the viability of the government’s overall framework of implementation of the 
constitution. 
 The transformative and integrated two-tiered approach, a strong rights-based approach 
to constitutional interpretation, therefore adopts the best of both the minimum core content 
approach and the reasonableness approach thereby ensuring that the constitutionally 
entrenched SERs achieve their true potential in alleviating human suffering, eradicating poverty 
and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. On the other hand, it also reacts to the 
criticisms leveled at the minimum core approach and thus allows a proper margin of 
appreciation for the decisions of the other arms of government best suited to make decisions on 
the distribution of State resources to meet the diverse obligations of the State.221 The integrated 
approach thus shows sensitivity to democratic legitimacy and acknowledges the limits of judicial 
competence.222 It allows for the separation of powers and a participatory approach to decision 
making where all the arms of the State as well as all the sectors of society are actively involved 
in the development and implementation of the State’s legislative, policy and programmatic 
                                                            
219 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 124 above) 142. 
220 Dixon (n 132 above) 405-406. 
221 This is in line with the holding of the then President of the SACC, Justice Chaskalson, in the 
Soobramoney case that ‘a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by 
political organs….whose authority is to deal with [matters concerning the development of implementation 
framework as well as the allocation of resources for the realisation of justiciable SERs],’ at para. 29.  
222 Dixon (n 132 above) 393. 
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framework for the implementation of SERs. The integrated approach can thus aptly be 
summarised by borrowing the words of Cuss Sunstein that: 223 
[it] is respectful of democratic prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while 
also requiring special deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not being 
met…[and that] it suggests that [SERs] can serve, not to pre-empt democratic deliberation, but to 
ensure democratic attention to important interests that might otherwise be neglected in ordinary 
debate. 
 Properly implemented, the transformative and integrated approach has the benefit of 
inculcating a collaborative cooperation between the judiciary and the other levels of government 
allowing each of them to bring their unique expertise and skills on the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework dealing with the implementation of SERs and thus promoting overall 
implementation and enforcement.224 This in turn will enhance the realisation of the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution as is discussed above.  
5.4 The connection between the integrated approach and the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism  
In understanding the link between the integrated approach proposed in this chapter and the 
theory of dialogical constitutionalism discussed in chapter three and four of this thesis, it is 
imperative that an analysis is undertaken of how the composite parts of the integrated 
approach, the minimum core approach and the reasonableness approach, link with the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism.  
5.4.1 The minimum core and dialogical constitutionalism 
Carol Steinberg, in her analysis of the SER jurisprudence of the SACC, provides the most 
searching critique of the dialogical credentials of the minimum core approach. Steinberg argues 
that the minimum core approach is an intrusive rule-based approach which is likely to stifle 
                                                            
223 CR Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’ (1999-2001) 11 Constitutional 
Forum 123, at 123. 
224 Dixon (n 132 above) 393, acknowledges that the idea of constitutional dialogue between the judiciary 
and the legislature is not a new phenomenon and has been extensively debated in the context of Canada, 
the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia. 
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institutional conversation and collaboration between the three branches of government.225 
Related reservations as to the dialogical competences of the minimum core approach have 
been expressed by Rosalind Dixon who avers that a complete normative definition of the 
minimum core by the courts will foreclose legitimate dialogue within civil society about the 
conceptual and value-based underpinnings of SERs, and the best way of enforcing them in 
differing contexts.226 Liebenberg also raises important concerns with regards to a once-off 
judicial determination, formulation and enforcement of the minimum standards for the 
implementation of SERs, contending that this limits societal dialogue as it does not take into 
account the value-laden nature of SERs, and the reality of the existence of legitimate diversity in 
society.227 Marius Pieterse further chronicles these concerns, stating that judicial elaboration of 
the minimum core:228 
[m]ay result in over- or under-inclusive specification of SER obligations; may invite undue 
reductionism and/or minimalism in need-definition; may exclude or marginalise the needs of 
various groups that do not fit the background norms informing the definition of core obligations; 
and, may oversimplify the interaction between and co-dependence of interconnected socio-
economic needs of varying levels of complexity, urgency and costs. 
These are genuine concerns in relation to the judicial elaboration of SERs, especially 
taking into account the conservative legal culture prevailing in Kenya and South Africa, and the 
                                                            
225 Steinberg (n 124 above) 269. She contrast this with the democracy and deliberation promoting aspects 
of the reasonableness approach that she terms ‘abstract and open-ended’ and which is better able to 
engender societal exchanges, learning and compromise in the case-by-case evolution of SER 
implementation standards, as well as enabling the State to function efficiently through the fostering of a 
culture of justification,  at 274-276. 
226 Dixon (n 132 above) 416-417. 
227 S Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights: Revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum core debate’ in 
S Woolman & M Bishop (eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 303, at 308-319; Liebenberg – 
Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 167. She contends that such judicial 
establishment of a normative essence of SERs that is beyond contestation and debate promotes closure 
in societal dialogue on the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of SERs.   
228 M Pieterse ‘On dialogue, translation and voice: A reply to Sandra Liebenberg’ in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (Eds.) Constitutional conversations (2008) 331, at 340. 
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echelons of society where judges are most likely to emanate from.229 The concerns, however, 
need to be clarified in the context of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism elaborated on in 
chapters three and four of this thesis. First, these arguments do not take into account the critical 
function that SERs play in enhancing the equal and effective substantive participation of all 
people in collective self-government, which is one of the most important aspects of democracy 
as is discussed in chapter four above.230 Without the protection from material deprivation, 
human dignity and self-worth - necessary for the active participation in collective self-
government - are impaired. This leads to the political and social voicelessness of the poor, 
marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups, thus eroding the chances of equality in 
deliberation. The elaboration of the content of rights, and especially the prioritisation of the basic 
essential needs of these poor and vulnerable individuals, is thus critical in the inculcation of a 
culture of democracy which entails meaningful deliberation in collective public decision-making.  
Secondly, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, as discussed in chapter four above, 
does not envisage the court developing the minimum core content of the entrenched SERs. It 
identifies correctly that this is a legitimate role of the political institutions of the State working in 
collaboration with larger societal actors in a process of participatory dialogue and deliberation.231 
The legitimacy of the political institutions rests on their representation of the concerns, and the 
protection of the rights, of citizens, and a government that is unable to undertake these 
responsibilities effectively loses its legitimacy to govern.232  In accordance with the 2010 Kenyan 
                                                            
229 Judges mostly come from the middle or high echelons of society and may not be able to relate to the 
lived experiences of poverty and deprivation of the poor and marginalised individuals and groups in 
society. The judges may, thus, not be able to effectively capture these lived experiences as well as the 
basic survival needs of the poor if the task of developing the content of rights is left exclusively to them.  
230 See Young – Constituting SERs (n 193 above) 4-6; A Sen, Development as freedom (1999) 152-153; 
Moellendorf (n 146 above) 332; Brand (n 124 above) 35.  
231 See E Wiles ‘Aspirational principles or enforceable rights: The future for socio-economic rights in 
national law’ (2006-2007) 22 American University International Law Review 35, at 40, who argues that 
SER litigation is minimised if the political institutions of the State put in place optimal implementation 
frameworks and ensure their faithful observance. 
232 See N Udombana ‘Social rights are human rights: Actualising the right to work and social security in 
Africa‘(2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 181 at 188, who contends that the primary 
responsibility of the State is to take care of the welfare of its citizens, and a government’s legitimacy 
entails meeting the basic needs of the citizens. 
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Constitution, the power to design and implement policy is a power of the people, to be exercised 
on their behalf and for their benefit.233 The people themselves must, therefore, be involved in the 
design and implementation of policy, through their participation in both democratic and 
deliberative institutions of the State. To enhance their equal participation in these democratic 
and deliberative institutions, they must be capable of meeting their basic survival needs as 
discussed in the paragraph above. The adoption of the minimum core approach does not, 
therefore, denigrate democracy; but enhances democracy because it enables all sectors of 
society to engage equally in the democratic process as well as in deliberative public decision-
making processes. 
Thirdly, these arguments do not take into account the fact that the very reason for 
litigation in the first place is the failure of these democratic institutions to put in place adequate 
measures and programmes for the alleviation of poverty.234 The courts do not act on their own 
motion; they have to be moved by litigants whose rights, as entrenched in the Constitution, have 
not been realised or are being violated by the State itself. These arguments thus fail to realise 
that the courts are a forum for societal dialogue and that the very process of litigation is an 
aspect of constitutional conversation between the political institutions, the courts and society at 
large in the form of litigants, amici and expert witnesses brought in by parties or summoned by 
the courts.235 Litigation spurs dialogue as the policies of the government are subjected to 
                                                            
233 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 1 (sovereignty of the people), 94 (legislative authority derives 
from the people and is to be exercised by parliament for the benefit of the people), 129 (executive 
authority, which includes the design, development and implementation of policy and programmatic 
framework, derives from the people and must be exercised in a manner compatible with the principle of 
service to the people, as well as for their well-being and benefit, 159 (judicial authority also derives from 
the people and is to be used for the benefit of the people) as well as 232 (1) (d) & (f)  (which calls for the 
participation of the people in the process of policy-making and transparency in the provision of timely as 
well as accurate information to the public).   
234 See Dixon (n 132 above) 401, where she acknowledges that the political processes are rife with blind 
spots and burdens of inertia which may result in SER implementation frameworks that do not  take into 
account their adverse impact on rights. 
235 See Dixon (n 132 above) 405, who submits that due to the visibility of court proceedings and 
decisions, courts play a prominent role in bringing out the claims of vulnerable and marginalised groups 
whose voices are not represented adequately, or at all, in the political processes, thus helping counter 
political inertia and blind spots. 
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societal deliberation so as to enhance their effectiveness in responding to the dire needs of the 
most desperate in society. As has been pointed above, the failure to ensure access to the basic 
material needs of the poor and vulnerable in society makes true democracy - which is respectful 
of the dignity and equal worth of all individuals in society - impossible.236 For this dialogue to 
take place, there must be some basic standard against which the State's policy is measured, of 
which the minimum core approach forms a part. As Danie Brand has convincingly argued, the 
reason for the proceduralisation of the SACC's SER jurisprudence is because of the failure of 
the Court to define the content of SERs, leading to its failure to evaluate the State's policies and 
programmes with regard to their effectiveness to realise the constitutionally mandated goals.237 
Thus the elaboration of the content of rights, especially the adoption of a minimum core to the 
entrenched SERs, spurs on dialogue rather than stifle it. 
Fourthly, and perhaps more importantly, these arguments fail to acknowledge the 
important role entrenched SERs were meant to play in policy formulation as well as in social 
activism aimed at policy change, as they (the arguments) are based on a view of SERs as 
reactive tools used as standards to test policy in the instances of live controversies.238 Brand 
argues that the most important role of SERs is to guide and shape policy formulation from the 
outset, a task that will be more effectively realised if the meaning, scope and content of these 
                                                            
236 Wiles (n 231 above) 49, who contends that SERs are an important means in the achievement of a just 
form of democracy as they are designed to empower the marginalised societal voices to improve their 
situation, and thus redresses concerns of the “tyranny of the majority” that results from a democracy 
without such safeguards. See also Hunt (n 209 above) 183, where he contends that social rights are 
necessary for marginalised individuals and groups to enjoy full and effective citizenship; C O’Cinneide 
‘Emerging models of socio-economic rights adjudication: Lessons from home and abroad’ (2011) 
available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/10/186.pdf (accessed on 22 October 2012) 
who affirms the difficulty of establishing a rights-based democracy on unstable socio-economic 
foundations, and calls for the realisation of basic SERs as a necessary and integral building blocks of a 
rights-based polity, at 12-13; L Osberg & S Phipps ‘A Social Charter for Canada’ available at 
http://myweb.dal.ca/osberg/classification/book%20chapters/A%20social (accessed on 18 June 2012), 
who submits that the effective expression of individual legal and political rights requires a minimum level 
of social and economic standing, without which they cannot effectively participate in political life, at 2-3. 
237 Brand (n 124 above) 44-51. 
238 Brand (n 124 above) 53. 
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SERs are clearly developed.239 To enhance this argument, Brand quotes the arguments by the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of Witwatersrand who submit as 
follows:240 
Constitutional SERs are not just tools used by lawyers to force government to accede to awkward 
political demands. Rather [they] are policy-structuring devices intended to inform the very way 
government goes about its business.   
The development of the content of rights thus has the potential to enhance dialogue as it 
provides the requisite tools for social actors to engage actively with the political institutions in 
the design and development of policy. 
Lastly, despite the importance of the above-discussed challenges, they are not just 
apparent in instances of judicial adjudication of SERs; they are also experienced during the 
design of SER implementation frameworks by the political institutions, specifically with regard to 
the design of legislative and policy frameworks.241 Societal dialogue is thus critical in responding 
to the mentioned challenges, and societal participation in an environment of dignity and equality 
is crucial in bringing out all the societal voices, especially of the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals and groups whose voices are almost never present in the normal 
political or judicial processes of decision-making. The only way to empower such groups to 
actively participate in societal decision-making is by ensuring that they have access to basic 
survival needs, the very basis of the proposal that the political institutions develop the minimum 
core content of rights in the SER implementation frameworks at the first level of dialogue as is 
elaborated in chapter four, section 4.2 above. This is also the basis for the proposal that the 
courts adopt the integrated approach discussed above, an interpretive approach that entails a 
searching scrutiny of the SER implementation frameworks to ensure that the minimum core 
content is entrenched therein, in the absence of which the implementation framework must be 
                                                            
239 Brand (n 124 above) 54.  
240 As above.  
241 See Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 166, where she 
acknowledges the institutional inadequacies of the political institutions of the State, especially the 
legislature, in the development of an SER implementation framework. The inadequacies include lack of 
sufficient time and resources, insufficient technical expertise, capture by family dynasties, powerful 
businesses and other dominant societal interest groups, as well as political sycophancy and lack of party 
discipline among parliamentarians. 
 
 
 
 
289 | P a g e  
 
held to be per se invalid. It is thus only with the adoption of a minimum core approach as an 
aspect of the integrated approach proposed herein that progress towards societal 
transformation and the creation of a just and equal society where all citizens participate 
effectively in self-governance can be realised.  
 5.4.2 Reasonableness and dialogical constitutionalism 
Due to its perceived flexibility and open-ended nature, the dialogical credentials of the 
reasonableness approach have been emphasised.242 Sandra Liebenberg argues that due to its 
contextual sensitivity as well as its sensitivity to the diverse needs of differently placed 
individuals, the reasonableness approach has the capacity to facilitate societal dialogue and 
public participation in the development of the substantive meaning, scope and content of 
entrenched SERs as well as in the design, development, implementation and enforcement of 
the State’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of SERs.243 
The dialogical credentials of the reasonableness approach have, however, been 
questioned, with Marius Pieterse providing the most searching critique. Pieterse contends that 
the “conceptual emptiness” of the approach with regard to the content of rights denigrates the 
transformative potential of rights translation through dialogue.244 He avers that the approach 
changes the dialogue taking place in the courts from a dialogue on the rights in question to a 
dialogue on the desirability and implementational astuteness of government’s legislative and 
policy framework.245 He submits that this basically shifts the dialogue to the political institutions, 
                                                            
242 See Steinberg (n 124 above) 268ff who extensively emphasizes the dialogical potential of the 
reasonableness approach. See also Yeshanew (n 172 above) 326, who similarly states that 
reasonableness ensures scrutiny of the State’s SER programmes while at the same time giving 
appropriate deference to the political institutions of the State, and thus escapes the institutional legitimacy 
objections. 
243 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 174-175. See also C 
Hoexter ‘The future of judicial review in South African administrative law’ (2000) 117 South African Law 
Journal 484, at 509-513, who, in defining the reasonableness standard, acknowledges that it allows for 
the legitimate diversity of views, which in essence promotes dialogue and deliberation. 
244 Pieterse – A reply to Liebenberg (n 228 above) 341-342. 
245 As above. See also Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 175-
179, who similarly contends that in conflating the traditional two-stage approach to constitutional analysis 
and failing to develop substantive content to the entrenched SERs, the dialogic and relational potential of 
the reasonableness review is weakened as it eschews a limitations analysis as well as allows the courts 
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a dialogue venue that is almost always inaccessible to the voiceless poor and marginalised 
individuals and groups in society.246 He terms this an abdication of the responsibility of the 
courts, who are the constitutionally mandated guardian of the Constitution and the primary 
protectors of rights, and contends that the courts’ failure to take up a more active role in the 
development of the content of the entrenched SERs is lamentable.247 With regard to individual 
and group participation, he submits that the reasonableness approach also stifles dialogue due 
to its chariness towards individual entitlements, making it worthless for individuals or groups to 
articulate and pursue rights claims in the courts.248 
In the same vein, Liebenberg also points out that due to its conflation of the two-stage 
approach to constitutional adjudication, which in essence detracts from the development by the 
courts of the meaning, scope, content, purpose as well as the relevant values protected by a 
specific SER, the reasonableness approach forecloses societal dialogue on these important 
aspects of the implementation and enforcement of justiciable SERs.249 This is because societal 
actors are denied the opportunity to persuade the court to adopt a certain interpretation of 
entrenched SERs, as well the forclosing of the courts as a societal forum in which legitimately 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
to avoid a substantive engagement with other societal actors on the purposes and underlying values of 
the entrenched SERs and the impact of their deprivation on claimant groups.  
246 Pieterse – A reply to Liebenberg (n 228 above) 342-344, he contends that the only instance when the 
poor get to be heard is if their agenda coincides with the agenda of a powerful, well-resourced and well-
connected social movement, at 344. This is affirmed by Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative 
constitution (n 4 above) 167, who states that even though the abstractness and minimalism associated 
with the reasonableness approach allows political institutions to develop the SER implementation 
framework, it reinforces the marginalisation of vulnerable groups that do not have a political voice in these 
institutions.  
247 Pieterse – A reply to Liebenberg (n 228 above) 343. He mentions the delimiting effect which a 
restrictive understanding of SERs by the highest constitutional court in a legal system has in enhancing 
dialogue in other subordinate judicial fora due to the principle of stare decisis.  
248 Pieterse – A reply to Liebenberg (n 228 above) 344. 
249 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 175-177. She contends that 
the non-elaboration or non-reliance on these purposes and values in the analysis of reasonableness by 
the courts leads to further deprivation of the vulnerable and marginalised in society, thus further eroding 
their voice in the deliberative as well as elective democratic processes, at 177-179. 
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held and competing conceptions of the purposes and values of the entrenched SERs can be 
legitimately mediated.250 
The main challenge to the dialogical credentials of the reasonableness approach is its 
lack of elaboration of the meaning, content and scope of SERs, including the minimum core 
content as well as its non-reliance on the values and purposes underpinning the entrenchment 
of SERs as justiciable constitutional rights. The theory of dialogical constitutionalism together 
with the integrated interpretational approach proposed herein responds effectively to the above 
concerns. The theory of dialogical constitutionalism requires that political institutions, in 
collaboration and cooperation with other societal actors in deliberative processes based on the 
equality of worth of all human beings, undertake the development of a comprehensive 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework that elaborates the meaning, scope and content 
of each of the entrenched SERs, including the minimum core content of each of the SERs, 
taking into account the values that underlie an open and democratic society, that is, democracy, 
human dignity, equality and freedom. The theory further requires that the courts, as the 
guardians of the Constitution, adopting the integrated approach proposed here, undertake a 
two-tiered analysis of the State’s SER implementation framework with the aim of ensuring that 
all the societal long-, medium- as well as short-term needs, goals and aspirations are met. The 
theory envisages deference by the courts to the political institutions as to choices in policy 
aimed at the realisation of SERs, but also retains both a substantive and a facilitative role for the 
courts, in their design of remedies, to ensure that the transformative aspirations of the 
Constitution, envisaged in the entrenchment of justiciable SERs are achieved.   
5.5 Conclusion  
In the realisation of the transformative potential of the Kenyan Constitution, the critical 
importance of adopting a progressive and purposive approach to the interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs cannot be overstated. This is 
because the normative foundation that is provided by the adopted approach will inform the 
understanding of the nature of the SERs as well as determine the scope and the content of 
SERs. This chapter undertook an extensive analysis of the current approaches to the 
interpretation and enforcement of SERs, the minimum core approach and the reasonableness 
approach.  
                                                            
250 Liebenberg – Adjudication under a transformative constitution (n 4 above) 176. 
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The analysis found that the reasonableness approach has several advantages which are 
democracy enhancing such as its flexibility as well as its sensitivity to the historical, social, 
economic and political context, which allows the courts to accord the requisite deference and 
margin of appreciation that is respectful of the doctrine of separation of powers. It acknowledges 
that there can be legitimate disagreements with regard to the interpretation and implementation 
of the indeterminate, constitutionally entrenched SERs, and thus provides the opportunity for 
legitimate societal deliberation and dialogue as to the meaning, content and scope as well as 
the best framework to be adopted for the implementation and enforcement of the entrenched 
SERs. The major flaw of the reasonableness approach is its lack of substantive delineation of 
the normative content of SERs, leading to the difficulty in developing review guidelines and 
standards for the evaluation of the State’s SER implementation frameworks. This flaw has 
resulted in the courts’ adoption of varying degrees of scrutiny in relation to the positive 
obligations arising from the entrenched SERs which, as has been argued by several authors, is 
lower than the standard of scrutiny that the courts use for the adjudication of CPRs as well as 
negative SER obligations. This flaw has also led to the criticism that in using the approach, the 
courts have neglected the values that underpin the Constitution, to the detriment of the 
achievement of the transformative aspirations of the Constitution and the better protection of the 
rights of the poor, marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups in society. 
An analysis of the minimum core approach has, on the other hand, revealed that this 
approach, with its clear specifications of the basic minimum essentials, gives the State better 
guidance in policy formulation and development, enhances the monitoring and evaluation of 
State policy by both governmental and non-governmental institutions as well as individuals, 
ensures better protection of important interests of poor and vulnerable individuals and groups 
and is thus better able to enhance the achievement of the transformative potential of a 
transformative constitution. The above positive features of the minimum core approach have 
been affirmed by Brand, who contends that the advantage of the approach is that it targets 
deprivation and hardship itself, and thus deals specifically with the concrete realities of hunger, 
homelessness, disease and illiteracy. The minimum core approach has also had its fair share of 
criticism, and it has been argued that it is rigid and unresponsive to the diverse needs of 
differently situated individuals and groups; it is difficult to ascertain due to varying degrees of 
need and the large pool of information required to develop it; the courts are not institutionally 
and constitutionally competent to develop it; its development is based solely on survival needs 
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and does not take into account other important constitutional values such as equality, dignity 
and freedom; and that it restricts the policy choices of political institutions.  
Taking into account the above important critique of the two approaches, it has been 
submitted that Kenya should adopt a transformative and integrated approach that espouses the 
best of both approaches in the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the 
entrenched SERs. The integrated approach proposed in this chapter is amalgamated with the 
theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in chapters three and four of this thesis, and 
thus espouses the view that it is the primary responsibility of the political institutions, in the first 
instance, to develop the legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the implementation 
of the entrenched SERs. It states that in developing this framework, the political institution must, 
as mandated by the Constitution itself, substantively ensure public participation of all sectors of 
society in the legislative and executive decision-making processes so as to ensure that all 
societal concerns and interests are substantively espoused, in line with the principle of equal 
importance or worth of all human beings. The approach proposes that in the design and 
development of the implementation framework, the political institutions must, in line with their 
coordinate interpretive authority, infuse their understanding of the meaning, content and scope 
of the entrenched SERs into the implementation framework, including the espousal of the 
minimum core content of the entrenched SERs.  
At the second level and in relation to the courts, the proposed transformative and 
integrated approach envisions them adopting an expansive reasonableness approach in the 
evaluation of the State’s implementation framework, where the courts will, in the first instance, 
review whether the implementation framework has incorporated the minimum core content of 
the relevant SERs. The integrated approach proposes a searching scrutiny in this first instance 
of analysis, and if the courts find, after that analysis, that the framework has not incorporated 
the minimum core and the political institutions have not provided any substantive justification as 
to why it has not been incorporated, then the courts should find that the relevant legislative, 
policy or programmatic framework is per se unreasonable. The rationale for this searching 
analysis is the acknowledgement that if the needs and interests of the most indigent and 
marginalised in society are not catered for, the entire corpus of rights in the Bill of Rights 
becomes redundant. If, on the other hand the courts find that the needs and interests of the 
indigent and marginalised individuals and groups have been sufficiently catered for, the court 
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can then proceed to undertake the reasonableness analysis using the criteria provided by the 
SACC, as enumerated in section 5.3.1 above.  
It is submitted that the adoption of this approach will enhance the alleviation of human 
suffering, eradicate endemic poverty and inequality, enhance the realisation of social justice, 
entrench democracy as well as good accountable governance, and thus ensure the realisation 
of the transformative aspirations of the Constitution for the betterment of all people.  
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Chapter six: The right to food in Kenya 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The thesis in chapter two undertook an analysis of the substantive nature, scope, content and 
extent of socio-economic rights (SERs), developed the theory of dialogical constitutionalism as 
a theoretical framework for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of SERs in 
chapter three and four, as well as the transformative and integrated approach, a progressive 
interpretive approach aimed at the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution in chapter five. This previous chapters have set up the requisite 
substantive, theoretical and interpretive framework for an analysis of the right to food as a case 
study in the present chapter. The chapter looks at the food security situation in Kenya, the 
meaning, scope, content and scope of the right to food and the obligations arising from the right 
both at the national and international level, as well as the role of the courts in enforcing the right 
to food. 
Hunger and malnutrition are endemic concerns that have straddled Kenya for a long time. 
The situation has, however, worsened in the recent past due to declining food production as a 
result of climate change and its attendant change in rainfall patterns in the food producing 
areas; the 2007 political violence after the bungled general election which resulted in the 
displacement of people mainly from the food producing regions; the recent global economic 
downturn; the spike in international oil prices leading to the skyrocketing in food prices; and the 
runaway inflation that has wiped out people’s capacity to feed themselves.1 The situation is 
                                                            
1 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) ‘An overview of the food security situation in 
Eastern Africa’ (February 2010) 5, available at 
http://www.uneca.org/ea/meetings/srcm2010/Food%20Security%20OVERVIEW.pdf (accessed on 5 July 
2012). See also G Obare ‘Querying the fire-fighting approach to food security in Kenya: The innovations 
extension alternative (2011) 12-13, available at https://fsc.uni-
hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/fsc/FSC_in_dialog_Presentation/Approach_to_food_security_in_K
enya_-_Obare.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2012), who outlines the underlying causes of food insecurity as 
follows: growing population and endemic poverty; insecure land tenure and land degradation; skewed 
income distribution; increasing frequency and severity of droughts; limited government investment in 
agriculture, corruption; and, poorly integrated markets; DE Buckingham ‘A recipe for change: Towards an 
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further exacerbated by the extremely unequal international trade regime entrenched by 
developed States through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the imposition of the 
“Washington consensus” which emphasises  trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and 
the compression of social spending in the national budget, and the external debt-servicing 
burden.2 
Kenya is, in reality, a food deficient country, as is indicated by the graph below which shows 
that over the recent past, Kenya has become a net food importer, further reducing the capacity 
of Kenyans, especially poor and vulnerable individuals and groups, to feed themselves and their 
families. The dire food security situation has been acknowledged by the Kenyan President, 
Mwai Kibaki, who on 16thJanuary 2009 declared it a national emergency, with one out of every 
three Kenyans (approximately 15 million people) threatened with starvation.3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
integrated approach to food under international law’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 285, at 286 
– footnote 5, who documents causes of world hunger as poverty, poor production and distribution 
infrastructure, corruption, civil strife, discrimination, overpopulation, the lack of political will to 
acknowledge and actively pursue the fulfilment of basic human needs, international debt, domination of 
food trade by transnational corporations, unfair international trade and aid policies, and environmental 
concerns. 
2 J Ziegler ‘Preface’ in J Ziegler et al, The fight for the right to food: Lessons learned (2011) xiii-xiv. See 
also Commission on Human Rights ‘Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Jean 
Ziegler, E/CN.4/2002/58’ (January 2002) Executive Summary paras. 4-7 & Report paras. 16-17 & 107-
119, available at http://www.righttofood.org/publications/un-reports/ (accessed on 21 November 2012) 
(Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler). He notes that efforts by developing countries to introduce  a 
“food security box” that reflected the food security needs of these countries, and which gave them greater 
policy autonomy to protect their stable foods was ignored at the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, at 
paras. 116-117.   
3 Oxfam GB et al, ‘The Nairobi informal settlements: An emerging food security emergency within extreme 
chronic poverty – A compilation and synthesis of key food security, livelihood, nutrition and public health 
data’ (April 2009) 2, available at 
http://www.givewell.org/files/DWDA%202009/Concern/KenyaTechnicalBrief09.pdf (accessed on 20 July 
2012). 
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Figure 1.0 – Kenya national food security indicators and trends.4 
 
Figure 1.0 indicates a steady decline in cereal self-sufficiency, which refers especially to maize, 
rice and wheat - the main staple foods of a majority of the Kenyan people. This is mainly due to 
global warming and the resultant change in rainfall patterns, increase in the cost of farm 
implements, forcing many farmers to reduce plantation sizes or to abandon large-scale farming 
altogether, exploitation by middlemen, and lack of proper storage facilities leading to losses in 
crop yields, among others. Apart from the declining cereal production, the production of other 
food crops are also threatened, as is indicated by the steady decline in per capita food 
production and food self-sufficiency ratio over the years as shown by the graph above.  To 
stabilise the dire food security situation, the graph indicates a steady increase in food 
importation to cover for the steady reduction in per capita food production, leading to a steady 
decline in food self-sufficiency among the Kenyan people. Credence is further lent to the 
authenticity of trends and indicators in figure 1.0 above by a look at the overall food-sufficiency 
situation in the country as is indicated by figure 2.0 below. It shows that over 80 per cent of the 
country is highly food insecure; approximately 8 per cent is moderately food insecure; 
approximately 10 per cent is food secure, with the other parts either facing famine or being 
extremely food insecure. 
 
                                                            
4 Obare (n 1 above) 5. 
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social, economic, as well as political marginalisation.9 This is affirmed by the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its General Comment Number 
12 on the right to food where they contend that ‘fundamentally, the roots of the problem of 
hunger and malnutrition are not lack of food, but lack of access to available food, inter alia 
because of poverty by large segments of the world’s population’.10 It is estimated that over 51 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
FIAN International ‘Kenya’s hunger crisis – The result of right to food  violations: A report of a joint 
international mission by RAPDA and FIAN International’ (February 2010) 7, available at 
http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/kenyas-hunger-crisis-the-result-of-right-to-food-
violations/pdf (accessed on 20 July 2012). See also O de Schutter & KY Cordes ‘Accounting for hunger: 
An introduction to the issues’ in O de Schutter & KY Cordes (eds.), Accounting for hunger: The right to 
food in the era of globalisation (2011) 1, at 6 who acknowledge that hunger is a result of poverty and 
inequality, indicating that even though increases in annual world grain production have consistently 
exceeded demographic growth, the number of hungry people has consistently increased.  
8 Those who are most food insecure lack the requisite political, social or economic power or the ability to 
hold the government to account be it through the political or the judicial processes, see FIAN International 
(n 7 above) 10. 
9 GT Butcher ‘Foreword: The relationship of law to the hunger problem’ (1987) 30 Howard Law Journal 
193, at 195; M Watts ‘Entitlements or empowerments? Famine and starvation in Africa’ (1991) 51 Review 
of African Political Economy 9, at 13-15; A Eide, A OShauge & WB Eide ‘Food security and the right to 
food in international law and development’ (1991) 1 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 415, 
at 418, who contend that to realise the right to adequate food, causes and manifestations of poverty must 
be addressed. They further argue that primary attention must be given to the human dimension in efforts 
to realise the right to adequate food, and that the focus should not be on the overall per capita increase in 
food production, but a decrease in inequalities in access to food or food production resources, at 422. 
See also Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 3, who aver that ‘those who have money eat, and those without suffer 
from hunger and the ensuing disabilities, and often die,’ and that reducing hunger does not mean 
increasing food production, but increasing access to resources for the poor; D Brand ‘The right to food’ in 
D Brand & C Heyns (eds). Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 153, at 157-58, who 
acknowledges the above and affirms that the achievement of food security requires not only the 
availability of sufficient supply of food, but also the ability of the people to acquire the available food. 
10  CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 
1999, para 5, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838c11.html (accessed on 2 July 
2012). See also R Kunnemann ‘The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core 
content’ in A Chapman & S Russell (eds.) Core obligations: Building a framework for economic, social 
and cultural rights (2002) 161, at 168, who contends that ‘hunger and malnutrition are problems of people 
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per cent of the Kenyan population lack access to adequate food,11 reflecting statistical data 
which indicate that 56 per cent of the Kenyan population live in absolute poverty, 53 per cent of 
these living in rural areas and 47 per cent in urban areas.12 Of this number, between 10-15 
million people are permanently reliant on food relief, which is almost always inadequate to 
provide the requisite 2000 calorie content recommended by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) as the basic minimum level of nutrition.13 The worsening food security situation is 
especially evidenced by the rate of malnutrition among children under five years of age, which 
was 18 per cent a decade ago but is now over 35 per cent.14 According to the UN Development 
Assistance Framework 2009-2013, child nutrition has not improved in the last 20 years, and 
currently indicates dire nutritional statistics for children under five years, with 33 per cent 
stunting, 6.1 per cent wasting and 20.2 per cent underweight.15 These statistics are affirmed by 
statistical data from the 2008-2009 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) which 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
lacking the freedom to feed themselves, of people lacking the power to influence the political and 
economic decisions that would give them access to food in dignity’. 
11 UNECA (n 1 above) 6. 
12 FIAN International (n 7 above) 7; Obare (n 1 above) 12. For a more substantive analysis of poverty and 
inequality in Kenya, see chapter one, section 1.2. 
13 FIAN International (n 7 above) 9. 
14 UNECA (n 1 above) 6. Malnutrition has serious consequences, handicapping children throughout their 
life as it retards mental and physical development and heightens vulnerability to other illnesses. This 
limits their potential for productive existence, further exacerbating their marginalisation and vulnerability, 
and extending the vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment, see Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 2-3; 
Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 above) paras. 21-24; MJ Cohen & M Brown ‘Access to justice 
and the right to adequate food: Implementing Millennium Development Goal One’ (2005) 6 Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 54, at 54.  
15  UN Development Assistance Framework - Kenya 2009-2013 (May 2008) 6-7, available at 
http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/UNDAF (accessed on 20 July 2012); FIAN International (n 7 above) 7. 
The dire malnutrition situation was also recognised by the CESCR in its consideration of Kenya’s Initial 
Report to the Committee and it recommended in its Concluding Observation that Kenya should allocate 
sufficient resources to relevant programmes to ensure physical and economic access for everyone, 
including children in rural and deprived urban areas, to a minimum essential level of food that is sufficient, 
nutritionally adequate and safe. The CESCR further called on Kenya to ensure freedom from hunger in 
accordance with the Committee’s General Comment No. 12. See CESCR Report on the 40th and 41st 
Sessions – Supplement No. 2, E/C.12/2008/3’ (2009) para. 381, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a002b812.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2012). 
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undertaken using three tools: the progressive realisation standard; the tripartite typology tool; 
and the 4-A’s scheme. Section 6.7 delves into an analysis of the role of judges in the realisation 
of the right to adequate food in Kenya, and proposes the dialogical approach to SER 
adjudication to mitigate the challenges to judicial enforcement of the right to adequate food. 
Section 6.8 is a short conclusion of the chapter. Even though this chapter attempts to deal with 
the major concerns relating to food security and challenges facing Kenya with regard to the 
same, its scope does not allow for an exhaustive review of all aspects of the right to food. 
6.2 The meaning of the right to adequate food and the place of the law in the realisation 
of food security 
In his speech in 1941, the former president of the United States of America (US), Franklin D 
Roosevelt expounded on the four freedoms, being freedom of speech, faith, freedom from fear, 
and want.18 Even though freedom from want was an integral part of the quartet of rights, globally 
in general and in Kenya in particular, it has been honoured more in breach than in 
implementation, and it does not exist in reality for a majority of Kenyans. The right to adequate 
food is an important segment of the freedom from want, and it has been entrenched in several 
international and national binding legal instruments as will be discussed below. 
What does the right to adequate food mean, and what have law and judges got to do with it? 
The CESCR contends that the right to food is realised when ‘every woman, man or child, alone 
or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food 
or means for its procurement’.19 The above interpretation has been buttressed by Asbjorn Eide 
who contends that the right implies ‘the availability of food in quantity and quality sufficient to 
satisfy dietary needs’.20 A further definition of the right to adequate food has been provided by 
the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter who defines it as:21 
                                                            
18 FD Roosevelt, Message to Congress: The state of the Union, 7 vital speeches of the day 197,200 
(1941), quoted in Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 416. 
19 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 6. 
20 A Eide ‘The right to adequate standards of living including the right to food’ in A Eide, C Krause & A 
Rosas (eds.) Economic and social rights: A textbook, 2nd revised edition (2001) 133, at 134. 
21 O de Schutter ‘The right to food” available at http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/right-to-food 
(accessed on 5 July 2012). It was the same definition used by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the 
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The right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access, either directly or by means of 
financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding 
to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensure a 
physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear. 
This definition captures all the relevant components of the right to food, which include 
accessibility of food either by production or purchase, adequacy and safety of food, 
sustainability of food acquisition for present as well as future generations, cultural or consumer 
acceptability of available food, dietary sufficiency of food, and State accountability for the 
realisation of the right to food.22 
Law in general and legal rights in particular are partly responsible in the creation of 
conditions of starvation and nutritional deprivation through legally guaranteed ownership as well 
as property rights, trade and exchange systems (the WTO and its skewed international trade 
regimes – TRIPs),23 among others.24 In responding to these concerns, law can thus be used as 
a tool for transformation. Goler Teal Butcher argues as follows:25 
Law is relevant to the problem of hunger and securing food for hungry people with respect to both 
the short and long-term approaches to the problem because it is through law that we structure 
both the various mechanisms to respond to hunger in a crisis and the means to assist people with 
[the] pursuit of a development policy aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency.  
Law plays a two-fold role, that is, firstly the creation of a right to adequate food as well as its 
correlative duty, and secondly, the development of the institutional framework for the 
implementation and enforcement of the right to adequate food.26 In Kenya, the first role of law 
has been achieved though the entrenchment in the 2010 Constitution of important socio-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
right to food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, see Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 15; Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 
2 above) paras. 26-28. 
22 Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 16-18. 
23  Butcher (n 9 above) 195, who avers that hunger is a problem of global inequity and that responses to 
the hunger problem cannot ignore the world economic system. 
24 See J Dreze & A Sen Hunger and public action (1989) 20; D Brand ‘Food’ in S Woolman et al (eds.) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd Edition) 2 (2009)  56C-1. 
25 Butcher (n 9 above) 193. 
26 Butcher (n 9 above) 195. See also C Dias ‘The legal resources approach’ in A Eide et al (eds.) Food as 
a human right (1984) 175, at 175.   
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economic rights, such as the right to food and water, the right to social security and the right to 
health - rights intended to guarantee the minimal protection and survival needs for the most 
vulnerable in society.27 However, entrenchment on its own is not enough; the most important 
part, as envisaged by the second role of law above, is the interpretation, implementation and 
enforcement of the above legal provisions to translate them into concrete legal claims capable 
of ensuring their practical impact in the lives of the food-insecure individuals and groups in 
society. It is this second role of the law that is the main concern of this chapter, and will be 
tackled in the sections below. 
6.3  The right to food in international and regional law 
The right to adequate food can be gleaned from the Charter of the United Nations, especially 
article 55 which espouses the responsibility of the United Nations (UN) and its Member States 
to promote higher standards of living, full employment as well as conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; to find solutions for international economic, social, health and 
related problems; as well as to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.28 The right was first expressly entrenched 
internationally in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which espoused it as an 
important component of the right to an adequate standard of living.29 Though not legally binding 
at the time, it has been argued that due to the continued incorporation of the right in 
international and regional binding legal instruments, coupled with its incorporation in 
contemporary national constitutions as a justiciable right, it can confidently be said that the right 
to adequate food as incorporated in the UDHR has achieved the status of customary 
international law.30 Laura Niada has argued that due to the ‘oft pronounced revulsion for 
worldwide hunger’ and the espousal of the right to food in several binding and non-binding 
international legal instruments as well as in State constitutions and legislation, the right to food 
has, of necessity, achieved the status of customary international law, and should even be 
                                                            
27 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 43. 
28 UN Charter, article 55 (a)-(c) as read with articles 1(3) and 56. For more in-depth discussion on this, 
see, Buckingham (n 1 above) 289-290. 
29 See UDHR, article 25(1). See also article 25(2) which further entails special care and assistance for 
motherhood and childhood, two most vulnerable statuses with regard to hunger and malnutrition. 
30 See Buckingham (n 1 above) 293; Niada (n 6 above) 171; R Kunnemann & S Epal-Ratjen The right to 
food: A resource manual for NGOs (2005) 31. 
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considered to be a jus cogens norm.31 Smita Narula, however, adopts a more cautious stance, 
arguing that even though the right to food may have not yet achieved the status of customary 
law, its minimum core, which is, the fundamental right to be free from hunger, has achieved that 
status.32 Therefore, even if it is at a minimum, the right to food forms an important component of 
customary international law and is binding on non-state actors such as transnational 
corporations who are not bound by treaty obligations on the right to food. 
As an international binding legal right, the right to adequate food was first expressly 
enshrined in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) as an integral component to the right to an adequate standard of living.33 Article 11 
not only incorporates the right to adequate food, but also goes further to recognise the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.34 Specific to children, the right to 
adequate food is envisaged in article 24(2)(c) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) which envisages it as a component of the right to health, and which encompasses the 
obligation of the State to take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition through 
the provision of adequate nutritious food and clean drinking water.35  Article 24(2)(e) of the CRC 
further calls for the provision of information to, and the education of, parents and communities 
on child nutrition and the importance of breastfeeding.  Article 27(1) of the CRC further 
buttresses the protection of children’s right to adequate food by providing for the right of every 
                                                            
31 Niada (n 6 above) 173-176. 
32 S Narula ‘The right to food: Holding global actors accountable under international law’ (2006) 44 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 691, at 771-796. He undertakes an extensive analysis of a 
plethora of treaties both under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
Resolutions of the UN and its agencies, UN Declarations, national and international judicial declarations 
as well as provisions in national constitutions and legislation which have all at least affirmed the right to 
be free from hunger and concludes that the right to be free from hunger can safely be said to have 
customary law requirements of practice and opinio juris.  
33 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976. Accented to by Kenya on the 1 May 1972, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (accessed on 2 July 2012). 
34 ICESCR, article 11 (2). 
35 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 
20 November 1989. Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. Ratified by Kenya 
on the 30 July 1990, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (accessed on 2 July 2012). 
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child to a standard of living adequate to the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development. The right to adequate food for specific groups is further entrenched in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),36 and 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD).37 
The right to food subsists even in times of armed conflict, be it international or non-
international armed conflict (civil war). This is because the right has been entrenched in 
international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties, especially the Geneva Convention I,38 Geneva 
Convention III39 and Geneva Convention IV40 as well the two Additional Protocols.41 The 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions have widely been affirmed as having attained the status 
of customary international law, thus enhancing the protection that they accord as they then bind 
                                                            
36 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions on 18 December 1979 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1981. Accented to by Kenya on 9 March 1984, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm (accessed on 2 July 2012), articles 12(2) & 13. 
37 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f973632.html (accessed 31 January 2012). Signed by Kenya on 30 
March 2007 and ratified on 19 May 2008, article 28. 
38 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (GC I), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, articles 3 & 32, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3694.html (accessed 25 November 2012).  
39 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
135, articles 3, 20, 26-28, 31, 46, 51, 72, among others, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c8.html (accessed 25 November 2012). 
40 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287, articles 3, 15, 23, 36, 40, 49-51, 55, 59-62, among others, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html (accessed 25 November 2012). 
41 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, articles 54, 70(1), among 
others available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36b4.html (accessed 25 November 2012); 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, articles 5(1), 14, 
18(2), among others, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b37f40.html (accessed 25 
November 2012). 
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non-state actors as well as non-state parties.42 The protection in these conventions has further 
been enhanced by the adoption of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) as the violation of the right to food forms an important component of 
genocide, war crimes as well as crimes against humanity, international crimes over which the 
ICC has jurisdiction.43 
The right to adequate food is also recognised in the African Human Rights System as a 
legal right. Even though the main normative treaty cataloguing fundamental human rights in 
Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), does not expressly 
provide for the right to adequate food, the right was derived from the right to life (article 4), the 
right to dignity (article 5), the right to health (article 16), and the right to economic, social and 
cultural development (article 22) by the African Commission on Human Peoples’ Rights, the 
authoritative body mandated by the African Charter to interpret, promote and protect the rights 
in the Charter, in the case of SERAC v Nigeria.44 The place of the right to adequate food in the 
overall framework of the right to health in Africa was further affirmed by the 2004 Pretoria 
Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, which espouses the content of 
the right to health as encompassing the right of access to minimum essential food which is 
                                                            
42 Narula (n 32 above) 782-783. 
43 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, articles 6(b), 7(2)(b), 8(2), among others,  available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html (accessed 25 November 2012). 
44 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001), para. 64,  reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds.) Compendium of key human rights documents 
of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007)  251, at 260. Similar practices of protecting SERs through a broad 
interpretation of civil and political rights can be gleaned from the practice of the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) which, in its General Comment No. 6 contends that the “inherent right to life” must be interpreted 
broadly to include positive State duties such as the elimination of malnutrition (at para. 5). This trend has 
been adopted by the Indian Supreme Court which has developed a jurisprudence of SER protection 
through the broad interpretation of the right to life such as in Francis Coralie Mullin v The administrator, 
Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516 at 529 and in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of 
India, (Writ Petition [Civil] No. 196 of 2001) available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html 
(accessed on 3 September 2012). 
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nutritionally adequate and safe to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone and to prevent 
malnutrition.45 
The right to adequate food is further provided for in the African Human Rights System, in 
relation to women, in the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa 
which, in making provision for the right to food security, affirms the obligation of the State to 
ensure that women have the right to adequate and nutritious food.46 In relation to children, the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter) also 
recognises the right to adequate food within the right to health, requiring State Parties to ensure 
the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water, as well as undertaking societal 
education with regard to child health and nutrition, advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and 
environmental sanitation.47 Further in this regard, the Children’s Charter encompasses the 
responsibility of the State, where needed, to materially assist and support parents as well as 
guardians, specifically in relation to nutrition.48 
A discussion of the right to food in international and regional law is imperative as 
international law contained in ratified international and regional treaties as well as customary 
international law have been directly incorporated into the Kenyan domestic legal system as 
sources of law as discussed chapter two, section 2.2 above. The right to food obligations arising 
from these laws are, therefore, as binding to the Kenyan government as those arising from the 
2010 Kenyan Constitution and any other domestic legislation enacted by the Kenyan 
parliament. The political institutions as well as the courts must, therefore, take these 
international legal provisions on the right to food into account in developing a legislative, policy 
                                                            
45 Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa 2004, paras. 7 & 10 Adopted by 
the African Commission at its 36th Session in December, 2004, reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds.) 
Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007) 315, at 317-318.  
46 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(2003/2005) article 15, reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds.) Compendium of key human rights 
documents of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007) 47, at 54. 
47 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990/1999), article 14 (c) & (h), reprinted in C 
Heyns & M Killander (eds.) Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union, 3rd edition 
(2007) 62, at 66. 
48  African Children’s Charter, article 20(2). 
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and programmatic framework on the realisation of the right to food as well as in litigation relating 
to the right to food. 
6.4 The right to food in the Kenyan legal system 
Hunger, starvation and the food security crisis in Kenya is not a totally exceptional 
phenomenon, but the result of endemic and persistent human mismanagement as well as a lack 
of adequate government planning. It is the culmination of a situation described by Richard H. 
Tawney as follows:  
Famine is the final stage of a disease which, though not always conspicuous, is ever present. As a 
calamity, it affords us the opportunity to grasp in a more profound sense the structure of society itself 
in the same way that disease permits the physician to better understand the secret life of the body. 
The State’s inability to recognise the political, economic and social determinants of starvation is 
exemplified by the multiplicity of fragmented, contradictory and, at times, conflicting legislative, 
policy and programmatic framework that has hampered the realisation of the right to adequate 
food.  However, with the adoption of the 2010 Constitution and the elaboration of a Draft 
National Food and Nutrition Security Policy 2011, there is a concerted effort to develop and 
implement a comprehensive and coordinated legal, policy and programmatic framework for the 
realisation of the right to food in Kenya. 
6.4.1 The right to food in the Kenyan Constitution  
The right to adequate food, as a justiciable right, has, for the first time, been entrenched in the 
Kenyan national legal system with the commencement of the new constitutional dispensation as 
a result of the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. It is provided for both as a direct 
constitutional provision,49 and through the incorporation of international law into the Kenyan 
domestic legal system through articles 2(5) and (6) of the 2010 Constitution.50 Other 
                                                            
49 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, articles 43(1)(c) which entrenches the right to adequate food and 
freedom from hunger, and article 53(1)(c) which entrenches the right of children to basic nutrition. 
50 Debate abounds as to the correct place of international law, especially with regard to its hierarchy, in 
the Kenyan domestic legal system. As submitted in chapter two of this thesis, international law, especially 
binding treaty law, which has been ratified by Kenya, forms part of Kenyan law and can be directly 
applied by the Kenyan Courts. For a more elaborate discussion, see chapter two, section 2.2 above. 
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complementary rights have also been entrenched in the Constitution, such as the right to life,51 
the right to health,52 the right to clean and safe water in adequate quantities,53 the right to social 
security,54 the right to clean and healthy environment,55 right to fair labour practices,56 consumer 
protection rights,57 and more importantly the right of access to land and land tenure rights, the 
basic means of food production.58 
6.4.2 The right to food in the national legislative and policy arena 
At the legislative and policy level, Kenya has not put in place framework legislation aimed at the 
holistic realisation of the right to food. The food security sphere has for a long time been 
governed by a myriad of contradictory legislative,59 policy and structural frameworks devoid of 
                                                            
51 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 26(1). See FAO, The right to food guidelines: Information papers 
and case studies (2006) 72. 
52 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 43(1)(a). 
53 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 43(1)(d). 
54 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 43(1)(e). This is further buttressed by article 43(3) which enjoins 
the State to provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and 
their dependants.  
55 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 42 which enjoins the State to protect the environment for the 
present and future generations, thus espousing the concept of sustainable development. 
56 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 41, which includes the right to work and earn fair remuneration, 
an important aspect in the enhancement of people’s food entitlements as discussed in section 6.6.3 
below. 
57 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 46. 
58 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, Part V, especially article 60, which provides for an equitable, efficient, 
productive and sustainable access to and use of land, and prohibits gender discrimination in access to, 
and use of, land. Article 68, among other things, further requires parliament to enact legislation regulating 
the recognition and protection of matrimonial property during and on the termination of marriage, an 
important safeguard to ensure continued access to food production or access to resources in instances of 
separation, divorce or the attempted sale of matrimonial property in the execution of debts. 
59 Some of the legislation related to food security and thus the right to food include: The Agriculture Act, 
Cap 318 (aimed at promoting and maintaining stable agriculture and the management and conservation 
of agricultural land for crop production); The Crop Production and Livestock Act, Cap 32 (aimed at the 
improvement of livestock and crop production and marketing); Price Control of Essential Foods Act, 26 of 
2011 (aimed at controlling prices of essential commodities with the objective of cushioning Kenyans 
against arbitrary price increases and thus enhance the affordability of especially food commodities); and, 
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adequate coordination.60 However, with the adoption of the Constitution and the entrenchment 
of the right to food as a justiciable right, efforts have been undertaken to develop a holistic 
policy on the right to food, and this has culminated in the Draft National Food and Nutrition 
Security Policy, 2011. The Policy is premised on the State’s commitment to ensure that all 
Kenyan throughout their life-cycle enjoy safe food61 of sufficient quality and quantity to enable 
them satisfy their nutritional needs and live healthy lives.62 The major objectives of the policy 
aimed at realising this goal are to increase the quantity and quality of food available so as to 
enhance accessibility and affordability, as well as the development of safety-nets to cushion 
vulnerable groups and individuals, and to ensure their long-term development.63 
The Policy acknowledges the importance of adequate food and nutrition at all stages of a 
person’s life for proper growth, development and productivity and thus adopts a life-cycle 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The Environmental Management and Coordination Act, 8 of 1999 (establishes the National Environmental 
Management Authority tasked with the management of all environmental issues). For a more elaborate 
discussion of these legislation, see FM Bulimo, The effects of climate change on the realisation of the 
right to adequate food in Kenya (January 2012) chapter five, an LLM thesis submitted at Rhodes 
University, available at http://eprints.ru.ac.za/2993/1/KHAYUNDI-LLM-TR12-69.pdf (accessed on 24 
November 2012). 
60 Some of these policies included: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2001; the Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007; the Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture, 2004-2014; Kenya’s Vision 2030; the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy, 2010-2020; 
the Food Policy, Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981; and the National Food Policy, Sessional Paper No. 1 of 
1994, see Kenya’s Draft National Food and Nutrition Security Policy, 2011, paras. 1.4-1.5, available at 
http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs (accessed on 23 November 
2012). 
61 Food safety has been an area of concern for Kenya and the responsibility for ensuring food safety and 
quality has been scattered in 20 uncoordinated or loosely coordinated Acts of Parliament monitored by 12 
different regulatory ministries and departments of the State. This, coupled with the fact that most of the 
regulatory regimes are not in conformity with current international standards, has led to inefficiency and 
threatened the well-being of people. However, the Draft Policy aims to rectify this situation through the 
creation of the National Food Safety Coordination Committee, an inter-ministerial body aimed at 
reforming and harmonising the regulatory regime and ensuring coordination between the relevant 
government structures, see Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) chapter 3. 
62 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) Executive Summary (ES) para. 4 & para. 1.6. 
63 As above. 
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approach to food security and nutrition.64 It further affirms the important role knowledge and 
access to information plays in enhancing nutritional well-being, and calls for efforts to improve 
nutritional education for all sectors of society.65 It envisages the establishment of early warning 
systems to detect threats to food security and advocates the establishment of innovative 
response mechanisms such as transfer-based entitlements, cash transfers, public works 
programmes, input support, livelihood restoration (the Njaa Marufuku Kenya programme is a 
case in point),66 and livestock management programmes.67 The Policy recognises that the 
failure in the previous framework for the realisation of food security was due to a lack of 
coordination among the myriad legal and institutional frameworks which had differing mandates, 
as well as a lack of financial and human resources. To respond to this state of affairs, the Policy 
envisages the development of a comprehensive and coordinated legal framework for the 
enhancement of food security as well as the establishment of an adequate structural framework 
for the coordination of all efforts geared towards the realisation of food security.68 It further 
espouses the commitment of the State to avail resources through its Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework to enhance the realisation of the goals contained in the Policy.69  
Though the Policy does not employ the language of the right to food, it recognises the 
entrenchment in the Constitution of the right to be free from hunger and the right to food, and 
                                                            
64 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) ES para. 8 & para. 4.2. 
65 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) ES para. 9. It calls for the collection and utilisation of data 
in the formulation and implementation of policies and strategies aimed at the realisation of food security, 
at para. 10. 
66 The Programme is aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, food utilisation, agro-processing and 
value addition, health and nutrition improvement, water harvesting, as well as conservation of natural 
resources, see Bulimo (n 59 above) 110-111. 
67 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) ES para. 11 & chapter 7. 
68 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) ES para. 12 & chapter 8.  
69 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) para. 2.2.6 which envisages some of the resource 
commitments of the State to include: the establishment of an Agricultural Development Fund to enhance 
agricultural production; increased funding to the food and agriculture sector to 10 per cent of the national 
budget; support of sustainable irrigation and water management systems; support for the markets and the 
private sector to provide input and financial services at affordable prices to food producers; subsidisation 
of production inputs to support those experiencing food insecurity; and support of investment in 
infrastructure to enhance production.  
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also closely links the realisation of food security to national security, affirming that substantive 
peace cannot be achieved unless food security is ensured.70 It also recognises the adverse 
effects of global warming as well as global food and financial crisis on agriculture and livestock 
farming. To respond to these challenges, it envisages the establishment of adaptation 
interventions to cushion affected people and enhance their food security.71  
6.4.3 Proposed strategies towards the realisation of the right to adequate food in Kenya 
Though comprehensive, the Draft National Food and Nutrition Security Policy, 2011 discussed 
above, has not sufficiently incorporated the international standards on the right to food. First, it 
does not employ the language of the right to food, and thus detracts from an understanding of 
food as an entitlement and not a charity. This failure delinks the realisation of food security from 
the realisation of other human rights, taking into account the internationally entrenched principle 
of the indivisibility, interrelatedness and interdependence of rights.72 It is also contrary to the 
recommendations by the CESCR that to enhance the realisation of the right to food at the 
national level, a State must adopt a national strategy which is ‘based on human rights principles 
that define the objectives, and the formulation of policies and corresponding benchmarks’.73 
                                                            
70 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) paras. 1.2, 2.9.4. & Annex 1. 
71 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) para. 1.3. It affirms the importance of supporting domestic 
production as well as the diversification of food production and consumption. It also recognises that the 
use of agricultural land for bio-fuel and agricultural export production, as well as the non-strategic 
agricultural trade liberalisation which has turned Kenya into a net food importer, have adverse effects on 
Kenya’s food security and must be addressed to ensure that food and nutritional security remains 
Kenya’s priority at para. 1.3.8-1.3.10. 
72 See CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 4, which affirms that the right to food is inherently linked 
to human dignity, is indispensable to the realisation of other human rights, and is inseparable from social 
justice. It further contends that to enhance the realisation of food security, States must adopt sound 
economic, environmental and social policies aimed at the eradication of poverty and the realisation of all 
human rights. See also FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Preface, paras. 7 & 19 and Guideline 3.1 which calls 
for the adoption of a national human rights-based strategy for the realisation of the right to food. 
73 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 21. See also C McClain-Nhlapo ‘Implementing a human rights 
approach to food security’(2004) 4, available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ib29.pdf 
(accessed on 6 January 2013), where she acknowledges the importance of food in the realisation of all 
the other human rights, and advocates the adoption of a rights-based approach to food security, 
contending that this approach has several advantages, that is, it introduces international principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, it is supportive of both CPRs and SERS, it draws attention to the needs 
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Secondly, the Policy has failed to adopt the minimum core approach to the right to food, which 
is, putting in place sufficient measures aimed to alleviating and mitigating hunger.74 Thirdly, the 
Policy was developed using the top-down approach to policy formulation and development, and 
thus did not sufficiently incorporate the voices of the most vulnerable and marginalised 
individuals and groups, the very people who are the most food insecure.75 Fourthly, the Policy 
failed to provide a clear time-frame within which the programmes incorporated therein are to be 
developed and operationalised.76 Finally, the Policy fails to set clear and verifiable indicators 
and benchmarks for the monitoring and evaluation of its implementation, only providing, in 
paragraph 9.3, that this are to be developed at some later stage.77 
 Since the Draft Policy has not yet been adopted by the Cabinet, there is still room for 
further improvements to enhance its capacity to meet the practical challenges to food security 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of the most vulnerable and food insecure, and it addresses not only the consequences of food insecurity, 
but also its causes.  
74 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 6, 8, 14, 17 & 28, which affirm the minimum core approach in 
relation to the right to food. For a more elaborate discussion on the minimum core of the right to food, see 
section 6.5 below.  
75 This was contrary to the requirements of the espousal of the principles of accountability, transparency, 
people’s participation and other good governance principles which are key to the realisation of human 
rights, reduction of poverty and the achievement of social justice, see General Comment No. 12, paras. 
23 & 24; FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 1; McClain-Nhlapo (n 73 above) 4, who affirms the 
importance of a rights-based approach in the development of national food security strategy as it ensures 
people’s participation, promotes good governance, empowers local communities to take part in public 
decision-making and holding the government accountable to its obligations, as well as empowering 
people to take direct responsibility to meet their food needs, thus being part of the solution to food 
insecurity challenges. Public participation in government decision-making is the bedrock on which the 
theory of dialogical constitutionalism, developed in chapters two and three, and applied in this chapter, is 
premised.  
76 See General Comment No. 12, para. 24, which requires that a national strategy for the realisation of 
the right to food must not only set out responsibilities for its implementation, but must also contain clear 
timelines within which measures aimed at its realisation are to be implemented. The National Policy 
provides generally that it will be implemented in a period covering 15 years, with three five-year phases. 
It, however, does not clearly set out which specific activities within the policy will be implemented within 
which phases of the 15 year period, see Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) para. 9.2.2. 
77 See CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 29. See also FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 3.3. 
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and thus lead to the realisation of the right to adequate food for everyone in Kenya.78 Some 
suggestions for the improvement of the Draft Policy, and the subsequent legislative and 
programmatic framework anticipated in line with the Draft Policy, are thus made below. 
To begin with, the development of the national food security strategic framework, which 
encompasses the Draft policy and subsequent legislative and programmatic frameworks aimed 
the realisation of the right to adequate food, must be informed by the livelihood approach, taking 
into account the different entitlements of different people as discussed in the legal obligations of 
the State in section 6.6 below. The need to adopt this approach is supported by the FAO’s 
Voluntary Guidelines which advocates a holistic and comprehensive approach to hunger and 
poverty reduction, and requires the adoption of the following measures:79 
[d]irect and immediate measures to ensure access to adequate food as part of a social safety net; 
investment in productive activities and projects to improve the livelihoods of the poor and hungry 
in a sustainable manner; the development of appropriate institutions, functioning markets, a 
conducive legal and regulatory framework; and access to employment, productive resources and 
appropriate services. 
The development of such a holistic and comprehensive strategic framework should be aimed at 
the realisation of the short-, medium- and long-term goals of ensuring food security for the entire 
Kenyan populace.80  This, in essence, therefore requires that the strategic framework addresses 
all levels of the food system, being production, processing, distribution, marketing, safety; non-
discrimination in access to production resources such as land, credit, natural resources and 
                                                            
78 This should be done by taking incorporating the areas that the Policy has failed to expressly provide for 
as discussed above. The need to adopt a human rights-based national strategy for the realisation of the 
right to food is especially emphasised by the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, especially Guideline 3.5. The 
adoption of the minimum core approach in the realisation of the right to food is emphasised by the FAO’s 
Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 3.6, which requires the prioritisation of basic services to the poorest.  
79 FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 2.4. See also CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 29-30, 
which calls for the development of a framework legislation as an important component of the national 
strategy for the realisation of the right to food.  
80 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 21-22 & 29. See also FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 
3 which calls for a national rights-based strategy for the realisation of the right to food (Guideline 3.1). 
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appropriate technology; as well as food-related fields such as health, education, employment 
and social security.81 
Secondly, in developing the strategic framework, the State must, in line with the theory 
of dialogical constitutionalism expounded in chapters three and four above, undertake an 
inclusive and participatory food security assessment of the whole country, and undertake an 
analysis of that assessment to identify groups and communities who are food insecure, as well 
as the causes of food-insecurity of these groups.82 It should then use its analysis to design the 
requisite remedial measures to ensure short-,83 medium- and long-term food security of these 
vulnerable groups.84 Such framework must include the time-frames for implementation, the 
                                                            
81 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 25 & 26. See also the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, 
Guidelines 3.3 & 3.6; Brand – Right to food (n 9 above) 160, who summarises the requisite measures as 
follows: 
[m]easures to ensure the creation and maintenance of a sufficient supply of food (agricultural 
production planning and subsidisation, food import and export planning and sustainable 
management and use of natural and other resources for food production); measures to ensure 
that standards of nutritional adequacy, safety and cultural acceptability of food are maintained 
(nutritional supplementation of basic foodstuffs…); measures facilitating access to food (tax zero-
rating of basic foodstuff, food price monitoring, market regulation, subsidisation or actual price 
control); measures actually providing food or the means to acquire it to those who are deprived 
(direct food provision to disaster victims, food stamp or other social assistance programmes to 
indigent people); measures to monitor the nutritional situation in the country so as to inform policy 
formulation and implementation; measures to prevent discrimination in access to food.    
82 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 140-141. He argues that the identification of 
the food-insecure groups, their location, and the particular causes underlying their food insecurity 
increases the possibility of developing precise and appropriate responses to their situations. See also 
FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guidelines 2.2, 3.8-3.9 & 17.2. 
83  Short-term measures may include the design of social as well as food safety nets to cushion those 
who are unable to feed themselves, see the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 14. 
84 FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline13, which calls for a disaggregated analysis of food insecurity, 
vulnerability and the national nutritional status of different  groups in society, and to put in place  both 
immediate and progressive corrective measures to remedy the situation of the food-insecure and 
vulnerable groups. 
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institutional responsibility for the implementation of the framework,85 collaboration with national 
and international civil society organisations and the private sector, as well as specific indicators 
and benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation of the success of the resultant programmes.86 
Further, the framework must identify the resources capable of implementing the national food 
strategic framework, be it from national or international sources taking into account the principle 
of international responsibility for the realisation of the right to food, and use the available 
resources in the most cost-effective way to enhance the realisation of the right to food for a 
majority of the food-insecure people in Kenya.87 In this vein, the process of developing the 
national food strategic framework must thus engender societal dialogue and participation, 
incorporating the voices of the vulnerable food-insecure groups and communities.88 It must also 
comply with the good governance principles such as transparency and accountability.89  
 
                                                            
85 See FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 5 which calls on the State to establish, reform, or improve 
institutional structures aimed at the realisation of the right to adequate food, and to ensure that there is 
national inter-sectoral coordination and collaboration between all government ministries and other 
stakeholders concerned with the realisation of the right to adequate food. 
86 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 141-142; FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, 
Guidelines 3.3 & 17.3-17.4. Guideline 17.4 specifically provides that indicators should be developed in 
such a way that ‘they explicitly relate and reflect the use of specific policy instruments and interventions 
with outcomes consistent with the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security’. 
87 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 21. 
88 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 23 & 24. See also  Eide – Right to adequate standards of 
living (n 20 above) 155, where he interprets the limitations on individual duties imposed in article 29 of the 
UDHR “that limitations must not go beyond what is justly required in a democratic society” as containing 
an essential principle that in ascertaining a proper balance of competing interests in the design of the 
legal and implementation framework with regard to the right to adequate food, there must be an all-
inclusive societal dialogue on the basis of equality. For an elaboration of the need for public participation 
in the design and development of an SER implementation framework, see chapter four, section 4.2.  
89 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 23, which provides that good governance is essential to the 
realisation of all human rights, including the elimination of poverty and the enhancement of livelihood for 
all people. See also the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, especially Guideline 1 which sets out the 
responsibility of States to ensure democracy, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of 
human rights in their efforts to realise the right to adequate food. 
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6.5 The content of the right to food in the Kenyan legal system 
The development of the content of the right to food must of necessity be understood within the 
scope of the objective of the right to adequate standards of living, which is to ensure human 
dignity and the full participation of people in ordinary social interaction.90 The major source of its 
legal content is derived from article 11 of the ICESCR as it is both a codification of the norms 
contained in the UDHR, and is the norm from which other international and national legal 
instruments providing for the right to adequate food draw their inspiration and content.91   
The right to food as enshrined in article 11 of the ICESCR has two components: the right 
to adequate food as provided for in article 11(1) and the right to be free from hunger as is 
provided for in article 11(2).92 In analysing the two rights, most commentators have argued that 
the right to adequate food is a much broader right in scope, engendering a maximalist approach 
to the right to food, while the fundamental right to be free from hunger is a sub-norm of the 
broader norm, which espouses the starting point (first step) for national as well as international 
efforts in the overall realisation of the right to food.93 Taking into account the maximalist 
approach, adequacy of food thus demands that it is of such quantity to facilitate a normal, active 
existence, rather than a mere minimum calorie package aimed at preventing death by 
starvation.94 The maximalist approach is adequately espoused by the definition of the right to 
                                                            
90 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 133; Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 
39. 
91 P Alston ‘International law and the right to food’ in A Eide et al (eds.) Food as a human right (1984) 
162, at 165; Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 9 
above) 168. 
92 Alston - International law and the right to food (n 91 above) 166-167; Niada (n 6 above) 151. 
93 CESCR General Comment 12, para. 1, which provides that the realisation of the fundamental right to 
freedom from hunger and malnutrition needs immediate and urgent steps. It further affirms that States 
have a core obligation to take necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger as provided in article 
11(2), at para. 6; Alston - International law and the right to food (n 91 above) 167; Butcher (n 9 above) 
194; HJ Richardson ‘The right to food in international perspective: The international human rights 
response’ (1987) 30 Howard Law Journal 233, at 241; Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: 
Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 168; Buckingham (n 1 above) 292-293. 
94 Alston - International law and the right to food (n 91 above) 167. See also CESCR General Comment 
No. 12, para. 6 which warns against a narrow or restricted interpretation of the right to adequate food that 
equates it to a minimum package of calories, proteins or other specific nutrients. 
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adequate food as is provided by de Schutter above. The CESCR details the core content of the 
right to adequate food as follows:95 
The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs96 of 
individuals, free from adverse substances,97 and acceptable within a given culture; [as well as] 
the accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the 
enjoyment of other human rights. 
The content of the right to adequate food, as is discussed above, is further elaborated in the 
discussion on the attendant State obligations below.  
6.6  The obligations of the State with regard to the right to food in Kenya 
The obligations of the State discussed here proceed from the direct constitutional provision on 
the right to food, supportive constitutional provisions as well as international human rights law.98 
This is because the direct constitutional provision on the right to adequate food has an 
international law DNA, and thus its content as well as attendant obligations must be gleaned 
from, and be understood within the context of, international law.99  This section thus discusses 
                                                            
95 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 8.  
96 Dietary needs require that the food contains a sufficient mix of the nutrients to enhance physical and 
mental growth, development and maintenance, as well as the daily activities of the individuals concerned, 
see CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 9. 
97 Requires that the food is safe for human consumption and is free from contamination or adulteration by 
any harmful agents, see CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 10. 
98 Though Kenya has extra-territorial obligations with regard to the right to food in other countries, this 
component of the obligations is beyond the scope of this study. For an analysis of the extra-territorial 
obligations of States in the context of the right to food, see Niada (n 6 above) 158-163. See also Narula (n 
31 above) 691-800, who argues passionately for the reform of the human rights system to enhance 
accountability for global actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs) and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) through the mechanisms of extra-territorial obligations as well as international 
cooperation so as to ascertain the realisation of the right to food. 
99 See P de Vos ‘The right to housing’ in D Brand & C Heyns (eds). Socio-economic rights in South Africa 
(2005) 85, at 89, who acknowledges the importance of international SER law in interpreting domestic 
constitutional law contending that international SER law is more developed and more nuanced than 
equivalent domestic law on SERs.  
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the obligations of the right to adequate food as it is generally understood in international law.100 
This approach is important as the fulfilment of the right to adequate food encompasses both 
national and international obligations, and failures at any of these levels almost always leads to 
the violation of the right to adequate food for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups in 
society.101 
In discussing the State’s obligations with regard to the realisation of the right to adequate 
food, two points must be borne in mind. First, this discussion must commence from the premise 
that it is the primary duty of an individual to feed him/herself and his/her family, and that the 
obligations of the State are intended to supplement these personal efforts whenever needed.102 
This point is affirmed by commentators who argue that in fulfilling the right to adequate food, the 
main role of the State is not feeding or maintaining everyone, but creating a social and 
economic environment which fosters development and which ensures that individuals have the 
ability to feed themselves.103 This has further been affirmed by the current UN Special 
                                                            
100 An integrated discussion of Kenya’s obligations in national and international law in relation to the right 
to food is especially important due to the constitutional provisions incorporating customary international 
law as well as international law in ratified international and regional treaties directly in the Kenyan 
domestic legal sphere as has been more elaborately discussed in chapter two, section 2.2 above.  
101 See Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 32. 
102 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 140. See also A Eide ‘The international 
human rights system’ in A Eide et al (eds.) Food as a human right (1984) 152, at 157-158, who contends 
that rights cannot be realised unless individuals accept the duty ‘not only to do what is within their power 
to secure their own basic needs, but they are also obliged to participate in common endeavours, as 
directed by the State, in order to realise human rights for all’. 
103 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A perspective on its 
development (1998) 310; K Tomasevski ‘Human Rights: The right to food’ (1985) 70 Iowa Law Review 
1321, at 1325; C Christensen The right to food: How to guarantee (1978) 33; Alston - International law 
and the right to food (n 91 above)168-169, where, in answer to the question “what are the exact individual 
entitlements with regard to the right to adequate food” he avers that the most important requirement at the 
national level is to develop a set of relevant legal norms which reflect and seek to satisfy the State’s 
international legal obligations to promote the realisation of the right to adequate food; Eide, Oshauge & 
Eide (n 9 above) 430-433, where they decry the traditional wisdom that the provision of SERs, of which 
food is a part, is the sole responsibility of the State, and contend that this is a narrow, incorrect 
understanding of the nature of SERs and their corresponding obligations. They argue, relying on article 2 
of the Declaration on the Right to Development, that individuals have the responsibility, whenever 
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Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who avers that the right requires States to provide an enabling 
environment in which people can use their full potential to produce or purchase adequate food 
for themselves and their families.104 The principle is further acknowledged, with regard to 
children, in the CRC which affirms the primacy of parental responsibility in securing conditions 
of life necessary for a child’s development, though limiting that responsibility in relation to the 
abilities and financial capacities of the parents.105  
Secondly, in undertaking an analysis of the obligations of the State to realise the right to 
food, it is important to take into account the principle of the interdependence, 
interconnectedness and interrelatedness of rights.106 It is generally agreed among 
commentators that the realisation of the right to food is dependent upon the realisation of other 
mutually supportive rights such as the right to health, water, work, social security and even 
participatory rights such as labour rights and the right to self-determination.107 The crucial 
importance of understanding the right to food within the context of other human rights has been 
affirmed by the CESCR who contend that ‘the right to food is indivisibly linked to the inherent 
dignity of every human person …, is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human rights, 
…[and] is inseparable from social justice’.108  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
possible, to use their own efforts and employ their own resources to ensure the satisfaction of their 
needs. 
104 Schutter - The right to food (n 21 above) para. 2. 
105 CRC, article 27(2). 
106 See, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) ‘Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive 
realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security’ adopted by the 127th 
Session of the FAO Council (November 2004) para. 19, available at 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/publi09/y9825e01.pdf (accessed on 6 July 2012). 
107 Craven (n 103 above) 311. For an analysis of the intrinsic interrelation of the right to food to other 
rights in the context of South Africa, see Brand – The right to food (n 9 above) 163-165. 
108 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 4. It thus provides that the fulfilment of the right to food 
requires the adoption of appropriate economic, environmental and social policies aimed at the eradication 
of poverty and the fulfilment of the entire corpus of human rights for everyone. See also Kunnemann - 
The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 164, who 
contends that without the right to feed oneself, political participation, cultural identity and democracy lose 
their meaning. 
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In acknowledging the important role that the realisation of the right to food plays in 
relation to other rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights  found that the 
right is intricately linked to human dignity and is essential in the enjoyment of other rights such 
as health, education, work as well as political participation.109 Phillip Alston, referring to the need 
for a comprehensive approach to the realisation of the right to food argues that ‘a 
compartmentalised approach to the right to food is both empirically unworkable and theoretically 
unacceptable’.110 Similar calls have been made for a “livelihood approach to food security” 
instead of a “food-first approach” in the realisation of the right to adequate food.111 The Supreme 
Court of India espoused the livelihoods approach in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corp where 
it held as follows:112 
An equally important facet of the right [to life] is the right to livelihood because no person can live 
without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to a livelihood is not 
treated as part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right 
to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to a point of abrogation. 
The Indian Court, therefore, considered the right to food as an integral part of the right to life. 
The present chapter advocates a livelihoods approach to the realisation of the right to adequate 
food, and calls on all the institutions of the State to put in place an environment conducive for 
people to feed themselves through the protection of people’s resources and survival 
entitlements as discussed below. 
                                                            
109 SERAC v Nigeria (n 44 above) para. 65. See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom & Others, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 23, where Justice Yacoob held that: 
[t]here can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our 
society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Affording [SERs] to all people 
therefore enables them to enjoy other rights enshrined in [the Bill of Rights]. The realisation of 
these rights is the key to the achievement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a 
society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential. 
110 P Alston ‘International law and the human right to food’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds.), The right to 
food (1984) 9, at 19. 
111 FAO – Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 2, especially 2.4, which also advocates for a holistic and 
comprehensive approach to hunger and poverty reduction. 
112 Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (July 10 1985) para. 2.1, available at http://droits-
sociaux.u-paris10.fr/assets/files/Jurisprudence/D.Roman/Olga_Tellis.pdf (accessed on 20 August 2012). 
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6.6.1 General obligation with regard to the right to adequate food 
The general obligation of the State with regard to the right to food, as with the other SERs is 
provided in articles 2(1) and 11113 of the ICESCR as well as article 21(2) of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states as follows: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights 
recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures. 
This general obligation has several intertwined and mutually reinforcing components as has 
been discussed more expansively and comprehensively in chapter two, section 2.3 above: 
progressive realisation; obligation to take steps; maximum of available resources; and, 
international cooperation and assistance, as is discussed below.114 
i) Progressive realisation 
The standard of progressive realisation is a flexibility device115 which entails a recognition of the 
inability of the State to immediately, or in the short-term, fulfil the right of everyone to adequate 
food.116 Progressive realisation is not, however, futuristic; it demands that States, regardless of 
level of economic development, ensure respect for the minimum subsistence rights for all.117 
                                                            
113 ICESCR article 11 affirms the responsibility of States to take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realisation of the right to adequate standards of living, of which the right to food forms an integral part, 
and the duty is to be undertaken taking into account the importance of international cooperation based on 
free consent. 
114 The standard of progressive realisation in relation to the fulfilment of SERs in general has been 
discussed extensively in chapter two, section 2.3 above. This part of the discussion is a continuation of 
that particular discussion, though more attuned to the realisation of the right to food as a component of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. 
115 See Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 434, who contend that the flexibility was intended to make it 
possible for States to realise their SER obligations in ways that correspond to their particular situations.  
116 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the 
Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 9, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838e10.html (accessed on 2 July 2012). 
117 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 138. 
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CESCR has affirmed that the standard requires States to move expeditiously in taking steps to 
realise the right to adequate food,118 and further avers that ‘every State is obliged to ensure for 
everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient, 
nutritionally adequate, and safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger’.119 Asbjorn Eide 
summarises this obligation by stating as follows:120 
States are ...under an immediate obligation to ensure the minimum essential level required to be 
free from hunger, and an immediate obligation and continuous obligation to move as 
expeditiously as possible towards the full realisation of the right to [adequate] food, particularly for 
the vulnerable population groups and individuals.  
This necessarily leads us to the concept of the minimum core content of rights and its attendant 
minimum core obligations.121 In its General Comment Number 3, the CESCR states that:122 
[a] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party [and that] a State party in which 
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuff….is, prima facie, failing to 
discharge its obligations under the Covenant. 
                                                            
118 For a requirement that the State moves expeditiously in realising SERs, see Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-26, 1997, guideline 8, 
available at http://www.escr-net.org/resources_more/resources_more_show.htm?doc_id=425803 
(accessed on 2 July 2012); Limburg Principles on the Implementation of Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights, para 7, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987), pp. 122–
135,  principle 21. See also Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum 
core content (n 10 above) 172-173. 
119 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 14. 
120 Eide – Right to adequate standards of living (n 20 above) 139. 
121 Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 21. For a comprehensive and illuminating discussion of the minimum core 
approach and its place in the development of Kenya’s SER jurisprudence, see chapter two, section 2.5 
and chapter five, section 5.3.2. The submission emanating from the discussion in the two sections is that, 
if Kenya is to achieve the transformative aspirations of 2010 Constitution, a substantive conception of 
SERs, which encompasses an espousal of the minimum core approach to the interpretation, 
implementation and enforcement of SERs, must be adopted both by the political institutions and the 
courts. 
122 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 10. 
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Rolf Kunnemann contends that the CESCR’s recognition of “access to essential foodstuff” 
as part of the minimum core content of the right to adequate food is in line with the emphasis 
that has been placed on the “fundamental right to be free from hunger” as contained in article 
11(2) of the ICESCR, and he concludes that freedom from hunger is the baseline and minimum 
core content of the right to adequate food.123 For its part, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights has found, in the SERAC case, that the minimum core of the right to food 
requires the State not to contaminate or destroy food sources, to prevent third parties from 
destroying or contaminating food sources, and not to prevent people from feeding 
themselves.124 The exposition of the minimum core by the African Commission is reflective of 
the minimum core content of the right to food as advocated by the CESCR, as both are aimed at 
ensuring that people are free from hunger and starvation.125 Therefore, failure to realise the 
minimum core obligation, which is essentially a failure to satisfy the minimum essential levels of 
food to ensure freedom from hunger is a violation of the right to food.126 
Non-discrimination in the realisation of the right to adequate food is also an immediate 
obligation of the State, and should be viewed as a component of the minimum core content of 
the right to adequate food.127 Therefore, any form of discrimination on any prohibited grounds 
                                                            
123 Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 
171; Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 36-37. 
124 SERAC v Nigeria (n 44 above) 65. The African Commission held that the Nigerian government had 
violated all three minimum core obligations of the right to food in relation to its oil extraction activities and 
the activities of Shell petroleum with regard to the Ogoni community, at para. 66. 
125 See Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 above) paras. 42 & 45, who affirms that the standard 
of progressive realisation entails an immediate minimum core obligation for the realisation of the right to 
food. 
126 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 17. For a more in-depth analysis and the sampling of 
violations of the minimum core content of the right to adequate food, see Kunnemann - The right to 
adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 177-182. 
127 Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 9 above) 
178. See also Niada (n 6 above) 156-157; Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 above) paras. 41 & 
45, who affirms that non-discrimination in accessing food is an immediate obligation not subject to the 
standard of progressive realisation and which must be enforced irrespective of resource scarcity. 
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with regard to access to food or means for its production also constitutes a violation of the right 
to adequate food.128 
ii) Obligation to take steps 
This is an immediate obligation and it requires that the steps taken by the State to implement 
the right to adequate food be deliberate, concrete and targeted.129 The obligation to take steps 
is further emphasised by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in their Voluntary 
Guidelines for the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of 
National Food Security (2004) who contend that strategies for the progressive realisation of the 
right to adequate food must include: ‘objectives, targets, benchmarks, time-frames as well as 
actions to formulate policies, identify and mobilize resources, define institutional mechanisms, 
allocate responsibilities, coordinate the activities of different actors, and provide for monitoring 
mechanisms’.130 The requisite steps to meet the minimum core of the right to food, that is the 
realisation of the right to be free from hunger, are provided for in article 11(2) of the ICESCR as 
follows: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and 
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient 
development and utilisation of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to 
ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. 
Phillip Alston divides the above obligations into two dimensions: national obligations as 
espoused in article 11(2)(a), and international obligations as is espoused in article 11(2)(b).131 
                                                            
128 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 18 & 26; Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 above) 
para. 45. For a brief analysis of cases where unfair discrimination has been held to constitute a violation 
of SERs, see FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 78-79. 
129 CESCR General Comment No. 3, paras.2 & 4. 
130 FAO – Voluntary Guidelines, Guideline 3.3.  
131  Alston - International law and the right to food (n 91 above) 167. 
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He summarises the national obligations as requiring the state to improve methods of food 
production, conservation and distribution so as to enhance the realisation of the right to food.132 
The obligation to take steps to enhance the realisation of fundamental rights, the right to 
adequate food included, is a constitutional obligation of the State. The Kenyan Constitution 
adopts the requirement that the State undertakes legislative, policy and other measures for the 
progressive realisation of entrenched SERs.133 The Constitution further affirms, in section 21(4), 
the duty of the State to enact and implement legislation aimed at fulfilling its international human 
rights obligations. Other steps which are necessary to enhance the realisation of the right to 
adequate food also include the provision of practical, accessible, affordable, timely and effective 
remedies for the violation of the right to adequate food and other related entitlements; as well as 
the creation of implementation and monitoring institutions.  
iii) Maximum of available resources 
The realisation of the right to adequate food requires resources, which are almost always limited 
for a developing State like Kenya. Despite limitation, it should also be acknowledged that it is 
the most marginalised and vulnerable groups that are almost always food insecure, and, 
therefore, the right to adequate food must, of necessity, be a priority area for the State in terms 
of allocation of the available limited resources. Both national and international law affirm the 
responsibility of the State to protect the most vulnerable, even in the context of limited 
resources. The need for the prioritisation of Kenya’s resources in the realisation of its SER 
obligations is entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution which provides that:134 
[i]n allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest possible enjoyment of 
the right or fundamental freedom having regard to prevailing circumstances, including the 
vulnerability of particular groups or individuals. 
                                                            
132 As above. He avers that these are the main objectives of the provision, and that the other 
requirements such as the use of technical and scientific knowledge, dissemination of nutritional 
knowledge, and the reform of agrarian systems are just secondary requirements aimed at achieving the 
three main objectives. 
133 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(2) & (4). 
134 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(b). 
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The Constitution further provides that in the instances where the State alleges the unavailability 
of resources to fulfil SERs, it is the responsibility of the State to prove that such resources are 
lacking. 135 
On its part, the CESCR has argued, in relation to resources and vulnerability that ‘the duty 
of States parties to protect the vulnerable members of their societies assumes greater rather 
than lesser importance in times of severe resource constraints’.136 Kunnemann and Epal-Ratjen 
contend that this prioritisation in the context of limited resources can be achieved through an 
emphasis on basic food production, targeting programmes to the most vulnerable members of 
the population, especially maternal and child nutrition programmes, among others.137 
iv) International cooperation and assistance 
As has been noted by Phillip Alston above, the realisation of the right to adequate food has both 
a national and an international dimension. The requirement that States use all the available 
resources for the prioritised realisation of the right to adequate food not only refers to resources 
within the concerned State, but also resources that can be harnessed from the international 
community through international assistance and cooperation.138 
International cooperation and assistance in the realisation of human rights is the 
cornerstone of the UN Charter which provides that one of the purposes of the UN is the 
achievement of international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
                                                            
135 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(a). 
136 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 12. This is further affirmed in CESCR General Comment No. 
12, para. 28 which provides the following: 
Even where a State faces severe resource constraints, whether caused by a process of economic 
adjustment, economic recession, climatic conditions or other factors, measures should be 
undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is especially fulfilled for vulnerable 
population groups and individuals. 
137 Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 40. 
138 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 13. See also SI Skogly ‘Right to adequate food: National 
implementation and extraterritorial obligations’ (2007) 11 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
339, at 344-345. See also FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, section three - international measures, actions 
and commitments for the realisation of the right to adequate food.  
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rights and fundamental freedoms.139 Further, for SERs in general, it is entrenched in article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR.140 Article 11, which provides specifically for the right to adequate food, also 
contains a requirement for international cooperation and assistance.141 The CESCR has 
emphasised the importance of international cooperation and assistance in the realisation of the 
right to adequate food in its General Comment Number 12, calling on States to: recognise its 
essential role in the full realisation of the right to adequate food; to respect the enjoyment of the 
right in other countries; to facilitate access to food; to provide food aid where necessary; and to 
give due attention to the right to food in the development of international instruments.142 It urges 
States to desist from using food as a tool for political or economic pressures in the context of 
economic sanctions, as well as to refrain from declaring food embargoes or any other measures 
that deter production and access to food.143 
Sigrun Skogly contends that the above provisions provide a strong legal basis for an 
extraterritorial obligation requiring developed States to assist developing States such as Kenya 
to enhance the realisation of the right to adequate food.144 It has also been argued that 
international cooperation is an important tool that can be used to support the extraterritorial 
obligations of States to control the activities of TNCs and IFIs that violate the right to food.145 
6.6.2 Tripartite typology 
The obligations with regard to the right to food can be analysed by using the tripartite typology, 
as developed by Asbjorn Eide and which includes the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the 
                                                            
139 UN Charter, article 1(3) as read with articles 55 and 56.  See Skogly (n 138 above) 341-343. 
140 See ICESCR, article 2 (1) which provided for individual and collective action by States through 
international cooperation and assistance, both economic and technical in the realisation of entrenched 
SERs.  
141 ICESCR article 11, which provides that ‘The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realization of this right, recognising to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent’. It further provides for steps to be taken to ensure freedom from hunger, which 
steps are also to be taken ‘individually and through international co-operation’. 
142 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 36.  
143 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 37. For further elaborations see also paras. 37-41.  
144 Skogly (n 138 above) 346. 
145 Narula (n 32 above) 735-737. 
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right to food.146  David Bilchitz argues convincingly that an understanding of the obligations of 
the State using the tripartite typology can only make sense when the substantive content of the 
rights in question have been developed, as the obligations flow from the content of rights.147 It is 
thus imperative that if the courts are going to understand and assess State obligations using the 
tripartite typology, they must, of necessity, adopt the integrated approach to interpretation and 
enforcement of SERs as developed in chapter five above. The integrated approach ensures that 
the courts not only develop the substantive content and scope of the SERs in question in the 
event of litigation, but also adopt a purposive interpretation of the entrenched SERs that takes 
into account the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom, as well as the 
purpose of the entrenchment of SERs, which is the amelioration of the conditions of the poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups, and the achievement of social justice. 
i) Duty to respect 
The duty to respect is based on the reasoning that individuals and groups will seek to find their 
own solutions to their food and nutritional needs. It thus requires the State to respect the 
resources owned by individuals, such as land, capital, labour, and the intellectual ability to 
optimally use those resources to provide for themselves individually or in groups; as well as the 
freedom of individuals to undertake employment of their preference.148 In a further elaboration of 
the duty to respect, Manisuli Sseyonjo avers that this duty obliges States to adopt laws or other 
                                                            
146 See A Eide ‘The human right to adequate food and freedom from hunger’ Final Report prepared by 
Asbjorn Eide for the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W9990E/w9990e03.htm (accessed on 2 July, 2012). See also CESCR General 
Comment No. 12, para. 15; Ziegler et al (n 2 above) 18-20; Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 
above) paras. 44-45. For further elaboration of the tripartite typology in the later works of Eide, see: A 
Eide ‘The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights: the right to adequate food and to be free from 
hunger; Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr. Asbjorn Eide in accordance with Sub-
Commission decision 1998/106, E/CN.4/Sub.2/199/12, 28 June 1999, paras. 52-53, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.ns (accessed on 2 July 2012); A Eide ‘Economic, social and 
cultural rights as human rights’ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights: 
a textbook (2001) 22-28. 
147 D Bichitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2007) 184 & 195-96.  
148 Eide – Final report on the right to food (n 146 above) paras. 15-16; Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 
432.  
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measures, and to reform laws, policies, administrative measures and programmes that 
contravene protected SERs such as the right to food.149 In discussing the obligation to respect 
the right to food in the context of South Africa, Danie Brand divides the duty to respect into three 
State obligations, that is, first, the obligation to refrain from impairing people’s existing access to 
adequate food;150 secondly, the obligation to undertake mitigative steps should impairment be 
unavoidable; and thirdly, the obligation to refrain from placing obstacles in the way of people 
newly gaining access or enhancing existing access to food.151  
ii) Duty to protect 
The duty to protect means that it is not enough for the State to just refrain from interfering with 
the use of resources by right-holders, but that it has a further secondary obligation to prevent 
more economically powerful or assertive third parties from adversely interfering with the 
possible options available to right-holders in the fulfilment of their food and nutritional needs.152 
It thus requires the creation of State structures and institutions, and the adoption, 
implementation and enforcement of laws and policies to protect rights-holders from fraud, 
unethical behaviour in trade and contractual relations, and the marketing and dumping of 
hazardous or dangerous products.153 Legislative measures aimed at the realisation of this duty 
may include price regulation to ensure that basic foodstuffs remain reasonably stable and 
affordable,154 standard-setting with regard to the safety and nutritional content of food, as well 
                                                            
149 M Sseyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law (2009) 23. See also FAO – 
Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 76. 
150 This is exemplified by the South African case of Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern 
Metropolitan Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W). In this case dealing with access to water, an 
important right related to the right to food, the Court held that the action of the Council to disconnect 
Applicants’ water due to non-payment of water charges was a prima facie violation of the constitutional 
duty to respect the Applicants’ right to water.  
151 Brand – Right to food (n 9 above) 165-170. 
152 Eide – Final report on the right to food (n 146 above) paras. 17-18; Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 
432, who contend that the obligation to protect is the most important State obligation with regard to the 
right to food and other survival rights. 
153  Eide – Final report on the right to food (n 146 above) paras. 17-18 
154  This is exemplified by the German Milk and Butterfat case 18 BVerfGE 315, 1965,  which concerned a 
challenge to legislation regulating the price of drinking milk on the basis that it infringed on freedom of 
competition for milk suppliers and dairies. The German Constitutional Court rejected the above challenge, 
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as laws protecting land tenure and production resources from arbitrary private interferences.155 
Due to the continuing difficulty of subjecting transnational corporations (TNCs) to the human 
rights regime, the duty to protect, which includes the establishment of regulatory structures as 
well as the provision of effective judicial and administrative remedies, plays an important role 
checking the uncompetitive conduct of agribusiness TNCs which have adverse effects on the 
availability, access and affordability of essential foods.156 
iii) Duty to fulfil 
This is a tertiary level of obligation that requires the State to fulfil the rights of everyone who is 
otherwise unable to meet their right to adequate food. It contains three sub-components, that is, 
the obligation to facilitate, promote, and provide.157 The obligation to facilitate requires the State 
to pro-actively create opportunities or the environment in which the substantive right to 
adequate food can be realised, especially when the obligations to respect and protect have not 
been realised.158 Apart from the recognition of the right to food in political and legal systems, the 
duty to facilitate requires the adoption of a comprehensive national strategy and plan of action 
for the realisation of the right to adequate food.159   
The second component, the obligation to provide, means that the State must, directly or 
indirectly, meet the food needs of those who are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
holding that due to the nature of milk as a basic foodstuff, public interest required that its price be kept at 
an affordable level.  According to Brand, the Court judgment in effect allowed the State to infringe on 
competition rights in fulfilling its constitutional obligation of ensuring that people’s basic food needs are 
met on a sustainable basis, see Brand – The right to food (n 9 above) 173. 
155 Brand – The right to food (n 9 above) 170-172. He avers that these measures need not only be 
enacted, but must also be effectively implemented and enforced, failing which a prima facie violation of 
the right to food is present, at 172.  
156 Niada (n 6 above) 155 & 184. She enumerates some of these practices to include: promotion of 
export-oriented production of cash crops; conspicuous collusion in the control of agricultural trade, 
marketing and processing; and the imposition of low producer prices while maintaining high consumer 
prices to maximise profit margins, at 182-183. See also Narula (n 32 above) 715-724. 
157  Eide – Final report on the right to food (n 146 above) paras. 19-23. 
158  As above. 
159  Sseyonjo – SER in international law (n 149 above) 25. For a discussion on this in the context of South 
Africa, see Brand – The right to food (n 9 above) 180-187. 
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meet their basic needs, such as through the development of safety nets or though the provision 
of social security.160 Eide argues that this obligation has gained more currency due to increasing 
urbanisation and the destruction of the traditional social support structures within families and 
communities.161 It, however, remains a difficult obligation for States due to the fact that the 
satisfaction of food needs has traditionally been entrusted, in a high degree, to the markets, and 
that food still remains a commodity subject to the vagaries of demand and supply.162 Strategies 
aimed at the realisation of the right to food, just like those aimed at the realisation of the right to 
housing as discussed in chapter seven below, must thus espouse a pragmatic balance of the 
right to food as both a birth-right for all human beings and a commodity that can be bought and 
sold in the open market.163 This balance necessitates that the strategy is based on a broad and 
holistic understanding of the right to food that incorporates all the relevant societal stakeholders 
including food producers and distributors, as well as national and international governmental 
and non-governmental organisations in the efforts aimed at the realisation of the right to food.164 
The duty to provide is exemplified by the case of Gebrüder v Regierungsrat des Kanton 
Berns,165 where the Swiss Federal Court recognised the obligation of the State to provide the 
                                                            
160 See FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 83, who contend that this duty is subject 
to the State’s available resources, and that it also extends to victims of natural and other disasters. 
161 Eide – Final report on the right to food (n 146 above) paras. 19-23. 
162 C Courtis ‘The right to food as a justiciable right: Challenges and strategies’ (2007) 11 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 317, at 323-324. See also Second Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 
above) para. 109, who acknowledges the traditional reliance on markets to satisfy people’s food needs, 
but contends that this can no longer be the practice in the current circumstances as it has been 
ascertained that unregulated markets cannot guarantee the basic food needs of the whole of society. 
163 For a discussion of the need for this balance in the context of the right to housing, see S Leckie 
‘Where it matters most: Making international housing rights meaningful at the national level’ in S Leckie 
(eds.), National perspectives on housing rights (2003) 3, at 6-7. 
164 Courtis (n 162 above) 324-325. This approach has been espoused in the Kenyan Draft National Food 
Nutritional Security Policy (n 60 above) ES paras. 3 & 5-13 & chapters 2-9, which addresses all related 
food security issues such as food availability and access, food safety standards and quality control, 
nutritional improvement, food security and nutrition information, early warning and emergency 
management, institutional and legal framework, and financing. 
165 Tribunal fédéral suisse, références: ATF 121 I 367, 371, 373 V. = JT 1996 389, quoted in Second 
Report of the SR Jean Ziegler (n 2 above) para. 58.  
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basic minimum conditions of life, that is, food, clothing, and housing, to ensure a dignified 
human existence.166 
The third component, the obligation to promote, was added to the tripartite typology by 
Godefridus van Hoof.167  It requires positive action of a long-term character such as advocacy, 
human rights education, training and the dissemination of human rights information so as to 
change public consciousness and understanding of rights as well as the obligations they 
engender both horizontally and vertically.168 Kunnemann, contributing to the debate on the 
tripartite typology, argues that the obligation to fulfil only requires the State to provide the 
remainder of what is lacking after individuals and groups have strived to fulfil their needs using 
their own private resources.169 
This typology is envisioned in section 21(1) of the Kenyan Constitution which provides 
for the duty of the State with regard to all the entrenched fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
which states that ‘it is the fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights.170 
6.6.3 The 4-As scheme 
In analysing the obligation of the State to realise the right to food, further regard can be paid to 
the 4-As scheme, that is, availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability.  
i) Availability  
                                                            
166 As above.  
167 GHJ van Hoof ‘Legal nature of economic, social and cultural rights: a rebuttal of some traditional view’ 
in P Alston & K Tomasveski (eds.) the right to food (1984) 106-108.   
168 As above. 
169  R Kunnemann ‘A coherent approach to human rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323, at 328. 
This argument is in line with the argument at the beginning of section 6.6 of this chapter that the primary 
obligation is for individuals and groups to feed themselves, and the obligation of the State is to 
supplement these efforts where people are unable, due to circumstances beyond their means, to satisfy 
their own food needs. 
170 The tripartite typology was also adopted in the formulation of FAO’s voluntary guidelines on the right to 
food; see FAO ‘Voluntary Guidelines, para. 17. 
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Availability of food refers to national food security.171 Food security has been defined by the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to encompass: adequate food production; increasing 
stability in the flow of supplies; and, securing access to food supplies.172 Enhancing national 
food security encompasses the responsibility of the State to ensure the existence of sufficient 
food supply to meet the quantitative and nutritional needs of the entire national population.173 
This can be done either through the national production of food, or through the importation of 
food to ensure the existence of adequate food reserves at all times. Apart from ensuring a 
sufficient national food reserve, the State should also ensure adequate distributional networks to 
enhance the physical availability of food in all parts of the country.174 
ii) Accessibility  
Accessibility of food refers to household food security and recognises the fact that the right to 
food can only truly be realised if food security exists at the household level.175 Accessibility thus 
requires that people are either capable of purchasing food from the opportunities available to 
them, or are in possession of means of production from which they can produce food for their 
own use.176  
                                                            
171 Brand – the right to food (n 9 above) 158. 
172 FAO, Progress in Implementation of the Plan of Action to Strengthen World Food Security-A 
Reappraisal of Concepts and Approaches, Doc. C/83/20 (1983), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5563E/X5563e06.htm (accessed on 5 July 2012). The third aspect of the 
definition, securing access to food, has also been captured by the World Bank which defines food security 
as ‘access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life’, see World Bank 
‘Poverty and hunger: Issues and options for food security in developing countries (1986) v, available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external (accessed on 20 July, 2012). 
173 Brand - Food (n 24 above) 56C - 3. 
174 As above. See also CESCR General Comment No. 12, para.12.  
175 Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 451. They define household food security to imply that: 
[a] household enjoys access to a basket of food which is nutritionally adequate, safe, and 
culturally acceptable, procured in a manner consistent with the satisfaction also of other basic 
human needs, and obtained from supplies, and in ways, which are sustainable over time, at 455. 
176 Brand - Food (n 24 above) 56C-3. See also Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 450, who argue that the 
lack of economic assets, which is so crucial in determining access to adequate food, is often overlooked 
in policy formulation, with focus instead on ensuring the availability of national reserve stock of grain. 
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Accessibility to food has two components: economic and physical accessibility.177 Economic 
accessibility requires that food must be available at a price that is affordable to citizens, and at a 
level that does not have adverse effects on personal or household financial resources to the 
extent that threatens or compromises the satisfaction of other basic needs.178 Eide, Oshauge 
and Eide expound on this by contending that food competes for scarce household resources 
with other basic household needs such as housing, water and education, and that food security 
can only be realised at the household level when there are sufficient resources to be expended 
simultaneously on food and these other basis needs.179 To better understand the dynamics of 
economic accessibility of food at the household level, reliance can be placed on Amartya Sen’s 
concept of “entitlements”, that is, the means through which different households or groups have 
access to adequate food.180 Sen elaborates on a quartet of entitlements as follows:181 
i) Trade-based entitlement–one is entitled to own what one obtains by trading something one 
owns with a willing party or parties. 
ii) Production-based entitlement – one is entitled to own what one gets by engaging in 
production using one’s own resources or resources hired from willing parties meeting the 
agreed conditions of trade. 
iii) Own-labour entitlement – one is entitled to one’s own labour power, and thus to the trade-
based and production-based entitlements related to one’s own labour power. 
iv) Inheritance and transfer entitlement – one is entitled to own what one is willingly given by 
another who legitimately owns it, to take effect before or after the latter’s death.  
Sen contends that unless measures aimed at the realisation of the right to food are focussed 
around these entitlements, with the aim of addressing people’s lack of entitlements, the 
problems of economic access to adequate food cannot effectively be addressed.182 Eide, 
Oshauge and Eide agree with Sen and aver that to enhance the realisation of the right to food, 
‘domestic legal systems should be transformed in such a way that everyone possesses a 
legally-sanctioned, operational entitlement to food’.183 Such a process will entail land reform; 
                                                            
177 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para.13. 
178 As above. 
179 Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 457. 
180 A Sen Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlements and deprivation (1981) 1-8. 
181 Sen (n 180 above) 2. 
182 Sen (n 180 above) 8. 
183 Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 423. 
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State subsidies on production resources such as farm implements, seeds, fertilizers and 
pesticides; creation of employment and encouragement of self-employment; and the provision 
of social assistance to cushion vulnerable individuals and groups, among many others.184 A 
holistic approach to food security encompassing broad legal entitlements to food has been 
adopted by Kenya’s Draft National Food and Nutrition Security Policy 2011, with the aim of 
enhancing availability and access to adequate food of nutritional quality to all Kenyans.185  
Physical accessibility on the other hand requires that adequate food is accessible to 
everyone, including vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities.186 Rolf Kunnemann, in his analysis of General Comment Number 12, contends that 
physical accessibility entails a requirement of immediate as well as unconditional access to 
adequate food, and that should a person be unable to buy or otherwise gain access to food, the 
State is under an obligation to provide such.187 This is acknowledged by Brand who, in 
analysing the distinction between economic and physical accessibility, as discussed in General 
Comment Number 12, contends that economic accessibility refers to entitlements which self-
sufficient people require to gain access to food, while physical accessibility refers to those who 
are not self-sufficient and have to receive State assistance to gain access to food.188 Physical 
accessibility further requires sustainability in food production, that is, the requirement that 
current production techniques must not adversely affect the opportunities of future generations 
to feed themselves.189  
iii) Acceptability  
                                                            
184 As above. See also generally Dreze & Sen – Hunger and public action (n 24 above); FAO –Voluntary 
guidelines, Guideline 8.1. 
185 Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) chapter 2. 
186 CESCR General Comment No. 12, para.13. 
187 Kunnemann - The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 
169; Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 38. See also CESCR General Comment No. 12, para. 15, 
which provides that ‘whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy 
the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that 
right directly’. 
188 Brand - Food (n 24 above) 56C-3. 
189 Brand – The right to food (n 9 above) 158. 
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Acceptability refers to the non-nutrient based value attached to food as well as food 
consumption, and requires that the available food must recognise the many cultural roles and 
meanings of food to the identity of the communities in question. This ensures respect for a 
people’s traditional dietary diversity and by extension a recognition of their human dignity.190 
This aspect of State obligation with regard to food was acknowledged in the South African case 
of Huang v Head of Grootvlei Prison, a case which dealt with the cultural and nutritional rights of 
Taiwanese prisoners.191 The Court ordered that the prisoners be provided with raw food, as the 
State’s expense, for them to cook in accordance with their cultural requirements, an order that 
was in line with the South African Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 8(3) which 
provided that ‘where reasonably practicable, dietary regulations must take into account religious 
requirements and cultural preferences’.192 
 
iv) Adaptability  
Lastly, adaptability, in relation to the right to adequate food entails the requirement that food 
production, accessibility and availability is sustainable over-time, both for the current and for 
future generations. Food production strategies and other resource entitlements must therefore 
be adaptable to changing ecological and economic situations to ensure that households are 
capable of realising their right to adequate food continuously in the long-term.193 Over-reliance 
on rain-fed agriculture in the context of global warming and its attendant change in weather 
patterns,194 unsustainable use or overuse and exhaustion of natural production resources, run-
away and unchecked population growth, and inadequacy of the minimum wage, among others, 
                                                            
190 CESCR General Comment No. 12, paras. 8 & 11; Eide, Oshauge & Eide (n 9 above) 458; Kunnemann 
- The right to adequate food: Violations related to its minimum core content (n 10 above) 170; 
Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 37; FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, Guidelines 10.9-10.10. 
191 Huang v Head of Grootvlei Prison, Case No. 992/2003 (ZAFSHC) (unreported judgment of 15 May 
2003). 
192  Huang, at para. 35. 
193 Kunnemann & Epal-Ratjen (n 30 above) 38-39. 
194 See Draft Food and Nutrition Policy (n 60 above) para. 2.10, which recognises that Kenya is heavily 
dependent on rain-fed agriculture, leading to adverse consequences for food security. It, however, notes 
the huge potential for irrigation in Kenya (1.3 million hectares) and affirms the commitment of the State to 
enhance irrigation through the provision of requisite funding and the reform of the legal regulatory 
framework on irrigation.  
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are the areas that must be addressed to enhance adaptability in the realisation of the right to 
adequate food for all. 
In synchronising the tripartite typology and the 4-A’s scheme approaches used in 
analysing the right to adequate food, as discussed above, Oliver de Schutter is of the opinion 
that the 4-A’s scheme combines seamlessly with the tripartite typology as it ‘describes the 
characteristics of the goods or services that the individual rights holder has a right to’ while the 
tripartite typology framework ascertains the ‘different obligations of the State either not to 
interfere with the enjoyment of those goods or services, or to regulate private actors, or to 
facilitate access to those goods or services by market mechanisms, or in certain cases to 
provide for it’.195  
6.7 The role of courts in the realisation of the right to food 
The question then is, what is the role of the judiciary in the realisation of the right to adequate 
food? In other words, what is the potential for the judiciary in enhancing the realisation of the 
right to adequate food in Kenya? In answering this question, reliance is placed on the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism, as discussed in chapters three and four above, which envisages an 
active role for the courts both as a forum and as an active facilitator of societal dialogue on the 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement of entrenched SERs. Further, the analysis of 
the role of the courts in the realisation of the right to food also ties in closely with the integrated 
and transformative approaches to the interpretation of SERs discussed in chapter five above, 
which similarly envisages an active role for the courts in protecting people’s food entitlements. 
6.7.1 Mandate and duties of the court with regard to the right to food 
To begin with, the courts have a fidelity to the Constitution,196 and also have a duty (as State 
organs) to observe, respect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
Constitution.197 This, therefore, means that the SER obligations of the State as discussed 
generally in chapter two, sections 2.3 - 2.5, and specifically in relation to the right to food in 
                                                            
195 O De Schutter International human rights law: cases, materials and commentaries (2010) 256-257. 
196 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, articles 23 & 165. 
197 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 21(1). For an affirmation of this role of the courts in the context 
of South Africa, see generally J Dugard ‘Courts and the poor in South Africa: A critique of systemic 
judicial failures to advance transformative justice’ (2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 214; 
K Young Constituting economic and social rights (2012) 133. 
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section 6.6 above, also applies to the courts. The courts thus have a responsibility to provide 
effective remedies to victims of violations of the right to adequate food, which may include 
reparations in the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantee of non-
repetition.198 The provision of remedies is essential in the enhancement of the accountability of 
the political institutions in the realisation of their obligation arising from human rights, as was 
recognised in the UDHR.199  
Secondly, and has been discussed in section 6.6 above, article 21(2) of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution entails the responsibility of the State to put in place legislative, policy and 
other measures, including the setting of standards to achieve the progressive realisation of the 
rights guaranteed under article 43, of which the right to adequate food forms a part.200 Even 
though this is normally the responsibility of the political institutions, if they fail to undertake the 
same, or if there is an inordinate delay in fulfilling this duty, or if the legislative, policy and 
programmatic framework developed by the political institutions do not pass constitutional 
muster, then the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have a duty to ensure that the 
requisite measures capable of operationalising the right to food are put in place.201 Thirdly, and 
in relation to the second point above, courts and judges, as State organs and State officers 
                                                            
198 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 23(3) which provides for these and other remedies in instances 
of violation of entrenched fundamental rights. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 12, paras. 32-34.  
199 See UDHR, article 8, which provides for the right to an effective remedy at the national level in 
instances of rights violation. This is further affirmed by the CESCR in its General Comment No. 9, para. 2 
where it states that appropriate means of remedies must be put in place at the domestic level to enhance 
government accountability in the realisation of the provisions of the ICESCR. See also CESCR General 
Comment No. 12, paras. 32-25, on the need for domestic remedies for the violation of the right to food. 
200 See Courtis (n 162 above) 319-320, who acknowledges that adjudication should not be the main 
means for the realisation of SERs, especially the right to food, and that the most important aspect is the 
development, implementation and monitoring of policies and programmes, a task that better suits the 
political institutions.  He, however, contends that courts have a role to play and this role includes: giving a 
voice to rights-holders and offering them a remedy in instances of violation of their rights; subjecting the 
duty-bearers to control in instances of failure to realise rights and instituting the requisite democratic 
checks and balances in the exercise of public power; enhancing the resolution of legal uncertainties and 
balancing the interpretation of conflicting rights; as well as the protection of minorities and disadvantaged 
groups. 
201 For a more elaborate discussion of this duty in the context of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, 
see chapter four above. 
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respectively, have a duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups and communities,202 and 
this duty includes enhancing the protection of the food-insecure, who are almost always 
vulnerable and marginalised individuals, groups or communities. 
The courts must, therefore, play a major role if the right to adequate food and other 
related rights in the Constitution are to achieve their transformative potential of eliminating 
hunger, improving the living standard of the Kenyan people, achieving social justice, and 
ultimately ensuring sustainable development. 
6.7.2 Transformative adjudication in the context of the right to food 
As has been discussed in chapter five above, if Kenya is to realise the transformative 
aspirations of the Constitution, the judiciary must, of necessity, adopt a progressive attitude and 
disposition towards the adjudication of SERs.203 This is due to the requirement that the Courts 
develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to fundamental rights,204 as well as to 
adopt the interpretation that most favours the enforcement of fundamental rights during 
adjudication.205 This, therefore, requires that when cases dealing with the right to food arise, be 
they based on the constitutional provisions on the right food or other relevant legislation, the 
courts must adopt a substantive and progressive interpretation of the right to food, detailing the 
meaning, content and scope of the right to food in line with the integrated approach proposed in 
chapter five above.206  
In this regard, the courts must require that the political institutions design, develop and 
implement a comprehensive and holistic national strategy encompassing legislative, policy and 
programmatic frameworks for the realisation of the right to adequate food as discussed in 
section 6.4.3 above.207 If the national strategy has been developed and is the basis of the 
                                                            
202 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, article 21(3). 
203 Chapter five, section 5.2.2 (viii).  
204 This can be done by infusing the common law and customary law with the values that underpin the 
Constitution such as dignity, equality, equity, freedom and the protection of the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups and communities. 
205 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(3).  
206 Chapter five, section 5.3. 
207 This is in line with the obligation of the State “to take steps” as discussed in section 6.6.1(ii) above. 
See also the FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 77 & 92, who contends that failure 
to take steps in the context of widespread starvation and famine is a clear violation of the State’s 
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litigation, the courts must conduct a comprehensive and critical analysis of the same using a 
substantive reasonableness review standard to ensure that it has made provision for the short-, 
medium- and long term food needs as well as food entitlements for all sectors of society, 
especially for the poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups.208 In undertaking 
this substantive analysis, the courts, taking into account the integrated approach to the 
interpretation of SERs discussed in chapter five, must adopt the minimum core approach to 
SERs and ensure that at the very least, the government’s national strategy is capable of 
realising the minimum core content of the right to food, that is the right of everyone to be free 
from hunger.209  If the strategy has failed to provide for the food needs of the most vulnerable, 
that is, if it fails to incorporate the minimum core approach as an intrinsic component of the 
progressive realisation standard, then the courts should, unless substantive countervailing 
reasons are provided by the political institutions, hold the strategy to be per se invalid.210 Should 
the courts determine that the strategy has sufficiently provided for the food needs of the most 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
obligations and the courts must be competent to order the State to take the requisite steps to end the 
unconstitutional state of affairs; V Abramovich ‘Fostering dialogue: The role of the judiciary and litigation’ 
in J Squires, M Langford & B Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of 
economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 167, at 168ff, who affirms that when constitutional or legal 
provisions set guidelines for the design of social policy for the realisation of SERs and the political 
institutions fail to develop such policies, the judiciary must ensure that the political institutions are 
accountable to the Constitution by requiring them to design, develop, finance and implement such social 
policies.  He contends that it is only in the exceptional instances when the magnitude of violations justifies 
or when the political institutions completely refuse to cooperate that the judiciary can substantively design 
the concrete social measures to be adopted. 
208 See FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 83, who affirm the mandate of the courts 
to undertake this analysis to assess whether State policies and programmes are reasonable and 
appropriate. 
209 For a substantive analysis of the minimum core content approach generally, see chapter two, section 
2.5 and chapter five, section 5.3.2. For a discussion of the same in relation to the right to adequate food, 
see section 6.5 above.  
210 See FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 51 above) 92-93, who in analysing the Swiss 
Federal Court case of Gebrüder v Regierungsrat des Kanton Berns, discussed in section 6.6.2 (iii) above, 
contend that the Court held that it could ‘set aside legislation if the outcome of the legislative framework 
failed to meet the minimum claim required by constitutional rights’. 
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vulnerable, it should then go ahead and review it using the other reasonableness benchmarks 
that have been gleaned from the SER jurisprudence of the SACC.211  
The Kenyan Courts have shown a propensity towards the protection of SERs, 
acknowledging their competence to undertake SER adjudication relating to the right to food in 
the case of Consumer Confederation of Kenya (COFEK) v Attorney General & 4 Others.212 The 
case was filed in relation to the failure of the relevant government agencies to take necessary 
fiscal, regulatory, good governance and other necessary steps to control, stabilise or reduce 
high fuel prices, leading to the high cost of subsistence goods and services, and thus violating 
the right to be free from hunger as well as the right to adequate food as enshrined in article 43 
of the Constitution and in the UDHR.213 The Court affirmed its jurisdiction to adjudicate SERs by 
stating that:214 
[i]t is not in dispute that the court has jurisdiction to determine whether there has been a violation 
of the [SERs] set out in article 43. The inclusion of the rights in the Bill of Rights, and the vesting 
of jurisdiction in the High Court under article 165 to determine whether a right or fundamental 
freedom has been violated, is a clear indication of the intention by Kenyans to ensure social 
transformation through the protection of these rights. 
Despite the willingness of the Court to entertain the case, the Petitioner failed to provide 
sufficient evidence linking the actions or ommissions of the Respondents and the violations of 
the relevant SERs, leading to the case being thrown out by the Court.215 This was a golden 
opportunity for the Court to expound on the right to adequate food in Kenya, but the opportunity 
was lost due to the poor litigation strategy by the Petitioner, leaving the Court to lament the 
                                                            
211 See chapter five, section 5.3.3 for a more elaborate discussion of the integrated approach. See also 
FAO – Information papers and case studies (n 50 above) 91, who affirms the applicability of the 
reasonableness standard as a valuable tool in the judicial scrutiny and assessment of a national strategy 
for the realisation of the right to food. 
212 Consumer Confederation of Kenya (COFEK) v Attorney General & 4 Others, High Court Petition No. 
88 of 2011. 
213 COFEK case (n 212 above) 1-3. The Petitioner was seeking an order that the Respondents undertake 
requisite legislative, policy and other measures to control the rise in price of fuel and thus brind down the 
cost of living, at paras. 30 & 34.  
214 COFEK case (n 212 above) 4. 
215 COFEK case (n 212 above) 4-5. 
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laxity and the lack of seriousness with which public interest litigation of such fundamental 
importance was conducted. The Court stated as follows:216 
It must be stated that in bringing matters such as this before the court, which have a critical 
bearing on the rights, lives and livelihoods of citizens, it is not enough to make bare statements 
with regard to the violation of rights without seriously addressing oneself to the manner in which 
the violations have occurred and the reasonableness or otherwise of the measures taken to avert 
or ameliorate their impact. At this nascent stage in the implementation of the new Constitution, 
parties in the position of the Petitioner, should they determine to take on cases which have a 
bearing on the public interest, must take them on with all due seriousness. 
With the progressive thinking of the courts and their willingness to adjudicate the right to food as 
indicated by the COFEK case above, it is hoped that should there be a more substantive and 
properly litigated case on the right to food, the courts will be willing to adopt the intergrated and 
transformative approach to adjudication that is proposed here.   
However, as has been the practice in many national jurisdictions, cases dealing 
expressly with the right to food are rarely litigated in courts, and most of the jurisprudence 
dealing with the right to food has been as a result of cases which dealt with other rights relevant 
to the right to food, but which substantively affected the right to food. Such cases are regularly 
litigated in the Kenyan courts, especially those dealing with access to land and land rights, 
labour relations, family law cases such as succession, matrimonial property rights, as well as 
wife and child maintenance, among many others. It is in these cases that the courts can 
progressively protect the food entitlement rights of Kenyans, especially the poor, marginalised 
and vulnerable. It is thus proposed here that the courts adopt a livelihoods approach to the 
realisation of the right to food and to undertake what can be called “adjudication with a human 
face” in which the courts take into account the context and the circumstances of the litigants, 
especially with regard to their food entitlements as discussed in section 6.6.3 (ii) above.  
The livelihood approach to adjudication is contemplated by the Constitution which 
requires that its provisions, principles and values permeate all areas of law and apply to all 
persons, public and private.217 The Constitution mandates the judiciary to interpret and develop 
                                                            
216 COFEK case (n 212 above) paras. 43-45. 
217 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, articles 2, 10, 20(1) and 20(4). See SA Yeshanew ‘Approaches to the 
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
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all areas of law so as to infuse them with the constitutional values enshrined therein. This not 
only entails new responsibilities for the judiciary in the interpretation of the statutes subsisting 
prior to the 2010 Constitution, but also calls on the courts to develop the common and 
customary law in its adjudication of common and customary law rules and principles, which 
govern the majority of private relationships, especially the conduct of trade - of which food is a 
key commodity, and access to land and other property rights either through acquisition or 
inheritance/succession.218  
The pervasiveness of common and customary law rules and principles in private 
transactions is acknowledged by Dennis Davis and Karl Klare who contend that this structuring 
of relations has consequences for the relative distribution of power and welfare, resulting in 
inequality in the distribution of welfare and absolute levels of deprivation.219 They further 
convincingly argue that the ground rules of social and economic interactions significantly affect 
distributive outcomes in transactions and relationships such as employment, access to land and 
land benefits, trade as well as marital and family relationships with diverse implications for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Progress and perspectives’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 
317, at 332-339, where he advocates the interdependence approach, an approach similar to the 
livelihoods approach proposed here, in the interpretation and enforcement of SERs in the African Human 
Rights System. He contends that this approach is not only applicable in jurisdictions where there are 
substantive normative gaps and challenges in the protection of SERs, but can also be utilised in systems 
with entrenched justiciable SERs with the aim of strengthening the protection of these entrenched SERs, 
at 334. See also M Scheinin ‘Justiciability and the indivisibility of human rights’ in J Squires, M Langford & 
B Thiele (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural 
rights (2005) 20-23. 
218 Adjudication on inheritance should specifically take into account article 82(4) of the 2010 Constitution 
which exempts certain customary law practices, such as those related to marriage and inheritance from 
constitutional guarantees against discrimination, and should ensure that the article is not interpreted in a 
manner that adversely affect the livelihood of women, and thus adversely affecting the right to adequate 
food for themselves as well as their families, see FIAN International (n 7 above) 14. 
219 D Davis & K Klare ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law’ (2010) 26 
South African Journal on Human Rights 403, at 434. They argue that market-based distribution rules are 
a result of conscious or unconscious choices made by communities, and that if ‘the prevailing rule-set 
produces a constitutionally unacceptable distribution of basic, life-sustaining goods, [the] government [is 
in violation of] the Constitution unless it undertakes to rearrange the background rules so as to yield a 
constitutionally adequate level of access to the minimum components of human welfare’. 
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pursuit of well-being.220  To illustrate this point, they give the example of P, a landowner who 
negatively affects the interests of Q, a malnourished and homeless person, when P denies Q 
rent-free access to her property or edible yields. Though P’s refusal adversely affects Q’s 
chances of feeding himself, her refusal is privileged by the common law rules of property which 
empowers her to refuse access to Q and even to use State machinery to do so.221  Their 
conclusion is that private law rules which govern social and economic relationships always 
disproportionately empower already privileged actors while disempowering and subordinating 
others, especially those who have previously been vulnerable or marginalised.222 
Davis and Klare argue that the victims of these massive common and customary law 
inequalities should be able to challenge the common law rules on which the exploitative 
economy is based for the violation of entrenched egalitarian provisions of the Constitution, 
especially the SER provisions, of which the right to adequate food forms an intrinsic part.223 In 
such litigation, the court must embrace its transformative obligations as is espoused by the 
Constitution and undertake transformative adjudication (adjudication with a human face) to 
develop the common and customary law taking into account the egalitarian values and 
principles that populate the Constitution, and thus vindicate the entrenched rights of the poor 
and vulnerable whose nutritional security is in danger. 
                                                            
220 Davis & Klare (n 219 above) 445-46. They contend that these rules have a direct effect on the 
distribution of entitlements, privileges and liabilities in a society, and thus directly relate to people’s lived 
experiences and quality of life. See also Courtis (n 162 above) 325-326, who similarly argues that in order 
to comply with State obligations for the realisation of the right to food, indirect horizontal obligations 
should also be placed on private parties, and the possibilities for SER litigation against private parties for 
the violation of SERs in areas such as labour relations, protection against forced evictions, protection of 
dependent children from parental neglect, consumer protection and antitrust protection, be encouraged. 
Since most of these spheres are governed by common or customary law, the courts have a role, using 
their mandate, to develop the law in accordance with the constitutional values and principles, to enhance 
protection of the right to food in the context of litigation in these spheres.  
221 Davis & Klare (n 219 above) 445-46. 
222 As above.  
223 Davis & Klare (n 219 above) 434.  They aver that to achieve substantive equality and widen 
opportunities for self-realisation for a majority of the people, adjudication must be aimed at an equality-
seeking renovation of the common and customary law structures, at 448. 
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 The adjudicative proposals above are in line with the concept of the interdependence 
and interrelatedness of rights as well as the livelihoods approach advocated in section 6.6 
above, and the transformative constitutionalism approach advocated in chapter five of this 
thesis. Christian Courtis affirms the applicability of these approaches in the judicial adjudication 
of the right to food by contending that in comparative perspective, issues dealing with food 
rights have mostly been indirectly adjudicated through their (the right to food issues) framing in 
the context of judicial adjudication of the violation of other related rights.224  
This is illustrated by the Indian case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties v The Union of 
India,225 a case which is reflective of the important role judges can play in the realisation of the 
right to adequate food. Nearly 50 per cent of the world’s hungry live in India, with over 35 per 
cent of its population being food insecure, nine out of ten women between the ages of 15-49 
years suffering from malnutrition, and nearly half the children under five suffering from severe 
malnutrition as well as stunting.226 Despite the above statistics and raging drought in most parts 
of India in the year 2001, the government had not taken any measures to respond to the crisis 
situation, even though India had accumulated an impressive surplus of 17 million tonnes of 
food-grain stocks.227 The Supreme Court, on 2 May 2003, made extensive preliminary orders to 
address the situation, ordering the government to introduce midday meals in all government-
assisted primary schools, to provide food security benefits through a card system and 
nationwide food security schemes to the most vulnerable groups, as well as ordering the 
government to increase its budgetary allocations to schemes aimed at enhancing 
employment.228 To ensure that these orders were fulfilled, the Supreme Court proceeded to 
appoint two commissioners to monitor their implementation, and to work with both the 
                                                            
224 Courtis (n 162 above) 326-336. He contends that this is due to the overlapping nature of duties in 
relation to different rights, and that the protection of one right usually leads to the automatic protection of 
another related right.   
225 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (n 44 above). 
226 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 147 above) 241; Cohen & Brown (n 14 above) 55. 
227 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, Interim Orders of 2 May 2003, at page 2, available 
at http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/401033 (accessed on 29 January 2013). See also Bilchitz – Poverty and 
fundamental rights (n 147 above) 241. 
228 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, Interim Orders of 2 May 2003, at 3-6; Bilchitz – 
Poverty and fundamental rights (n 147 above) 242; DP Chong ‘Five challenges to legalising economic 
and social rights’ (2009) 10 Human Rights Review 183, at 187. 
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government and non-governmental organisations to enhance the realisation of the right to 
food.229 Through this monitoring mechanism, the court was further able to make follow up orders 
in instances where implementation was either slow or had not taken off.230  
The approach of the Indian Supreme Court contains important aspects of the theory of 
dialogical constitutionalism discussed in chapter four above as the Court provided a forum for 
wide societal engagement running over a period of time, retained jurisdiction and appointed a 
monitoring commission to engage with both governmental as well as non-governmental 
organisations to ensure that its orders were fulfilled, and further made follow-up orders to 
enhance the implementation of its previous orders and to also reformulate the orders taking into 
account changes in circumstances on the ground. The case has further elevated the food 
programmes from charity to legal entitlements and has also enhanced the legal standing of the 
Right to Food Campaign, India, enabling it to undertake further advocacy and awareness 
campaigns to empower people to demand their right of access to adequate food of nutritional 
value, something which is also envisaged by the theory of dialogical constitutionalism.231 David 
Bilchitz contends that the PUCL case portrays the positive benefits that properly balanced SER 
litigation can have in enhancing the realisation of SERs, by shattering bureaucratic bottlenecks 
as well as placing SER issues on the political agenda.232 
A similar instance where the right to food was protected as an adjunct of the right to life 
was the Inter-American Court case where Paraguay had failed to ensure access to food, water 
and healthcare to a group of 19 extremely indigent members of an indigenous community.233 
                                                            
229  People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, Interim Orders of 2 May 2003, at 5-6; Bilchitz – 
Poverty and fundamental rights (n 147 above) 242; Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
‘Jurisprudence on the right to food justiciability: Cases on Switzerland, India and South Africa’ in FAO, 
The right to food guidelines: Information papers and case studies (2006) 122-124, available at 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/214344/RtFG_Eng_draft_03.pdf (accessed on 29 January 2013).  
230 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 147 above) 245. 
231 See Cohen & Brown (n 14 above) 55. For a substantive discussion of the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism, see chapters three and four of this thesis. 
232 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 147 above) 242-43. 
233 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (March 
2006) paras. 145-178, available at http://www.crin.org/Law/instrument.asp?InstID=1217 (accessed on 25 
November 2012). 
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Even though a Presidential Order had been made to supply indigenous people with food and 
medicine, the Court held that the State failed to put in place adequate measures to guarantee 
the food rights of this indigenous group, only delivering small quantities of food ten times in a 
period of six years, and only providing medical assistance two times in that same period, 
measures which were inadequate to guarantee the right to life of the affected population.234 The 
Court thus found the State to have violated the right to life of the members of the indigenous 
community who had died due to the failure of the State to put in place adequate health and 
nutrition measures to ensure the survival of the community.235 
6.8. Conclusion  
Kenya is undergoing a food insecurity crisis due to its inability to produce a sufficient quantity 
and quality of food to feed its entire populace. This is exacerbated by rampant and endemic 
poverty and inequality that makes it impossible for more than half the population to access the 
food required to feed themselves and their families, endemic corruption and nepotism in access 
to food entitlements, socio-economic and political exclusion of vulnerable groups, lack of 
investment in sustainable agriculture as well as a fragmented and contradictory legislative and 
policy agenda.236 Food insecurity is, however, not a natural disaster, but results from poor and 
unresponsive governance leading to deeply entrenched structural inefficiencies in the State 
bureaucracy. To respond to these structural problems and ensure food security in Kenya, a 
comprehensive multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral national food security strategy (legislative, 
policy and programmatic) that engages all sectors of society must be formulated, implemented 
and enforced.  
Though not a panacea for the realisation of food security, the adoption of the right to 
food as a legal entitlement, as well as the development of a comprehensive legal and regulatory 
framework to enhance the capacity of people to access adequate food, is a promising starting 
point. As this chapter in section 6.4 has shown, Kenya has chosen to adopt this approach by the 
entrenchment, in the 2010 Constitution, of the right to adequate food and other complementary 
                                                            
234 As above, at para. 170.  
235 As above, at 178.  
236 Right to Food and Nutrition Watch ‘Land grabbing and nutrition: Challenges for global governance’ 
(October 2010) 75, available at http://www.icco.nl/nl/linkservid/3A3B149A-D24C-800E-
3A8068FCE004C868/showMeta/0/ (accessed on 23 November 2012).  
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SERs such as the right life, land, water, health and social security. The constitutional provisions 
are buttressed by a plethora of international and regional legal instruments detailing the right to 
food that Kenya has ratified, and which now have a direct applicability at the national level due 
to articles 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution which incorporates ratified international treaties and 
customs into the Kenyan legal system as is more elaborately discussed in chapter two, section 
2.2 above. The entrenchment of these food-related constitutional rights has been followed by 
the drafting of a National Food and Nutritional Security Policy, 2011, a policy which adopts a 
life-cycle as well as livelihoods approach to food security with the aim of enhancing the 
availability, accessibility, affordability, quality and safety of food for all Kenyans. The policy 
responds to the previous food security challenges that have faced Kenya, that is, lack of 
adequate financing of agricultural production, reliance on rain-fed agriculture, lack of legislative 
and policy coherence, lack of sufficient coordination between the government structures 
mandated with the realisation of food security, as well as lack of early warning systems to 
enhance disaster preparation. Despite these progressive provisions, the Policy has failed to 
incorporate some of the requisite international standards that must be met by national food 
security strategies as is discussed more elaborately in section 6.4.3 above. It is hoped that the 
Draft Policy will be developed further in accordance with the proposals made in section 6.4.3 of 
this chapter so that it is in line with the international standards provided by the CESCR in its 
General Comment Number 12 and the FAO in their voluntary guidelines on the right to food. 
The proposed improvement of the Draft Policy will enhance the chances for the design, 
development and implementation of a comprehensive legislative and programmatic framework 
for the realisation of food security in Kenya, and with that the realisation of the right to adequate 
food.  
The entrenchment of the right to food and its complementary rights creates an 
opportunity for the courts to play an active role in the protection of people’s food entitlements. 
This is a role that must be embraced by the judges if the transformative potential of the 
Constitution, as is expounded in chapter five, section 5.2 of this thesis, is to be realised. This 
chapter proposes that in adjudicating cases in which the right to food has been expressly 
pleaded, the courts must adopt a substantive and progressive interpretation of the right to food, 
detailing the meaning, content, scope and the obligations of the State arising from the right to 
food in accordance with the integrated approach proposed in chapter five above. In this regard, 
where there is no functional implementation framework for the realisation of the right to food, the 
courts must require that the political institutions develop a comprehensive national strategy, 
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based on legislative, policy and programmatic framework, capable of efficiently realising the 
right to food.237 The courts should require that the strategy be developed with the substantive 
participation of all societal actors, especially the most food vulnerable groups, and it must also 
retain jurisdiction, in accordance with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in 
chapter four above, to ensure that the resulting strategy meets all the constitutional 
requirements and has made sufficient short-, medium- and long-term provisions to cater for all 
sectors of society. If the strategy fails to prioritise the short-term needs of the most food-
insecure sectors of society, that is, if it fails to incorporate the minimum core of the right to food 
– the fundamental right to be free from hunger - then the courts must per se hold it to be invalid 
and require that it be revised to take into account these needs. If the courts are satisfied that the 
strategy has sufficiently provided for the needs of the most vulnerable, then it should go ahead 
and review it using the reasonableness standards as has been developed in the jurisprudence 
of the SACC, as detailed in chapter five, section 5.3 above.  
However, express cases dealing with the right to food are rarely filed in courts and the 
jurisprudence resulting from the right to food has mainly been developed in litigation involving 
rights relevant to the right to food. This chapter is alive to this challenge and proposes that the 
courts embrace a livelihoods approach to the adjudication of the right to food by protecting 
people’s entitlements to food in the adjudication of cases in which the right to food issues are 
relevant such as cases dealing with land, succession, intellectual property, consumer protection, 
matrimonial property, and labour relations. In this way, the courts will be able to develop the law, 
especially common and customary law, in line with the constitutional values and principles, and 
thus achieve the constitutional requirement that the law be developed in accordance with the 
Constitution, as the supreme law of the land. The livelihoods approach is consonant with the 
principle of interdependence and interrelatedness of rights, a principle that traverses the entire 
international human rights law framework. Sandra Liebenberg contends that an approach to 
interpretation that encompasses the importance of the interrelatedness of rights is capable of 
                                                            
237 Even though substantive efforts have been made in developing the Draft National Food and Nutrition 
Policy, the same has not been adopted by the Cabinet and therefore does not have any operational force. 
Further, No framework legislation on the right to food has so far been adopted by the State to enhance 
the implementation of the right to food. The development of a national food security strategy requires the 
development of not only policy, but also legislative and programmatic frameworks for the realisation of the 
right to food. Kenya has thus not yet achieved these international standards in relation to the right to food.  
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achieving the transformative potential of the Constitution as it embraces the complexity of 
human experience as well as the interrelated dimensions of poverty without reducing it to a 
single constitutional right.238 
  
                                                            
238 S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 142. 
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Chapter seven: The right to housing in Kenya  
7.1 Introduction  
As has been outlined in chapter six above, this chapter, a case study of the right to housing in 
Kenya, relies on the substantive, theoretical and interpretive approaches that have been 
developed in the previous chapters two, three, four and five of this thesis. Further, similar to the 
case study on the right to food as is illustrated in chapter six above, the present chapter looks at 
the housing and tenure security situation in Kenya, the meaning, scope, content and scope of 
the right to housing and the obligations arising from the right both at the national and 
international level, as well as the role of the courts in enforcing the right to housing. 
 Access to adequate housing plays an important role in ensuring the dignified existence 
of human beings and the enjoyment of all the other rights, civil and political as well as economic, 
social and cultural. The importance of access to a house was affirmed in the South African case 
of City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties where the High Court stated as follows:1 
Housing forms an indispensable part of ensuring human dignity. “Adequate housing” 
encompasses more than just the four walls of a room and roof over one’s head. Housing is 
essential for normal, healthy living. It fulfils deep-seated psychological needs for privacy and 
personal space; physical needs for security and protection from inclement weather; and social 
needs for basic gathering points where important relationships are forged and nurtured. In many 
societies, a house also serves an important function as an economic centre where essential 
commercial activities are performed.  
The essential nature of housing was further elaborated on in the South African Constitutional 
Court (SACC) case of Port Elizabeth Municipality, where Justice Albie Sachs contended that ‘a 
home is more than just shelter from the elements [but] a zone for personal intimacy and family 
                                                            
1 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Limited and Others (10330/04) [2006] ZAGPHC 21 (3 
March 2006), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2006/21.html (accessed on 19 October 
2012).  
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security [as well as] the only relatively secure space of privacy and tranquillity in what (for poor 
people in particular) is a turbulent and hostile world’.2   
 Access to adequate housing, however, is a global challenge, with an estimated 100 
million people being homeless, over a billion people being inadequately housed, and an 
estimation that by the year 2050, over 3 billion people will be living in slums and other informal 
settlements.3 These challenges are compounded by the difficulty in accessing other elements 
intrinsic to housing such as water and sanitation, with data further indicating that over a billion 
people globally have no access to water and 2.6 billion people lack access to basic sanitary 
installations.4   
The challenges are similar, if not more dire, in the Kenyan context in relation to access 
to adequate housing. Even though housing challenges are experienced both in rural and urban 
areas, the situation is especially dismal for the urban population, which forms 32.3 per cent of 
the Kenyan population. Of the urban population, 60-70 per cent live in informal settlements that 
are crowded,5 lack proper housing structures, as well as basic essential services such as 
                                                            
2 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (CCT 53/03) 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), para. 17. To further 
illustrate the importance of housing, justice Sachs quotes from the United Nations Housing Rights 
Programme, Report No 1, ‘Housing Rights Legislation: Review of International and National Legal 
Instruments” (2002) at 1, which states as follows: 
To live in a place, and to have established one’s own personal habitat with peace, security and 
dignity, should be considered neither a luxury, a privilege nor purely the good fortune of those 
who can afford a decent home.  Rather, the requisite imperative of housing for personal security, 
privacy, health, safety, protection from the elements and many other attributes of a shared 
humanity, has led the international community to recognise adequate housing as a basic and 
fundamental human right. 
3 Centre Europe (CETIM), Brochure: Right to housing (2007) 1, available at 
http://www.cetim.ch/en/documents/bro7-log-A4-an.pdf (accessed on 12 September 2012). 
4 As above.  
5 United Nations-HABITAT, UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, Strategy 
Document, (2008) 10-11, available at www.unhabitat.org/ (accessed on 20 September 2012), states that 
while 60 per cent of the population in the Capital City, Nairobi, live in informal settlements, their homes 
only occupy a total of 5 per cent of land area in the city and its environs. See also C Bodewes & N 
Kwinga ‘The Kenyan perspective on housing rights’ in S Leckie (eds.), National perspectives on housing 
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healthcare, education, water, electricity, sanitation facilities, and also suffer from chronic 
insecurity.6 These informal settlements lack official legal recognition by the State and thus not 
only experience tenure insecurity,7 but are also not serviced by government urban services, 
leading to their exploitation by unscrupulous business-people who make them pay higher fees 
for basic services than the other formal parts of the urban areas.8  With the urban population 
expected to grow to over 50 per cent by 2050 due to the rapid rural-urban migration,9 the 
housing challenges will grow exponentially unless the government takes drastic, comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
rights (2003) 221, who also aver that 55 per cent of Nairobi’s total population live in over 100 slum 
communities that occupy only 1.5 per cent of the total land area of the city.  
6 Hakijamii ‘Assessment of the realisation of the right to housing in Kenya – 2009-2010 (January 2011) 2, 
available at http://www.hakijamii.com/publications/hr-finalreport.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2012). 
See also Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) Mission Report ‘Listening to the poor? 
Housing rights in Nairobi-Kenya’ (June 2006) 26, available at http://sheltercentre.org/library/listening-
poor-housing-rights-nairobi-kenya-revised-edition (accessed on 16 September 2012), which contends 
that there are approximately 199 informal settlements in Nairobi alone. 
7 The refusal by the Kenyan government to grant land title deeds and thus guarantee land tenure security 
to the Nubian community who own land and reside in Kenya’s biggest informal settlement, Kibera, was 
one of the grounds for the submission of the Nubian children’s communication to the Committee on the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, see Institute for Human Rights and Development 
in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative on Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v 
The Government of Kenya, Decision: No 002/Com/002/2009, para. 3 
8 COHRE Report (n 6 above) Chapter two, especially 40ff.  The report avers that water is sold in the 
informal settlements at between 3 to 30 times more than the normal City Council charges, at 42. See also 
Bodewes & Kwinga (n 5 above) 221-224, who affirm that the greatest challenge to informal settlement 
dwellers is the lack of State recognition of their existence, and thus the constant fear of forced evictions. 
This challenge was recognised by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
when it considered Kenya’s Initial Report on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The CESCR recommended that Kenya should take 
adequate measures to ensure the availability and affordability of adequate water and sanitation in 
informal settlements as well as in arid and semi-arid areas in accordance with the Committee’s General 
Comment No. 15. See CESCR Report on the 40th and 41st Sessions – Supplement No. 2, E/C.12/2008/3’ 
(2009) para. 383, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a002b812.pdf (accessed on 18 
September 2012).  
9 Hakijamii (n 6 above) 3. 
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and extensive measures to enhance the realisation of the right to adequate housing for all 
spheres of society.10  
Forced evictions by both governmental and non-governmental entities as well as 
individuals have been a scourge in the Kenyan context since the colonial days, with 
communities having been forced out of their lands to create land for the white settlers. This 
trend of eviction continued after independence with Kenya witnessing massive spates of land 
grabbing of both public and private land by people who exercised State authority, forcing out the 
inhabitants of those grabbed lands.11 Forced evictions have also been undertaken in the guise 
of tribal land clashes, a phenomenon which has been prevalent since Kenya reverted to political 
multi-partism in 1990, and which has seen land clashes resulting in displacements of people 
before and during the 1992 and the 1997 multi-party elections.12 This phenomenon came to a 
head after the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections when circles of ethnic violence led 
to the displacement of over 300, 000 people from their land, with most of them losing their land 
and other property, including houses. Forced evictions have exacerbated the dire housing 
situation in Kenya, further decimating government efforts to realise the right to accessible and 
                                                            
10 The government has acknowledged the housing challenges in informal settlements and lists the causes 
of those challenges as follows: the deficit in housing supply due to poverty, rural urban migration and 
population growth; the inability of the market economy to cater for low-cost housing to respond to the 
housing needs of the majority low income groups; failure to prioritise the housing sector in the general 
economic development plans; prohibitive building standards and regulatory requirements making housing 
construction unaffordable to the low income sectors of society; lack of adequate land policy leading to 
insecure tenure, land grabbing as well as land holding for speculative purposes; poor urban governance 
leading to non-provision of essential services; and the politicisation of development leading to a desire for 
the maintenance of the status quo for the benefit of the rich structure owners in the informal settlements. 
See Government of Kenya ‘Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project – 2004’ quoted in COHRE (n 6 
above) 24. COHRE further contends that this politicisation of land resulted in a dramatic increase in 
forced evictions in different parts of the country, providing a list of such evictions, at 37-38. 
11 On land grabbing and forced evictions in Kenya, see Bodewes & Kwinga (n 5 above) 230-39; COHRE 
(n 6 above) chapter three. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Communication 
276/2003, Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) and Minority Rights Group International 
(MRG) (on behalf of the Endorois) v Kenya (decision of February, 2010)(hereinafter Endorois case), a 
case resulting from the forced eviction of an indigenous community from their ancestral land without 
adequate compensation by the Government of Kenya, especially paras. 99, 144, 163,173 & 200-238. 
12 This aspect of forced evictions is recognised by the CESCR in General Comment No. 7, para. 5-6. 
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adequate housing.13 Despite a moratorium being adopted by the Kenyan government in 1997 
and 2004 suspending all forced evictions14 as well as the promulgation in 2010 of the 
Constitution with an entrenched provision on the right to accessible and adequate housing, 
forced evictions continue to be a challenge in Kenya. 
An analysis of the housing situation in Kenya in the context of the promulgation of the 
2010 Constitution is the main concern of this chapter. The chapter is divided into seven main 
sections. After this brief introduction, the chapter delves into an exposition of the legal 
instruments providing for the right to adequate housing in international law in section 7.2, and in 
the Kenyan domestic legal jurisdiction in section 7.3. Section 7.4 contains an analysis of the 
meaning and content of the right to adequate housing, while section 7.5 undertakes an 
extensive analysis of Kenya’s legal obligations in national and international law in relation to the 
right to adequate food. Section 7.6 delineates the role of the courts in the realisation of the right 
to adequate housing, proposing that the courts adopt the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
as well as the transformative and the integrated approaches proposed in chapters three to five 
above, in the adjudication of cases on housing rights. Section 7.7 is a short conclusion. Even 
though this chapter attempts to deal with the major concerns relating to housing and challenges 
facing Kenya with regard to the same, its scope does not allow for an exhaustive review of all 
aspects of the right to accessible and adequate housing. 
7.2 The right to adequate housing in international law15 
The right to adequate housing is one of those rights in international human rights law that are 
universally acknowledged, having been recognised in numerous international law instruments, 
                                                            
13 Forced evictions have overall denigrating effects on the protection and promotion of human rights. It 
also has negative effects on victims of evictions due to the resultant trauma; physical, emotional and 
psychological distress; increased impoverishment resulting from loss of means of economic sustenance; 
physical injury and sporadic deaths; family break-ups; an increase in homelessness; and the 
inaccessibility of social services such as hospitals, schools and day-care centres, among other ills. For an 
illustration of these problems, see S Liebenberg, Socio-economic rights adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 268-270.    
14 COHRE (n 6 above) 38 & 70. 
15 For a comprehensive history of the right to housing in international law, see M Craven ‘History, pre-
history and the right to housing in international law’ in S Leckie (eds.), National Perspective on Housing 
Rights (2003) 43-62. 
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binding and non-binding, as well as in over 100 national constitutions,16 but which infamously 
continues to be observed more in breach than in actual realisation.17 It was first entrenched 
internationally in the Universal Declaration of human rights in 1948 as an integral component of 
the right to adequate standards of living.18 With the elaboration of the provisions of the UDHR 
into binding legal instruments, the right to adequate housing was entrenched both in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)19 and in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The right is more completely entrenched in 
article 11 of the ICESCR which encompasses the commitment of States to: 
[r]ecognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions. 
The components of the right to housing as contained in the ICESCR have been extensively 
elaborated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is the 
main United Nations mechanism charged with monitoring the ICESCR’s implementation, in its 
General Comment Number 420 and General Comment Number 7.21 These general comments 
form the bedrock of the discussion of the content of the right to adequate housing below.  
                                                            
16 CETIM (n 3 above) 1. For a discussion of constitutional provisions entrenching the right to adequate 
housing, see UN Housing Rights Programme (UNHRP) Report No. 1 ‘Housing rights legislation: Review 
of international and national legal instruments’ (2002) Part III, at 28-30 & Part IVA, at 36-40, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HousingRightsen.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2012).  
17 S Leckie ‘The human right to adequate housing’ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds.), Economic, 
social and cultural rights: A textbook, 2nd revised edition (2001) 149, at 149; S Leckie ‘Where it matters 
most: Making international housing rights meaningful at the national level’ in S Leckie (eds.), National 
perspectives on housing rights (2003) 3, at 4-5. 
18 Universal declaration of Human rights (hereinafter UDHR), article 25 which provides that ‘[E]veryone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…’. 
19 See ICCPR, article 17 which entrenches the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference in one’s privacy, family or home. 
20 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), 13 
December 1991, E/1992/23, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a7079a1.html (accessed 
12 September 2012). 
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Further, the right to adequate housing has been entrenched in several binding 
international legal instruments aimed at the protection of specific vulnerable groups. These 
include the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD),22 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),23 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),24 the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),25 the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention),26 the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990 Migrant Workers’ Convention),27 and the 
International Labour Organisation Convention 169.28 All these conventions have been signed 
and ratified by Kenya, making the Kenyan government legally obliged to ensure the realisation 
of the right to adequate housing. The legal force of these international provisions is further 
enhanced by the entrenchment in the Kenyan Constitution of a right to accessible and adequate 
housing, coupled with articles 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution which make ratified international 
legal instruments directly applicable in the Kenyan domestic jurisdiction.29 They thus form an 
important authoritative source and guide in the understanding and interpretation of the content 
of the constitutionally entrenched right to housing due to the paucity of comparative domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
21 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions, 20 May 
1997, E/1998/22, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a70799d.html (accessed 12 
September 2012). 
22  CERD, article 5(e)(iii). 
23 CEDAW, articles 14(2)(h) & 15(2). 
24 CRC, articles 16(1) & 27. 
25 CRPD, articles 9 & 28. 
26 1951 Refugee Convention, article 21. This protection is augmented, in cases of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Principle 18; and also by the UN 
Principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons, also known as the 
“Pinheiro Principles”, especially Principles 2, 12, 13 and 18. 
27 1990 Migrant Workers’ Convention, article 43(1)(d). 
28 ILO Convention 169, articles 16 & 20(2)(c). The protection of indigenous people by this Convention is 
augmented by the provisions of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 
especially article 21(1) which recognises their right to improved housing.  
29 For an extensive discussion on these provisions, see chapter two, section 2.2 above. 
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jurisprudence in relation to national implementation and enforcement of the right to adequate 
housing.30 
In addition to the incorporation of the right to housing in the above binding international 
legal instruments, the right has also been incorporated into other internationally developed non-
binding legal instruments.31 This has especially been so with regard to the resultant instruments 
of the two United Nations Conferences on Human Settlement, being the 1976 Vancouver 
Declaration, the 1996 Istanbul (Habitat II) Declaration and the Habitat Agenda. The Vancouver 
Declaration affirmed that adequate shelter and attendant services are basic human rights which 
oblige States to ensure their realisation through measures such as direct assistance through 
guided programmes of self-help and community action and to remove obstacles hindering 
access to adequate housing.32  
The affirmation of the legal nature of the right to adequate housing was also repeated in 
the Istanbul Declaration, which further reaffirmed the commitment of States to ensure adequate 
shelter for all as well as making human settlement safer, healthier, more liveable, equitable, 
sustainable and productive.33 The Istanbul Declaration further encompassed an undertaking by 
States to seek the active participation of all societal actors, public, private and non-
governmental organisations in the realisation of the right to adequate housing including ensuring 
legal security of tenure, equal access to affordable housing and protection from discrimination in 
accessing housing.34 The Habitat Agenda also encompasses the commitment to a holistic 
realisation of the right to adequate housing as provided in international human rights 
                                                            
30 See P de Vos ‘The right to housing’ in D Brand & C Heyns (eds.) Socio-economic rights in South Africa 
(2005) 85, at 89, where he acknowledges the importance of international SER law in interpreting 
domestic constitutional law contending that international SER law is more developed and more nuanced 
than equivalent domestic law. 
31 See UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 7-11 for a list of UN Resolutions by the different UN Agencies 
affirming the right to adequate housing, as well as other international declarations and mechanisms. 
32 United Nations Conference on Human Settlement, Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlement (1976) 
section III para. 8, available at http://habitat.igc.org/vancouver/van-decl.htm (accessed on 19 September 
2012).   
33 United Nations Conference on Human Settlement, Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlement (1996), 
para. 1, available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2072_61331_ist-dec.pdf (accessed on 19 
September 2012).  
34 Istanbul Declaration, paras.7-8 & 12. 
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instruments.35 The commitment to the implementation of the Istanbul Declaration and the 
Habitat Agenda were affirmed in the UN Declaration on Cities and other Human Settlements in 
the New Millennium,36 which also affirmed the economic, social as well as environmental 
interconnectedness and interdependence of rural and urban areas and called for their 
concurrent development.37 
Though not binding per se, these declarations and resolutions acknowledge the 
importance of the realisation of the right to adequate housing and thus have persuasive value in 
the understanding, implementation and enforcement of the constitutionally entrenched right to 
accessible and adequate housing. 
At the regional level, the main human rights document, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) does not expressly recognise the right to housing. 
However, this right was recognised to be intrinsic to other protected rights in the Charter by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) using an implied 
rights theory (which entails the recognition of rights not explicitly provided for in a treaty through 
the expansive interpretation of the expressly enumerated rights) in the case of SERAC v 
Nigeria.38 The Commission found that:39 
                                                            
35 UN Habitat, The Habitat Agenda Goals and Principles, Commitments and the Global Action Plan 
(1996) paras. 39 & 40, available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs (accessed on 19 September 
2012).  
36 UN General Assembly Resolution 25/2 ‘Declaration on Cities and other Human Settlements in the New 
Millennium’ (2001) paras. 1 & 4-6, available at http://www.unbrussels.org/agencies/habitat.html (accessed 
on 19 September 2012).  
37 Declaration on Cities, para. 3, which further calls for the eradication of rural poverty,  the improvement 
of living conditions,  as well as creating educational and employment opportunities.   
38 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001), para. 64,  reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds.) Compendium of key human rights documents 
of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007)  251, at 260. Similar practices of protecting SERs through the 
broad interpretation of civil and political rights can be gleaned from the practice of the European Court on 
Human Rights as well as the now defunct European Commission on Human Rights in cases such as 
Akidivar and others v Turkey, Cyprus v Turkey, see Leckie – Right to adequate housing (n 17 above) 
158-61. This trend has been adopted by the Indian Supreme Court which has developed a jurisprudence 
of SER protection through the broad interpretation of the right to life such as in Olga Tellis v Bombay 
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[a]lthough the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the African Charter, 
the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of mental and physical health [article 16], the right to property [article 14] and the protection 
accorded to the family [article 18(1)] forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when 
housing is destroyed, property, health and family life are adversely affected. 
The Commission further found that the right to housing, as implicitly protected under the 
Charter, encompasses the right to protection against forced evictions.40 
Further to the African Charter, the right to adequate housing, in relation to women, has 
been expressly recognised in the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa,41 which provides in article 16 that: 
[w]omen shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions in a 
healthy environment. To ensure this right, States Parties shall grant to women, whatever their 
marital status, access to adequate housing. 
The Protocol also protects women in relation to matrimonial property and inheritance rights, 
entrenching their right to continue living in their matrimonial houses whether they remarry or 
not.42 In relation to children, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter) also explicitly recognises the rights of children to adequate housing and 
contains the commitment of States to assist parents in the realisation of that right.43 The African 
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Municipal Corporation (1985, 3 SCC 545); Ram Prasad v Chairman, Bombay Port Trust, AIR 89 S.C.R. 
1306 (Decided on 29 March 1989); and, Shanti Star Builders v Naryan Khimalal Totame & Others (JT 
1990 (1) S.C. 106, Civil Appeal No. 2598 of 1989). For a discussion of this cases, see UNHRP Report (n 
16 above) 94-96; Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 27, footnote 50. 
39 SERAC v Nigeria (n 38 above) para. 60.  
40 SERAC v Nigeria (n 38 above) para. 63. 
41 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(2003/2005) article 16, reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds.), Compendium of key human rights 
documents of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007) 47, at 54. 
42 African Women’s Protocol, article 21 (1).  
43 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990/1999), article 20(2), reprinted in C Heyns 
& M Killander (eds.), Compendium of key human rights documents of the African Union, 3rd edition (2007) 
62, at 68. 
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(the Kampala Convention) also provides for the protection of housing rights of internally 
displaced persons in its article 9. 
A discussion of the right to adequate housing in international and regional law is 
imperative as international law contained in ratified international and regional treaties as well as 
customary international law have been directly incorporated into the Kenyan domestic legal 
system as sources of law as discussed chapter two, section 2.2 above. The right to housing 
obligations arising from these laws are, therefore, as binding to the Kenyan government as 
those arising from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution and any other domestic legislation enacted by 
the Kenyan parliament. The political institutions as well as the courts must, therefore, take these 
international legal provisions on the right to adequate housing into account in developing a 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework on the realisation of the right to adequate 
housing as well as in litigation relating to housing and other related rights. 
7.3 The right to accessible and adequate housing in the Kenyan legal system 
Kenya has for a long time failed to put in place a comprehensive framework for the realisation of 
housing rights and the protection of tenure, adhering mostly to the principle of the sanctity of 
private property, a relic of Kenya’s colonial legacy.44 However, with the advent of legal reforms 
in the 1990s, there has been a slow progress towards the recognition of housing rights which 
culminated in the entrenchment, in the 2010 Constitution, of a right to accessible and adequate 
housing. This section looks at the constitutional as well as legislative and policy provisions on 
the right to housing in Kenya. 
7.3.1 Constitutional provisions   
For the first time, the right to adequate housing has been entrenched as a justiciable right in the 
2010 Kenyan Constitution, which provides that ‘every person has the right to accessible and 
adequate housing and to reasonable standards of sanitation’.45  The wording of the 
                                                            
44 Bodewes & Kwinga (n 5 above) 226-27. 
45 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 43(1) (b). The importance of the constitutional entrenchment of 
housing rights is discussed by the UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 36-37, where it is averred that it: provides 
the strongest national commitment to the realisation of the right; helps establish clear substantive norms 
at the national level; protects housing rights from legislative capriciousness; introduces the language of 
rights in the discussion of housing issues; provides a powerful advocacy tool for individuals, communities 
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constitutional provision differs markedly from the wording of the ICESCR which provides only for 
“adequate housing”.46 This raises the question of whether the content of the constitutional 
provision substantively differs from the content of the right to adequate housing in international 
law. A response to this question necessitates a comparison with the South African context 
where the SACC in its seminal housing case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom held that the housing provision in the 1996 South African Constitution (SAC) was 
markedly distinct from the provision in the ICESCR.47 However, after making this distinction, the 
Court still proceeded to enumerate elements similar to those expounded by the CESCR as 
delineating the content of adequate housing.48  
Kirsty McLean, in her analysis of housing rights in South Africa, contends that the 
arguments of the SACC, as to the marked distinctness of the housing rights provision in the 
SAC and that in the ICESCR, were in stark contrast to the South African national government 
policy on housing which expressly accepted the interpretation of the word “adequate” as 
expounded by the CESCR.49 She attributes this to two reasons, firstly, the failure of the Court to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and organisations working on housing rights issues; helps in the understanding, design and interpretation 
of a national legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of housing rights; as well 
as ensuring that non-retrogressive legislative or policy measures are not adopted, and if adopted, 
enabling judicial challenge of the adopted measure as unconstitutional.  
46 ICESCR, article 11(1).  
47  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (hereinafter 
Grootboom), para. 35. Justice Yacoob held, in the case, that section 26 only provided for the right to 
access adequate housing, and not a right to adequate housing as in the ICESCR, and the arising 
obligations were thus distinctly different from those arising under international law. The Kenyan 
Constitution is, however, more comprehensive, not only providing for the right to accessible and adequate 
housing, but going further to provide for reasonable standards of sanitation. It thus encompasses all the 
aspects of housing rights at the international level that Justice Yacoob may have felt did not apply in the 
South African context due to the wording of the SAC. 
48 This included availability of land (security of land tenure in accordance with the CESCR), provision of 
services such as water, sanitation and sewage services (similar recognised by the CESCR) and the 
financing of all the elements of housing (delineated by CESCR as accessibility and affordability of 
housing). See General Comment No. 4, para. 8.  
49  K McLean ‘Housing’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa, 2nd edition Original 
Service, volume 4 (2006) 55-1, at 55-35 – 55-36. She quotes the National Housing Code (2000) part 1, 7 
which provides that: 
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adequately understand and assess the housing policy before it, leading to the Court adopting a 
lower constitutional standard than that adopted in the policy.50 Secondly, she argues that the 
Court’s rejection of the definition of “adequacy” by the CESCR was less about the difference in 
wording between the SAC and the ICESCR, than a pretext aimed at camouflaging the Court’s 
refusal to engage in a discussion over the substantive meaning of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution, and to delineate the substantive content of the right to housing, especially the 
minimum core.51  
The United Nations Housing Rights Programme (UNHRP) contends, in relation to the 
many formulations of the right to housing, that the distinctions are overstated, as ‘international 
agreement does exist as to the intent, meaning and actions required with a recognition of such 
rights as established under international human rights law’.52 From the above discussion, it is 
submitted here that the difference in the wording of housing rights in the Constitution vis-à-vis 
that in international law does not in any way distinguish their substantive contents, and thus 
international law can authoritatively be used to give content to the right to housing as 
entrenched in the Constitution. Both formulations of housing rights are thus used 
interchangeably in this chapter.53 
The right to housing is also provided for, in relation to children, in article 53 of the 
Constitution which guarantees every child’s right to shelter.54 The provisions on the right to 
housing are further bolstered by the entrenched right to property55 and land rights.56 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
[t]he wording of the housing right provision corresponds with the [ICESCR]. In that context, 
‘adequate housing’ is measured by certain core factors: legal security of tenure; the availability of 
services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; 
and cultural adequacy. South Africa’s housing policy concurs with this concept of housing. 
50 Mclean – Housing (n 49 above) 55-36.  
51 As above. For a more comprehensive exposition of these arguments, see K McLean, Constitutional 
deference, courts and socio-economic rights in South Africa (2009) 138-143. 
52 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 14-15. 
53 For a similar use, see Leckie - Where it matters most (n 17 above) 3. 
54 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 53(1)(c). 
55 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 40 which guarantees the right of people, individually or in 
association with others, to acquire and own property in any part of Kenya as well as further guaranteeing 
against arbitrary deprivation of property and the payment of just, prompt and equitable compensation in 
instances of compulsory acquisition by the State. 
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comparative perspective, the constitutional provision on the right to housing is not as expansive 
as those found in other constitutions, such as the SAC, as it does not expressly provide for 
protection against forced evictions, one of the major challenges to accessing adequate housing 
in Kenya today,57 as well protection of prisoners’ right to adequate accommodation.58 A look at 
the drafting history of the 2010 Constitution, however, indicates that attempts were made to 
expressly prohibit forced eviction through a constitutionally entrenched provision.59 The 
provisions were later omitted from the Draft Constitution adopted at the Constitutional 
Conference at the Bomas of Kenya, the Bomas Draft, which only provided for “the right to 
accessible and adequate housing”.60 The Harmonised Draft Constitution 2009, added the 
wording “and to reasonable standards of sanitation”61 to give the housing provision its form as is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
56 See The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, Part  five, especially article 60(1) which provides for equitable 
access to land, the security of land tenure, as well as the elimination of gender discrimination in law, 
customs and practices related to land, among others. Part five further requires, in article 68(c) for 
parliament to enact legislation protecting matrimonial property, especially the matrimonial home, in 
instances of divorce as well as protecting dependants and spouses of a deceased person having an 
interest in land. 
57 See the 1996 South African Constitution, section 26(3) which provides that ‘[N]o one may be evicted 
from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions’. 
58 The 1996 South African Constitution, section 35(2)(e). This apparent omission can, however, be cured 
by article 51 which provides that prisoners retain all their fundamental rights as contained in the Bill of 
Rights, and the requirement that parliament enact legislation to ensure their humane treatment taking into 
account relevant international human right instruments. 
59 Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) ‘The Draft Bill to amend the 
Constitution – volume two’ (2004), also known as the “Ghai Draft,” article 59, available at 
http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-instrument/constitution (accessed on 16 
September 2012), which had similar eviction provisions as those entrenched in the SAC. 
60 National Constitutional Conference ‘The Draft Constitution of Kenya – 2004,’ article 63, available at 
http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-instrument/constitution (accessed on 16 
September 2012). 
61 Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review ‘Harmonised Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2009’, article 
64, available at http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-instrument/constitution 
(accessed on 16 September 2012). 
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currently reflected in the 2010 Constitution.62 The failure to retain the provision on the prohibition 
of forced evictions conflicts with the concerns espoused by the CESCR which, in its 
consideration of Kenya’s Initial State Report on the ICESCR, had recommended that Kenya 
include such a provision in the Constitution.63 
However, the lack of express prohibition of forced evictions in the 2010 Constitution is 
not fatal, as the prohibition of evictions has been found to be an intrinsic component of the right 
to housing in international law by the CESCR in its General Comment Number 7.64  This has 
also been affirmed, in the context of South Africa, by the SACC in the case of Jaftha v 
Schoeman, where the Court held that section 26 of the 1996 South African Constitution must be 
read as a whole, and that the whole section was aimed at ‘creating a new dispensation in which 
every person has adequate housing, and in which the State may not interfere with such access 
unless it would be justifiable to do so’.65 The Court further held that the prohibition of forced 
evictions was the negative aspect of the right to housing and that any measure allowing such 
forced evictions violated the right to housing as provided for in section 26(1) of the SAC.66 
7.3.2 Legislative and policy provisions 
Legal protection of housing rights in Kenya can also be found in several legislative and policy 
documents. One of the oldest pieces of legislation intended to protect tenants against 
                                                            
62 For a similar analysis see I Ndegwa ‘A roof over Wanjiku’s head: Judicial enforcement of the right to 
housing under the Constitution of Kenya’ in J Biegon & G Musila (eds.), ICJ Judiciary Watch Report 
Volume 10: Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights under the new Constitution – Challenges and 
opportunities for Kenya (2012) 143, at 154-156. 
63 CESCR, Concluding Observations on Kenya’s Initial Report – 1993, para. 16, available at 
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/uncom.nsf/804bb175b68baaf7c125667f004cb333/89263c23858e2a0cc
125663c00343b10?OpenDocument (accessed on 16 September 2012). 
64 General Comment No. 7, para. 5. See also Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) & UN-Habitat ‘The right to adequate housing: Fact-Sheet No. 21/Rev.1, at 4, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf (accessed on 15 September 
2012); SERAC v Nigeria (n 38 above) para. 63, where the African Commission acknowledged that the 
protection from forced eviction was an important component of the right to adequate housing implicitly 
protected in the African Charter.  
65 Jaftha v Schoeman & Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), para. 28. 
66 Jaftha, para. 34.  
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exploitation by landlords was the Rent Restriction Act of 1982, which prohibited arbitrary rent 
increases above the standard rent, making it an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment to 
charge more than the standard rent.67 It also established a Rent Tribunal mandated to 
investigate complaints by landlords and tenants, and to mediate or find a resolution to rent 
disputes.68 However, since the Act only applies to tenant-landlord relationships in which the 
monthly rent does not exceed Kshs. 2, 500 (approximately 30 US dollars), it has lost its 
protective value as most rental houses are priced far above that amount, even in the informal 
settlements.69 The Act is also inapplicable in most informal settlements either because the 
structure owners have no legal title to the land or because the structures are built of temporary 
materials.70 It has been suggested that if the Act was to be effectively made applicable to the 
informal settlements, rent would decrease by 70 per cent, thus making accommodation in the 
informal settlements more affordable.71  
With the adoption of the National Housing Policy in 2004,72 efforts are being made to revise 
the pecuniary limits of the Act so as to provide the requisite protection to all low cost housing. 
These efforts have culminated in the drafting of the Landlord and Tenant Bill 2007, aimed at 
simplifying and modernising laws relating to the renting of residential premises, the regulation of 
landlord and tenant relationships so as to enhance stability in the rental housing sector, and to 
protect tenants from unlawful rent increases as well as unlawful forced evictions.73 Though it 
                                                            
67 Rent Restriction Act, Cap 296, Revised Edition 2010 (1982), sections 9-10 
68 Rent Restriction Act, sections 4-8. 
69 Rent Restriction Act, section 2(1)(c). 
70 COHRE Report (n 6 above) 86-87. They state that home owners insist on the use of ‘temporary 
materials’ such as mud so as to evade the provisions of the Act. 
71 P Syagga, W Mitullah & S Gitau-Karirah, Nairobi situation analysis supplementary study: A rapid 
economic appraisal of rents in slums and informal settlements (2002) 5.  
72 Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2004: National Housing Policy for Kenya’ (2004) available at 
http://mail.housing.go.ke/home/ict@housing.go.ke/Briefcase/Website%20Downloads/National%20Housin
g%20Policy%20for%20Kenya.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2012). The policy is aimed at responding 
to the dire housing situation in Kenya and to bridge the shortfall in housing stock resulting from increased 
demand caused by population explosion, rapid urbanisation, widespread poverty, and escalating costs of 
housing. The policy forms the basis of the Tenant and Landlord Bill 2007, the Housing Bill 2011 and the 
Evictions and Resettlement Procedure Bill 2012 discussed herein below. 
73 The Landlord and Tenant Bill 2007, preamble & part III. 
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increases the pecuniary limits to Kshs. 15, 000 per month, the draft is ambiguously or wrongly 
crafted creating an impression that the Bill is not intended to apply to residential premises that 
have a fair rent not exceeding Kshs. 15, 000.74 The Bill retains the Landlord and Tenant tribunal 
to settle disputes arising from the application of the Bill, but further empowers it to grant more 
substantive remedies such as the award of costs, the issuing of injunctions, the ordering of 
compensation, and the reinstatement of tenants into their former houses if they were wrongfully 
evicted.75 The Bill also retains the offence of not complying with the lawful orders and decisions 
of the Tribunal, but enhances the penalty to a fine of Kshs. 100, 000, a twelve month prison 
sentence or both.76 
The Housing Act of 1990, which was supposed to be the main legal document on housing, 
does not adopt the language of a right to housing.77 It establishes a National Housing 
Corporation and a National Housing Fund to be controlled by the Corporation, from which loans 
and grants to local authorities, companies and individuals can be made for the construction of 
dwellings.78 The Corporation is also mandated to undertake research and collect data on 
housing as well as to operate housing finance institutions.79  
In line with the 2004 National Housing Policy and the 2010 Constitution, the Housing Act will 
be replaced by the proposed Housing Bill 2011, which specifically adopts the language of rights, 
proposes the establishment of a National Housing Authority, the appointment of a 
Commissioner of Housing, and the Establishment of a National Housing Development Fund for 
                                                            
74 Contrast the drafting in the Bill which provides as follows: 
This Act applies to – (a) all residential premises, other than – (iii) residential premises which have 
a fair rent not exceeding [Kshs. 15, 000] per month… 
With the drafting in the Rent Restriction Act which provides as follows: 
This Act shall apply to all dwelling houses, other than – (c) dwelling houses which have a 
standard rent exceeding [Kshs. 2, 500] per month… 
In my opinion the ‘not’ between ‘rent’ and ‘exceeding’ in the Bill is misplaced as it totally destroys the 
protection that was intended to be given to low income tenants who stay in houses below Kshs. 15, 000, 
and who are the majority of the population who need the protection.  
75 Landlord and Tenant Bill, section 4 
76 Landlord and Tenant Bill, section 9. 
77 The Housing Act, Cap 117, Revised Edition 2010 (1990). 
78 Housing Act, sections 3-7. 
79 Housing Act, section 10. 
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the provision of the right to accessible and adequate housing as entrenched in the 2010 
Constitution.80 It adopts the definition and content of the right to housing as espoused the 
CESCR in General Comment Number 4, that is, security of tenure, availability, affordability, 
habitability, accessibility, location as well as cultural adequacy.81 It encompasses a broad 
definition of housing to include local, national and international policies, strategies, programmes 
and practices that provide for housing rights.82 The guiding principles of the Bill includes an 
affirmation of housing as key to economic and social development; an adoption of the language 
of progressive realisation of housing rights; facilitation as well as provision of adequate housing, 
including social housing; the recognition of the private sector as the engine in housing 
development and the government as a facilitator, enabler and catalyst in housing development; 
and the facilitation of access to land and security of tenure for housing.83  
To complement the extensive provisions in the Housing Bill, efforts are being made to put in 
place an evictions regulation regime, starting with the development of the Evictions and 
Resettlement Guidelines84 as well as the drafting of the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures 
Bill, 2012.85 The aim of the Bill is to provide protection, prevention and redress in instances of 
                                                            
80 The Housing Bill, November 2011, preamble and sections 4 (objectives), 5 (implementing agency), 6 
(housing financing, including financing for low-cost housing), 7 (provision of land for housing 
development), 10 (national housing development fund into which it is to be deposited 5 per cent of the 
government budget for the first ten years from when the fund is established as well as contributions from 
employers and employees),  14 (Commissioner of Housing who is to be the chief government adviser on 
matters relating to housing and human settlement, and who is also mandated to develop a 
comprehensive national shelter program aimed at ensuring the availability of affordable and descent 
housing and basic services, among other duties), 16 (National Housing Authority mandated to exercise 
general supervisory authority over all matters relating to housing and human settlement), and 49 
(Housing Dispute Tribunal to resolve any disputes related to housing as provided for by the Bill). 
81 Housing Bill, section 2. 
82 Housing Bill, section 2. 
83 Housing Bill, section 3. 
84 Ministry of Lands, Evictions and Resettlement Guidelines, Final Edited Version, March 2011 (on file 
with author). 
85 Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012, available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2012/EvictionsandResettleBill2012.pdf 
(accessed on 25 September 2012). 
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forced evictions for all persons including unlawful occupiers and squatters.86 It prohibits forced 
evictions and demolitions without a court order, and provides the procedures for evictions 
including the giving of an opportunity for genuine consultation between all affected parties;87 the 
issuing of sufficient notice of not less than three months; an undertaking of economic, 
environmental and social impact assessment before evictions; availability of adequate 
resettlement plans; and the availability of an opportunity for legal redress.88 The Bill also 
provides guidelines to courts when dealing with eviction applications, requiring the court to 
cause service of application documents to all the affected parties; to issue an order of eviction 
for groups that have occupied a piece of land for less than six months only if it is just and 
equitable to do so taking into account all the relevant circumstances, including the needs of 
special vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, persons living 
with HIV/AIDS; not to issue an order of eviction if it will result in homelessness; and in instances 
where occupiers have been on the land for more than six months, evictions are to be ordered 
only if it is just and equitable taking into account all the circumstances and also whether 
alternative land has been made available, among other conditions.89 The Bill directs the courts 
to only issue an eviction order if they are satisfied that all the conditions set out in the Bill have 
been met, and that in doing so, they should also indicate a just and equitable date when the 
occupiers are expected to vacate or when the eviction is to be carried out should the occupiers 
fail to vacate on the date set out by the court.90 
If enacted and effectively implemented, the Tenant and Landlord Bill, the Housing Bill and 
the Evictions Bill have the potential to respond to most of the housing challenges being 
experienced in Kenya today. The challenge, however, will be to translate precepts into practice. 
                                                            
86 Evictions Bill 2012, preamble. 
87 Similar to the requirement of meaningful engagement which is discussed more elaborately in chapter 
three, section 3.5 above. 
88 Evictions Bill 2012, sections 4-7. For evictions being undertaken by organs of the State, see sections 
10ff. 
89 Evictions Bill 2012, section 8. See also section 11 for the mandatory requirements during evictions 
which include: the presence of a government official during evictions; proper identification of those 
conducting the eviction; evictions to be done transparently and in compliance with international human 
rights principles; evictions not to be conducted at night or in bad weather; and that evictions be conducted 
in a manner respectful of the life, security and dignity of those affected. 
90 Evictions Bill 2012, section 8 (9) & (10). 
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The provisions in the above housing policy and proposed legislation are further augmented 
by policy and legislation dealing with land, especially the National Land Policy of 200991 and its 
attendant Land Act 2012,92 as well as the Land Registration Act 2012.93 Other legislation which 
provide for housing for special groups includes the Children’s Act 2001, Act No. 8 of 2001, 
sections 23 and 98; The Refugees Act, 2006, section 16, which has been expanded by the 
proposed Refugees Bill, 2011, section 14; as well as the Kenya Railways Corporation Act, 
section 16(3). 
7.4 The meaning and content of the right to accessible and adequate housing   
The formulation of an all-encompassing definition of the right to adequate housing is not an 
easy task as it will depend on a specific context, the circumstances of households and 
                                                            
91 Ministry of Lands, ‘Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009: National Land Policy (August 2009) available at 
http://www.lands.go.ke/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=81&Itemid=26 (accessed 
on 25 September 2012). The policy is aimed at ensuring efficient, equitable and sustainable use of land 
(para. 3) as well as security of tenure and other rights over land with the aim of poverty reduction through 
equitable access to land for all Kenyans (paras. 5, 7, 29-33, & 52-55). It calls for the equal recognition 
and protection of all tenure systems, non-discrimination in ownership of and access to land in all tenure 
systems as well as the promotion and protection of the multiple values attaching to land, not just the 
economic value as is the current practice (paras. 69-80). 
92 The Land Act 2012, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 37 (Acts No. 6). It provides for equitable access to 
land, security of land rights, transparent and cost-effective management of land and land resources, 
elimination of gender discrimination in access to land, public participation and democratic decision-
making in land matters as well as non-discrimination and the protection of the marginalised, in section 4. 
It also provides for equal recognition and protection of land rights emanating from all the provided tenure 
systems, in section 5. It allows for the issuing of temporary licences for the use of public land, a tool that 
can be used to enable people in distress to temporarily use public land for housing purposes pending a 
more permanent government solution to their plight, in sections 20-21. It further provides for the 
Commissioner to implement settlement programmes to provide access to land for shelter and livelihoods, 
to ameliorate the land and housing needs of squatters and displaced persons. This is to be undertaken 
through the reservation of public land or through the purchase of private land, and a Land Settlement 
Fund is established for this purpose, in sections 134-135. 
93 The Land Registration Act, 2012, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 33 (Acts No. 3). 
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individuals, as well as the prevailing housing needs and priorities.94 However, a working 
definition has been adopted and it defines the right to adequate housing as ‘the right of every 
woman, man, youth and child to gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in 
which to live in peace and dignity’.95 Both international and national courts as well as quasi-
judicial organs have adopted this interpretation of the right to adequate housing, holding that the 
right should be broadly interpreted not only to include a roof over one’s head or be viewed 
exclusively as a commodity, but must be seen as an important component of the right to human 
dignity, the pillar on which all the other SERs are premised.96  
The CESCR, therefore, contends that adequate housing should mean ‘adequate privacy, 
adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic 
infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at a reasonable 
cost’.97 The CESCR further expounds on the above requirements for adequate housing by 
delineating the content of the right to adequate housing to include: legal security of tenure to 
                                                            
94 K Tissington (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI) ‘A review of housing policy and 
development in South Africa since 1994’ (September 2010) 28, available at 
http://www.spii.org.za/agentfiles/434/file/Research/Review%20of%20the%20Right%20to%20Housing.pdf 
(accessed on 18 September 2012). 
95 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing to the 57th Commission on Human 
Rights, E/CN.4/2001/51, 25 January 2001, para. 8, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G01/105/87/PDF/G0110587.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 20 September 
2012); Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, A/HRC/7/16 (February 2008) para. 4, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47ce73f32.html (accessed 26 September 2012).  
96 General Comment No. 4, para. 7 & also para. 9 which affirms that the right to housing is important for 
the realisation of other complimentary rights, and thus basically advocates a comprehensive rights-based 
approach when dealing with issues related to housing. See also OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 3-4, 
which summarises the content of the right to adequate housing as comprising of freedoms such as 
protection from forced eviction and the demolition of dwellings; freedom from arbitrary interference with 
one’s privacy, home and family; and freedom of movement and the choice of one’s residence; as well as 
housing entitlements which include security of tenure; housing, land property restitution; equality and non-
discrimination; and participation in housing related matters at the national and community level.  
97 General Comment No. 4, para. 7. 
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guarantee legal protection of inhabitants from forced evictions, harassment and other threats;98 
availability of services, infrastructure and other facilities essential to health security and 
comfort;99 affordability to ensure that people are capable of accessing adequate housing without 
jeopardising access to other essential elements for a dignified life; habitability to ensure 
protection against the elements and other threats to a healthy life; physical and economic 
accessibility of adequate housing to all persons, but especially the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals and groups; appropriate location with adequate affordable transport to 
allow access to employment,  healthcare facilities, educational institutions, and other social 
facilities; as well as being culturally adequate to take into account the diversity of the population 
and their cultural identities.100  
This expansive understanding of the right to adequate housing was also adopted by the 
SACC in the Groootboom case where the Court held as follows:101 
Housing entails more than brick and mortar. It requires available land, appropriate services such 
as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all these, including the 
building of the house itself. For a person to have access to adequate housing all of these 
conditions need to be met: there must be land, there must be services, there must be a dwelling. 
Access to land for the purposes of housing is therefore included in the right of access to adequate 
housing in section 26. 
                                                            
98 Tenure takes a variety of forms including ‘rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative 
housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of 
land or property,’ see General Comment No. 4, para. 8(a). Scott Leckie contends that security of tenure is 
the most indispensable core element of the right to adequate housing, the absence of which makes the 
enjoyment of housing rights unlikely. He says that the enforcement of this component ensures the 
protection of not only property owners, but also of tenants, thus expanding human rights protection to all 
people of all incomes and in all hosing sectors. He, therefore, labels it as the baseline or core minimum 
entitlement of the right to housing, see Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 35-37. 
99 These include safe drinking water, electricity, sanitation, refuse disposal, site drainage, and emergency 
services. See General Comment No. 4, para. 8(b).  
100 General Comment No. 4, para. 8. See also Habitat Agenda, para. 60; Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Housing (n 95 above) para.5. For an elaboration of this components of the 
right to adequate housing, see Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 10-11, FN 14. 
101  Grootboom, para. 35.  
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Land as an important component of the right to adequate housing was also affirmed in the 
Habitat Agenda where it is stated that ‘access to land and legal security of tenure are strategic 
prerequisites for the provision of adequate shelter for all’.102 This broad understanding is 
important as it encompasses all the elements that are required to ensure that housing 
contributes to a dignified life for the whole population.  
An important component of the right to adequate housing, which is encompassed in the 
requirement of security of tenure, is the protection from forced, arbitrary and unprocedural 
eviction.103 Forced eviction is defined by the CESCR as:104 
[t]he permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities 
from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, 
appropriate forms of legal or other protection. 
The UN Commission on Human Rights has affirmed the detrimental nature of forced evictions 
on the realisation of the right to housing, terming the practice as contrary to international human 
rights standards and a gross violation of a broad range of human rights.105 
The right to adequate housing also entails a minimum core content, the realisation of 
which is an immediate obligation of the State.106 This was expounded by the CESCR in its 
General Comment Number 3 where it stated that a State Party in which any significant number 
of individuals are deprived of basic shelter and housing is prima facie failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant, and that if the Covenant were to be read in a way not providing 
                                                            
102 Habitat Agenda, para. 75. See also Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate 
Housing (n 95 above) paras. 65-78, where he emphasises the important linkages between land and the 
realisation of the right to adequate housing for numerous individuals and groups including the rural poor, 
women, informal settlement inhabitants, indigenous people, refugees and IDPs, and calls for a continued 
focus on the important place access to land has in the realisation of the right to adequate housing. 
103 General Comment No. 7, para. 1-2; OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 10. 
104 General Comment No. 7, para. 3. 
105 Commission on Human Rights Resolution: 2004/28 ‘Prohibition of forced evictions’ (16 April 2004) 
para. 1, available at www.unhabitat.org/downloads/.../1341_73776_forced%20evic4.doc (accessed on 20 
September 2012). 
106 For a comprehensive and illuminating discussion of the minimum core approach and its place in the 
development of Kenya’s SER jurisprudence, see chapter two, section 2.5 and chapter five, section 5.3.2. 
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for the minimum core, it would be deprived of its raison d’être.107 The question then is, what 
forms the minimum core of the right to housing? The office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and UN-Habitat contend that the provisions highlighted by the CESCR in General 
Comment Number 4, paragraph 8, as discussed above, entail the minimum essentials for 
adequate housing and must be met for housing to be considered adequate.108 This is 
acknowledged by Kirsty McLean writing in the context of South Africa.109 McLean advocates the 
adoption of this flexible approach to the understanding of the minimum core content of the right 
to housing as it allows for its use as a universal benchmark while at the same time taking into 
account the local needs and resource capacity of different States.110   
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the minimum core content of the right 
to adequate housing encompasses security of tenure to guarantee protection from forced 
eviction, harassment and other threats; access to services, materials, facilities and 
infrastructure; adequate space and habitality – protection from the elements as well as other 
threats to health, structural hazards and disease vectors; appropriate location allowing for 
access to employment options, healthcare services, schools, child-care centres and other 
facilities.111  Protection from forced eviction forms an important part of the minimum core content 
of the right to housing.112 This has been acknowledged by the CESCR in its General Comment 
Number 7 where it contends that the standard of progressive realisation is not relevant to the 
prevention of forced eviction and that ‘the State’s obligation to ensure respect for that right is not 
qualified by obligations relating to its available resources’.113 
David Bilchitz, analysing the reasonableness approach in the context of the Grootboom 
case, has also called for the adoption of the minimum core approach in relation to housing 
rights, arguing that failure to provide for the short-term urgent needs of homeless people 
                                                            
107 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the 
Covenant), 14 December 1990, para. 10, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4538838e10.html (accessed 16 September 2012). 
108 OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 9-10. 
109 McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-40 – 55-41. 
110 McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-40 – 55-41. 
111 General Comment No. 4, para. 8; McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-40. 
112 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 21-22. 
113 General Comment No. 7, para. 8. See also COHRE (n 6 above) 29. 
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necessarily limits their chances of enjoying the benefits of housing rights realised progressively 
due to death or ill-health caused by their inter-mediate deprivation.114 He argues that a 
programme aimed at the realisation of long-term housing goals is self-defeatist if it does not 
provide for short-term and intermediate housing needs, and therefore, in that context, the 
reasonableness approach naturally leads to the recognition of a minimum core content of 
housing rights.115 Bilchitz, therefore, concludes that the findings of the unreasonableness of the 
South African Government’s housing policy would not have been possible without the 
Grootboom court adopting, without expressly saying so, the minimum core approach.116 
Bilchitz, however, does not adopt an expansive understanding of the minimum core 
approach to housing rights as is espoused by the Office of the High Commissioner, UN-Habitat 
and by McLean as is discussed above.117 He argues that this entails providing a more 
expansive form of housing than is required to meet the minimal housing interests.118 In this light, 
he criticises the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Shantistar Builders v 
Narayan Khimalal Totane, where the Supreme Court held that human beings require ‘suitable 
accommodation which allows them to grow in every aspect – physical, moral and intellectual’,119 
as failing to distinguish between the minimal and the maximal housing interests protected by the 
right to adequate housing.120 To him, the expansive understanding of the minimum core content 
of the right to housing, as is expounded by the UN-Habitat and McLean above, is the second 
(maximal) threshold of interest protected by the right to adequate housing, the first threshold 
(minimum core) being the need to have ‘at least minimal shelter from the elements so that one’s 
                                                            
114 D Bilchitz, Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
(2007) 145. 
115 As above.  
116 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 145-46.  
117 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 188. 
118 As above.  
119 AIR 1990 SC 630, (1990) 92 BOMLR 145, JT 1990 (1) SC 106, para.9, available at http://droits-
sociaux.u-paris10.fr/assets/files/Jurisprudence/D.Roman/Shantistar_Builders.pdf (accessed on 19 
October 2012).  
120 As above. 
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health and thus one’s ability to survive are not compromised’.121 It is submitted here that this 
understanding of the minimum core to housing rights based on survival needs is too thin and 
does not take into account the interrelated nature of housing rights and other important human 
needs. It is thus proposed that in the development of the minimum core of the right to adequate 
housing, the relevant institutions of the State must also take into account other constitutional 
values such as equality, dignity and freedom so as to espouse a more expansive understanding 
of the minimum core as is entailed in the integrated approach proposed in chapter five, section 
5.3 above. 
7.5 Kenya’s national and international obligations with regard to the right to accessible 
and adequate housing 
Kenya’s obligations in the realisation of the right to housing are discussed using three analytical 
approaches, that is, the progressive realisation standard,122 the tripartite typology and the 4-A’s 
scheme. 
7.5.1 General obligations with regard to the right to housing 
Kenya’s general obligations in respect of the realisation of the right to accessible and adequate 
housing, like all other SERs, are contained in article 21 of the Constitution, which borrows from 
article 2(1) of the ICESCR.123 As has been discussed generally in chapter two, section 2.3,124 
                                                            
121 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 187. Bilchitz slightly expands this minimum 
core to include ‘at least, protection from the elements in sanitary conditions with access to basic services 
such as toilets and running water,’ at 198. 
122 For a comprehensive general discussion of the components of the ‘progressive realisation’ standard 
for the realisation of SERs, see chapter two, section 2.3.  
123 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21 which provides that: 
(1) It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights. 
(2)  The State shall take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting of standards, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights guaranteed under Article 43. 
124 An integrated discussion of Kenya’s obligations in national and international law in relation to the right 
to accessible and adequate housing is especially important due to the constitutional provisions 
incorporating customary international law as well as international law in ratified international and regional 
treaties directly in the Kenyan domestic legal sphere as has been more elaborately discussed in chapter 
two, section 2.2 above. 
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and specifically in relation to the right to food in chapter six, section 6.6 above, these obligations 
consist of several intertwined and mutually reinforcing components, which are, progressive 
realisation; obligation to take steps; maximum of available resources; and, international 
cooperation and assistance. 
i) Progressive realisation 
The standard of progressive realisation is a recognition that even though every person has a 
right to accessible and adequate housing, this cannot be achieved immediately by States as 
measures aimed at the realisation of the right are always complex, time consuming and 
costly.125 This was acknowledged by the former UN Special Rapporteur on housing rights, 
Justice Rajindar Sachar, who contended that the right to housing should not be taken to imply 
that the State is required to immediately build housing for the entire population as soon as it 
assumes obligations under the ICESCR.126  
                                                            
125 See M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A perspective on 
its development (1998) 330; S Leckie ‘The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the right to adequate housing: Towards an appropriate approach’ (1989) 11 Human Rights Quarterly 522 
at 527, who argues that the complexity of realising the right to housing is due to its numerous elements 
which are difficult to reconcile with one another such as private versus public ownership of property, 
rented versus owned housing, self-built versus State-built housing, the difficult balance between the right 
to property and the right to housing of those living in a property belonging to others, as well as the 
diversity of housing users who have distinct housing needs. See also McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-
1, who affirms the complexity of housing law due to its animation by a complex network of law, policy, 
politics, international law, macro-economic planning, multi-layered and cooperative government as well as 
finance.  
126 See Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Housing: Second progress report 
submitted by Mr. Rajindar Sachar, Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/20 (June 1994) Part II, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1994.20 
(accessed on 26 September 2012); Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Right to Adequate Housing: 
Final report submitted by Mr. Rajindar Sachar, Special Rapporteur (1995) para. 11, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1995.12.En?Opendocument 
(accessed on 26 September 2012). See also Grootboom, para. 95, where the SACC also held that the 
right of access to adequate housing in the SAC did not entitle the respondents to claim shelter or housing 
from the government immediately upon demand. 
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The standard was also adopted at the national level, in the Grootboom case where the 
SACC contended that the basic goal of the right to housing was to enhance the realisation of 
the basic needs of all in society, and the standard of progressive realisation contemplated that 
the right could not be realised immediately. 127 Progressive realisation was thus to be achieved 
through the taking of effective steps that facilitate access by ensuring that legal, administrative, 
operational as well as financial challenges are examined and possibly lowered over time, with 
the aim of making housing accessible not only to a larger number of people, but also to a wider 
range of people as time progressed.128 The SACC further held in the Modderklip case that 
progressive realisation of the right to housing required ‘careful planning, fair procedures and 
orderly and predictable processes’.129 In his analysis of section 26 of the SAC, David Bilchitz 
calls for an interpretation of progressive realisation to entail two components: the first 
component being the minimum core content aimed at the protection of minimal housing 
interests; and the second, the achievement of maximal housing interests to enable human 
beings to achieve their goals and live productive lives.130 To him, progressive realisation is thus 
the movement from the first component to the second component.131 
The practical application of the obligation to progressively realise the right to housing 
was given by the CESCR in its consideration of the State Report of the Dominican Republic. In 
its Concluding Observation to that Report, the CESCR stated that the fulfilment of this obligation 
required the State to provide basic essential services to dwellings, ensure that public housing is 
provided to those in greatest need, and to undertake substantive dialogue and consultation with 
all affected communities in the design, implementation and enforcement of programmes aimed 
at the realisation of the right to adequate housing, among other requirements.132 This followed a 
finding by the Committee that by planning and undertaking massive forced evictions, the 
Dominican Republic had not only failed to implement its obligations under the ICESCR, but was 
                                                            
127 Grootboom, para. 45. 
128 As above. 
129  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (CCT20/04) 
2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), para. 49. 
130 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 193. 
131 As above.  
132 See OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 32; Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 14 note 22. 
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in actual violation of the internationally recognised right to adequate housing, the first time the 
Committee had found a violation of an SER in relation to the ICESCR.133 
ii) Obligation to take steps 
Although the overall realisation of the right to accessible and adequate housing is subject to 
progressive realisation, there is an immediate obligation that the State takes steps or adopts 
measures that are sufficiently capable of realising the right to housing over the shortest period 
possible, taking into account the resources available to the State internally and externally.134 
The steps taken must be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards the 
realisation of the right to housing and must actually be capable of realising the right.135  
Matthew Craven contends that the first step should entail an analysis of the housing 
situation in the entire country so as to ascertain the full extent of homelessness and inadequate 
housing.136 The CESCR contends that this obligation to undertake a nationwide housing 
situational analysis is an immediate obligation that must be undertaken either by the State on its 
own or through international cooperation where the State lacks sufficient resources to undertake 
the assessment.137  
The national survey and assessment should then be followed by the development of a 
comprehensive national housing strategy which ‘defines the objectives for the development of 
shelter conditions, identifies the resources available to meet these goals and the most cost-
                                                            
133 Leckie- Where it matters most (n 17 above) 20.  
134 Craven (n 125 above) 331-333.   
135 General Comment No. 3, para. 2.  
136 Craven (n 125 above) 331-333. See also Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 253, 
who contends, in analysing the right to housing in India, that proper statistics and an analysis of the 
overall housing situation in the country is the first step towards developing an appropriate strategy for the 
provision of shelter to the destitute. 
137 General Comment No. 4, para. 13. See also CESCR, Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be 
Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, E/C.12/2008/2 (March 2009), para. 
50,  available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/  (accessed on 26 September 2012), which 
requires State Parties to indicate in their Reports to the CESCR whether this national survey has been 
undertaken as well as its findings with regard to the level of homelessness as well as those insufficiently 
housed. 
 
 
 
 
382 | P a g e  
 
effective way of using them, and sets out the responsibilities and time-frames for the 
implementation of the necessary measures.138 Scott Leckie proposes that the national strategy 
must be developed in a pragmatic manner that envisions housing as both a basic birth-right of 
human beings and a commodity that can be bought and sold in the open market, thus 
acknowledging both the human rights dimensions and the economic interests associated with 
housing.139  Further, the strategy must take into account the housing needs in the rural areas, a 
segment of society that is almost forgotten in policies and programmes aimed at the realisation 
of the right to adequate housing, particularly in Kenya.140 It must also encompass sufficient 
mechanisms to enhance collaboration and cooperation among all sectors of society, including 
government, NGOs and individuals, in the realisation of the right to adequate housing.141 
The obligation to take immediate steps to develop a national strategy was also affirmed, 
in the South African context, in the Grootboom case where the SACC upheld the duty of the 
State to develop a coherent, coordinated programme capable of realising the right.142 The 
SACC further developed criteria to scrutinise the reasonableness of such adopted programme, 
and it included the requirements that it must: be adopted through both legislative and policy 
means; be reasonably implemented; be flexible and balanced taking into account both short, 
medium and long-term housing needs of the people; not exclude a significant segment of 
                                                            
138 General Comment No. 4, para. 12. This is acknowledged and anticipated by the Kenya Housing Bill, 
2011 in section 2 where it interprets housing to include the process of: 
(a) analysis of shelter needs and demands; 
(b) determination, organisation and management of the production and maintenance of dwelling units 
including supporting infrastructure; and, 
(c) the resources required thereof, while upholding environmental sustainability.  
139 Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 6-7, who argues that strategies treating housing either as 
purely social goods or exclusively as market-based assets are unrealistic in the fulfilment of housing 
rights. 
140 See Declaration on Cities, para. 3 which calls for concurrent development of rural areas, the 
eradication of poverty, provision of educational as well as employment opportunities. See also Final 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (n 95 above) paras. 79-80 & 105, 
where he also calls for a continued emphasis on rural development if the housing challenges in both rural 
and urban areas are to be tackled. 
141 General Comment No. 4, para. 12. 
142 Grootboom, para. 41. 
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society; contain a clear as well as efficient assignment of functions to all the relevant levels and 
departments of government; ensure that appropriate financial and human resources are 
available at all the relevant levels and departments of government; and provide a procedure for 
review so as to take into account changing societal circumstances.143 
The adoption or reform of legislation is an important, though not the only, measure that 
can be taken by a State to enhance the realisation of the right to adequate housing.144 The 
Revised State Reporting Guidelines to the ICESCR give a long list of types of legislation that the 
State can put in place to enhance the realisation of the right to adequate housing which 
include:145 
a) Legislation which gives substance to the right to housing by defining the content 
of this right; 
b) Legislation relevant to land use, distribution, allocation, zoning, ceilings (total 
amount of land that can be owned by one person), expropriations (including 
provision for compensation) and planning (including procedures for community 
participation); 
c) Legislation concerning the rights of tenants to security of tenure and conferring 
legal title to those living in the ‘illegal’ sector; to protection from eviction; to 
housing finance and rent control (or subsidy); and to housing affordability; 
d) Legislation concerning building codes, building regulations and standards as well 
as the provision of infrastructure; 
e) Legislation prohibiting any and all forms of discrimination in the housing sector, 
including of groups not traditionally protected; 
                                                            
143 Grootboom, paras. 42-44. For an evaluation of the South African housing policy in relation to the 
Grootboom criteria, see McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-14 – 55-30. 
144 See UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 30ff. See also Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Adequate Housing (n 95 above) para. 9, who states that the lack of an effective national legislative and 
policy framework was one of the major challenges to the realisation of the right to adequate housing at 
the national level.  
145 CESCR, General Reporting Guidelines - Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1991, 
Supplement No. 3 (E/1991/23-E/C.12/1990/8), annex IV, part (c), at 88-110. 
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f) Legislation restricting speculation on housing or property, particularly when such 
speculation has a negative impact on the fulfilment of housing rights for all 
sectors of society; and 
g) Legislation concerning environmental planning and health in housing and human 
settlements. 
The UNHRP details several advantages to the adoption of legislation as a measure in the 
realisation of the right to adequate housing. First, it provides judicial redress in cases of violation 
of housing rights; secondly, the permanency of legislation provides an assurance as to the 
continuity of housing rights obligations in differing political administrations; thirdly, it may be the 
only way of equitably protecting the housing rights of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised 
groups as it is an important incentive towards ensuring substantive equality; and lastly, it 
provides tangible substantive content to vague international obligations, and thus encourages 
governmental accountability to citizens.146  
Even though Kenya has put in place some of these types of legislation, they do not 
sufficiently capture the entire spectrum of all the interests related to the right to adequate 
housing that require protection. The legislative reforms being undertaken in this direction, as 
discussed in section 3.2 above are to be welcomed, but they must be followed by well-crafted 
and efficiently implemented programmes so as to realise their potential in the realisation of the 
right to adequate housing.   
iii) Maximum of available resources 
The standard of progressive realisation is an acknowledgement that the full realisation of the 
right to adequate housing requires a lot of resources, which, in reality, are always scarce. 
Availability of resources contextualises a State’s obligation for the realisation of the right to 
housing, as States can only be expected to do as much as their available resources permit, 
taking into account other societal needs and concerns. Availability of resources thus acts as an 
internal limitation to a State’s obligations for the realisation of the right to housing. Resources in 
this context should not, however, be understood restrictively as those resources committed to 
housing in the State’s budget, but must be broadly understood to include resources that can be 
                                                            
146 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 33. 
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harnessed from the private sector, individual citizens as well as resources that can be accessed 
from the international community through international cooperation and assistance.147 
The importance of the availability of resources in the realisation of the right to adequate 
housing and other constitutionally entrenched SERs was emphasised, in the context of the 
SAC, by the SACC in the Soobramoney case where the then President of the Court, Justice 
Chaskalson, held as follows:148 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligation imposed on the State by sections 26 
and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent 
upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves 
are limited by reason of lack of resources. Given this lack of resources and the significant 
demands on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet these 
needs would not presently be capable of being fulfilled. 
This approach was also adopted by the SACC in its decisions in the Grootboom case149 in 
relation to housing and in the Khosa case in relation to social security.150 The availability of 
resources thus forms an internal limitation on the obligations of the State in the realisation of the 
right to adequate housing, but does not affect the content of the right itself.151 
iv) International cooperation and assistance 
The principles of solidarity and shared responsibility are the fundamental values that inform the 
duty to cooperate internationally to enhance the realisation of the right to adequate housing.152 
                                                            
147 Istanbul Declaration, para. 13; OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 30.  
148 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), para. 11.  
149 Grootboom, para. 46 
150  Khosa & Others v Minister of Social Development & Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development (CCT 13/03, CCT 12/03) 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC), para. 43. 
151 For a more nuanced discussion of this aspects, see McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-9 – 55-12; D 
Bilchitz ‘Health’ in S Woolman et al (eds.), Constitutional law of South Africa, 2nd edition Original Service, 
volume 4 (2006) 56A-1, at 56A-9 & 10, especially footnote 4. 
152 M Kothari ‘Privatising human rights – the impact of globalisation on adequate housing, water and 
sanitation’ Social Watch (undated) 18, at 20-21, available 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN010131.pdf (accessed on 26 
September 2012).  
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International cooperation is thus a key asset in the global reallocation and redistribution of 
resources with the aim of enhancing access to housing and other attendant rights, especially for 
the poor and marginalised individuals and groups.153 This has been recognised in several 
binding and non-binding international legal instruments aimed at the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing such as the ICESCR,154 CRC,155  and CESCR General Comment Number 
4.156 The commitment of States to international cooperation in the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing was further affirmed in the Habitat Agenda as follows:157 
We commit ourselves… to enhancing international cooperation and partnerships that will assist in 
the implementation of national plans of action and the global plan of action and in the attainment 
                                                            
153 As above. 
154 ICESCR, article 11(1) which provides that ‘The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent’. 
155 CRC, preamble para. 11, which recognises the importance of international cooperation in improving 
the living condition of children in every country and especially developing countries; as well as article 45 
which encourages international cooperation so as to foster the effective implementation of the CRC. 
156 CESCR General Comment No. 4, para. 10, which provides that in instances of the inability of a State 
to take immediate steps towards the realisation of the right to housing due to scarcity of resources, the 
State should seek international cooperation and assistance to undertake the same. Para. 13 further 
requires international cooperation in ascertaining the level of homelessness and inadequate housing in a 
State, and para. 19 recognises that not only less than 5 per cent of international assistance has been 
directed towards the realisation of the right to adequate housing, but even this funding has not been used 
to meet the housing needs of the poor and vulnerable groups. Para. 19 thus calls for more resources 
being directed at the realisation of adequate housing for all, especially the vulnerable groups.  
157 UNGA ‘The Habitat Agenda: Chapter III: Commitments, A/CONF.165/14 (June 1996), para. 49, 
available at http://www.un-documents.net/ha-3.htm#F (accessed on 26 September 2012).  The States 
further agreed, in para. 50,  to: 
a) Strive to fulfil the agreed target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product of the developed 
countries for official development assistance as soon as possible and to increase, as necessary, 
the share of funding for adequate shelter and human settlement development programmes, 
commensurate with the scope and scale of activities required to achieve the objectives and goals 
of the Habitat Agenda; 
c) Promote responsive international cooperation between public, private, non-profit, non-
governmental and community organisations. 
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of the goals of the Habitat Agenda by contributing to and participating in multilateral, regional and 
bilateral cooperation programmes and institutional arrangements and technical and financial 
assistance programmes; by promoting the exchange of appropriate technology; by collecting, 
analysing and disseminating information about shelter and human settlements; and by 
international networking. 
This obligation is also affirmed in the UN Declaration on Cities as one of the essential pillars in 
the realisation of the right to adequate housing.158 The realisation of the right to adequate 
housing does not, therefore, depend only on the resources available in a specific State, but can 
be realised using resources that can be availed by other States using the facility of international 
assistance and cooperation. 
7.5.2 The tripartite typology  
The obligation of the State in relation to the right to accessible and adequate housing can be 
understood within the tripartite typology of the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil as has 
been discussed in relation to the right to food in chapter six above. David Bilchitz argues 
convincingly that an understanding of the obligations of the State using the tripartite typology 
can only make sense when the substantive content of the rights in question have been 
developed, as the obligations flow from the content of rights.159 It is thus imperative that if the 
courts are going to understand and assess State obligations using the tripartite typology, they 
must, of necessity, adopt the transformative and integrated approaches to interpretation and 
enforcement of SERs as developed in chapter five above. The integrated approach ensures that 
the courts not only develop the substantive content and scope of the SERs in question in a 
particular case, but also adopt a purposive interpretation of the SERs that takes into account the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom, as well as the purpose of the 
entrenchment of SERs, which is the amelioration of the conditions of the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals and groups, as well as the achievement of social justice. The adoption 
of the integrated approach in the interpretation of the right to adequate housing thus expands 
the opportunities for the progressive realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution.  
i) Duty to respect  
                                                            
158 Declaration on cities, paras. 58, 65 & 67. 
159 Bilchitz – Poverty and fundamental rights (n 114 above) 184 & 195-96. See also K Young Constituting 
economic and social rights (2012) 82-83. 
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The duty to respect requires of the State to desist from taking away people’s existing right to 
housing through the arbitrary and unprocedural destruction of homes, or the adoption of 
measures that obstruct access to housing for those who do not already have housing.160 This 
duty was emphasised by the African Commission in the Endorois case when it recognised that 
the right to housing formed an intrinsic part of the right to property as is enshrined in article 14 of 
the African Charter, and found Kenya in violation of this article by its forced eviction of the 
Endorois indigenous community from their ancestral land.161 The Commission further found that 
to enhance the protection of the land and housing rights of indigenous and tribal people, Kenya 
must put in place a legal regime that recognises and protects their collective land tenure 
systems, even if this requires the adoption of affirmative action measures.162   
The duty to respect encompasses the obligation to prohibit discrimination vertically and 
horizontally in all aspects of housing and to prioritise the housing needs of individuals and 
groups previously discriminated against in access to housing such as the elderly, children, 
women, people with disabilities, people living with HIV/AIDS, and poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised communities.163 It further obliges the State to desist from taking retrogressive 
                                                            
160 Craven (n 125 above) 331. See also SERAC v Nigeria (n 38 above) para. 61, where the African 
Commission acknowledged the duty to respect as entailing the obligation of the government not to 
destroy the housing of its citizens and not to obstruct efforts by individuals or communities to rebuild lost 
homes; UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 22, which summarises this duty as requiring of the State to allow 
individuals and groups freedom to use their available resources in ways most appropriate for them to 
meet their housing needs; enhance popular participation and inculcate a conducive environment for self-
help initiatives; as well as respecting the freedom of organisation and assembly to enhance the voice of 
tenant groups.  
161 Endorois case, para. 238.  
162 Endorois case, paras. 196-199 & 241-248. 
163 ICESCR article 11 as read with article 2(2). For an elaboration, see General Comment No. 4, para. 6; 
Craven (n 125 above) 337; Habitat Agenda, para. 40(b), (c), (j), (l) & (m); Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (n 95 above) paras. 22-25, where he avers, in the context 
of indivisibility, interdependence and universality of human rights, that the eradication of discrimination in 
the realisation of the right to adequate housing has a direct positive bearing on the protection of other 
congruent rights such as life, adequate standards of living, freedom of movement and residence, and 
popular participation. 
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measures that reverse the enjoyment of already existence housing rights.164 This is emphasised 
by the CESCR which contends that a general decline in living and housing conditions that are 
directly attributable to the legislative or policy actions of a State and which are not accompanied 
by equitable compensatory measures are inconsistent with the Covenant obligations.165 This is 
specifically relevant in the prohibition of forced evictions that are undertaken arbitrarily without 
any laid-down legal procedure, and without the provision of alternative accommodation.166 The 
CESCR, referring to the prohibition of eviction in the ICCPR article 17 that prohibits arbitrary 
and unlawful interference with one’s home, emphasises the obligation of the State to refrain 
from forced evictions and to ensure that relevant laws are enforced against its agents or third 
parties who are engaged in forced evictions.167 To enhance protection from forced evictions, the 
                                                            
164 See General Comment No. 3, para. 9, which prohibits retrogressive measures and requires that any 
deliberatively retrogressive measures be justified in taking into account a holistic consideration of all the 
Convention rights and in the context of the full use of the State’s maximum available resources. See also 
UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 13 & 65; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Maastricht (1997), guideline 14(e), available at http://www.escr-
net.org/resources_more/resources_more_show.htm?doc_id=425803 (accessed on 23 January 2012). 
See also Grootboom, para. 45, where the SACC adopts the CESCR’s understanding of the progressive 
realisation standard which contains the component prohibiting the adoption of retrogressive measures.  
165 General Comment No. 4, para. 11. See Craven (n 125 above) 331-32 for further discussion on this 
point. An illustration of this point is Communication No. 31/2003: Slovakia CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 where 
the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) found that a resolution adopted 
by Dobsina Municipal Council, cancelling a previous resolution to construct low cost housing for Roma 
inhabitants living in poor conditions, was contrary to, and was thus in violation of article 5(e)(iii) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. Aoife Nolan contends 
that even though the CERD Committee did not categorically state so, the second resolution constituted a 
retrogressive measure with regard to the housing rights of poor Roma inhabitants in Slovakia, see A 
Nolan ‘Litigating housing rights’ Conference on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9-10 December 
2005, at 6, available at http://www.ihrc.ie/publications/list/aoife-nolan-litigating-housing-rights-conference-
o/ (accessed on 26 September 2012). 
166 Hakijamii (n 6 above) 9. See also General Comment No. 4, para. 18, which provides that forced 
eviction is prima facie incompatible with the obligations entrenched in the ICESCR and can only be 
justified in the most exceptional circumstances.  
167 General Comment No. 7, para. 7, which further contends that this obligation is not qualified by 
considerations relating to availability of resources. See also UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 22 which avers 
that the duty to respect, with regard to forced evictions, also requires the full realisation of the right to 
 
 
 
 
390 | P a g e  
 
State is duty-bound to put in place effective legislative measures that ‘(a) provide the greatest 
possible security of tenure to occupiers of houses and land, (b) conform to the Covenant, and 
(c) are designed to control strictly the circumstances under which evictions may be carried 
out’.168 Such measures must specifically take into account marginalised and vulnerable groups 
such as women, children, and indigenous communities, who always suffer disproportionately in 
instances of forced eviction.169 
The duty to respect is an immediate duty that the State must implement even in the 
context of resource constraints, and the CESCR has emphasised that in the instances when a 
State does not have sufficient resources to implement these immediate obligations, that State 
should request international assistance.170  
ii) Duty to protect 
The duty to protect on the other hand requires the State to put in place all measures, including 
an effective legislative, policy and programmatic framework to protect people from interference 
with their housing rights by third parties such as landlords, property developers, landowners, as 
well as corporations.171 This framework must include provisions protecting the population from 
land and property speculation,172 a phenomenon that is prevalent in Kenya and which is solely 
responsible for the high housing and rental prices that have made adequate housing 
unaffordable for the majority of Kenyans. The duty to protect further requires the State put in 
place and effectively enforce legislation and other measures to prevent discrimination, 
especially discriminatory customary inheritance as well as matrimonial property practices that 
affect women’s access to land, property and housing.173 The duty also encompasses the 
responsibility of the State to protect people from unlawful and unprocedural evictions by third 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
equality of treatment, principles of non-discrimination, the right to privacy of the home, among other 
relevant rights. 
168 General Comment No. 7, para. 9. 
169 General Comment No. 7, para. 10. 
170 General Comment No. 4, para 10. See also OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 31. 
171 OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 33. See also SERAC v Nigeria (n 38 above) para. 61, where the 
African Commission acknowledges this and further states that where an infringement has occurred, the 
government should act to stop it and to ensure access to legal remedies. 
172 CITEM (n 3 above) 20. 
173 OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 33. 
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parties as well as to provide adequate legal and equitable remedies in cases of such evictions 
which include compensation or restitution.174 
Further to this, the State must regulate financial loan and mortgage practices by banks 
and financial institutions to ensure stability of lending rates, protection of mortgage debtors as 
well as ensure non-discrimination in access to housing financing. This duty was emphasised by 
the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) in the Mortgage cases, which concerned a situation 
of rising interests rates in the context of declining wages in a financial crisis that had seen over 
200, 000 mortgagees either defaulting or being in danger of defaulting and losing their 
homes.175 The Court made orders restructuring the entire mortgage sector, orders which 
imposed specific caps on interest rates in housing, requiring that they be no higher than the 
lowest real interest rates being charged in the financial system; banned capitalisation of 
interests as well as prepayment penalties in mortgages; and required government bailout of 
mortgage debtors as well as those in danger of defaulting.176 The intervention of the Court has 
been termed fairly successful, as it was able to initiate far-reaching reforms in the housing 
finance sector that was more favourable to debtors, and thus more in line with the realisation of 
the right to adequate housing.177 
The duty to protect has also been developed in the South African context, in relation to 
the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, to ensure State protection of individuals from the 
infringement of their rights by third parties.178 This development occurred in a delict case of 
                                                            
174 General Comment No. 7, paras. 9-10; CITEM (n 3 above) 20; UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 22. 
175 For a discussion of this cases, see D Landau & JD Lopez-Murcia ‘Political institutions and judicial role: 
An approach in context, the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court’ (2009) 55, at 76ff, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/julian_lopez_murcia/26 (accessed on 26 September 2012). 
176 Landau & Lopez-Murcia (n 175 above) 77-78. 
177 As above. 
178 For an extensive discussion of this jurisprudence, see AJ van der Walt ‘Transformative 
constitutionalism and the development of South African property law (part 1)’ (2005) Journal of South 
African Law 655, at 679ff; Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South 
African property law (part 2)’ (2006) Journal of South African Law 1, where he extends the discussion in 
part 1 with the German system as a comparator, and he argues that the emergence of the duty to protect 
is a paradigm shift from the liberal image of the State as threat to fundamental rights to a new image of 
the State as a guarantor of fundamental rights. He states that the central idea of the concept is that: 
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Carmichele, where the SACC called for the development of the common law to reflect the 
constitutional obligation of the State to protect fundamental rights.179 The reasoning by the 
SACC in the Carmichele case was applied by the SA Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
Modderklip case, a case which concerned the inability of a landowner to evict illegal occupiers 
on his land because they had nowhere else to go.180 The Supreme Court held that the 
occupation was due to the State’s failure to realise and fulfil the occupiers’ constitutionally 
entrenched housing rights, and was thus, by extension, a failure by the State to fulfil its duty to 
protect the property rights of the landowner from violation by third parties.181 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal thus ordered the State to pay damages to the landowner until alternative 
accommodation was secured for the occupiers.182 Andre van der Walt contends that this is an 
important development in the protection of fundamental rights in a globalised world as it reflects 
a response to the increasing exercise of State or quasi-State powers by individual private 
parties such as multinational corporations.183 
  The State must therefore, of necessity, put in place effective measures to regulate the 
housing market to ensure that housing units are affordable to the majority of the population and 
to establish competent mechanisms to enforce such regulations.184 This duty was 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
[t]he State, through private law statutes and through civil law adjudication, has to protect the 
fundamental rights of individual citizens against all infringements, including those by other private 
persons, at 11. 
179 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 
938 (CC) para. 32. 
180 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821 (SCA). 
181 Modderklip, paras. 26-27, where the Court further stated that ‘Governments have a duty to protect 
their citizens, not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting 
them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties’. See also AJ van der Walt “The 
State’s duty to protect property rights owners v the State’s duty to provide housing: Thoughts on the 
Modderklip case’ (2005) 21 South African Journal of Human Rights 144, at 155-156. 
182  As above. 
183 Van der Walt – Transformative  Constitutionalism Part 2 (n 178 above) 11. 
184 See Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (n 95 above) para. 7, 
where he contends that the acquiescence and  complicity of States in allowing unfettered dominance of 
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acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights in the James and others case where the 
Court noted that ‘modern societies consider housing of the population to be a prime social need, 
the regulation of which cannot be left entirely to the play of market forces’.185  
To achieve the requisite regulation, the Kenyan State must, as a priority, undertake 
amendments to the Rent Restriction Act to enhance its pecuniary reach, and to also ensure the 
efficiency of the Tribunal to deal with rent disputes between tenants and landlords as well as 
reduce instances of arbitrary and unsustainable rent increases, an effort that is underway with 
the drafting of the Tenant and Landlord Bill, 2007, as discussed in section 3.2 above. For the 
informal settlements, the government must enhance their recognition, ensure security of tenure 
and also ensure the regularisation of the landlord-tenant agreement by bringing them under the 
provision of the Rent Restriction Act.  
iii) Duty to fulfil 
The duty to fulfil is a positive duty of the State and it is divided into three components, being the 
duty to facilitate, promote and provide.186 It has been acknowledged that the State on its own 
cannot fulfil the duty to provide adequate housing to the entire population.187 This does not, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the market over housing and property rights is one of the main challenges to access to adequate housing 
by low and middle income individuals and groups. 
185 James and Others v the United Kingdom, European Court on Human Rights, series A, vol. 98 
(Judgement of 21 February 1986), para. 47, Quoted in Leckie – The human right to adequate housing (n 
17 above) 160. 
186 See UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 23, which summarises this duty as requiring public expenditure and 
resource allocation; State regulation of the economy, especially the land and housing sectors; provision of 
housing subsidies; monitoring of rent levels and other costs; the provision of public housing, basic 
services and related infrastructure; as well as the adoption of taxation and subsequent redistributive 
measures.  
187 See General Comment No. 4, para. 14, which provides that experience has shown the inability of 
governments to fully realise the right to housing through publicly built housing; OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 
64 above) 6, who argue that the expectations of governments to build housing for entire populations is a 
misconception of the right to adequate housing; UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 17-19, which undertakes an 
analysis of this issue, contending that even though States are not legally obliged to provide housing to 
everyone, the duty is incumbent on them to provide housing in special instances of vulnerability or 
inability of people to access housing using their own resources; and Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 
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however, absolve the State from its responsibility with regard to the right to adequate housing. 
The State, in its duty to fulfil (facilitate), thus has a responsibility to put in place a conducive 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework to enable people to meet their own housing 
needs, as well as engender the role of the private sector in the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing.188 This approach borrows from the “enabling approach” which was 
developed in the Global Shelter Strategy to the Year 2000 by the UN Commission on Human 
Settlement,189 and reaffirmed in the Habitat Agenda,190 and which calls for the employment of 
the full potential and resources of all societal actors in the provision of adequate housing.191 This 
approach includes strategies such as private-public partnerships in the construction of housing 
and the provision of relevant services; social housing, a form of low cost rental or cooperative 
housing for low income groups;192 and the provision of housing finance and subsidies.193   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
above) 22.  A practical example can be seen in the South African context where, even though the 
government has undertaken a massive housing project, building over 1, 916, 918 houses, to provide 
housing to approximately 7, 859 363 people, and also approving 2, 784, 675 subsidies benefitting 
approximately 1, 698, 788 people between 1994 to 2005, the housing backlog is still heavy with very 
many applicants having been on a housing waiting list for over 15 years, see McLean - Housing (n 49 
above) 55-1 & 55-18. See also SERI (n 94 above) 7, which acknowledges an increase in the backlog 
from 1.5 million units in 1994 to 2.1 million units in 2010, and generally section 8 of the report which 
provides a more extensive discussion on housing delivery and backlogs. 
188 General Comment No. 4, paras. 14 & 15. See also Grootboom, para. 35, where the SACC 
acknowledged that the obligation to provide adequate housing does not only rest with the State, but that 
other societal actors also had the obligation to contribute to the realisation of the right, and that they must 
be enabled, through the adoption of relevant legislative and other measures, to contribute towards the 
realisation of the right.   
189 UNGA ‘Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, A/RES/43/181’ (December 1988) para. 2(a), 
available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/1393_76192_other1.htm (accessed on 26 
September 2012). 
190 Habitat Agenda, paras. 3, 6, 18, 44-45, 53, 58-64, among others. 
191 See Leckie - Towards an appropriate approach (n 125 above) 545-46, where he discusses this 
approach. See also Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 33-34, where he calls for the refinement 
of the enabling approach to ensure that the State retains sufficient control of the housing sector and not 
leave it entirely to the market forces to the detriment of citizens.  
192 For an elaboration of the concept of social housing in the context of South Africa, see SERI (n 94 
above) 51ff.  
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The duty to fulfil (promote) requires of the State to take positive steps to advance the 
right to adequate housing.194 The duty to fulfil (provide) requires the State to directly provide 
housing for the poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups who, for reasons 
beyond their control, are not able to provide housing for themselves and their families.195 The 
duty to provide is exemplified by the United States case of Callahan v Carey, a case for the 
provision of shelter to homeless men in Manhattan which sought a temporary mandatory 
injunction to order State officials to provide the applicants and other similarly placed individuals 
with lodging and meals.196 The New York Supreme Court held that the applicants were entitled 
to shelter in accordance with article XVII of the New York State Constitution which declared that 
‘the aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the 
State…’,  and ordered the responsible officials to provide them with the same.197 The Court 
order led to a consent judgment in which the State of New York undertook to provide shelter to 
the needy who apply for it provided they met two criteria, that is: (a) they were in need of 
temporary shelter due to physical, mental or social dysfunction, or, (b) they met the need 
standard to qualify for the New York home relief programme. 198 The consent judgment further 
provided extensive standards which shelters for the homeless must meet, which included a bed 
of a minimum width of 30 inches together with required bedding, storage space and a laundry 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
193 See Habitat Agenda, para. 61 for the full list of strategies. 
194 SERI (n 94 above) 15. In many instances, the duty to promote is often taken as an independent duty 
on its own. This is the case in the Kenyan Constitution which, in article 21(1), recognises the obligations 
of the State as encompassing the duty to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil. In this thesis, the 
duty to observe is subsumed under the duty to respect and the duty to promote is taken as a part of the 
duty to fulfil, thus dovetailing with the tripartite typology which has been used to analyse States’ SER 
duties at the international level.  
195 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 23. This is one of the special circumstances in which the State is 
expected to actually provide housing for people, in accordance with the analysis in the UNHRP Report at 
pages 17-19 
196 Callahan v Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Cot. 18, 1979), available at http://www.escr-
net.org/docs/i/399028 (accessed on 14 November 2012).  
197 As above.  
198 The Callahan consent decree, para. 1, available at http://www.escr-
net.org/sites/default/files/callahanconsentdecree_0.pdf (accessed on 14 November 2012).   
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unit.199 It has been documented that the Callahan Degree has had an extensive progressive 
influence in the provision of shelter to the homeless in New York City and the courts have over 
the years used the consent judgment to enhance the protection of the shelter rights of the 
homeless.200 
The obligations of States in relation to housing, as discussed above, were neatly 
summarised by the United Nations Housing Rights Programme in table 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
199 Callahan consent decree, paras. 2-6. For a more elaborate discussion of the Callahan case, see Nolan 
(n 165 above) 6. 
200 For an extensive account of this, see Coalition for the Homeless ‘The Callahan Legacy:  Callahan v. 
Carey and the Legal Right to Shelter’ available at http://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/pages/the-
callahan-legacy-callahan-v.-carey-and-the-legal-right-to-shelter (accessed on 14 November 2012).  
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Box1: Housing Rights Obligations201 
                                                            
201 Commission on Human Rights, ‘Activities of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
(Habitat): Progress report of the Executive Director, HS/C/17/INF/6’ (May 1999), para. 77, available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/1986_44675_inf6.htm (accessed on 27 September 2012). 
To Respect To Protect To Promote To Fulfil 
Prevention of Illegal 
Evictions 
Preventing Violations of 
Housing Rights 
Develop National 
Housing Rights 
Strategies 
Combatting, 
Reducing and 
Eradicating 
Homelessness 
Prevention of All Forms 
of Discrimination 
Ensuring Domestic Legal 
and Other Remedies and 
the Domestic Application 
of Int. Law 
Develop Benchmarks 
of Full Realization 
Increase and 
Properly Target 
Public Expenditure 
on Housing 
Prevention of any 
Measures of 
Retrogressivity 
Ensuring Equality Rights 
for All Groups 
Legislative Review 
and Recognition of 
Housing Rights 
Adequate and 
Habitable Housing 
for All 
Housing-Based 
Freedoms 
Access for All to 
Affordable Housing and 
the Development of an 
Affordability Benchmark  
Security of Tenure Develop Minimum 
Physical Housing 
Standards 
Right to Privacy and 
Respect for the Home 
Accessibility of Housing to 
Disadvantaged Groups 
Requiring Special 
Measures 
Focus on the Rights 
of Vulnerable Groups 
Provision of All 
Necessary Services 
and Infrastructure 
Popular Participation in 
Housing 
Democratic Residential 
Control of Housing 
Access to Housing 
Information 
Popular Housing 
Finance and Saving 
Schemes 
Respecting the Cultural 
Attributes of Housing 
Safeguarding Residential 
Stability 
Ensuring a Sufficient 
Supply of Affordable 
Land 
Social Housing 
Construction 
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7.5.3 The four-A’s scheme  
The obligations arising from the right to accessible and adequate housing can also be 
understood using the four-A’s scheme framework, which is availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability. This framework recognises that the right to housing encompasses 
more than just a roof over one’s head, and also relates to questions of dignity, personal safety 
as well as security.  
i) Availability 
Availability entails the requirement that for the right to adequate housing to be fully realised, 
there is a need for an adequate stock of housing to cover all the categories of people, especially 
low cost housing for middle and low income households.202 It follows therefore that if sufficient 
stock of social or low cost housing is unavailable, the State will not be in a position to fully 
realise the right to adequate housing, thus engendering the obligation of the State to put in 
place sufficient measures to enhance the level of availability of housing stock for all segments of 
society.203 Much is required of the Kenyan government if it is to meet this obligation, as 
currently, of the 150, 000 housing units required in the urban areas annually to meet the 
population’s housing needs, only 35, 000 units annually are being made available.204 Further to 
this huge backlog, it is estimated that only 20 per cent of these houses cater for low income 
earners, leaving low and middle income households bereft of accessible housing stocks and 
further fuelling the expansion of informal settlements.205 Despite plans by the Government to 
build over 200, 000 housing units annually by 2012 through construction incentives to the 
private sector, the establishment of a mortgage finance corporation, and the provision of 
                                                            
202 See Council of Europe ‘Recommendation of the Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
implementation of the right to housing’ (June 2009), para. 3.1.2, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1463737&Site=CM (accessed on 24 September 2012). 
203 As above. 
204 Government of Kenya ‘Second Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the First Medium 
Term Plan (2008-2012) of Kenya Vision 2030’ (May 2011) 121, available at 
https://opendata.go.ke/api/file_data/zF8ojyoGLyfgA97OZZnZuRojLqC-FUCnDJgVVJOFD-
4?filename=Vision%25202030%2520progress%2520report.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2012). 
205 As above. 
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serviced land for low-cost housing,206 not much progress can be seen on the ground, especially 
with regard to the increase in stock of social and low-cost housing for the low and middle 
income earners, who form the majority of the population.207 
Availability also entails the presence of requisite sanitation and other attendant services, 
infrastructure and facilities such as water, refuse disposal, electricity as well as adequate 
personal security.   
ii) Accessibility  
Accessibility can be viewed in terms of physical accessibility and economic accessibility. 
Physical accessibility takes into account the location of the shelter in relation to people’s 
sources of income, schools, healthcare facilities and other basic necessities.208 It also requires 
improved accessibility to housing for special groups, especially people with disabilities, the 
elderly, persons living with HIV/AIDS, the terminally ill, among other special groups through the 
requisite modification of housing facilities and practices.209  
                                                            
206 Vision 2030 Second Annual Report (n 204 above) 122. According to Kenya’s Housing Bill, 2011, low-
cost housing is understood as a housing unit: 
(a) comprising a minimum of two habitable rooms, cooking area and sanitary facilities and 
covering a gross floor area of between thirty to sixty square metres for each household with basic 
infrastructure and services of standards stipulated by law; 
(b) of a cost of not more than two hundred times the prevailing statutory minimum wage. 
207 The Government contends that the reasons for this difficulty are: lack of a comprehensive housing 
sector policy; inadequate human resource capacity; inadequate private-public partnerships due to lack of 
a comprehensive PPP framework; inadequate funding coupled with slow implementation of housing 
incentives; high cost of building materials; the effects of the 2007 post-election violence that led to 
massive destruction of houses as well as dampening investor confidence, see Vision 2030 Second 
Annual Report (n 204 above) 124. 
208 See McLean - Housing (n 49 above) 55-16 -55-17, who contends that one of the four major points of 
criticism of the realisation of the right to housing in South Africa is the poor location of low-cost housing 
which  are located far away from main economic centres and social services  resulting in “mono-functional 
settlements”. She argues that this reality in effect replicates, reinforces and perpetuates the distorted 
apartheid geography of the past. 
209 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 51-52. 
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Economic accessibility, on the other hand, touches on the affordability of shelter, and 
whether it is possible for people to access shelter while at the same time being able to acquire 
other relevant basic needs.210 It entails the duty of the State to ensure that the percentage of 
housing-related costs is commensurate with income levels of the majority of citizens.211 
Achieving this requires that the State put in place sufficient rent control measures to ensure that 
ordinary people are not priced out of available housing.212 Such a measure is severely lacking in 
Kenya at the moment as the Rent Restriction Act, the mechanism that was put in place to 
undertake the above responsibility, is too archaic and out of touch with the current realities in 
the housing sector.213  
Affordability also requires that the State puts in place a plan for the building of sufficient 
low-cost housing in strategic parts of the city to ensure that the housing needs of the poor are 
met as well as developing affordable housing finance schemes or housing subsidies to enable 
the poor and middle income populations to access adequate housing.214 This is in line with the 
recommendations of the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing, Miloon Kothari, 
urging States to expand budgetary allocations to housing, increase availability of social housing, 
adopt policies aimed at increasing housing subsidies for low-income groups, and to adopt 
                                                            
210 See General Comment No. 4, para. 8(c) which provides that ‘personal or household financial costs 
associated with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic 
needs are not threatened or compromised’ and that the State should put in place measures ‘to ensure 
that the percentage of housing-related costs is, in general, commensurate with income levels’. See also 
Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (n 95 above) paras. 14 & 30-35, 
who states that the lack of affordability, caused by land and housing speculation, rising rental and home 
prices, corruption as well as land grabbing and other illegal activities, is the main factor leading to 
homelessness; C Hartman ‘The case for a right to housing’ (1998) 9 Housing Policy Debate 223, at 225 & 
231, who acknowledges the painful choice poor people have to make between food and housing, 
contending that excessive housing costs affects one’s ability to secure other basic essential goods and 
services. 
211 Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 10, FN 14. 
212 Craven (n 125 above) 338; UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 51. 
213 See section 3.2 above for a discussion of the limitations of the Rent Restriction Act. 
214 Craven (n 125 above) 338. See also Istanbul Declaration, para. 9, which entails the commitment of 
States to expand the supply of affordable housing by enabling socially and environmentally responsible 
markets, enhancing access to land and credit, as well as the provision of housing to those who are 
unable to participate in the housing markets; Habitat Agenda, para. 40(e)-(i). 
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policies regulating public and private rental markets as well as mortgage markets to ensure 
households do no pay more than 30 per cent of their income on housing.215 Affordability has 
been a major concern raised by residents of informal settlements that have been earmarked for 
upgrading under the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) run by the Government in 
conjunction with UN-Habitat.216 These concerns were recognised by the CESCR in its 
consideration of Kenya’s Initial Report leading to a recommendation that Kenya:217 
Ensures that slum upgrading projects give priority to the construction of social housing which is 
affordable for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and families and that affected 
communities are effectively consulted and involved in the planning and implementation of such 
projects. 
As discussed above, affordability of the upgraded housing units should require that they are not 
priced at such a level as to make it impossible for the poor to afford their other basic essential 
goods and services. 
iii) Acceptability  
Acceptability entails the cultural adequacy or suitability of housing which requires that houses 
are constructed in a manner that takes into account the diversity of cultural identities.218 
Acceptability also entails the habitability of both the house itself and its surrounding areas, that 
is, it must comply with the requirements of safety, health and hygiene as well as offer the 
requisite basic amenities such as water, electricity and refuse disposal.219 The quality of the 
housing structure must also be acceptable, as structurally deficient or inadequate housing often 
                                                            
215 Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing (n 95 above) para. 103.  
216 COHRE Report (n 6 above) 6 & chapter five. 
217 CESCR 40th & 41st Sessions Report (n 8 above) para. 383. 
218 See COHRE Report (n 6 above) 44, which acknowledges that in some Kenyan communities, it is a 
taboo for a male child to sleep in the same room as their mother and sisters, a concern that must be 
factored in if housing is to be adequate. An illustration is provided by the Australian case of Balaiya v 
Northern Territory Government (Decided in May 2004), brought by an indigenous man who complained 
that the allocation to him of a one bedroomed housing unit amounted to unreasonable direct 
discrimination based on his race as it failed to provide for his special accommodation needs as it would 
prevent him from engaging in cultural practices essential to his race as an indigenous person, see Nolan 
(n 162 above) 8-9. 
219 Council of Europe Recommendations (n 202 above) paras. 3.2.2 & 3.2.3. 
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leads to higher mortality and morbidity rates.220  This has been a challenge in Kenya due to the 
lack of sufficient monitoring of the available housing standards and building protocols, leading to 
the collapse of several housing units with adverse consequences to the health and property of 
inhabitants. There is therefore a need for legislative reforms that engender stricter building 
protocols, scrupulous and effective enforcement mechanisms, as well as harsher penalties to 
reign in unscrupulous private contractors who are driven by profits at the expense of public 
safety and security.  
iv) Adaptability      
Adaptability requires that the shelter is habitable in all weather conditions and that it adequately 
protects its inhabitants from the elements such as rain, cold, heat and other threats to health. 
7.6 Dialogical constitutionalism and the role of courts in the realisation of the right to 
housing 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism, as discussed in chapters three and four above, 
acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the design and implementation of strategies for 
the realisation of the right to adequate housing belongs to the political institutions.221 This duty 
was recognised, in the context of South Africa, by the SACC in the Grootboom case, where the 
Court held that courts should defer to the political institutions in this regard as it is not the 
province of the Court to second-guess the design of public policy by enquiring whether the 
measures adopted for the realisation of the right to housing are the most favourable or 
desirable.222  
7.6.1 The requirement of dialogue in the realisation of the right to housing 
The theory of dialogical constitutionalism envisages an active role for the citizen in the 
cooperative enterprise of the design, development, implementation and monitoring of the 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the realisation of the right to adequate 
housing by the political institutions. According to this theory, public participation in the design of 
                                                            
220 Craven (n 125 above) 346. A practical example of a subsidy system is exemplified by the practice in 
South Africa where low-income housing development has been financed primarily through subsidies. For 
a discussion, see McLean Housing (n 49 above) 55-6- 55-7. 
221 See the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(1). 
222 Grootboom, para. 41.  
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this implementation framework is a necessity, and failure to undertake societal consultation as 
well as to provide opportunities for genuine dialogue necessarily calls for the intervention of the 
courts as discussed below.  
One of the major challenges to the realisation of the right to adequate housing in Kenya has 
been the lack of public participation as well as the insufficient relay of relevant information to the 
population affected by the government’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework on 
housing.223 According to international best practices on the realisation of the right to adequate 
housing, public participation in the design of national housing strategies and their corresponding 
implementation framework is crucial as it secures trust, promotes collaboration and cooperation 
between all the relevant players within the housing sector, as well as cultivates a sense of 
ownership which ensures long-term sustainable commitment to the realisation of set housing 
objectives.224  
The role of dialogue in the realisation of the right to housing is acknowledged by the CESCR 
which states that the design and development of the national housing strategy must engender 
public participation as well as genuine consultation with all members of the affected population, 
especially the homeless and inadequately housed populations as well as their 
representatives.225 The Committee contends that this is important as it enhances the relevance 
and the effectiveness of the resultant strategy as well as ensures a holistic approach to the 
protection of all the other attendant human rights.226 CESCR has further emphasised the 
importance of public dialogue and consultation in relation to protection against forced evictions, 
calling on State Parties to ensure that prior to eviction, especially of large groups, consultations 
with the affected persons are undertaken so as to explore feasible alternatives and to reduce 
                                                            
223 See for example COHRE Report (n 6 above) 26, which contends that people, especially those in 
informal settlements who were interviewed, want to be treated as partners in the design of the housing 
implementation framework on issues such as evictions, slum upgrading, land allocation, as well as the 
management and access to essential services. See also the Endorois case, paras. 17-20, 129-135, & 
225-228.  
224 COHRE Report (n 6 above) 28.  
225 General Comment No. 4, para. 12. 
226 As above. For a long list of rights and other social goods attendant to the right to adequate housing, 
see SERI (n 94 above) 12. 
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the necessity for the use of force.227 This reasoning has also been adopted by the SACC 
through the concept of “meaningful engagement” which the Court elaborated on in the cases of 
PE Municipality,228 Olivia Road,229 Joe Slovo,230 and Abahlali.231 In their analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the SACC on “meaningful engagement” in the above cases, SERI summarises 
the requirements of the concept as follows:232 
 The State is under an obligation to ‘meaningfully engage’ with those facing eviction to ascertain if 
they will be rendered homeless by an eviction and to determine what alternative accommodation 
can be provided. State institutions are obliged to engage meaningfully prior to taking a decision to 
institute eviction proceedings – Olivia Road; 
 If engagement takes place after there has been a decision to institute eviction proceedings, it 
cannot be genuine or meaningful and proper engagement unless it includes taking into 
consideration the needs of those who will be affected, the possibility of upgrading the area in situ 
and the provision of alternative accommodation where necessary – Abahlali. 
 No evictions should occur until the results of the proper engagement process are known – Olivia 
Road, Abahlali. 
This requirement of public participation is one of the key objectives of Kenya’s National 
Housing Policy which provides that one of the aims of the policy is:233 
                                                            
227 General Comment No. 7, para. 13. 
228 Port Elizabeth Municipality, paras. 36-39. 
229 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others (24/07) 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), Order paras. 1-4. 
230 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) 
[2011] ZACC 8, order paras. 5 & 11. 
231 Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and 
Others (CCT12/09) [2009] ZACC 31, paras. 69 & 79.  For a more in-depth analysis of these cases, see 
SERI (n 94 above) 17-27. 
232 SERI (n 94 above) 26-27. For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of “meaningful engagement” 
in the context of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, see chapter three, section 3.5 above. 
233  National Housing Policy (n 72 above) para. 13(p). See also para. 19 which provides as follows: 
The poor people’s pragmatic approach to housing will be harnessed and put to maximum utility 
by community based organisations through effective and well defined popular participatory 
approaches. Community involvement as a planning tool will be advocated in all housing 
programmes targeting the poor. 
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To promote inclusive participation of the private sector, public sector, community-based 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, co-operatives, communities and other 
development partners in planning, development and management of housing programmes. 
When governmental and non-governmental actors fail to provide adequate space for dialogue, 
or if they arbitrarily fail to consider the recommendations and views of the people in relation to 
the realisation of the right to adequate housing, the courts should play an important role of 
enforcing the public participation requirements in the Constitution and order appropriate 
remedies to ensure that the voices of people, including the poor, marginalised and vulnerable 
are included in housing processes.234  
7.6.2 Role of the courts in the realisation of the right to housing 
As a facilitator of dialogue, the court can play an important role in the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing, especially on the enhancing of the realisation of the State’s duty to respect 
and protect the right to housing; the development of a conducive framework aimed at the 
progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing; the realisation of the minimum core 
content of housing rights for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups such as the 
homeless; and the protection of people from forced evictions that are contrary to international 
law, and which do not comply with the procedural requirements as is envisaged in the national 
eviction guidelines and the proposed Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill 2012.235 The 
role of the courts in this regard is envisaged by the CESCR which delineates the components of 
the right that are consistent with the provision of domestic legal remedies such as:236  
(a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions through the issuance of 
court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal eviction; 
(c) complaints against illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or 
private) in relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms of 
                                                            
234 For a brief discussion of some of the remedial choices that engender dialogue and public participation 
in judicial decision-making, see chapter four, section 4.4.1 above. 
235 For a brief elaboration of the provisions of this Bill, see section 7.3.2 above. 
236 General Comment No. 4, para. 17. For a further delineation of these elements, see Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘The Right to Adequate Housing: Final report submitted by Mr. Rajindar Sachar, Special 
Rapporteur’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/12, para. 95, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95/129/50/PDF/G9512950.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 27 September 
2012). 
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discrimination; (d) allegations of any form of discrimination in the allocation and availability of 
access to housing; (e) complaints against landlords concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing 
conditions, [as well as (d)] class action suits in situations involving significantly increased levels of 
homelessness. 
The above delineation by the CESCR is in line with the work of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Adequate Housing who outlined instances of State action or omissions that 
violate the right to housing to include the following: undertaking or condoning forced evictions; 
demolishing housing as a punitive measure; non-provision of essential services despite 
available resources; discrimination; adoption of legislation or policies inconsistent with the 
realisation of housing rights; repeal of legislation aimed at the realisation of housing rights; 
unreasonable housing budget reduction; overt prioritisation of high-income housing without 
concomitant focus on low-cost housing; allowing housing construction in unsafe sites; restricting 
freedom of organisation and expression for NGOs, CBOs and rent associations; failure to take 
steps for the realisation of housing rights in accordance with the ICESCR; failure to regulate 
housing markets; and the failure to integrate housing rights concerns in the development of 
macro-economic policies.237 
 It is clear from the above exposition that the violation of the right to adequate housing, 
just like the violations of the more traditionally court enforced civil and political rights is possible, 
and that the courts can thus undertake adjudication and provide effective remedies to ensure 
their respect, protection and fulfilment.238 Scott Leckie concurs, stating that an effective remedy 
in instances of violations is a central component of international human rights law 
                                                            
237 Commission on Human Rights, The right to adequate housing: progress report submitted by Rajindar 
Sachar, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/15, paras. 144-145, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1993.15.En?Opendocument 
(accessed on 27 September 2012). For further guidelines as to violations of SERs of which the right to 
housing forms an integral part, see Maastricht Guidelines, Guidelines 14 & 15.  
238 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 68. They further affirm that judicial remedies can be made available for 
housing rights violations, at 72. See also Maastricht Guidelines, Guideline 22; Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, para 7, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987) 122–135, principle 19. 
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encompassing the entire corpus of human rights law, and forms an indispensable component of 
any effective strategy aimed at the realisation of housing rights.239  
Further, the courts can play an especially significant role in the protection of people 
against forced evictions, which is widely acknowledged nationally and internationally as a prima 
facie violation of the right to adequate housing.240 The requisite safeguards to guide the courts 
in the protection of people from forced eviction are especially clear, having been extensively 
developed at the international and comparative domestic levels. Such safeguards can be found 
in the CESCR General Comment Number 7 which provides that evictions must be undertaken in 
strict compliance with international human rights law as well as in accordance with general 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality.241 The Committee further delineates the 
requisite due process and procedural protection guidelines that should be followed when 
undertaking evictions, and which may help the courts when undertaking adjudication in eviction 
cases, as follows:242 
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable 
notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the 
proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or 
housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; (d) especially 
where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to be present 
during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f) evictions 
not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent 
otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to 
persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts. 
                                                            
239 Leckie – Where it matters most (n 17 above) 26, footnote 47. He argues that judicial adjudication of 
housing rights is an important component of effective remedies, and that courts of law can be a driving 
force in the realisation of housing rights, at 27. 
240 COHRE Report (n 6 above) 75; UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 74. 
241 General Comment No. 7, para. 14.  See also COHRE Report (n 6 above) 67-68 and OHCHR & UN-
Habitat (n 64 above) 9, which expound on some of the other human rights violations resulting from the 
violation of the right to adequate housing, and especially from forced evictions.   
242 General Comment No. 7, para. 15. See also OHCHR & UN-Habitat (n 64 above) 5-6. Similar 
provisions are encompassed in the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012 as discussed in 
section 7.3.2 above. 
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These guidelines can further be complemented by other principles of adequate resettlement 
developed by other international organisations such as the UN Comprehensive Human Rights 
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacements.243 
Precedents exist where the courts have come to the aid of persons facing evictions, with 
positive results.  A case in point is Maina Ngare Njeru and 87 Others v Kenya Railways 
Corporation,244 which was filed by 88 people threatened with eviction by the Railway Company. 
The Court issued an injunction stopping the Railway Company from conducting the evictions, an 
order which led to dialogue and negotiations between the parties resulting in the resolution of 
the conflict.245 Similarly, in the case of John Samoei Kirwa & 9 Others v Kenya Railways 
Corporation,246 the Court granted a temporary injunction and required that due process, 
including consultation with the Plaintiffs and all the other people to be affected by the 
demolitions be conducted by the Respondents.  The judgment of the Court was especially 
sensitive to the plight of the Plaintiffs with the order stating the following:247 
The Managing Director of the defendant should have heard the plaintiffs before issuing the notice. 
It should be noted that human compassion must soften the rough edges of justice in all situations. 
The eviction of squatters not only means their removal from their houses but the destruction of 
the houses themselves. The humbler the dwelling, the greater the suffering and more intense the 
                                                            
243  UN Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based Displacements, A/HRC/4/18 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/housing/docs/guidelines_en.pdf (accessed on 27 
September 2012). It requires States to provide a legal framework prohibiting forced evictions; undertake a 
holistic and comprehensive prior assessment of any project that might lead to evictions and explore less 
harmful alternatives; engender participation of all sectors, especially those to be directly affected by the 
project; ensure that evicted persons have access to adequate food, potable water and sanitation, basic 
shelter and housing; livelihood sources, essential medical services, education and childcare facilities, 
among other things. 
244 Maina Ngare Njeru and 87 Others v Kenya Railways Corporation (High Court of Kenya, Nairobi) 
HCCC No. 189 of 2004. See also Gusii Mwalimu Investment Co. Ltd and Two Others v Ms Mwalimu Hotel 
Kisii Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 180 of 1995, where the Court held that an eviction without a court order was 
illegal. 
245 COHRE Report (n 6 above) 59. 
246 John Samoei Kirwa & 9 Others v Kenya Railways Corporation (High Court of Kenya, Bungoma) HCCC 
No. 65 of 2004 (unreported). 
247 See COHRHE (n 6 above) 59. 
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sense of loss. It is the dialogue with the person likely to be affected by the proposed action which 
meets the requirement that justice must also be seen to be done. 
The Court further went on to say that where people have lived on a piece of land for a 
considerable period of time and made improvements to the land, they should be provided with 
alternative accommodation before they are evicted.248 The Court based its reasoning on section 
16(3) of the Kenya Railway Corporation Act which provides the procedure for evictions, holding 
that the Railway Company had failed to abide by the legal requirements in accordance with that 
section.249 This injunction, granted without a constitutionally entrenched right to adequate 
housing mirrors the judgment of the SACC in the PE Municipality case where the Court held 
that:250 
[a] court should be reluctant to grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is 
satisfied that a reasonable alternative is available, even if only as an interim measure pending 
ultimate access to housing in the formal housing programme. 
It is also in line with CESCR General Comment Number 7 which provides that evictions should 
not lead to homelessness or precipitate the violations of other human rights, and that States 
must provide, to the maximum of their available resources, adequate alternative housing, 
resettlement or access to productive land to those affected by evictions.251 
 Though the courts can play an important role in the realisation of the right to adequate 
housing, the task is by no means free of challenges. One of the most enduring challenges in the 
adjudication of housing rights is that adjudication will, of necessity, engender conflict between 
the right to adequate housing and the right to property, a conflict that must be resolved by the 
judges espousing a holistic understanding of the entire Bill of Rights and the Constitution in 
general. In international and comparative law, this balance has steadily shifted towards the 
protection of the right to adequate housing when there is a conflict with traditional rights 
                                                            
248 As above. 
249 As above. 
250 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 28. For further analysis of this aspects of the case, see Nolan (n 162 
above) 4-5. 
251 General Comment No. 7, para. 16.  
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protecting private property.252 The UNHRP contends that in these instances, the public interest 
of securing housing rights trumps property rights.253 The UNHRP Report quotes the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Housing who similarly states as follows:254 
Under international treaties where the right to property is protected, and in countries in which it is 
a fundamental right, it has never been doubted that the right to property must yield to the greater 
social good of the community. 
This has been the balancing jurisprudence emanating also in Europe where the former 
European Commission on Human rights found in Z. and E. v Austria, that the restriction of a 
landlord’s right to give notice to a tenant was a justifiable regulation of property within article 1 of 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it pursued a legitimate social 
policy, that is, the protection of the interest of tenants in a situation of shortage of affordable 
housing.255 
A more nuanced approach has been developed by the SACC in the context of forced 
evictions in South Africa, especially in relation to section 26(3) of the SAC and the Prevention of 
Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 1998 (PIE).256 In the PE Municipality 
case, the Court developed a ‘constitutional matrix’ aimed at balancing the conflict between 
property rights and housing rights, stating the non-absolute nature of property rights and its 
                                                            
252 See the African Charter, article 14 which recognises that the right to property can be encroached upon 
in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community so long as this is done in 
accordance with laid down law. As has been discussed above, the integral human interests protected by 
the right to accessible and adequate housing meets the standard of public need and general communal 
interest provided for by the African Charter, and so communal housing needs can legitimately require the 
encroachment on property rights.  
253 UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 16. 
254 Second progress report by Rajindar Sachar (n 126 above), paras. 67-76.  
255 Case of Z. and E. v Austria, App. No. 10153/82, quoted in UNHRP Report (n 16 above) 86.  
256 For an extensive analysis of this jurisprudence, see Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative 
constitution (n 13 above) 268ff; van der Walt – Transformative constitutionalism (n 178 above) 674ff; van 
der Walt – Thoughts on Modderklip (n 178 above) 144-161; T Roux ‘Continuity and change in a 
transforming legal order: The impact of section 26(3) of the constitution on South African law’ (2004) 
South African Law Journal 466-492; and S Wilson ‘Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, 
homelessness and a new normality’ (2009) 126(2) South African Law Journal 270-290.  
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limitation in relation to the promotion of the public interest.257 With the entrenchment of housing 
rights in the Constitution, the Court acknowledged the change in the judicial role from the 
traditional common law approach, holding as follows:258 
The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement 
between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights 
of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather, it is to 
balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of 
all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.  
The Court further held that its new role required it ‘to balance competing interests in a principled 
way and to promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness 
and shared concern’.259 In her analysis of the PE Municipality case, Sandra Liebenberg 
contends that justice and equity should be the guiding lights of the courts in dealing with the 
conflict between property rights and housing rights.260  
                                                            
257 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 16.  
258 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 23. The Court further held that in the resolution of this conflict 
between property and housing rights, the procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity must 
be taken into account, and thus a requirement that people facing evictions be genuinely consulted and 
allowed to participate in the decision-making process as to the most just resolution of the conflict, at 
paras. 39-41. 
259 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 37, as per Justice Sachs who further relied on the principle of 
‘ubuntu’ which combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy envisioning the need for 
human interdependence, respect and concern. The Kenyan Courts, in the case of John Kabui Mwai & 3 
Others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 Others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 15 
of 2011, available at http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/83548.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013), 
have also shown, in the context of the right to education, that it can adopt a progressive balancing of 
competing rights. In this case, the High Court held that a government policy which accorded more 
opportunites to students from public primary schools as opposed to those in private primary schools in 
joining national secondary schools was legitimate as it was affirmative action aimed at enhancing equity 
and the achievement of social justice, as reliance on merit alone had previously occasioned unfairness 
and prejudice to students from public primary schools, at 11. 
260 Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 13 above) 277-79. She contends that 
these principles apply even in the context of eviction applications brought by private landowners as 
against unlawful occupiers. To elaborate she extensively discusses the Modderklip case, among other 
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 Henk Botha contends that this balance between the right to housing and right to property 
is based on a relational and dialogical conception of rights, which is contrary to a conception of 
rights as rooted in abstract individualism, and which entails an expression of connectedness 
between the self and others, acknowledging that the self is forged within a network of social 
relationships situated within a concrete context.261 The dialogical aspect of the relational 
conception of rights is an acknowledgment that rights must not be understood as fixed 
boundaries, but that their content and limits must be subject to debate through political and legal 
discourse.262 He contends that this understanding of rights is better suited to the democratic-
transformative aspirations of the Constitution, and is better capable of transforming the legal, 
social and political power relations with the aim of achieving social justice.263 
 The Kenyan courts have already been faced with the apparent conflict between the right 
to accessible and adequate housing in article 43(1)(b) and the right to property in article 40, with 
two judges adopting divergent interpretations, Justice JB Ojwang’ (now of the Supreme Court of 
Kenya), in the Charo case, taking a restrictive and conservative interpretation of the right to 
housing,264 and Justice Daniel Musinga, in the Muthurwa265 and Waithera266 cases, taking a 
progressive and purposive interpretation of the right to housing. The Charo case concerned an 
application by about 270 households for an interim injunctive order restraining the Respondents 
from forcefully evicting them without the provision of alternative land or accommodation in 
contravention of the right to housing as is enshrined in article 43(1)(b) of the Constitution as well 
as a conservatory order to maintain the status quo ante pending the hearing and determination 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
cases, calling the resultant jurisprudence a ‘transformative approach’ to the resolution of the conflict 
between housing rights and property rights, see 281-292. 
261 H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 2)’ (2003) Journal of South 
African Law 20, at 23-25. 
262 As above.  
263 Botha (n 261 above) 25. 
264 Charo Wa Yaa v Jama Abdi Noor & 5 others, High Court of Kenya at Mombassa Misc. Civil Application 
No. 8 of 2011 (Charo case)(unreported – on file with author).  
265 Satrose Ayuma and others (on behalf of Muthurwa residents) v Kenya Railways Staff Benefit Scheme 
and others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 65 of 2010 (Muthurwa case) (unreported – on file 
with author). 
266 Susan Waithera Kariuki and others v The Town Clerk, Nairobi City Council and others, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Petition case No. 66 of 2010 (Waithera case)(unreported – on file with author). 
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of the main case.267 The Petitioner specifically urged the Court to take into account the judicial 
paradigm shift in the interpretation and application of the law of trespass and evictions required 
by the adoption of the transformative Constitution and as is envisaged in article 20(3) of the 
Constitution as follows:268 
[The Court should adopt] a novel, progressive judicial task [and thus] consider and grant the 
prayers sought [as] these rights are of a provenance…heretofore not known to the [law] of Kenya, 
and it is incumbent on this Honourable Court to interpret the new parameters under which these 
newly-acquired rights may be enjoyed, enforced and protected…[The] Court and its officers [have 
to] recognise [a] paradigm-shift that the Constitution […] seeks to bring about, rather than…seek 
to interpret new rights on the basis of old law. 
 Further, the Petitioners, through a subsequent application, requested the Court to allow them to 
construct makeshift shelters on the property so as to protect themselves and their families from 
the impending long rains which would have adverse consequences to their health and well-
being.269 The Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the land in question was private land 
                                                            
267 See Charo case, at pages 2-4 which details the case of the Petitioner. The Petitioner asked the Court 
to order that due process, taking into account the constitutional values of human dignity and social justice, 
be followed in the eviction of the households, taking into account their constitutionally entrenched 
fundamental right to housing, at 3-4.  
268 Charo case, pages 4 & 12. The Counsel for the Petitioner urged the Court to balance the competing 
right to housing and property on a scale of the constitutional values that underlie the Constitution, 
contending that the enjoyment of the right to property must be for the greater good of the entire 
community, at 11-12. For similar arguments in the context of SA, see Van der Walt – Thoughts on 
Modderklip (n 181 above) 149-150, who advocates a nuanced interpretation that recognises and 
accommodates both property and housing rights. He argues that since eviction is a strong private-law 
remedy, it entails tension between the transformative aspirations of the Constitution, on the one hand, 
and private law with its propensity to restrict change and thus preserve the status quo ante, on the other 
hand. He thus advocates a paradigm shift which views evictions as a fundamental constitutional law 
matter and which requires that courts develop private law so as to conform to the dictates of the 
constitutional rights, values and principles entrenched in the Constitution. These arguments are 
applicable to the Kenyan situation due to the similarity of constitutional provisions on housing and 
property rights in the two jurisdictions.  
269 Charo case, pages 8-10. The negative and condescending judicial attitude to SERs in this particular 
instance is indicated by the judge’s reference to this application as being ‘based on expediency and on 
transient ecological conditions’, at 8. This attitude is further reflected later in the ruling when the Court 
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subject only to private law,270 and that the State was not responsible for the applicants’ lack of 
shelter and was thus under no obligation to provide alternative accommodation or shelter to the 
applicants.271 
 The Charo Court declined to espouse a progressive and purposive interpretation of the 
right to adequate housing, calling it an aspirational right, and also failed to adopt a 
transformative concept of adjudication which reflected the paradigm shift as was advocated by 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
dismisses the Petitioner’s application, with costs, contending that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the 
same as it is not related to the main suit, and that its adjudication ‘would be inconsistent with the 
constitutional obligation of the Court, to resolve disputes justly, in accordance with the law, including the 
existing law of jurisdiction’, at 19-21. This reasoning is not only reflective of a lack of appreciation of the 
meaning, content and extent of the right to housing as discussed in section 7.4 above, but is also 
reflective of a lack of understanding of the continuum of obligations that the right to housing entails, which 
are discussed more substantively in sections 7.5 of this chapter. A proper understanding of the content of 
the right to housing would have enabled the judge to appreciate that emergency temporary shelter or 
accommodation for people in crisis situations was an intrinsic component of the right to housing and was 
thus intricately related to the main suit, which was against the forced eviction of the applicants. This 
particular understanding would have mandated the Court to adjudicate the relevant application and to 
flesh out the responsibility of the State to provide temporary accommodation to the applicants so as to 
protect them from the elements pending the final determination of the main case. Failure to adjudicate the 
application, taking into account the fact that the untenable position of a lack of proper shelters for the 
applicants was due to the actions of the 1st Respondent to demolish their houses, was an abdication, by 
the Court, of its judicial responsibility.  
270 This argument was the basis of the Court’s judgment, as the Court basically asserted that private 
property rights trumped housing rights, and there was thus no violation of the right to housing, see Charo 
case, pages 19-20.  
271 Charo case, pages 6-8 & 15-17. See Van der Walt – Thoughts on Modderklip (n 181 above) 150-151, 
who, in analysing the Modderklip judgments of both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, avers 
that the fundamental interpretive move which informed the judgments was the recognition of the duty of 
the State to provide alternative land or accommodation for the occupiers taking into account their 
fundamental constitutional right to housing once they had been evicted from the property. This was 
reflective of the new constitutional paradigm which reconciled the private property rights of landowners 
vis-à-vis the State’s constitutional duty towards people in crisis situations or threatened with 
homelessness. The Kenyan State thus cannot escape this obligation to provide alternative 
accommodation. 
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the Petitioners.272 In the end, the court failed to adopt a balanced normative framework 
recognising the important human interests underlying both property rights and housing rights, 
instead simply reaffirming the privileged position of property rights under common law. This, in 
effect watered down the transformative potential of the entrenched housing rights in providing 
the requisite protection to the poor, marginalised and vulnerable groups faced with real threats 
of homelessness.273 The Court’s reasoning for this was that the adoption of such a paradigm 
shift required an extensive and substantial body of sociological and comparative legal research 
material, which had not been laid before the Court.274 This reasoning flies in the face of the 
mandate of the Court as the guardian of the Constitution and as the protector of fundamental 
rights. According to the theory of dialogical constitutionalism advocated in this thesis, the courts 
must play an active role as facilitators of dialogue in the development, interpretation and 
elaboration of the meaning of normative constitutional provisions. The Court in this instance had 
the responsibility, as well as requisite judicial tools, to either call for further evidence from the 
Petitioner or on its own motion call for expert institutions to make submissions in the case so 
that the important constitutional questions are effectively dealt with for the benefit of the 
Petitioner and all other similarly situated poor and vulnerable people in crisis situations. In failing 
to do so, it is submitted that, the Court abdicated its judicial responsibilities, to the detriment of 
the Petitioners, and in the process created a retrogressive jurisprudence lacking in the 
                                                            
272 Charo case, page 12. This failure of the Court to adopt a transformative and progressive approach to 
SER interpretation and adjudication is due to the influence of the classical liberal legal culture subsisting 
in Kenya prior to the enactment of the 2010 Constitution. If the courts are to facilitate the realisation of the 
transformative potential of the Constitution, there is need for judges, practitioners and other participants in 
SER adjudication to revisit and refashion this formalistic liberal legal culture and adopt creative as well as 
innovative responses to SER claims, see Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 
13 above) 43-44. 
273 In this particular context, the Court should have had regard to the comparative SACC case of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality, paras. 17-23 & 30-38, where that court warned against the abstract and 
mechanical privileging of either property or housing rights, and instead called for courts to strive for a 
principled and just solution which balances and reconciles the competing constitutional interests in the 
context of the specific case. 
274 Charo case, page 12.   
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protection of the right to housing for people in crisis situation who face forced evictions, and 
subsequently, homelessness.275   
 The Court further proceeded to hold that the applicants had already been evicted by an 
earlier lawful court order without analysing the lawful nature of the previous order of eviction.276 
On this particular issue, the Charo Court failed to take into account international and 
comparative law requirements for a lawful eviction. It was open to the Court to assess the 
previous eviction order taking into account the persuasive international and comparative law 
jurisprudence such as the General Comments Number 4 and 7 of the CESCR as well as the UN 
Guidelines on Evictions, which provided specific procedural requirements for an eviction to be 
considered legal and procedural. It should also have undertaken a comparative analysis of 
similarly situated national jurisdictions such as South Africa where the courts have now 
consistently held that ‘a court should be reluctant to grant an eviction order against relatively 
settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alternative accommodation is available, 
even if only as an interim measure’.277  If the Court had undertaken this analysis, it would have 
had no trouble adopting a paradigm shift in relation to forced evictions in accordance with the 
prayers of the Petitioner’s counsel, and would have set aside the previous eviction order, which 
had not met the constitutional requirements needed for a just and humane eviction.  
 Lastly, the Charo Court asserted that the right to housing was an aspirational right, 
subject to the standard of progressive realisation,278 and further failed to discuss the obligations 
                                                            
275 See Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 13 above) 46, who contends that 
courts have the responsibility to affirm the fundamental nature of SERs  because judges are: 
[t]rained to interpret the nature and scope of rights, to systematically analyse evidence, to listen 
carefully to all parties to the litigation, to explore the implications of their arguments with them, to 
research relevant precedent, academic literature, international and comparative foreign law, and 
ultimately to write a judgment which provides transparent [and] comprehensive reasons for the 
conclusions reached.   
276 Charo case, page 17-18 
277 See for example: Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 28. See also Wilson (n 256 above) 280, who 
summarises this jurisprudence to indicate that ‘unless there are special circumstances justifying a 
departure from the general rule, eviction orders should not be granted if they would lead to 
homelessness’. 
278 Charo case, page 18-19. In terming the right to housing as an aspirational right, the court failed to 
transcend the negative/positive rights dichotomy to embrace an understanding of all rights, civil, political, 
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of the State arising from the right to housing in relation to the applicants and similarly situated 
individuals and groups.279 In making this argument, the Court relied on the Grootboom case, 
paragraph 41, which dealt with the analysis required to ascertain the reasonableness of a 
government plan for the realisation of the right to housing. The choice of the paragraph is 
indicative of either the Judge’s hastiness in trying to dispose of the case or is a sign of selective 
reading to justify an already preconceived judgment.280 The Court should have read and relied 
instead on paragraph 45 of the Grootboom judgment, which was more relevant to the issues in 
question and which specifically dealt with the meaning of progressive realisation, espousing the 
meaning of the standard of progressive realisation as elaborated on by the CESCR in its 
General Comment Number 3, paragraph 9.281 Two important components of the standard of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
economic, social and cultural as containing a continuum of obligations, all of which require resources, 
albeit at varying degrees, to realise. Terming the right to housing as “aspirational” is, therefore, contrary to 
the Constitution which entrenches the entire corpus of human rights as justiciable and obliges the State to 
observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil all rights entrenched in the Constitution (article 21(1)). For a 
discussion on the archaic nature of the separation of rights into the negative/positive dichotomy, see 
Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 13 above) 54-59. 
279 In this particular instant, the court failed to properly heed the voices of the poor and vulnerable litigants 
who were before it as it failed to adequately engage with the normative content of the right to housing. 
See Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 13 above) 46, who, in acknowledging 
the difficulty faced by poor litigants in bringing cases to the courts, avers as follows: 
If disadvantaged litigants do succeed, against the odds, in marshalling the substantial resources 
of money, time, energy and emotional commitment entailed in bringing a case to the courts, the 
least they can expect is a judgment which engages seriously with the normative commitments 
underlying the particular rights invoked.  
280 See Liebenberg - Adjudication under transformative constitution (n 13 above) 341, who contends the 
following: 
 If the rights and values associated with SERs and substantive equality are marginalised in the 
adjudication of legal disputes between private parties, the law will be skewed in favour of those 
already able to wield the power that access to property and economic resources provides. The 
ultimate consequence is will be to undermine the Constitution’s commitment to eradicating 
entrenched patterns of socio-economic disadvantage. 
The court thus made an ideological choice to disregard the values and purposes that were intended to be 
promoted by the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. 
281 For an elaborate discussion of the standard of progressive realisation, see chapter two, section 2.3 
above. In relation to housing rights, see section 7.5.1 above.  
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progressive realisation, and which are to be undertaken immediately, deserve to be mentioned 
here. First, the State must put in place measures, including legislative, policy and programmatic 
measures to enhance the realisation of the right to housing.282 Secondly, the minimum core 
content forms an intrinsic component of the standard of progressive realisation, and the CESCR 
stated that the reading of the obligations arising from the ICESCR without the minimum core 
deprives the Covenant of its raison d’être.283 As has been discussed in chapter five above,284 
even though the SACC did not expressly adopt the minimum core in the Grootboom case, it still 
held that a government plan for the realisation of rights which did not take into account the 
urgent needs of those in crisis situations were unreasonable, thus espousing the basic ideals of 
the minimum core approach.285 It is submitted that the Court should have demanded that the 
State take the requisite steps to implement the National Housing Policy as well move with haste 
to enact the relevant housing Bills into legislation to enhance the protection of the housing rights 
of the applicants and other similarly placed individuals. The Court should have further 
demanded that the programmatic frameworks to be developed by the State for the 
implementation of the National Housing Policy and related legislation, must contain a minimum 
core content component realisable immediately so as to ameliorate the shelter needs of the 
applicants, in line with the integrated interpretive approach proposed in this thesis.286 The 
espousal of this transformative approach to adjudication would have ensured that progressive 
frameworks are put in place to enhance the realisation of the transformative potential of the 
Constitution.  
 A more progressive understanding of the right to adequate housing, especially its 
component of forced evictions is exhibited by the Muthurwa and Waithera Courts, rulings of 
Justice Musinga. The Muthurwa case was an application brought under the Kenyan Constitution 
and international law, being articles 2(5), 43(1)(b) and 53(1)(c) of the Constitution, article 25 of 
the UDHR, article 11 of the ICESCR, article 27 of the CRC and article 26 of the CRPD, and it 
sought a conservatory order to protect the Applicants from the demolition of their homes and 
                                                            
282 See Wilson (n 256 above) 272 & 275. 
283 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 10.  
284 Chapter five, section 5.3.1. 
285 Grootboom, paras. 64-69. 
286 For an elaboration of the approach, see chapter five, section 5.3.3.  
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their forced eviction by the Respondents.287 Like in the Charo case discussed above, the 
Respondents’ defence was that the property in question was private and not public land and 
they were thus not under any obligation with regard to the housing rights of the Applicants.288  
The Court acknowledged that the First Respondent was the legally registered owner of the 
property in question, and thus had property rights in accordance with article 40 of the 
Constitution.289 It held that there was a conflict between the Respondents’ property rights and 
the Applicants’ housing rights, and that this conflict called for judicial balancing on the part of the 
Court so as to realise the transformative aspirations of the Constitution.290 The Court contended 
that the Constitution provided a guide to the courts when balancing competing rights; and the 
guidelines were the need to preserve the dignity of individuals, promote equality and social 
justice and to enhance the realisation of the potential of all human beings in accordance with 
article 19(2) as well as the provisions of articles 20(3)-(4) and 259(1).291 Further, the Court noted 
the dearth of appropriate legal guidelines to guide courts in relation to housing rights and forced 
evictions, Kenya not having adopted an evictions guideline.292 To fill this legal lacuna, the Court 
resorted to international and comparative law for standards to enable it to effect the requisite 
                                                            
287 Muthurwa case, pages 1-15. The application by the Applicants and their advocates is extensive, 
bringing to the Court’s attention very useful tools to help the Court in determining the case, including 
General Comments 4 and 7 of the CESCR as well as the UN Eviction Guidelines. The case is illustrative 
of the structural litigation proposed in chapter four, section 4.3 of this thesis, involving a collaboration 
between victims of threatened eviction as well as PIL institutions such as Kituo cha Sheria and SER 
experts such as  Professor Yash Pal Ghai with the aim of not only responding to the plight of the present 
victims, but also engendering structural changes in government to enhance the realisation of the right to 
housing, and to also set a proper precedent to guide Courts in the adjudication of similar cases. 
288 Muthurwa case, pages 15-18. 
289 Muthurwa case, pages 18-19. The aim of the property owner was to evict the Applicants, demolish the 
houses in the suit property and to construct modern residential and commercial buildings thereon.  
290 Muthurwa case, pages 19-20 & 24-25.  
291 Muthurwa case, page 20-22. For a more elaborate discussion of these provisions in the context of 
transformative adjudication, see chapter five, section 5.2.2 (viii). 
292 Muthurwa case, page 28. The Court noted the need for the State to comprehensively put in place 
measures to address forced evictions, especially through the adoption of clear policy and legal guidelines, 
at 32. 
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balance.293 It relied extensively on CESCR General Comments Number 4 and 7 to understand 
the content as well as obligations of the State in relation to the right to housing, acknowledging 
that even though the Applicants had to move from the property at some point, their eviction 
must be undertaken in a humane manner.294  
Further, the Muthurwa Court acknowledged the paradigm shift in adjudication that was 
intended by the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, holding that courts were expected to go 
beyond the previously applied test in the granting of temporary injunction, as was set out in the 
case of Giella v Cassman Brown Co Ltd (1973) E.A. 358, in restraining the breach of 
fundamental rights.295 It held that:296 
[t]he court has a duty to consider whether grant or denial of the conservatory relief will enhance the 
constitutional values and objects of the specific right or freedom in the Bill of Rights. The court is 
enjoined to give an interpretation that promotes the values of a democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality, equity and freedom. Dignity of the people ought to be a core value in our 
constitutional interpretation. 
The Court thus granted the interim injunction prayed for by the Applicants, not only because 
they had demonstrated a prima facie case with likelihood of success, but also because their 
fundamental rights and freedoms had been violated or were likely to be violated.297 
 The transformative judicial thinking exhibited by Justice Musinga in the Muthurwa case is 
further enhanced in his ruling in the Waithera case. The case concerned the demolition of 
houses and threatened eviction of the Applicants from their homes, which were in informal 
settlements, on the ground that the houses were built on road reserves.298 The First 
Respondent’s defence was that it had no mandate and capacity to allocate land to, or to 
resettle, the homeless.299 The court relied on international law to define “adequate housing” as it 
                                                            
293 As above.  
294 Muthurwa case, pages 29-32.  
295 Muthurwa case, pages 23 & 27. 
296 Muthurwa case, page 27. 
297 Muthurwa case, page 32-33. The sensitivity of the Court to the importance of the constitutional issues 
raised is illustrated by it not burdening the Respondents with the costs of the application, at 34.  
298 Waithera case, pages 1-5. 
299 Waithera case, page 5. Jurisprudence abound, in the SA context, as to the duty of municipalities and 
local governments to provide emergency temporary housing to people in crisis situation. An extensive 
 
 
 
 
421 | P a g e  
 
had not been defined by the Constitution, and in this regard used CESCR General Comment 
Number 7, paragraphs 15-16 to define the parameters that had to be met for an eviction to be 
legal.300 To further enhance its balance of the competing right to housing and property rights, 
the Court affirmed the importance of reliance on the constitutional principles enshrined in article 
10, human dignity as enshrined in article 28, the values underlying an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom as is enshrined in article 20(3)-
(4), as well as the requirement that the Constitution is interpreted in a manner that promotes its 
purposes, values and principles as well as advance the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as is enshrined in article 259(1) of the Constitution.301  
The Court thus held that Applicants’ right to housing overrode the First Respondent’s duty to 
plan the City, and that it was unconstitutional to forcefully evict the Applicants from the houses 
they had occupied for over forty years with the consequence that they are rendered 
homeless.302 The Court held that the government had an obligation to provide alternative 
accommodation if eviction was to be undertaken humanely, relying on the Modderklip case by 
the Supreme Court of South Africa to support its finding.303 The Court thus granted the 
conservatory order which was sought by the Applicants and also ordered the Respondents to 
bear the costs of the application.304 The Waithera Court further called on the State to 
expeditiously put in place the requisite legislative, policy and programmatic framework which 
sufficiently catered for the short-, medium- and long-term housing needs of everyone, but that 
responded to the special needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised people living in crisis 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
discussion of this duty is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. For a brief discussion, see Wilson 
(n 256) 282-288. 
300 Waithera case, pages 8-9 
301 Waithera case, page 9-10. See also van der Walt – Thoughts on Modderklip (n 181 above) 157, who 
calls this type of constitutionally-inspired interpretation aimed at the development of the common law the 
“radiation effect of the Constitution” or “indirect horizontal application”.  
302 Waithera case, pages 10-11.  
303 Waithera case, pages 11-14. See also Modderklip, para. 26 for similar affirmations in the South African 
context. 
304 Waithera case, page 16-17.  
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situations, such as the applicants.305 Further, the Court called on the State to develop and adopt 
appropriate eviction guidelines, in line with the UN Basic principles and guidelines on 
development-based evictions and displacement, so as to enhance the realisation of the right to 
adequate housing as well as to enhance the protection of people threatened with evictions.306  
In the adjudication of housing rights cases, it will thus be imperative that the Kenyan Courts 
borrow from the jurisprudence set at the international and comparative national jurisdictions so 
as to breathe life into the constitutionally entrenched right to accessible and adequate housing 
to enhance social justice for the Kenyan people. The jurisprudence of the Kenyan courts, as is 
exhibited by the Muthurwa and Waithera Courts, are geared in this direction. This is exemplified 
by cases such as the Ibrahim Songor Osman case which entailed an application by a group of 
1,122 people who had been forcefuly evicted from unalienated public land that they had been 
occupying since the 1940s.307 The Petitioners approached the Court citing a violation of both 
CPRs and SERs contained in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, especially the right to life under 
article 26(1) and (3), the right to human dignity under article 28 and 29, the right to information 
under article 35(1), the right to property under article 40, the right to housing, food, water and 
health as contained in article 43(1) as well as the right to fair administrative action under article 
47.308 They sought a permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from evicting the 
Petitioners in future, a mandatory injunction ordering the Respondents to provide the Petitioners 
                                                            
305 Waithera case, pages 14-16. The Court quoted the Grootboom judgment of the SACC as to the 
requirement that the government develops a policy that responds to the long, medium and short-term 
needs of the people. 
306  As above. It should be noted that even though efforts have been made to draft the Evictions and 
Resettlement Guidelines, 2011 and the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012, as discussed 
in section 7.3.2 above, the same have not been adopted by cabinet or enacted by parliament 
respectively, and so have not yet filled the lacunae created by the lack of a proper domestic legal regime 
protecting people from forced evictions.   
307 Ibrahim Songor Osman v Attorney General & 3 Others, High Court Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 
2011. Similarly, see the case of Musa Mohammed Dagane & Others v Attorney General, High Court 
Constitutional Petition No. 56 of 2009, which although filed under the previous Constitution was able to 
find that the eviction of the Petitioners were unlawful for failing to fulfil requirements similar to those 
enumerated under the UN Guidelines on Evictions. The Court thus held that the Petitioners were entitled 
to compensation from the State. 
308 Ibrahim Songor case (n 307 above) 4-6. 
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with suitable and permanent alternative land, shelter or accommodation, and an order for 
general, aggravated and exemplary damages.309 Even though the petition was undefended, the 
Court proceeded to undertake a substantive analysis of international law, especially the 
provisions of the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on evictions, and relied on the jurisprudence emanating from both the CESCR and the Human 
Rights Committee in determining that the Respondents had violated all the rights as per the 
Petitioners’ petition.310 The Court then provided substantive remedies as requested by the 
Petitioners, ordering the Respondents by a mandatory injunction to return the Petitioners to the 
land from which they were evicted, to reconstruct for them reasonable residences or houses 
with all the requisite social amenities to be mutually agreed upon by all the parties, a permanent 
injunction restraining the respondents from forcefully evicting the Petitioners in future as well as 
damages of Kshs. 200, 000 for each of the 1, 122 Petitioners.311 
 The requirement that other judges dealing with housing rights in general, and evictions in 
particular, adopt this progressive thinking cannot be overstated.  
7.7 Conclusion  
Housing plays a crucial role in ensuring that people are able to have a holistic, dignified and 
valuable existence. Despite this importance, access to adequate and affordable housing 
remains an endemic challenge for Kenyans, especially for the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals and communities. This challenge, which is prevalent both in the rural 
and urban areas, has seen the mushrooming of informal settlements in the urban areas as well 
as the prevalence of squatters in rural and urban areas. These are the challenges which the 
entrenchment of the right to accessible and adequate housing in the Constitution was meant to 
ameliorate. This chapter undertook an extensive analysis of the housing situation in Kenya, 
delving into a discussion of the right to adequate housing in national and international law and 
the State obligations which this right entail. The chapter then discussed the role of the courts in 
the realisation of the right to housing and how the courts can use their constitutional mandate, 
taking into account the theory of dialogical constitutionalism discussed in chapters three and 
                                                            
309 Ibrahim Songor case (n 307 above) 6-7. 
310 Ibrahim Songor case (n 307 above) 8-11.  
311 Ibrahim Songor case (n 307 above) 11-12. 
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four, as well as the integrated approach to SER interpretation discussed in chapter five, in 
undertaking transformative adjudication to enhance the realisation of the egalitarian objectives 
which informed the entrenchment of the right to housing in the Constitution.  
Though the right to housing is one of the most recognised rights at the international and 
domestic levels, many States, Kenya inclusive, have not been proactive in its realisation. The 
right has been extensively entrenched in several binding and non-binding international legal 
instruments such as the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, CRC, CEDAW, ICRPD, and the African 
Charter and its Optional Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, as discussed in section 7.2 
above. These binding international instruments, having been signed and ratified by Kenya, have 
direct application in Kenya’s domestic legal system and can be effectively relied on by the 
courts taking into account article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution as discussed more elaborately 
in chapter two, section 2.2 of this thesis. Several other non-binding legal instruments developed 
at the international and regional level have further expounded on the legal nature of the right to 
housing, providing clear standards and guidelines to help States in realising the right. Though 
these non-binding instruments have no legal force, it is submitted that they have persuasive 
force and must be taken into account by both the political institutions and the courts in the 
implementation and enforcement of the right to housing taking into account the international law 
principle that voluntarily accepted international obligations must be implemented in good faith. 
On the domestic front, the Kenyan legal system had at first not explicitly recognised the right 
to adequate housing as an intrinsic component of human rights, with the only legislation 
providing any form of protection being the Rent Restriction Act of 1982 and the Kenya Railways 
Corporation Act.312 The paucity of the rights language in national legislation dealing with housing 
continued through the early 1990s, with the Housing Act of 1990 not recognising housing as a 
fundamental right. However, with the advent of legal reforms in the 1990s which coincided with 
the agitation for a new constitutional dispensation, housing has gradually been recognised as a 
right, with the Kenya National Housing Policy of 2004 providing the background for the reform of 
the housing sector. Subsequent to the policy, several legislative developments have been 
initiated, being the drafting of the Landlord and Tenant Bill 2007 aimed at amending the Rent 
Restriction Act to enhance its protection in the changing rental sector; the Housing Bill 2011, 
intended to replace the 1990 Housing Act, which espouse the language of housing rights; the 
                                                            
312 Though the 1963 Kenyan Constitution had a Bill of Rights, the Bill provided only for CPRs, with the 
exception of the right to property.  
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Evictions and Resettlement Guidelines and the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 
2012, which prohibit forced evictions, provide clear guidelines and procedures when 
undertaking evictions and enhancing the protection of people threatened with evictions. The 
above reforms are premised on the entrenchment of the right to accessible and adequate 
housing, and the shelter rights of children, in the Constitution as discussed in section 7.3 above. 
The legal reform in the housing sector has been further buttressed by land reforms which have 
led to the adoption of the National Land Policy of 2009 and its attendant Land Act 2012 as well 
as the Land Registration Act 2012. It is believed that the above reforms have the potential to 
respond to most of the housing challenges being experienced in Kenya today. The challenge, 
however, will be to translate precepts into practice. 
The international and national legal provisions discussed above create a plethora of 
obligations for the State in the realisation of the right to adequate housing. These obligations are 
analysed using three different tools: the progressive realisation standard; the tripartite typology; 
and the 4-A’s scheme, an analysis which is extensively undertaken in section 7.5. These 
obligations require the State to undertake a country-wide situational analysis to ascertain the 
housing needs of the differently situated individuals and groups and to adopt a national housing 
strategy aimed at the realisation of the short-, intermediate- and long-term needs of the entire 
populace. It is submitted that for the national strategy to be effective in the realisation of the right 
to housing, it must be entrenched in an extensive legislative, policy and programmatic 
framework aimed at the realisation of the right to housing.313 The strategy must create a 
cooperative and collaborative framework that enables all the institutions of the State, together 
with all societal actors, to work together in an environment of mutual support to enhance the 
realisation of the right to adequate housing, as the government on its own cannot realise the 
right to adequate housing for all. The strategy must thus clearly delineate the role of the different 
State organs in the realisation of the right; provide a clear framework for the role of the private 
sector as well as the possibilities of reliance on the international mechanism of cooperation and 
                                                            
313 A lot of effort has been expended in drafting legislative Bills aimed at developing a comprehensive 
national strategy and framework for the realisation of the right to housing as is discussed more 
elaborately in section 7.3 above. However, the Bills have so far not been enacted into law by Parliament, 
and so the desired legal framework is not operational. The proposal here is that the courts can enhance 
the process of enactment by requiring the State to expedite the Bills and enact them into law so as to 
provide the requisite protection to the many people who are facing housing challenges.  
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assistance to acquire resources for the implementation of the right to housing; put in place clear 
time-lines and benchmarks to enhance the implementation of the strategy; and put in place a 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure scrupulous implementation. Taking into 
account the requirement of public participation as expounded in the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism, the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the 
national housing strategy must be undertaken with the active and substantive participation of all 
sectors of society.  
In discussing the role of the courts in the realisation of the right to adequate housing, this 
chapter, taking into account the theory of dialogical constitutionalism and the integrated 
interpretive approach, commences from the understanding that the primary responsibility for the 
realisation of the right to housing belongs to the political institutions. It thus envisages the courts 
espousing the requisite deference when assessing the viability of the national housing strategy 
or other implementation framework aimed at the realisation of the right to housing. The chapter, 
in section 7.6, delineates the opportunities available to the courts to undertake their facilitative 
role of enhancing dialogue and deliberation in the design, development and implementation of a 
national housing strategy, akin to the concept of “meaningful engagement” that was developed 
by the SACC. Further in assessing State obligations, especially using the progressive 
realisation standard and the tripartite typology tool, it is submitted that the courts are, of 
necessity, required to develop an expansive understanding of the meaning, scope and content 
of the right to housing. This requires that the courts adopt the expansive integrated approach 
developed in chapter five which envisions the courts adopting a strong rights approach, 
including requiring that the implementation framework on the right to housing espouse the 
minimum core content of the right to housing. It further envisages the courts adopting moderate 
remedies that inspire societal deliberation in the realisation of the right to housing and 
establishing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that its decisions are implemented. The courts, 
in undertaking their role, must further espouse a holistic understanding of the Bill of Rights in 
particular, and the Constitution in general, so as to ensure that the right to housing is interpreted 
and enforced taking into account, and balancing, other societal interests protected by other 
rights such as the right to property.  
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Chapter eight: Conclusion and recommendations  
8.1 Introduction 
The major objectives of entrenching justiciable socio-economic rights (SERs) in a constitution is 
to enhance the building of a just, free, equal, democratic and stable society.1 Kenya, in its 2010 
Constitution, has entrenched, for the first time, justiciable SERs with the major aim of realising 
the above-mentioned goals generally. The context of this study is Kenya, with its basis being the 
entrenched SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The main purpose of the study is to set out 
and develop the possible interpretive strategy as well as approaches that could be adopted in 
Kenya to enhance the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs. 
The study is mainly based on a literature survey, with primary and secondary literature being 
analysed, and findings from them applied towards answering the research questions. The study 
sets out to inquire into five main areas, guided by the research questions contained in chapter 
one, and these are: an analysis of the political and socio-economic context of Kenya leading to 
the entrenchment of justiciable SERs; the nature, scope and content of the entrenched SERs; 
the nature, scope, content and extent of Kenya’s national and international SER obligations; the 
ability of the entrenched SERs to achieve their constitutional purpose, that is, substantive 
equality, social justice, dignity and the improvement of the living conditions of all people; the 
approaches to SER interpretation, implementation and enforcement that are capable of 
achieving the above-mentioned constitutional purposes for the entrenchment of justiciable 
SERs; and the probable challenges in the interpretation and implementation of SERs that may 
detract from the achievement of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution.  
This chapter provides a summary of the major findings of the study in section 8.2, and provides 
some recommendations based on the findings of the study in section 8.3. Section 8.4 then 
consists of a few concluding remarks. 
                                                            
1 See DA Desierto ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Comparative powers, roles, and practices in the 
Philippines and South Africa’ (2009) 23, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485555 (accessed on 3 March 2011). 
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8.2. Synopsis of findings 
8.2.1 Poverty, inequality and the endemic socio-economic deprivation in Kenya 
The study found that poverty and inequality are rampant and endemic in Kenya, with the country 
ranking as one of the most unequal countries in the world. Statistical data, as is extensively 
discussed in chapter one, section 1.2, indicates that a high number of people in Kenya, between 
46-56 per cent,2 are living below the poverty line. Data further indicates that the level of poverty 
is increasing despite registered economic growth, and that since the post-election crisis of 2008, 
the poverty headcount has increased by 22 per cent, the measure of severe poverty has gone 
up by a startling 38 per cent, and that in the period between 2009-2010, inequality had 
increased in Kenya by 20 per cent.3 This rise in the levels of poverty and inequality has been 
attributed to factors such as politically instigated ethnic violence, rampant and runaway 
corruption in all sectors of society, global warming and the resultant climate change, the spike in 
prices of oil and other basic commodities, globalisation and skewed international trade 
practices. Chapter one further found that poverty and inequality in Kenya have a political and 
regional tilt, with regions that have previously benefitted from ruling elite practices having better 
poverty and inequality ratios than regions that have not previously featured in the top echelons 
of leadership in the State.  
 Poverty and inequality are intricately linked to socio-economic deprivation due to the 
skewed distribution of production resources, and access to basic social goods and services 
such as education, health, water, food, access to employment as well as political decision-
making power to determine the distribution or redistribution of national wealth. This socio-
economic deprivation leads to an unfair constriction of the life choices of poor people, leading to 
a vicious cycle of exclusion, marginalisation and powerlessness. The analysis of poverty and 
inequality in Kenya thus provides the contextual background for understanding and analysing 
the entrenched SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, as the major aim of their entrenchment 
is the elimination of poverty and inequality, emancipation and empowerment of the poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups, improvement of the living standards of the 
Kenyan people as well as the overall achievement of social justice and democratic governance. 
                                                            
2 Alternative data from non-governmental organisations indicates that this figure is an underestimation of 
the situation by the government and that in reality, about 56-65 per cent of Kenyans are living below the 
poverty line and the number is increasing. See chapter one, section 1.2. 
3 Chapter one, section 1.2. 
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The choices of theoretical and substantive interpretive approaches discussed in the study are 
thus premised on the need for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the 
entrenched SERs so as to meet the above-mentioned transformative aspirations of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution.   
8.2.2 The nature, scope, content and extent of the entrenched socio-economic rights 
i) Nature 
The SERs entrenched in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution are justiciable in nature, meaning that 
they can be enforced through litigation in courts in the same manner as civil and political rights 
(CPRs). In entrenching SERs as justiciable rights, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution has adopted 
the principle of indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of rights, affirming that all 
rights are mutually self-supporting and that the realisation of CPRs depends on the scrupulous 
implementation of SERs and vice-versa.  The importance of the entire corpus of human rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights, of which SERs forms a crucial part, is that they are intended to 
form an integral part of the Kenyan State and provide the framework for the State’s economic, 
social and policies.4 This affirms the integral nature of the entrenched SERs in Kenya’s 
government structures, as they are intended to influence policy and political decision-making at 
all the levels of the State, that is, the national and county levels, as well as in each organ of the 
State. 
However, even though SERs are justiciable and are contained in the same Bill of Rights 
as the CPRs, the obligations arising from the entrenched SERs vary slightly as the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution has primarily adopted the standard of “progressive realisation” in the 
implementation of the rights,5 a standard first entrenched in article 2(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).6 The adoption of the standard 
was basically due to the perception that the implementation of SERs was highly resource-
                                                            
4 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 19(1).  
5 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 21(2) as read with article 20(5). 
6 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976. The other international treaties that have 
adopted the “progressive realisation” standard in the implementation of SERs include, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), article 4; and The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), article 4(1) & (2). An example of a national constitution that has adopted the standard 
in a domestic legal system is the 1996 South African Constitution, sections 25(5), 26 & 27. 
 
 
 
 
430 | P a g e  
 
dependant, a perception that has been discredited with research that indicates that CPRs and 
SERs both contain positive and negative obligations; both require resources to implement; and 
both contain immediate and progressive obligations.7 Due the vagueness of the progressive 
realisation standard and the difficulties in designing indicators to monitor its use in the 
realisation of SERs, the standard has come under serious criticism, with several commentators 
arguing that it is the major reason for the endemic neglect in the realisation of SERs nationally 
and internationally.8 
To help enhance the understanding of the nature of SER obligations arising from the 
standard of “progressive realisation”, the study undertook an analysis of the four interrelated 
components of the standard, which are, progressive realisation, obligation to take steps, 
maximum of the available resources, and international cooperation and assistance. First, the 
progressive realisation component is a recognition that due to resource constraints all the SERs 
cannot be realised immediately.9 It entails an obligation for the State to put in place immediate, 
time-bound steps aimed at the realisation of SERs. The progressive realisation component also 
entails immediate obligations that must be put in place by the State, and they include: non-
discrimination in access to SERs; obligation to realise the minimum core content of substantive 
                                                            
7 For this discussion, see chapter two, section 2.3. 
8 M Dowell-Jones Contextualising the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Assessing the economic deficit (2004) 39; RE Robertson ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation 
to devote the “maximum available resources” to realising economic, social and cultural rights’ (1994) 16 
Human Rights Quarterly 693, at 694; M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: a perspective on its development, revised edition (1998) 151; AR Chapman ‘A “violations 
approach” for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 
Human Rights Quarterly 23; D Harris ‘Comments’ in F Coomans and F Van Hoof (eds.) The right to 
complain about economic, social and cultural rights (1995) 103-06; and, S Leckie ‘Another step towards 
indivisibility: Identifying the key features of violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly  81, at 94. 
9 The study, however, found that in the African Human Rights System, a similar standard, that of 
immediate realisation of rights, applies equally to both CPRs and SERs. For an extensive discussion of 
the SER obligations under the African system, see chapter two, section 2.4. 
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SERs; trade union rights; and, obligation to ensure fair wages and equal remuneration for equal 
work.10  
Secondly, the obligation-to-take-steps component is an immediate obligation, requiring 
ICESCR State Parties to take concrete and targeted steps immediately after ratifying the 
Covenant with the aim of realising their SER obligations. It requires the State to design and 
adopt a comprehensive, time-based as well as financially-backed national strategy 
encompassing legislative, policy and programmatic measures for the realisation of SERs, with 
clear and sufficient objectives, benchmarks and indicators to enhance monitoring and evaluation 
of the same. This component also requires the State to adopt judicial and other effective 
administrative enforcement measures that are practical, accessible, affordable, timely and 
effective in addressing SER violations.11  
Thirdly, the maximum available resources component is a recognition that States are 
differently situated in terms of the amount of resources available for the realisation of SERs. It 
demands prioritisation in the allocation of available resources as well as the efficient and 
accountable use of those resources.12 It not only refers to the budgetary resources available to 
the State, but also requires the State to put measures in place to harness private resources, and 
resources available through the facility of international cooperation and assistance, for the 
realisation of SERs. Resources not only include financial resources, but also include human 
resources, natural resources, technological and informational resources, as well as 
organisational resources. Some commentators, adopting the fiscal space diamond,13 have 
                                                            
10 For a general discussion of the progressive realisation component, see chapter two, section 2.3.1, as 
well as chapter six, section 6.6.1 in relation to the right to food, and chapter seven, section 7.5.1 in 
relation to the right to housing. 
11 For a more complete discussion of obligation to take steps component, see chapter two, section 2.3.2, 
as well as chapter six, section 6.6.1 in relation to the right to food, and chapter seven, section 7.5.1 in 
relation to the right to housing. 
12 The 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 20(5)(b). 
13 The four points of the diamond are: expenditure reprioritisation and efficiency; domestic resource 
mobilisation through taxation and other revenue raising measures; foreign aid grants (Official 
Development Assistance); and deficit financing. See R Balakrishnan et al (Centre for Women’s Global 
Leadership) ‘Maximum available resources and human rights: Analytical report’ (June 2011) 2-4, 
available at http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/publications/marreport.pdf (accessed on 7 February 
2012). 
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called for an expansion of the interpretation of this component to incorporate important sources 
of revenue for the realisation of SERs such as the State’s monetary policies, financial sector 
policy and deficit financing.14 
Lastly, the component of international assistance and cooperation is also an 
acknowledgment that the realisation of SERs may need resources which may not be available 
in some States, and it thus employs the principle of human solidarity in the realisation of SERs. 
It encompasses the extraterritorial obligation of developed States, as individual States and as 
members of international organisations, including the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to provide the requisite development assistance in 
terms of official development assistance (ODA) as well as through technology transfer to 
developing and least developed States to enable them meet their internal SER obligations.15  
ii) Scope 
In analysing the scope of the entrenched SERs, the study, in chapter two, commences with an 
analysis of the place of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system. This analysis is 
prompted by the provisions of article 2(5) and (6) which incorporates internaternational law into 
the Kenyan domestic legal system as being directly applicable in the Kenyan courts as sources 
of law. The Constitution thus incorporates a form of monism in a Commonwealth system that 
has previously adopted a dualist inclination when dealing with international law, requiring that 
enabling legislation be enacted by parliament before a ratified international treaty attains the 
force of law in the Kenyan domestic legal system. The study, however, found that the 
incorporation of international law as a source of law directly applicable by the domestic courts is 
not a strangely Kenyan experience, and has been the practice in the Latin American and 
Eastern European countries emerging from periods of dictatorship and going through the 
processes of democratization, a situation similar to the process of democratisation taking place 
in Kenya presently. 
                                                            
14 For a more complete discussion of the maximum available resources component, see chapter two, 
section 2.3.3, as well as chapter six, section 6.6.1 in relation to the right to food, and chapter seven, 
section 7.5.1 in relation to the right to housing. 
15 The extra-territorial obligations encompass all the three components of the tripartite typology of rights, 
that is the duty to respect, protect and fulfil (promote, facilitate and provide). See generally SI Skogly 
‘Extraterritoriality: universal human rights without universal obligations?’ in S Joseph & A McBeth (eds.) 
Research handbook on international human rights law (2010) 71, at 77ff. 
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The incorporation of international law directly into the Kenyan domestic legal system 
however raises questions as to the hierarchy of the sources of law in Kenya. The study 
undertook a comparative analysis of the practice in two countries with similar provisions 
incorporating international law in domestic legal systems, the United States of America and 
Colombia. The study found that earlier in its development, the jurisprudence of the American 
Supreme Court leaned towards international law, with the then Chief Justice Marshal holding 
that where possible, national law should not be interpreted to contravene international law.16 
However, with the passage of time, there has been a shift towards a nationalistic leaning in 
relation to international law, with the adoption of the system of self-executing and non-self-
executing treaty typologies, with self-executing treaties having direct application in the domestic 
legal system while non-self-executing ones need domesticating legislation for them to have the 
force of law in the domestic jurisdiction. In relation to the hierarchy of sources of law in the 
United States, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, while self-executing treaties and 
federal statutes have equal status as sources of domestic law. In the instances of conflict 
between the self-executing international law and a federal statute, the courts have used the 
“last-in-time” doctrine, which means that the subsequent legal instrument overrides the previous 
legal instrument.  
In contrast to the United States, Colombia has adopted monism in relation to 
international law, giving it prominence in Colombia’s domestic legal system. In this system, 
international law is at the same level as the Constitution and enjoys prominence over conflicting 
domestic law. The important place international law occupies in the Colombian legal system is 
exemplified by its extensive use in the courts in Colombia when deciding cases within the 
domestic jurisdiction, as is discussed more elaborately in chapter two, section 2.2.2.   
The study proposes that Kenya adopts an expansive interpretation of article 2(5) and (6) 
of the Constitution so as to give international law a prominent role in the domestic legal system, 
with the aim of enhancing the achievement of the transformative aspirations of the Constitution. 
This expansive interpretation is in accordance with articles 20(2) and 20(3)(b) of the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution which calls for an adoption of an interpretation of rights that provides for 
the enjoyment of rights to the greatest extent consistent with their nature.  In this vein, the study 
proposes that international law should be at the same level as the Constitution as a source of 
                                                            
16 Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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international law, and should be higher in hierarchy than domestic legislation. This is due to the 
horizontal and vertical constitutional cross-pollination which means that human rights in national 
constitutions have a similar nature, scope and content as those in international law (treaty and 
customary) thus making it nonsensical for them to be hierarchically different.17 Further, to 
enable international law to exert an influence in the interpretation and enforcement of human 
rights at the national level, they must be at the same level or higher than the relevant national 
legal instrument containing rights (be it the constitution or legislation), due to the legal 
positivistic and schematic perspective that a hierarchically inferior norm cannot have an impact 
on the reading of a higher norm.18 
The study thus found that taking into account the direct incorporation of international law 
into the Kenyan domestic legal system, the scope of the obligations of the State arising from 
SERs are not only those contained in the 2010 Constitution or other domestic legislation, but 
must also incorporate those obligations arising from international customary law and 
international treaties ratified by Kenya which contain SERs.  
iii) Content 
The study found that for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the entrenched 
SERs to enhance the achievement of the transformative potential of the 2010 Constitution, both 
the courts and the political institutions of the State must espouse a substantive, dialogical and 
interrelational conception of SERs. This can be better achieved by developing the substantive 
normative content of SERs, taking into account the constitutional values, objectives and 
purposes for which SERs were entrenched in the Constitution; as well as Kenya’s historical and 
contextual situation, especially the endemic poverty and inequality that have resulted in political 
as well as socio-economic vulnerability, exclusion and marginalisation of certain individuals, 
groups and communities.19 The development of the normative content of SERs thus ensures 
that the entrenched SERs have practical effects on the lives of the poor, vulnerable and 
                                                            
17 A Peters ‘Supremacy lost: International law meets domestic constitutional law’ (2009) 3 International 
Constitutional Law Journal 170, at 197. 
18 Peters (n 17 above) 177-181.  
19 This enables the political institutions and the courts to appreciate the lived experiences of people, 
especially in relation to historical injustices, endemic poverty, gross inequality and marginalisation, and to 
design an implementation framework capable of responding to these historical and contextual challenges.  
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marginalised individuals as well as groups in society.20 It also enables the courts to develop 
proper standards of review to scrutinise the State’s SER implementation frameworks. 
 It was also found that for the entrenched SERs to achieve their transformative potential 
and ameliorate the conditions of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups, 
both the political institutions and the courts must espouse and develop the minimum core 
content of SERs. The study undertook an extensive analysis of the minimum core approach and 
its applicability in the Kenyan context, submitting that since Kenya is a State Party to the 
ICESCR and the other international and regional legal instruments that have explicitly adopted 
the minimum core approach,21 it should be bound to adopt and develop the minimum core 
content of the entrenched SERs in good faith taking into account the international law principle 
of pacta sunt servanda.22  Further support for the development of the minimum core content of 
SERs can be gleaned from article 20(2) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution which provides for the 
enjoyment of rights in the Constitution to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the 
rights, and article 20(3)(b) which calls for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the 
enforcement of rights. The adoption of the minimum core approach has the potential to lead to 
the creation of an egalitarian society that provides for everyone’s basic needs, and that protects 
everyone against deprivation. It also enables the State to develop better standards to monitor 
and evaluate programmes aimed at the realisation of SERs, and thus influence political 
decision-making on social programmes and budgetary allocations. 
iv) Extent  
This study proceeded from the premises that SERs, like all the other rights, are not absolute 
and can be legitimately limited by the State in specific circumstances so as to accommodate the 
democratic conflict between entrenched rights and competing social interests. In recognition of 
this non-absolute nature of SERs, the study undertook a limitations analysis in the Kenyan 
domestic legal context, expounding on the general limitations clause contained in article 24 of 
                                                            
20 One of the major criticisms of the reasonableness approach developed by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa is that it fails to develop the content of SERs. For an extensive discussion of this criticisms, 
see chapter five, section 5.3.1. 
21 This proposal is in line with the direct incorporation of international law into the Kenyan legal system in 
accordance with articles 2(5) & (6) of the 2010 Constitution.  
22 For an extensive discussion of the minimum core approach and its applicability to the Kenyan situation, 
see chapter two, section 2.5 and chapter five, section 5.3.2.  
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the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The study found that limitations entail the exercise of public 
power and for it to be legitimate, it must accord with the provisions of article 24 of the 
Constitution, with the underpinning principle being that rights can only be limited in accordance 
with the law, and only to the extent that is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality,23 and freedom; and that limitations should not render 
the rights ineffective or illusory.24  The study proposes that Kenya adopts a two-stage approach 
to the limitations analysis, with the first stage entailing an interpretation and development of the 
meaning, scope and content of the entrenched SERs, and an assessment of whether the 
impugned legislative or executive action impairs or limits the SER in question. It is at this stage 
that an analysis of the internal demarcations/limitations of rights in relation to the available 
resources is undertaken, and the scope and content of the SER in question determined. The 
second stage entails a proportionality test, with an analysis of the reasonableness and 
justification of the limitation being undertaken taking into account the factors enumerated in 
article 24 of the Constitution.25  
8.2.3 The proposed theoretical framework for the interpretation of the entrenched socio-
economic rights 
The theoretical framework proposed in the thesis encompasses the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism as well as the transformative and integrated approach for the interpretation of 
the entrenched SERs. 
i) The theory of dialogical constitutionalism  
The study proposes the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, a theory that acknowledges the 
close link between law and politics as well as democracy and human rights. The theory 
espouses an understanding of constitutional interpretation as a value-laden and dialogical 
exercise that inculcates societal values and principles into the normative content of 
constitutional provisions. It acknowledges that legitimate disagreements on rights are inherent in 
society. It envisions that the resolution of these disagreements should be the responsibility of 
the people as a whole, engaging in a collaborative and cooperative project on the development 
of constitutional meaning undertaken in carefully structured deliberative institutions that 
enhance public participation based on equality and mutual respect, and thus engender a sense 
                                                            
23 2010 Kenyan Constitution, article 24(1). 
24 Limburg Principles, principle 56. 
25 For a more comprehensive discussion, see chapter two, section 2.6.3.  
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of collective self-governance. The study traced the historical and philosophical development of 
the theory of dialogue from the writings on dialogic imagination by Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian 
philosopher and literary scholar, to the writings on conscientisation (critical consciousness) by 
Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator and philosopher. The theory is, however, primarily based on 
the writings of two renowned contemporary scholars, Jürgen Habermas and Frank Michelman.  
  Habermas’s writings on dialogue are based on his reconstructive theory of 
communicative action, from which he develops a theory of discourse based on the capacity of 
societal actors to reach common understanding and to coordinate their actions through 
reasoned argument, consensus as well as cooperation. In this theory, for participants to achieve 
rational consensus, there must be sincerity, truth, normative legitimacy, discursive equality, 
freedom, impartiality and fairness in the dialogical process. Habermas develops a proceduralist 
paradigm of law, which stresses the critical interdependence between private and public 
autonomy, and which acknowledges the importance of socio-economic well-being in the 
realisation of other rights, especially political and democratic rights which entail participation in 
collective self-government as well as public decision-making. The endpoint of Habermas’s 
discourse theory is the emancipation or empowerment of the populace, leading to socio-
economic transformation and the enhancement of social justice, the very objective of the 
entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution.26 
 Michelman, on the other hand, expounds on a conception of dialogic politics which 
demands the unmediated responsibility of the people, through on-going transformative dialogue, 
to undertake public decision-making about the governance of the polity. Michelman envisions 
dialogic politics as a normative activity entailing a contestation over concerns of public value, 
carried out in a deliberative process where reason and persuasion are aimed at achieving the 
common good in the ordering of societal life. This conception of politics is pragmatic and context 
respecting, acknowledging the historical as well as cultural situation of a particular society, and 
espousing these peculiarities to undertake a critical re-examination of the particular society with 
the objective of achieving transformation through interpretation (critical self-revision), internal 
development and re-collective imagination. He emphasises the importance of dialogue in this 
societal transformation, contending that it is only through this inclusive normative dialogue that 
total freedom and political liberty – the achievement of both a government of the people by the 
                                                            
26 For an extensive discussion of Habermas, see chapter three, section 3.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
438 | P a g e  
 
people (democracy and self-rule), and a government of laws and not of men (rule of law and the 
judicial protection of human rights) can be realised.27 
 The study, in chapter three, also undertakes an analysis of the practical use of dialogue 
in three comparative national jurisdictions, that is, the “dialogic metaphor” in Canada, 
“coordinate construction” in the United States, and “meaningful engagement” in South Africa. 
First, dialogic constitutionalism in Canada is based on the understanding of the interaction 
between the courts and the legislature in the context of the judicial review of legislative acts as a 
dialogue. The basis of this conception of dialogue is sections 1 and 33 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which empower the legislature to reverse, modify or avoid the 
decisions of courts which have invalidated legislative or executive action. In this way, it is 
argued that judicial review by the courts is not the final word on constitutional interpretation, 
making it a weak form of review that does not have denigrating effects on the democratic 
aspirations of the majority as espoused by the political institutions.28 Secondly, coordinate 
construction, developed more elaborately in the United States, is based on the reasoning that 
the courts do not have the sole and exclusive responsibility of interpreting the Constitution, and 
that other organs of the State similarly have equal coordinate responsibility to undertake 
constitutional interpretation in the discharging of their constitutional duties. Coordinate 
construction forms an important component of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
fashioned in chapter four which affirms that the primary responsibility for the design, 
development and implementation of a framework for the realisation of the entrenched SERs, a 
task which of necessity involves the interpretation of these rights, belongs properly with the 
political institutions of the State to be accomplished with the requisite participation of all sectors 
of society. Thirdly, meaningful engagement, as a component of constitutional dialogue, has 
been developed and used by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the enforcement of 
entrenched SERs in the 1996 South African Constitution. It is an order of the Court requiring 
parties to litigation to substantively and meaningfully dialogue with each other with the aim of 
reaching amicable and mutually acceptable solutions. These orders always envision the Court 
retaining jurisdiction and scrutinising any agreement emanating from the parties before adopting 
                                                            
27 F Michelman ‘Law’s republic’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 1493, at 1493-1494. For a more 
comprehensive analysis of Michelman’s dialogic politics, see chapter three, section 3.2.2. 
28 This conception of dialogue has been criticised by several commentators, see chapter three, section 
3.3.2 for an analysis of these criticisms.  
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the same as the judgment of the Court.29 The practice in this three jurisdictions forms the basis 
of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism formulated for application in Kenya, as is elaborated 
in chapter four of the study, and is summarised below.  
 The theory of dialogical constitutionalism developed in chapter four envisages the 
development of the meaning of the entrenched SERs at three levels, first, at the political level in 
the development of the legislative, policy and programmatic framework for the implementation of 
the entrenched SERs; secondly, at the level of constitutional litigation in the courts; and thirdly, 
in the fashioning of judicial remedies subsequent to constitutional litigation. The first level of 
dialogue is an affirmation of the principle that the primary responsibility for the implementation of 
entrenched SERs rests on the political institutions of the State, especially the executive and the 
legislature. In undertaking their role, these institutions are expected to design, adopt and 
implement appropriate, effective as well as comprehensive national strategic frameworks, 
especially in the form of relevant legislation, policy and programmes for the realisation of 
SERs.30 Dialogic deliberation, which encompasses the active and equal participation of all the 
sectors of society, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups, must take root at 
this stage to ensure that the resultant frameworks are reflective of the concerns of all sectors of 
society and are aimed at the achievement of the societal common good.  
This first level of dialogue is supported by the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, which 
entrenches the requirement for public participation in decision-making at all levels and in all the 
organs of the State.31  The study proposes that to enhance deliberation in the context of the 
large number of societal actors and the little time within which decisions have to be made, there 
is a need for the design of responsive institutional frameworks, especially within parliament and 
its committees as well as the executive and its ministries, to open up these institutions and 
make them more accessible to the people. It further proposes that to enhance societal dialogue 
in the context of SERs, the Kenyan National Human Rights and Equality Commission can be 
mandated to supplement the deliberative efforts of the executive and the legislature in relation 
to the design, development and implementation of SER implementation frameworks. In this role, 
                                                            
29 For a more substantive discussion of meaningful engagement, see chapter three, section 3.5.  
30 This is in line with the concept of coordinate construction as discussed more broadly in chapter three, 
section 3.4. 
31 For a complete discussion of the provisions of the 2010 Constitution entrenching the requirement of 
public participation in decision-making, see chapter four, section 4.2.1.  
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it is proposed that the duty of the Commission will be to receive draft bills and policy documents 
from the relevant political institutions of the State, meaningfully engage the public on those 
documents through public hearings and submissions, prepare a report with proposed 
amendments to the draft bills or policy documents in accordance with the views resulting from 
the societal dialogue, and then submit the report to the relevant political institution for action. 
The choice of the Commission is due to its comparative advantage as a permanent 
constitutional commission with a human rights mandate, and with the relevant human resources 
capable of undertaking the required duties.32 
The second level of dialogue envisages constitutional litigation as a dialogue, and the 
courts as playing two important roles both as a forum, and as facilitators, of societal dialogue. It 
is based on the reasoning of Peter Häberle that ‘he who has the power of pleading, has the 
power of interpretation’, which basically means that pleadings in constitutional litigation are 
based on particular competing understandings or interpretations of the constitutional provision in 
issue. This understanding of litigation is envisioned by the 2010 Constitution which entitles a 
wide range of parties to institute judicial review proceedings as well as other forms of litigation 
for the vindication of entrenched SERs.33 This enhances the level of societal dialogue as it 
allows societal actors and the courts to participate in the development of a more inclusive 
understanding of the entrenched SERs. The study proposes that at this level, the courts adopt a 
“strong rights approach” which entails a principled, substantive and expansive interpretation of 
the entrenched SERs through the development of their content, including the minimum core 
content. This approach further envisages a restricted application of the limitations to SERs, be it 
through internal limitations or through the article 24 general limitations clause. In the context of 
this “strong rights approach” the study proposes that the courts adopt a two-stage litigational 
approach, where the courts will expound on the nature, scope and content of the rights as well 
as scrutinise the impugned executive or legislative act to determine if it infringes on the right as 
expounded in the first stage. If the courts determine that the impugned act infringes the relevant 
SER, the court then proceeds to the second stage to undertake an analysis of whether the 
infringement is justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
                                                            
32 For a comprehensive comparative analysis of the institutional structure best-placed to enhance 
deliberation in the design and implementation of SER implementation framework, see chapter four, 
section 4.2.2. 
33 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, articles 22 & 258. 
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freedom in accordance with article 24 of the Constitution.34 The study further proposes that 
Kenya adopts a mixed strategy of litigation in SER cases, a strategy that balances the need for 
structural reforms, but which also takes into account the peculiar situation and needs of the 
particular litigants.35  
The third level of dialogue looks at the dialogical remedies and monitoring mechanisms 
that the courts can adopt to enhance the enforcement of orders resulting from litigation. It calls 
on the Kenyan courts to adopt “moderate remedies” which are respectful of the separation of 
powers doctrine and the specific competencies of the political institutions of the State. Some of 
the remedies proposed here include the declaration of rights, declaration of invalidity, especially 
the suspended declaration of invalidity, as well as injunctions such as mandatory and structural 
interdicts. To enhance the effectiveness of remedies, the courts should also retain jurisdiction 
and exercise supervisory powers, especially in structural SER cases, to ensure that court orders 
are implemented by the political institutions. The exercise of supervisory jurisdiction may be 
undertaken either through the issuing of reporting orders, or may involve the courts requiring the 
parties to the litigation and other relevant societal actors to dialogue and meaningfully engage 
with each other with a view of coming up with a mutually satisfactory plan on how to vindicate 
the rights in question, the plan of which is adopted by the courts as the judgment of the court, 
and whose implementation is supervised by the courts to enhance its implementation.36   
In adopting moderate remedies, retaining jurisdiction and undertaking a supervisory 
function, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism fashioned here has effectively responded to 
the inherent challenges to judicial adjudication of SERs, that is, the separation of powers 
concerns as well as the concerns of polycentricity. In advocating the participation of a wide 
section of society in the design of an SER implementation framework as well as in the design of 
judicial remedies, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism ensures that varying societal 
expertise and lived experiences are brought to bear in the processes, with the result that any 
adverse polycentric impact of a judicial remedy is anticipated and dealt with. Further, in retaining 
jurisdiction and exercising supervision, the court retains its mandate to review its judgment 
during its implementation, and in this way it has the capacity to respond to any previously 
                                                            
34 For a more expansive discussion of the two-stage approach, see chapter four, section 4.3.1.  
35 For a more comprehensive discussion of this proposal, see chapter four, section 4.3.2.  
36 For a more expansive discussion of the third level of dialogue, see chapter four, sections 4.4-4.5. 
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unforeseen polycentric challenges.37 On the separation of powers concern with its attendant 
counter-majoritarian dilemma, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism does not envisage the 
courts as the sole, exclusive and ultimate interpreters of the Constitution, but as a forum as well 
as facilitator of societal dialogue and deliberation of constitutional meaning that encompasses 
the combined societal vision and values as expounded by the people as a collective. In this 
way, the theory of dialogical constitutionalism envisages a shared project of constitutional 
design and development that entail the role of all government institutions and societal actors in 
the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the entrenched SERs.38 
ii) The transformative and integrated approach  
The study found that the 2010 Kenyan Constitution can be termed a transformative Constitution 
as it contains all the essential elements required of such a constitution. These elements include: 
the entrenchment of justiciable SERs; the adoption of a substantive and redistributive 
conception of equality; the espousal of positive State duties to combat poverty and inequality as 
well as promote social welfare; the horizontal and vertical application of the Constitution as well 
as the Bill of Rights in both public and private spheres of society; the entrenchment of a 
requirement that the government be based on a democratic and participatory ethos; the 
envisioning of multi-culturalism; the entrenchment of historical self-consciousness; as well as 
the envisioning of transformative adjudication, that is, the creation of a new role and 
responsibilities for the judiciary through the transformation of adjudicative processes and 
methods.39 In order to achieve the transformative aspirations of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, 
the study proposes that Kenya adopts a transformative and integrated approach to SER 
adjudication, an approach that is principled, purposive as well as progressive, and which is 
aimed at developing the substantive content of the entrenched SERs.  
 The transformative and integrated approach proposed in the study finds its basis in the 
2010 Kenyan Constitution, especially article 20 which provides that any approach adopted in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights must not only promote the values underlying an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom; but must also 
                                                            
37 For a more substantive elaboration, see chapter four, section 4.6.1.  
38 For a more substantive elaboration, see chapter four, section 4.6.2. 
39 K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 146, at 154-156. For a more comprehensive analysis of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution as a 
transformative constitution, see chapter five, section 5.2. 
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promote the spirit,40 purport41 and objects of the Bill of Rights. Further, article 20(3)(b) of the 
Constitution requires the courts to adopt an interpretation that most favours the implementation 
and enforcement of rights.  
 The transformative and integrated approach proposed here is two-tiered, and it is not 
only aimed at giving content to SERs, but also the promotion of societal dialogue and public 
participation in the design, development, interpretation as well as enforcement of SERs in 
accordance with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism proposed in this study. The first-tier of 
the approach calls for the development of the substantive content of the entrenched SERs, 
including the basic minimum essentials for a dignified life, through the adoption of the 
progressive aspects of the minimum core approach developed by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). This development of the content of SERs must be 
undertaken by the political institutions of the State, with the mandatory and active participation 
of all sectors of society, in the design, development and implementation of the State’s 
legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks for the realisation of SERs. The content, as 
developed by the political institutions, will then be subject to improvements by the courts during 
adjudication as SER cases are litigated. The study avers that the advantage of an elaboration of 
the minimum core by the political institutions with the substantive participation of the people in a 
deliberative process is that it ensures that the meaning, content and scope of the rights are not 
permanent, but remain contingent and incomplete so as to allow for their evolution to meet 
emerging societal contexts as well as new forms of injustices. 
 The second tier of the transformative and integrated approach envisages the courts 
adopting an expansive reasonableness approach during SER adjudication to scrutinise and 
assess the State’s legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks developed by the political 
                                                            
40 The spirit of the Bill of Rights can be gleaned from article 20(2) which provides that “every person shall 
enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the greatest extent consistent with the 
nature of the rights or fundamental freedoms”. This calls for an expansive and generous interpretation of 
rights, and with regard to SERs, that they are given content as far as possible to enable them to achieve 
their desired goals and objectives.  
41 The purpose of the Bill of Rights is provided for in article 19(2) of the Constitution and it provides that 
“the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the 
dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of 
all human beings”. 
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institutions as stated above. The first level of analysis using the expansive reasonableness 
approach entails an inquiry as to whether the State’s SER implementation framework has made 
provision for the basic minimum essentials for a dignified life (minimum core content) to cater for 
the socio-economic needs of the most vulnerable in society. If the implementation framework 
fails to provide for the minimum essentials in the first instance, then the courts should, in the 
absense of any substantive countervailing reasons, hold it as being per se unreasonable. 
However, if the courts are satisfied that the implementation framework has sufficiently provided 
for the minimum core content of the entrenched SERs, they should then proceed to the second 
level of analysis which entails assessing the implementation framework using the 
reasonableness benchmarks set by the Constitutional Court of South Africa as is enumerated in 
chapter five, section 5.3.1.  
 The transformative and integrated approach is, therefore, a strong rights-based 
approach adopting the best of the minimum core and the reasonableness approaches to SER 
interpretation and implementation with the purpose of ensuring that the constitutionally 
entrenched SERs achieve their true potential in alleviating human suffering, eradicating poverty 
as well as reducing the gap between the rich and the poor. It is also sensitive to democratic 
legitimacy requirements as it inculcates a collaborative cooperation between the judiciary and 
the other levels of government, acknowledges the limits of judicial competence, and is thus 
responsive to the separation of powers concerns.  
8.2.4 The right to food 
The study found that Kenya is a food insecure country and that hunger and malnutrition are 
endemic concerns that have straddled the country for a long time. This was affirmed by the 
President of the Republic, Mwai Kibaki, who, in January 2009 declared food insecurity a 
national emergency. To respond to the situation, the study proposes that Kenya should adopt a 
comprehensive and holistic rights-based livelihoods approach to food security, which takes into 
account the interrelatedness of rights as well as varying household entitlements of different 
sectors of society. This proposal is based on the provisions of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
which entrenches the right to food and other related rights as justiciable rights, and also 
incorporates international law, which provides extensively for the right to food, into the Kenyan 
domestic legal system. Taking into account this rights-based livelihoods approach, the study 
develops the content of the right to food, stating that the right two components, the maximal 
component requiring that food be of such quantity and quality to facilitate a normal, active 
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existence, be free from adverse substances, be acceptable within a given culture, and also be 
accessible in a sustainable way. The minimalist component, which is the minimum core content 
of the right to food, is the right to be free from hunger.  
 In an effort to enhance the realisation of the right to food, Kenya has developed a Draft 
National Food and Nutrition Security Policy 2011, which encompasses a life-cycle approach to 
food security with the aim of enhancing availability and access to adequate food of nutritional 
quality to all Kenyans.  The policy aims to improve nutritional education for all sectors of society, 
establish early warning systems to detect threats to food security, and advocates the 
establishment of innovative response mechanisms such as transfer-based entitlements, cash 
transfers, public works programmes, input support, livelihood restoration as well as livestock 
management programmes. It envisages the development of a comprehensive and coordinated 
legal framework for the enhancement of food security as well as the establishment of an 
adequate structural framework for the coordination of all efforts geared towards the realisation 
of food security. It further espouses the commitment of the State to avail resources through its 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework to enhance the realisation of the goals contained in the 
Policy.  
 Despite its progressive nature, the Policy has several shortcomings. First, it does not 
adopt the right to food language, and thus detracts from an understanding of food as an 
entitlement and not a charity, the premise on which the rights-based livelihoods approach is 
based. Secondly, the Policy has failed to adopt the minimum core approach to the right to food. 
Thirdly, the Policy was developed using the top-down approach to policy formulation and 
development, and thus did not sufficiently incorporate the voices of the most vulnerable and 
marginalised individuals and groups. Fourthly, the Policy failed to provide a clear time-frame 
within which the programmes incorporated therein are to be developed and operationalised. 
Finally, the Policy fails to set clear and verifiable indicators and benchmarks for the monitoring 
and evaluation of its implementation. Since the Policy has not yet been adopted by the Cabinet, 
the study proposes that the Policy be amended to adopt a holistic rights-based livelihoods 
approach taking into account people’s varying food entitlements as well as the interrelation 
between the realisation of the right to food to the other rights, both CPRs and SERs as is 
discussed more comprehensively in chapter six, section 6.4.3.  
The study found that the courts have a prominent role to play in the realisation of the 
right to food, as it has been entrenched in the 2010 Constitution as a justiciable right. The courts 
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thus have a role, both as a forum and as facilitators of dialogue in accordance with the second 
and third levels of the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, to guide the political institutions of 
the State and other sectors of society in the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of 
the right to food. In doing this, it is proposed that the courts should adopt the transformative and 
integrated approach developed in the study so as to enhance the realisation of the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution in relation to food security, which are, eliminating 
hunger, improving the living standard of the Kenyan people, achieving social justice, and 
ultimately ensuring sustainable development. 
8.2.5 The right to housing  
In relation to housing rights, the study found that housing plays a prominent role in enhancing 
human dignity and the realisation of other human rights, both CPRs and SERs. Access to 
adequate housing and proper sanitation, however, remains a daunting challenge for the majority 
of Kenyans in both rural and urban areas. The Kenyan government has attributed the housing 
challenge, especially in urban informal settlements, to the following challenges: the deficit in 
housing supply due to poverty, rural urban migration and population growth; the inability of the 
market economy to cater for low-cost housing to respond to the housing needs of the majority 
low income groups; failure to prioritise the housing sector in the general economic development 
plans; prohibitive building standards and regulatory requirements making housing construction 
unaffordable to the low income sectors of society; lack of adequate land policy leading to 
insecure tenure, land grabbing, forced evictions as well as land holding for speculative 
purposes; poor urban governance leading to non-provision of essential services; and the 
politicisation of development.42 
 In reaction to these challenges, Kenya has, for the first time, entrenched the right to 
housing in the 2010 Constitution and has undertaken several efforts to reform old laws, as well 
as enact new ones, so as to enhance the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 
2010 Constitution. The legislative efforts commenced with the adoption in 2004 of the National 
Housing Policy, which was aimed at responding to the housing challenges by bridging the 
shortfall in housing stock resulting from increased demand caused by population explosion, 
rapid urbanisation, widespread poverty, and escalating costs of housing. The policy forms the 
                                                            
42 See Government of Kenya and the United Nations Habitat ‘Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project – 
2004’ available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021262.pdf (accessed 
on 19 September 2012).  
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basis of the Tenant and Landlord Bill 2007, the Housing Bill 2011 and the Evictions and 
Resettlement Procedure Bill 2012. The Tenant and Landlord Bill is set to replace the archaic 
Rent Restriction Act of 1982, which has failed to protect tenants from arbitrary rent increases, 
with the aim of simplifying and modernising laws relating to the renting of residential premises, 
the regulation of landlord and tenant relationships so as to enhance stability in the rental 
housing sector, and to protect tenants from unlawful rent increases as well as unlawful forced 
evictions.43  
The Housing Bill 2011, on the other hand is set to replace the Housing Act 1990, which had 
not adopted a rights-based approach to the realisation of housing needs. The Housing Bill 
adopts the language of rights, proposes the establishment of a National Housing Authority, the 
appointment of a Commissioner of Housing, and the Establishment of a National Housing 
Development Fund for the provision of the right to accessible and adequate housing as 
entrenched in the 2010 Constitution.44 The guiding principles of the Bill includes an affirmation 
of housing as key to economic and social development; an adoption of the language of 
progressive realisation of housing rights; facilitation as well as provision of adequate housing, 
including social housing; the recognition of the private sector as the engine in housing 
development and the government as a facilitator, enabler and catalyst in housing development; 
and the facilitation of access to land and security of tenure for housing.45 To complement the 
extensive provisions in the Housing Bill, efforts are being made to put in place an evictions 
regulation regime, starting with the development of the Evictions and Resettlement Guidelines46 
as well as the drafting of the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012, with the aim of 
providing protection, prevention and redress in instances of forced evictions for all persons 
including unlawful occupiers and squatters.47 If enacted and effectively implemented, the Tenant 
and Landlord Bill, the Housing Bill and the Evictions Bill have the potential to respond to most of 
the housing challenges being experienced in Kenya today. The challenge, however, will be to 
translate precepts into practice. 
                                                            
43 The Landlord and Tenant Bill 2007, preamble & part III. 
44 The Housing Bill, November 2011, preamble and sections 4-10, 14-16 & 49.  
45 Housing Bill, section 3. 
46 Ministry of Lands, Evictions and Resettlement Guidelines, Final Edited Version, March 2011 (on file 
with author). 
47 Evictions Bill 2012, preamble. 
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As has been discussed in section 8.2.5 above in relation to the right to food, the courts also 
have a prominent role to play in the realisation of the right to housing. The study found that one 
of the major challenges to the realisation of housing needs is a lack of public participation as 
well as the insufficient relay of relevant information to the population affected by the 
government’s legislative, policy and programmatic framework on housing. In its role as a 
facilitator of dialogue, and in accordance with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism 
developed in this thesis, the courts can ensure accountability of the political institutions of the 
State in the development and implementation of a national housing strategy and legal 
framework for the realisation of their obligation to respect, protect and fulfil SERs through the 
adoption of innovative, effective and progressive remedies.48 The courts can also undertake a 
more active role in protecting people from forced eviction using the eviction guidelines that have 
been developed both at the international level (CESCR General Comment Number 7 and the 
UN Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement) and that 
are still being developed at the national level (Evictions and Resettlement Guidelines, Final 
Edited Version, March 2011 and the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012).  
Though adjudication plays an important role in the realisation of the right to housing, the 
study found that it is faced with the challenge of the need to reconcile the right to housing and 
the right to property, two apparently conflicting constitutional provisions. International and 
comparative law indicates that there has been a progressive shift towards the protection of 
housing rights at the expense of the protection of property rights, with the argument being that in 
instances of conflict between the two rights, the public interest of securing housing rights trumps 
property rights.49 The South African Constitutional Court has, however, taken a more nuanced 
approach to this conflict, developing a ‘constitutional matrix’ which states the non-absolute 
                                                            
48 For a discussion of some of the innovative and dialogical remedies that can be adopted by the courts, 
see chapter four, section 4.4. 
49 UN Housing Rights Programme (UNHRP) Report No. 1 ‘Housing rights legislation: Review of 
international and national legal instruments’ (2002) 16, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HousingRightsen.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2012); 
Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Housing: Second progress report submitted by Mr. 
Rajindar Sachar, Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/20 (June 1994) paras. 67-76, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1994.20 (accessed on 26 
September 2012); former European Commission on Human Rights case of Case of Z. and E. v Austria, 
App. No. 10153/82.  
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nature of property rights and envisages its limitation to enhance the public interest.50 The SACC 
held that in this context:51  
The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between 
the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership 
over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather, it is to balance out and 
reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests 
involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case. 
The role of the court in the context of this conflict is thus ‘to balance competing interests in a 
principled way and to promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good 
neighbourliness and shared concern’.52 This nuanced approach is in line with the relational and 
dialogic conception of rights expounded in this thesis and should be adopted by the courts to 
surmount any challenges to the realisation of housing rights due to its apparent conflict with 
property rights.  
8.3 Recommendations 
Several recommendations to different sectors of society follow from the findings and discussion 
in this study. First, it is recommended that Kenya as a nation adopts the theory of dialogical 
constitutionalism proposed in this thesis for the interpretation, implementation and enforcement 
of the entrenched SERs. As has been discussed above, this theory has the potential to enhance 
the development of an inclusive and comprehensive legislative, policy and programmatic 
framework for the realisation of SERs as it entails the participation of all sectors of society, with 
the result that all sectors of society will work in collaboration and cooperation to ensure that the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution envisaged by the entrenchment of SERs is 
achieved. In conjunction with the theory of dialogical constitutionalism, this study further 
recommends that the Kenyan courts also adopt the transformative and integrated approach to 
SER interpretation and enforcement as discussed in section 8.2.4 above. 
Secondly, and in line with the first recommendation above, it is recommended that in 
undertaking a limitations analysis in accordance with article 24(1) of the 2010 Constitution, the 
                                                            
50 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (CCT 53/03) 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), para. 16. 
51 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 23.  
52 Port Elizabeth Municipality, para. 37. 
 
 
 
 
450 | P a g e  
 
courts should adopt a two-stage approach as is discussed more broadly in chapter two, section 
2.6.3 of this thesis. This will ensure that the courts are able to undertake stricter scrutiny and 
review of all legislative and executive action limiting rights, with the results that SERs are better 
protected and more widely enjoyed by the Kenyan people. They should refrain from adopting 
the contrary practice of the South African Constitutional Court which has failed to develop the 
content of rights, leading to the collapse of the limitations analysis of SERs into a one-stage 
test, with the consequence that the underlying constitutional values, objectives and purposes 
underpinning the SERs, as well as the historical and contextual situation of poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups are not brought to bear on the limitations analysis.  
Lastly, the study recommends that Kenya embraces a fundamental shift in the legal 
culture from the prevailing conservative and formalistic culture to a more substantive and 
progressive culture to enhance the realisation of the transformative aspirations of the 2010 
Constitution. This can be achieved through the transformation of legal education and advocates 
training curriculae so as to accord with and espouse the transformative underpinnings of the 
Constitution. In this context, it is proposed that Kenyan Law Faculties, the Kenya School of Law 
and the Law Society of Kenya through its Continuous Legal Education Programme adopt what 
was termed by Geo Quinot as “transformative legal education” the components of which 
include: adjustment of law curricula to reflect the new paradigm of constitutional supremacy; 
increased emphasis on fundamental rights and judicial review in law curricula; infusion of 
constitutional values into established areas of law, especially the private law subjects of 
property, torts and contracts so as to develop the common law; inculcation of substantive 
reasoning (innovation and creativity) among students and lawyers with increased engagement 
with both legal and extra-legal materials such as context, values, morality, policy and politics; 
development of an interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach to legal education; and the 
transformation of teaching methodology from the pedagogy of authority to the pedagogy of 
dialogue and justification.53 This has the potential of improving substantive legal reasoning and 
transforming the legal culture in Kenya from formalistic and conservative to substantive and 
                                                            
53 G Quinot ‘Transformative legal education’ (September 2011) 5ff, available at 
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/teaching/files/2011/10/G-Quinot-Inaugural-Final2.pdf (accessed on 7 October 
2012). 
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progressive, and in this way enhance transformative adjudication capable of achieving the 
transformative as well as egalitarian aspirations of the Constitution.54  
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
As has been elaborated in this thesis, challenges to the realisation of SERs abound both at the 
national and international level. In the Kenyan context, these challenges are exacerbated by the 
high poverty and inequality that is subsisting in Kenya today, as well as the general apathy 
towards the protection of human rights by both the political and the judicial institutions of the 
State.55  Judicial apathy has further been exercabated by the conservative and formalistic legal 
culture subsisting in Kenya presently both among the judges, litigating advocates and even legal 
commentators.  However, with the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and the reforms that 
are being undertaken in the judiciary, the judicial attitude towards the protection of human rights 
is slowly improving, and this is clearly illustrated in some of the cases, especially in relation to 
SERs, that have been discussed in the thesis.56 It is in this context that the thesis elaborates a 
modest theoretical and interpretive approach to enhance the realisation of the entrenched SERs 
in the Kenyan context by both the political and the judicial institutions of the State. Though not a 
perfect solution to all the challenges that bedevil the realisation of SERs, it is hoped that this 
thesis will go a long way in alleviating some of the challenges facing the adjudication of SERs, 
and in that vein, help enhance human dignity, the standards of living of the Kenyan people as 
well as ensuring social transformation with the aim of achieving social justice for all Kenyans. 
                                                            
54 For a more comprehensive discussion of this aspects, see chapter five, section 5.2.2. 
55 For an elaboration of judicial apathy in the protection of human rights, see J Arwa ‘Litigating socio-
economic rights in domestic courts: The Kenyan experience’ A paper presented at The Colloquium on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights held in Cape Town South Africa from 7 – 10 November 
2012, 10ff, available at http://kelinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/LITIGATING-SOCIO-
ECONOMIC-RIGHTS-3.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013). 
56 Some of these cases include: Satrose Ayuma and others (on behalf of Muthurwa residents) v Kenya 
Railways Staff Benefit Scheme and others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 65 of 2010 
(Muthurwa case); Susan Waithera Kariuki and others v The Town Clerk, Nairobi City Council and others, 
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition case No. 66 of 2010 (Waithera case); and, John Kabui Mwai & 3 
Others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 Others, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition No. 15 
of 2011, available at http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/83548.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2013). 
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